From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Texas Division-Tranter Inc. v. Carrozza

Supreme Court of Texas
Jun 15, 1994
876 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1994)

Summary

holding that summary judgment was appropriate in a workers' compensation retaliation case where the plaintiff failed to produce direct or circumstantial evidence to call into question the defendant's explanation for terminating the plaintiff's employment

Summary of this case from Almeida v. Bio-Medical Applications of Tex., Inc.

Opinion

No. 94-0234.

May 11, 1994. Rehearing Overruled June 15, 1994.

Appeal from 89th District Court, Wichita County, Temple Driver, J.

Charles B. Russell, Wichita Falls, for petitioner.

Holly Crampton, Wichita Falls, for respondent.


The question presented in this case is whether an employer is entitled to summary judgment in a retaliatory discharge action brought under the Workers' Compensation Law when a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the discharge is established and the employee fails to produce any evidence of retaliatory motive. The trial court granted summary judgment, and the court of appeals reversed. 876 S.W.2d 173. We reverse the court of appeals.

Mark Carrozza, an employee of Texas Division-Tranter, Inc., was injured on the job and received compensation benefits and medical leave. After he recovered, Carrozza did not report to work the day he was scheduled to return or the next several days. Carrozza did not inform Tranter before or during his absence that he would not be reporting to work as scheduled. Consequently, Tranter terminated Carrozza for violating the "three-day rule" in its collective bargaining agreement. This rule calls for the mandatory termination of any employee who, failing special circumstances, is absent three consecutive work days without receiving permission beforehand, or giving notice during those three days. Carrozza filed a grievance with his union and sought arbitration. After a hearing, the arbitrator denied Carrozza's grievance, finding that he had been properly terminated. Carrozza then sued Tranter for discharging him in retaliation for having made a compensation claim, as prohibited by TEX. LABOR CODE Sec. 451.001 (formerly TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 8307c). Tranter moved for and was granted summary judgment.

Tranter's summary judgment evidence included affidavits of supervisory and administrative personnel to the effect that Carrozza's termination was unrelated to his compensation claim, and that he was terminated solely for violating the three-day rule. Uniform enforcement of a reasonable absence-control provision, like the three-day rule in this case, does not constitute retaliatory discharge. See Palmer v. Miller Brewing Co., 852 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1993, writ denied); Parham v. Carrier Corp., 9 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 1993); Unida v. Levi Strauss Co., 986 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1993); Swearingen v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 968 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1992). Tranter's affidavits, although from interested witnesses, were clear, positive and direct, otherwise credible and free from contradictions and inconsistencies, as required by TEX.R.CIV.P. 166a(c). They could also have been readily controverted, as that rule also requires, by evidence of facts and circumstances belying Tranter's neutral explanation and thereby raising a material issue of fact. Carrozza, however, offered no evidence challenging Tranter's explanation that he was terminated solely for violating the three-day rule. Absent such controverting evidence, summary judgment based upon Tranter's affidavits was proper. Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 571 (Tex. 1989).

Carrozza did not deny that he violated the three-day rule, but averred in his own affidavit only the following:

I, in good faith, believe that I was terminated from Trantor [sic], Inc. because I filed a Worker's Compensation claim against the company.

I know of other people who used to be employees of Trantor who were also fired because they made Worker's Compensation claims.

I believe that I was a good employee and that no other legitimate reason for my termination existed.

I had been an employee of Trantor for thirteen years.

Carrozza's subjective beliefs are no more than conclusions and are not competent summary judgment evidence. See Brownlee v. Brownlee, 665 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex. 1984); Hidalgo v. Surety Sav. Loan Ass'n, 487 S.W.2d 702, 703 (Tex. 1972). Carrozza's assertion that other employees were wrongfully terminated, if relevant, is also conclusory and fails to indicate the basis of Carrozza's knowledge. See Mercer v. Daoran Corp., 676 S.W.2d 580, 583 (Tex. 1984) and Radio Station KSCS v. Jennings, 750 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1988). Carrozza offered no evidence, either circumstantial or direct, which would call into question Tranter's explanation that the termination was the result of non-discriminatory application of the three-day rule. Under these circumstances, the trial court properly found that Tranter established its right to summary judgment.

Accordingly, a majority of the Court grants Tranter's application for writ of error and, without hearing oral argument, reverses the judgment of the court of appeals and renders judgment that Carrozza take nothing against Tranter. TEX.R.APP.P. 170.


Summaries of

Texas Division-Tranter Inc. v. Carrozza

Supreme Court of Texas
Jun 15, 1994
876 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1994)

holding that summary judgment was appropriate in a workers' compensation retaliation case where the plaintiff failed to produce direct or circumstantial evidence to call into question the defendant's explanation for terminating the plaintiff's employment

Summary of this case from Almeida v. Bio-Medical Applications of Tex., Inc.

holding that terminated employee's affidavit, stating his belief that he and other employees had been terminated because they filed worker's compensation claims against the employer, was conclusory for failing to state a basis for this knowledge and thus not competent summary judgment evidence to raise a fact issue on retaliatory motive

Summary of this case from Sanchez v. Krogers

holding that conclusory statements are not competent summary judgment evidence

Summary of this case from Noble v. S.W. P.S. Co.

holding that plaintiff's statement of his subjective beliefs will not support motion for summary judgment

Summary of this case from World Help v. Leisure Lifestyles

holding that an employee's subjective beliefs are conclusions and do not raise a fact issue precluding summary judgment in a retaliatory discharge action

Summary of this case from Urquidi v. Phelps Dodge Refining

holding that an employer is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law when the employee fails to make this prima facie showing and the employer advances a legitimate reason for the employee's discharge

Summary of this case from Hogue v. Blue Bell Creameries, L.P.

affirming summary judgment by reasoning that the employee had "offered no evidence, either circumstantial or direct, which would call into question [the employer]'s explanation that the termination was the result of nondiscriminatory application of [the employer's policy]"

Summary of this case from Gutierrez v. Contract Frt.

recognizing in a summary judgment disposition that evidence contradicting uniform enforcement creates an issue of material fact

Summary of this case from Kingsaire, Inc. v. Melendez

In Texas Division-Tranter, Inc. v. Carrozza, 876 S.W.2d 312, 313 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam), we held that "[u]niform enforcement of a reasonable absence-control provision, like the three-day rule in this case, does not constitute retaliatory discharge."

Summary of this case from Continental Coffee Products Co. v. Cazarez

referring to claims under section 451.001 as "retaliatory discharge" claims

Summary of this case from Kinabrew v. Inergy Propane, LLC

stating "I believe" does not raise a fact issue

Summary of this case from Martin v. McDonnold

In Tex. Div.-Tranter, Inc. v. Carrozza, 876 S.W.2d 312, 313 (Tex. 1994), the Texas Supreme Court held affidavits of interested witnesses could be used to present evidence of a nonretaliatory reason for termination as long as the affidavits complied with Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c). Accord Trico Techs. Corp., 949 S.W.2d at 310.

Summary of this case from Chhim v. Univ. of Houston

In Texas Div.-Tranter, Inc. v. Carrozza, 876 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1994), in response to an employee's action under Section 451.001(1), defendant-employer's summary judgment evidence included affidavits of supervisory and administrative personnel to the effect that plaintiff-employee's termination was prompted by application of a "three-day rule," i.e., mandatory termination of an employee who, without special circumstances, was absent three consecutive days without receiving permission or giving notice.

Summary of this case from Fenley v. Mrs. Baird's Bakeries, Inc.

requiring more than plaintiff's subjective belief of retaliation to establish casual connection

Summary of this case from Porterfield v. Galen Hosp
Case details for

Texas Division-Tranter Inc. v. Carrozza

Case Details

Full title:TEXAS DIVISION-TRANTER, INC., Petitioner, v. Mark CARROZZA, Respondent

Court:Supreme Court of Texas

Date published: Jun 15, 1994

Citations

876 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1994)
9 IER Cas. 878

Citing Cases

Williams v. Corpus Christi Indep.

However, we conclude that Flores's statement is merely conclusory and not competent summary judgment…

Larsen v. Santa Fe Independent School District

An employer who terminates an employee pursuant to the uniform enforcement of a reasonable absence control…