Opinion
Case No. 3:10-cv-342
08-03-2011
LARRY SWICKARD, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant,
Judge
DECISION AND ENTRY: (1) THE ALJ'S NON-DISABILITY FINDING IS
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND IS AFFIRMED; AND
(2) THIS CASE IS CLOSED
This is a Social Security disability benefits appeal. At issue is whether the administrative law judge ("ALJ") erred in finding Plaintiff "not disabled" and therefore not entitled to disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). (See Administrative Transcript ("Tr.") 16-26).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on February 11, 2005, alleging that he became disabled on December 8, 2004, due to multifarious back problems, depression, and anxiety. (Tr. 16, 19). The application was denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 45, 49). Plaintiff timely filed for a de novo review of his claims and received a hearing on the matter on August 26, 2008, before ALJ Daniel R. Shell. (Tr. 51, 16). Plaintiff, represented by counsel, and a vocational expert appeared and testified. (Tr. 16).
On October 17, 2008, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled and therefore not entitled to benefits. (Tr. 16-26). Plaintiff sought review by the Appeals Council, which denied his request on July 7, 2010, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 4-7). Plaintiff subsequently brought this action in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision denying his DIB.
The ALJ's "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law," which represent the rationale of his decision, were as follows:
1. The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on December 31, 2005.
2. The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from his alleged onset date of December 8, 2004 through his date last insured of December 31, 2005 (20 CFR 404.1520(b) and 404.1571 et seq.).
3. Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following severe impairments: degenerative joint disease of the lumbosacral spine; degenerative [disc] disease of the lumbosacral spine; the residuals of a two-level lumbar fusion; depressive disorder; and anxiety disorder (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).
4. Through the date last insured, the claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).
5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that, through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c). Giving the claimant the full benefit of doubt, it is found that he was limited to jobs that would not require climbing. He was further limited to jobs that would not have required repetitive twisting or bending. All other posturals could have been performed on an occasional basis. He was further limited to low stress work, which in this case is defined as no direct dealing with
the public, no production quotas, and no close or "over-the-shoulder" supervision.
6. Through the date last insured, the claimant was unable to perform past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565).
7. The claimant was born on October 5, 1995[,] and was 50 years old, which is defined as an individual closely approaching advanced age, on the date last insured (20 CFR 404.1563).
8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564).
9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is "not disabled," whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).
10. Through the date[] last insured, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could have performed (20 CFR 404.1560(c) and 404.1566).
11. The claimant was not under a disability as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time from December 8, 2004, the alleged onset date, through December 31,2005, the date last insured (20 CFR 404.1520(g)).
Plaintiff makes two arguments on appeal: (1) that the ALJ failed to assess properly the weight due the opinions of Plaintiff s treating psychiatrist and psychologist; and (2) that the ALJ erred in not considering the impact of Plaintiff s mental impairment on his experience of pain. Each assignment of error will be addressed in turn.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The Court's task on appeal is two-fold: to determine whether the ALJ employed the correct legal criteria in reaching his decision and to determine whether the ALJ's non-disability finding is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Bowen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec, 478 F.3d 742, 745-46 (6th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). In this task, the Court considers the record as a whole. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978). If substantial evidence supports the ALJ's denial of benefits, that finding must be affirmed, even if substantial evidence also exists in the record upon which the ALJ could have found plaintiff disabled. As the Sixth Circuit has explained:
The Commissioner's findings are not subject to reversal merely because substantial evidence exists in the record to support a different conclusion. The substantial evidence standard presupposes that there is a "zone of choice" within which the Commissioner may proceed without interference from the courts. If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court must affirm.Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994).
The ALJ must also apply the correct legal standards and follow the Commissioner's regulations in coming to a decision. Failing to employ the correct legal criteria will typically result in reversal, even when the ALJ's opinion is otherwise supported by substantial evidence. Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746.
The claimant bears the ultimate burden to prove by sufficient evidence that he is entitled to DIB. 20 CFR § 404.1512. Plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to show that, during the relevant time period, he was unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
A. First Assignment of Error
For his first assignment of error, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in assessing the weight to be accorded the opinions of his treating psychiatrist and psychologist. Specifically, Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ's reasoning for declining to give their opinions controlling weight was scant, and, more to the point, that the ALJ did not subsequently determine whether their opinions nonetheless deserved some deference, as required by the regulations.
The ALJ must weigh a treating physician's opinion in accordance with 20 CFR § 404.1527. In general, the opinion of a treating physician is given greater weight than that of a non-treating physician. 20 CFR § 404.1527(d)(1). This is because treating physicians:
are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [the claimant's] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.20 CFR § 404.1527(d)(2).
The ALJ must give controlling weight to a treating physician's opinion if he finds it "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques" and "not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record." Id. If the opinion does not meet these requirements, however, the ALJ's task is not complete; as Plaintiff notes, the ALJ must still determine the ultimate weight the opinion deserves by applying certain factors found in 20 CFR § 404.1527(d)(2)-(6), namely: the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; the extent of the treatment relationship; the nature and extent of the relevant evidence that the treating physician presents supporting his opinion; the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; the treating physician's specialization; and any other factor the claimant presents that tends to support or contradict the opinion.
In addition, an ALJ's decision denying benefits "must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the treating source's medical opinion, supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight." Soc. Sec. R. 96-2p. This rule compels an ALJ to explain his decision to a lay claimant who may not understand why he is being denied disability when his own doctor believes his to be disabled. Wilson v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec, 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004). It also "ensures that the ALJ applies the treating physician rule and permits meaningful appellate review of the ALJ's application of the rule." Id.
It is a basic principle of administrative law that an agency must follow its own regulations. Id. at 545.
Because of the significance of the notice requirement in ensuring that each denied claimant receives fair process, a failure to follow the procedural requirement of identifying the reasons for discounting the opinions and for explaining precisely how those reasons affected the weight accorded the opinions denotes a lack of substantial evidence, even where the conclusion of the ALJ may be justified based upon the record.Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec, 486 F.3d 234, 242-3 (6th Cir. 2007). "Consistent with this principle, courts have remanded the Commissioner's decisions when they have failed to articulate "good reasons" for not crediting the opinion of a treating source, as [20 CFR § 404.1527(d)(2)] requires." Wilson at 545.
In the case at bar, the ALJ cited the proper legal criteria in assessing whether the opinions of Dr. Papadakis, Plaintiff's treating psychologist, and Dr. Walters, his treating psychiatrist, deserved controlling weight. (Tr. 22). The ALJ correctly stated that both doctors believed that Plaintiff's mental limitations were sufficiently severe. (Tr. 508, 511). Yet the ALJ dismissed their opinions because they were not "supported by the treatment notes of record," and because they were offered "several years after the date that [Plaintiff] last met the special earnings requirements of the Act, and therefore lack[ed] probative value." (Tr. 22). The ALJ concluded, "[a]s the opinions are not well supported by the record, they cannot be accepted." (Id.).
Plaintiff somewhat half-heartedly argues that both treating professionals' opinions deserved controlling weight. "[M]ore importantly," however, he asserts that the ALJ elided the required analysis regarding the ultimate weight, less than controlling, to be accorded their opinions. (Doc. 10 at 11, 13). Plaintiff makes two related arguments in this regard: first, that rather than examining the opinions under the various factors contained in § 404.1527(d)(2)-(6), the ALJ erroneously transformed the analysis into an all or nothing proposition; and second, that the ALJ's failure to provide "good reasons" for dismissing the opinions makes his decision opaque to appellate review.
The ALJ did commit a perplexing oversight in failing even to mention the § 404.1527(d)(2)-(6) factors. Furthermore, he seemingly melds the controlling weight analysis with the ultimate weight analysis. Yet the ALJ's decision regarding the ultimate weight of Dr. Papadakis' and Dr. Walters' opinions was sufficient, if slimly so.
The ALJ noted that both opinions were offered long after the date in question and that they were not supported by treatment notes or the rest of the record. The former points out a fundamental weakness in the supportability of both opinions under § 404.1527(d)(3). The latter is a crucial factor weighing against them under § 404. 3 527(d)(4). The ALJ identified the significant differences between their opinions and those of Dr. Flexman, the consultative psychologist, and Dr. Edwards, the reviewing psychologist, both of whom found Plaintiff only moderately impaired. (Tr. 20-1). Of particular note was Plaintiff's alleged malingering, noncompliance with treatment, and uncooperativeness. (Tr. 20,21, 23-4). The ALJ also juxtaposed Dr. Papadakis' and Dr. Walters' dire opinions with a review of Plaintiff s relatively normal daily activities. (Tr. 21).
The ALJ's decisions to deny Dr. Papadakis' and Dr. Walters' opinions controlling weight, and even any weight at all, are clearly supported by substantial evidence. The much closer question is whether the ALJ abided by the regulations and case law and properly assessed the ultimate weight due the opinions. While this is a close case, made unnecessarily so by the ALJ's simple failures, the ALJ did provide the minimal amount of analysis required. Accordingly, the ALJ's decision in this regard is affirmed.
B. Second Assignment of Error
For his second assignment of error, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to evaluate Plaintiff's experience of pain, resulting from his severe back problems, in combination with his mental impairments. Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ found his allegations of debilitating pain unsupported by the record without properly analyzing Plaintiff's back pain together with his psychological problems, which were aggravative. Plaintiff pointed out that both Dr. Papadakis and Dr. Walters believed that Plaintiff's mental condition exacerbated his back pain. (Doc. 10 at 16; Tr. 507, 510).
The ALJ cited the correct legal framework in determining the credibility of Plaintiff's pain complaints. (Tr. 22-3). The ALJ reviewed the copious evidence in the record and determined that Plaintiff's allegations of pain were unsubstantiated and significantly exaggerated. The ALJ noted that, since Plaintiff's alleged onset date and before his date last insured, his back problems, severe as they were, required only conservative treatment and did not necessitate hospitalization or additional surgery. (Tr. 23). In addition, his prior lumbar fusion surgery was successful, as an MRI showed his spine was stable and that he had no spinal stenosis. (Id.). While Plaintiff complained chiefly about numbness in his legs as a result of nerve damage, treatment notes are contradictory and objective studies are unsupportive of his testimony. (Id,). Though Plaintiff's treating physicians both believed that his psychiatric condition worsened his experience of pain, as discussed supra, their opinions were thinly supported and received little-to-no weight. In short, there is no evidence that Plaintiff's pain even approached disabling, and the ALJ's treatment of the issue was proper and supported by substantial evidence.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's assignments of error are unavailing. The ALJ's decision that Plaintiff was not entitled to disability insurance benefits and a period of disability through his date last insured, December 31, 2005, is supported by substantial evidence, and it is AFFIRMED. As no further matters remain pending for the Court's review, this case is closed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Timothy S. Black
United States District Judge