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State v. Hernandez

Supreme Court of Minnesota
Oct 26, 1981
311 N.W.2d 478 (Minn. 1981)

Summary

holding that in sentencing defendant on same day for three convictions based on different offenses not part of same behavioral incident or course of conduct and involving different victims, the district court properly considered first two convictions in determining defendant's criminal history score for third conviction

Summary of this case from State v. Scheer

Opinion

No. 81-977.

October 26, 1981.

Appeal from the District Court, Ramsey County, Harold Schultz, J.

Neighborhood Justice Center, Lawrence Laine, St. Paul, for appellant.

Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Tom Foley, County Atty., Steven DeCoster, Asst. County Atty., St. Paul, for respondent.

Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument.


The issue on this sentencing appeal is whether the trial court, in sentencing a defendant on the same day for three separate convictions of offenses which were not part of a single behavioral incident or course of conduct but which occurred at different times and involved different victims, could count the first and second convictions in determining the criminal history score used in determining the presumptive sentence for the third conviction.

On January 22, 1981, while on probation, defendant, age 19, was caught by St. Paul police as he attempted to commit a residential burglary. A search of defendant and his accomplice resulted in the discovery of property taken in the burglary of another residence that evening. Defendant was charged with two counts of attempted burglary and one count of aggravated criminal damage to property.

On February 25, 1981, Mounds View police arrested defendant for his participation with another person in a residential burglary committed earlier that day. Defendant was charged with burglary and theft.

While in custody, defendant cooperated with Officer Walter Robillard of the St. Paul Police Department and admitted having participated in approximately 50 burglaries on the east side of St. Paul and in the Maplewood area. As part of his investigation, Robillard would take defendant on drives through neighborhoods and defendant would point out houses he had burglarized. On one such outing, on March 13, they stopped at defendant's family home. While Robillard was talking with defendant's father in the living room, defendant went into the kitchen and then ran out the back door. For this defendant was charged with escape from custody.

On April 10, defendant, represented by an attorney, pled guilty to attempted burglary in connection with the January 22 incident, theft in connection with the February 25 incident, and escape from custody on March 13. It was agreed that another complaint, charging him with theft in connection with a January 5 burglary, would be dismissed, that defendant would not be charged with any of the other 50 burglaries to which he confessed, that sentencing would be concurrent even for the escape, and that defendant would testify against his "fence."

In determining the criminal history score for each offense on which defendant was to be sentenced, the agent preparing the presentence investigation report relied upon Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary, II.B.1. and Comment II.B.101 (1980), which provide that the defendant is given one criminal history point for every felony conviction on which a sentence was stayed or imposed before the date of the current sentencing. Since defendant was to be sentenced for each of the three offenses on the same date, defendant was given a criminal history score of three for each offense: one for his juvenile record, one for the prior felony for which he was sentenced in 1980, and one for the fact that he committed the offenses while on probation. This meant that the presumptive sentence lengths for the new offenses were as follows: 1 year and 1 day stayed for attempted burglary (severity level IV), 19 months stayed for theft (severity level III), and 19 months stayed for escape (severity level III).

The presentence investigation report recommended a departure in the form of a 60-month prison term because of defendant's continued criminal behavior and negative lifestyle.

At the departure hearing, held on May 26, defense counsel argued strongly against departure. The prosecutor, after referring to the large number of burglaries defendant had admitted, stated in relevant part as follows:

Aside from the actual facts involved here, Your Honor, we are dealing with three separate offenses. If these three offenses were sentenced today, tomorrow, and Wednesday, this defendant would be sent to the Commissioner of Corrections at St. Cloud, that would not be a departure. We have been informed by the Guidelines Commission, however, that because they are actually sentenced on one day that, in fact, it would be a technical departure for the Court to sentence him to St. Cloud. * * *

We suggest that the only fair disposition of this case would be to depart technically from the guidelines and send Mr. Hernandez to St. Cloud.

The trial court sentenced defendant to 1 year and 1 day stayed for the attempted burglary, 1 year and 1 day stayed for the theft, and 36 months, executed, for the escape. In imposing the sentence for the escape the court stated:

This is a downward departure but the state has not sought review.

It is a further part of this order that the Court having previously imposed sentence for the offense of attempted burglary and theft, that would add to the criminal history of this defendant two additional points. As far as this Court is concerned, while this may be termed a technical departure from the sentencing guidelines, with the additional history that this defendant would have, the Court is justified in imposing sentence.

In a departure report filed June 24, the court stated as follows:

This defendant has a record that indicates that he is not amenable to being serve in any meaningful manner by probation. His record is atrocious, and he attributes his problems to a severe chemical dependency habit. Yet he does not respond and will not respond to treatment. Apart from a record which indicates that he possesses some antisocial attributes which do not allow him to cease his activities with respect to burglary, he is not amenable to any other kind of treatment.

The more pertinent point to be raised is that if the sentencing of the defendant with respect to all of the files were spread out over a period of time, it would appear that there would be no question but that he would ultimately face a presumptive sentence of some incarceration. In the interest of expediting the handling of these numerous criminal files I have calculated that by my sentence I have accomplished the same result as could be done by stretching the procedure out over a longer period of time. Incarceration will serve the best interests of the defendant and society.

This appeal followed.

As indicated earlier, section II.B.1. of the Sentencing Guidelines provides that in computing an offender's criminal history score, the offender, subject to certain conditions, is assigned one point for every felony conviction for which a sentence was stayed or imposed and that "occurred before the current sentencing." Comment II.B.101 clarifies this by providing that "in order for prior convictions to be used in computing criminal history score, the sentence for the prior offense must have been stayed or imposed before the date of sentencing for the current offense."

The comments do not set forth the reasoning behind the rule and there may well be valid reasons for the rule. In this case, however, we are satisfied that the facts were such that it was appropriate for the trial court to count the two other convictions in determining the appropriate sentence for the escape conviction. These circumstances include (a) the fact that the three convictions were for separate and distinct offenses which were not part of a single behavioral incident or course of conduct and which did not involve the same victims, and (b) the fact that there is no indication that the trial court was trying to manipulate the Guidelines to achieve a substantive result not intended by the Guidelines. All the court was trying to do was avoid mere formalities and, in the interests of judicial economy, do in one day what the Guidelines allow to be done in three or more days.

Although we agree that it was appropriate to sentence defendant to prison, we reduce the term from 36 months to 27 months. If defendant is given the extra two points on his criminal score for the two other convictions on which he was sentenced, the presumptive sentence would be not 36 months but 27 months, with the trial court being given a range of 25 to 29 months. There is nothing in the record to justify increasing the term to 36 months and we do not believe that the trial court intended to depart. Indeed, the trial court stated that, "I have calculated that by my sentence I have accomplished the same result as could be done by stretching the procedure out over a longer period of time." In other words, the imposition of a 36-month term rather than a 27-month term was apparently an inadvertency.

We, therefore, reduce the defendant's prison term to 27 months.

Affirmed as modified.


Summaries of

State v. Hernandez

Supreme Court of Minnesota
Oct 26, 1981
311 N.W.2d 478 (Minn. 1981)

holding that in sentencing defendant on same day for three convictions based on different offenses not part of same behavioral incident or course of conduct and involving different victims, the district court properly considered first two convictions in determining defendant's criminal history score for third conviction

Summary of this case from State v. Scheer

holding that, when sentencing a defendant on the same day for three convictions from separate courses of conduct, the district court properly considered the first two convictions in determining the criminal-history score for the third conviction

Summary of this case from State v. Mondry

holding that defendant's criminal history score may be increased for other convictions sentenced on same day that are not part of same behavioral incident

Summary of this case from State v. Hickman

holding that trial court sentencing for separate offenses on the same day is justified in counting first two offenses to determine sentence for third

Summary of this case from State v. Miller

concluding that reduction of sentence from 36 months to 27 months was proper, when imposition of 36-month term was "apparently an inadvertency" on the part of the sentencing court

Summary of this case from State v. Hood

approving a method for sentencing multiple current convictions under circumstances of the case which showed no indication of manipulation

Summary of this case from State v. Zeimet

allowing a district court to increase a defendant's criminal history score when sentencing multiple offenses on the same day, if certain conditions are met

Summary of this case from State v. Degroot

In Hernandez, this court was confronted with a situation in which the defendant was sentenced on one day for three separate convictions that were not part of a single behavioral incident.

Summary of this case from State v. Soto

In Hernandez, this court was confronted with a situation in which the defendant was sentenced on one day for three separate convictions that were not part of a single behavioral incident.

Summary of this case from State v. Gould

In Hernandez, we held that the trial court in that case, in sentencing the defendant on one day for three offenses, was justified in counting two of the convictions in determining the appropriate sentence for the third.

Summary of this case from State v. Wallner

allowing the district court to sentence separate and distinct convictions sequentially

Summary of this case from State v. Grasty

stating that multiple offenses sentenced at the same time before the same court must be sentenced in the order in which they occurred, and, as each offense is sentenced, it is included in the criminal history on sentencing the next offense

Summary of this case from State v. Saari

In Hernandez, the Minnesota Supreme Court approved sentencing an offender for multiple convictions in one proceeding if the underlying offenses "were not part of a single behavioral incident" and "did not involve the same victims."

Summary of this case from Patchen v. State

stating offenses must involve different victims

Summary of this case from Patchen v. State

permitting district court to apply increased criminal-history score for the last of several serial convictions that were not part of "a single behavioral incident or course of conduct"

Summary of this case from State v. Longo

stating that, when multiple offenses are sentenced by the same court on the same day, the offense for which the defendant is first sentenced is included in the criminal history of the next offense sentenced

Summary of this case from State v. Schluessler

providing that a district court, when sentencing multiple felony offenses at the same time, should include earlier-sentenced offenses in calculating a criminal-history score for each subsequent offense

Summary of this case from State v. Johnson

allowing sentencing court to apply increased criminal history score for the last of several serial convictions

Summary of this case from State v. Stanius

interpreting sentencing guidelines to permit use of preceding convictions to determine criminal-history score for subsequent offenses sentenced on same day

Summary of this case from State v. Rodriguez

In Hernandez, the supreme court held that when a district court sentences an offender for several offenses on the same day, the court may count each conviction in the offender's criminal-history score.

Summary of this case from State v. Bertsch

providing that sentencing on same day for three convictions based on separate offenses not part of the same course of conduct involving different victims, could properly consider first two convictions when sentencing defendant on third conviction

Summary of this case from State Hicks

In Hernandez the supreme court determined that where the convictions were for three separate and distinct offenses, the trial court appropriately counted two of the convictions to aggravate the sentence for the third conviction even though all three sentences were imposed on the same day. The Sentencing Guidelines were then changed to provide that an "offender is assigned one point for every felony conviction for which a felony sentence was stayed or imposed before the current sentencing."

Summary of this case from Walker v. State
Case details for

State v. Hernandez

Case Details

Full title:STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jeffrey Scott HERNANDEZ, Appellant

Court:Supreme Court of Minnesota

Date published: Oct 26, 1981

Citations

311 N.W.2d 478 (Minn. 1981)

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