Opinion
Nos. 85-1213 and 85-1217
Decided April 9, 1986.
Bankruptcy — Forcible entry and detainer — Jurisdiction of municipal court — Court may determine its own jurisdiction.
APPEALS from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County.
These consolidated appeals come before the court from the dismissal of appellant's complaints for writs of mandamus (case No. 85-1213) and prohibition (case No. 85-1217) filed in the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County.
The controversy centers upon a lease between relator-appellant, P.O.B., Inc., and R.B. Brunemann Sons, Inc. ("Brunemann"), and Brunemann's efforts to evict appellant from the premises.
In July 1968, Brunemann's predecessor in interest and Allied Technology, Inc. ("Allied") executed a long-term lease for the rental of a building located in Hamilton County, Ohio. On February 25, 1980, Allied sold its P.O.B. Sealants Division to appellant. (P.O.B. Sealants Division eventually became P.O.B., Inc., the appellant herein.) In addition, Allied assigned its interest as tenant in the long-term lease to appellant. On March 18, 1980, Allied filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.
In bankruptcy court, Brunemann contested the right of Allied to assign its rights in the lease to appellant, claiming that Allied had breached the lease. At approximately the same time, Brunemann commenced its first forcible entry and detainer action against appellant in the Hamilton County Municipal Court.
In December 1982, the bankruptcy court held that Allied could assign its rights under the lease to appellant. In addition, the bankruptcy court found Brunemann in contempt and issued sanctions against it for violating the automatic stay provisions of Section 362(a)(1), Title 11, U.S. Code, and the confirmation order of Allied's reorganization plan by commencing the eviction action. Brunemann appealed the December 1982 order to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, which appeal is presently pending (case No. C-3-83-019), and dismissed the first eviction action.
On August 22, 1984, Brunemann commenced its second forcible entry and detainer action against appellant in the Hamilton County Municipal Court. This action is the subject of the current complaints for mandamus and prohibition and is now pending before respondent-appellee, Judge Deidra L. Hair. On September 7, 1984 and October 3, 1984, appellant filed motions to dismiss in the municipal court, contending that the bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction over the action. Appellee denied both motions on January 14, 1985. In the meantime, on November 1, 1984, appellant filed a motion, entitled "Motion For Enforcement of Court Order and Stay of Proceedings" in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, case No. C-3-83-019, that motion is still pending.
Finally, on February 12, 1985, appellant filed the subject complaints for mandamus and prohibition in the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County seeking to halt Judge Hair from proceeding in the second eviction action. The court of appeals, however, in a single judgment entry addressed to both complaints, sustained Judge Hair's motion to dismiss the complaints for failure to state claims for which relief can be granted.
The consolidated appeals are now before this court as a matter of right.
Frost Jacobs, Pierce E. Cunningham and Jeffrey A. Lipps, for appellant.
Arthur M. Ney, Jr., prosecuting attorney, and James W. Harper, for appellee.
The single issue for resolution here is whether appellee has the authority to proceed to a determination of the jurisdiction of her court with respect to the subject eviction action.
R.C. 1901.18(H) provides in part:
"Subject to section 1901.17 [monetary jurisdiction not to exceed $10,000] of the Revised Code, a municipal court has original jurisdiction within its territory:
"* * *
"(H) In any action of forcible entry and detainer[.]"
In light of the record now before us and R.C. 1901.18(H), we find the following statement in State, ex rel. Smith, v. Court (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 213, 215 [24 O.O.3d 320], controlling in this joint action for mandamus and prohibition:
"The question of whether a writ of prohibition can be used to prevent the exercise of jurisdiction by an inferior court has often been addressed by this court. The rule which emerges from the myriad of cases is that '[a] court having general jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action has authority to determine its own jurisdiction on the issue raised, and a party challenging its jurisdiction has a remedy at law in appeal from an adverse holding of the court that it has such jurisdiction, and may not maintain a proceeding in prohibition to prevent the prosecution of such action.' State, ex rel. Miller, v. Court (1949), 151 Ohio St. 397 [39 O.O. 232], paragraph three of the syllabus * * *."
We thus conclude that Judge Hair is empowered to decide the jurisdiction of her court in the underlying forcible entry and detainer action.
Further, appellant has available an adequate remedy in the form of appeal for which neither mandamus nor prohibition is a substitute. State, ex rel. Dunphy, v. Graham (1946), 146 Ohio St. 547, 548-549 [33 O.O. 22 (mandamus); State, ex rel. Rhodes, v. Solether (1955), 162 Ohio St. 559 [55 O.O. 440], paragraph one of the syllabus (prohibition); State, ex rel. Woodbury, v. Spitler (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 134 [63 O.O.2d 229], syllabus ("[e]xtraordinary writs may not be employed before trial as a substitute for the remedy of appeal").
Therefore, appellant has failed to allege facts sufficient to entitle it to have the requested writs of mandamus and prohibition issue; and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing appellant's complaints.
Judgment affirmed.
CELEBREZZE, C.J., SWEENEY, LOCHER, HOLMES, C. BROWN, DOUGLAS and WRIGHT, JJ., concur.