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Spratlen v. Rainey

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Midland/Odessa Division
Dec 27, 2024
No. 24-CV-00053-DC-RCG (W.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2024)

Opinion

24-CV-00053-DC-RCG

12-27-2024

MATTHEW SETH SPRATLEN, Plaintiff, v. JOHN RAINEY, in his individual capacity, MARK ANTHONY LUNA, in his individual capacity, GUADALUPE PINEDA, in her individual capacity, and ECTOR COUNTY, Defendants.


REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

RONALD C. GRIFFIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

BEFORE THE COURT is Defendants John Rainey, Mark Anthony Luna, and Guadalupe Pineda, each in their individual capacities, as well as Ector County's Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 11). This case is before the undersigned through a Standing Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Appendix C of the Local Court Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges. After due consideration of the Parties' briefs and the case law, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. (Doc. 11).

All page number citations are to CM/ECF generated pagination unless otherwise noted.

I. Background

On February 23, 2024, Plaintiff Matthew Seth Spratlen (“Plaintiff”) filed his Complaint against John Rainey (“Defendant Rainey”), Mark Anthony Luna (“Defendant Luna”), and Guadalupe Pineda (“Defendant Pineda”), each in their individual capacities, as well as Ector County (collectively “Defendants”). (Doc. 1). Plaintiff asserts causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for: (1) unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (3) deprivation of civil rights by retaliatory detention in violation of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech; (4) Second Amendment Right to Bear Arms; and (5) a Monell claim for wrongful hiring of Defendant Luna and failure to train or supervise officers. Id. Causes of action one through three are against Defendants Rainey, Luna, and Pineda. Cause of action four is against Defendant Rainey, while cause of action five is against Defendant Ector County. Id.

When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the alleged facts as true and view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Sewell v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 974 F.3d 577, 582 (5th Cir. 2020). However, here, the Court will also consider video evidence of the incidents giving rise to Plaintiff's claims because Plaintiff incorporated the videos and provided still shots in his Complaint, the videos are central to Plaintiff's claim, both parties extensively discuss and cite to the videos in their briefing, and Defendants attached the videos to their Motion to Dismiss and provided the Court with copies. See Terrell v. Town of Woodworth, No. 23-30510, 2024 WL 667690, at *5 (5th Cir. Feb. 19, 2024) (considering body camera and dash camera footage that Defendants attached to their motion to dismiss a § 1983 claim). The Court will only reject Plaintiff's version of the events when the video “blatantly contradict[s]” his allegations. Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159, 1163 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).

Plaintiff separates the factual allegations into two incidents-the hunting incident and the gunpoint incident. (Doc. 1 at 3, 7). The hunting incident took place on October 11, 2022. Id. at 3. This incident involved only Defendant Rainey. See id. Plaintiff was dove hunting when Defendant Rainey responded to the property for a call of “shots fired.” Id. Upon arriving, Defendant Rainey asked Plaintiff for identification. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff refused, stating that he was hunting and not driving. Id.; Axon Body 3 - X60A8074R, at 39:45. Defendant Rainey then asked to see Plaintiff's hunting license. (Doc. 1 at 3-4); Axon Body 3 - X60A8074R, at 40:03. Plaintiff walked away without responding. (Doc. 1 at 3-4); Axon Body 3 - X60A8074R, at 40:10. The video then shows Defendant Rainey driving to the entrance of the property. Axon Body 3 -X60A8074R, at 43:00. During the drive, Defendant Rainey is requesting that the dispatcher contact the game warden to determine when dove season begins. Id. at 44:26. When Defendant Rainey pulls up, he begins speaking with the presumptive owners of the property to explain the situation. Id. at 46:10. Defendant Rainey states that Plaintiff refused to show his hunting license, and the property owner immediately calls Plaintiff telling him to come to the front and show the officer his hunting license. Id. at 47:25. While waiting for Plaintiff, two other officers arrive on scene, and Defendant Rainey calls his lieutenant to confirm that Plaintiff must show an officer his hunting license. Id. at 50:00-52:25. The lieutenant tells Defendant Rainey that the best way to proceed is to call the game warden. Id.

Defendant Rainey consistently refers to the game warden as the “bird and turtle police.”

When Plaintiff arrives at the entrance, he provides Defendant Rainey with his driver's license and hunting license (Doc. 1 at 4), and Defendant Rainey tells Plaintiff that he is getting in touch with the game warden. Axon Body 3 - X60A8074R, at 53:05-53:35. Defendant Rainey then asks Plaintiff “how many birds you got down there on your truck?” Id. at 53:45. Plaintiff shakes his head, begins to walk away, and states, “Contact Parks and Wildlife for me please.” Id. at 53:51. Defendant Rainey is able to confirm that Plaintiff had a valid hunting license with the proper hunter's education endorsement, and he acknowledges that he must return the license to Plaintiff. (Doc. 1 at 4); Axon Body 3 - X60A8074R, at 57:15, 01:11:22. Following this, Defendant Rainey obtains permission from the owners to drive through the property to where Plaintiff's truck is parked. Axon Body 3 - X60A8074R, at 01:00:55. Once in his car, Defendant Rainey can be heard saying to the other officer, “He needs to stay with y'all,” in reference to the Plaintiff staying at the property entrance, and “I don't trust that SOB.” Id. at 01:01:23-01:01:31. Plaintiff follows Defendant Rainey to his truck. Id. at 01:03:32.

Once Defendant Rainey arrives at Plaintiff's truck, he asks Plaintiff, “Where's your birds, sir?” Id. at 01:03:45. Plaintiff does not respond. See id. Defendant Rainey asks if Plaintiff's truck is unlocked, to which Plaintiff responds, “You do not have permission to search my truck.” Id. at 01:04:27. During this interaction, Defendant Rainey is again on the phone with his lieutenant. See id. Defendant Rainey can be heard saying, “Should I go ahead and handcuff him just to be safe?” Id. at 01:04:44. Defendant Rainey then handcuffs Plaintiff and tells him he is being detained. Id. at 01:04:58. While being handcuffed, Plaintiff says that the handcuffs are hurting him and his “wrists do not turn that way.” (Doc. 1 at 4); Axon Body 3 - X60A8074R, at 01:05:20. Plaintiff asks what he is being detained for, and Defendant Rainey responds, “Failure to identify to a peace officer.” (Doc. 1 at 4); Axon Body 3 - X60A8074R, at 01:05:43. Defendant Rainey then states, “Right now we are waiting for a game warden,” and he places Plaintiff in the back of the police car. Axon Body 3 - X60A8074R, at 01:06:24. While waiting, Defendant Rainey and the other officer look around Plaintiff's truck. See id. Defendant Rainey says he can see three dead birds in the bed of the truck. (Doc. 1 at 5); Axon Body 3 - X60A8074R, at 01:08:11. Further, in the video, the individual on Defendant Rainey's phone or radio can be heard saying, “Due to game law, he cannot refuse you to look or count birds if he has killed any at all.” Axon Body 3 - X60A8074R, at 01:10:15. Roughly 17 minutes after Defendant Rainey detained Plaintiff, Defendant Rainey is told that a game warden is unavailable to come to the property. Id. at 01:21:40. Defendant Rainey, with Plaintiff handcuffed in the back seat, drives his car back to the entrance of the property. Id. at 01:24:11-01:27:00. Once back at the entrance, Defendant Rainey collects contact information from the property owners and explains the situation to them. Id. at 01:27:00-01:35:35. As another officer arrives at the property, Plaintiff is released. Id. at 01:35:00.

The second incident that Plaintiff describes is the gunpoint incident. The gunpoint incident occurred roughly 14 months after the hunting incident. (Doc. 1 at 7). This incident involved Defendants Luna and Pineda. Id. On November 30, 2023, Plaintiff “called Ector County Sheriff's Department requesting a civil standby as he was owed approximately $5,000 in unpaid invoices from XCU.” Id. at 2. “On December 1, 2023, approximately twelve men from XCU arrived at [Plaintiff's] residence. [Defendants Luna and Pineda] also arrived at the residence for a civil stand by.” Id. From the moment Defendants arrive on the property, Plaintiff is hostile. See Axon Body 4 - D01A1289Z, at 01:50-03:30. Roughly three and a half minutes into the conversation, Plaintiff proceeds to get into a white truck. Id. at 03:40. Plaintiff explains in his Response that he then attempts to maneuver his truck from a tight location in between construction equipment. (Doc. 14 at 15). The video, however, shows that in the process, Plaintiff backs into another individual at least once, if not twice. Axon Body 4 - D01A1289Z, at 03:4303:55. After Plaintiff reverses the second time, Defendants Luna and Pineda draw their weapons. Id. at 03:56; (Doc. 1 at 7). Plaintiff exits the truck while Defendant Luna attempts to give him commands, which Plaintiff ignores. Axon Body 4 - D01A1289Z, at 03:56-04:38. While the Complaint alleges that Defendant Luna “aggressively yelled that he was going to shoot [Plaintiff],” a review of the video shows this did not happen. (Doc. 1 at 8). Within 60 seconds, Defendants holster their weapons. Axon Body 4 - D01A1289Z, at 04:39. Defendants then leave the scene within the next six minutes. Id. at 10:12.

On May 1, 2024, all Defendants filed a joint Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 11). The instant matter is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to move for the dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A claim for relief must contain: (1) “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction”; (2) “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to the relief”; and (3) “a demand for the relief sought.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). A plaintiff “must provide enough factual allegations to draw the reasonable inference that the elements exist.” Innova Hosp. San Antonio, L.P. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 995 F.Supp.2d 587, 602 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (citing Patrick v. Wal-Mart, Inc.-Store No. 155, 681 F.3d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 2012)); see also Torch Liquidating Tr. ex rel. Bridge Assocs. L.L.C. v. Stockstill, 561 F.3d 377, 384 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he complaint must contain either direct allegations or permit properly drawn inferences to support every material point necessary to sustain recovery”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In a court's review of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), all factual allegations from the complaint should be taken as true, and the facts are to be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Assoc., 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993). Still, a complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “‘[N]aked assertions' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement,'” and “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not entitled to the presumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); see also R2 Invs. LDC v. Phillips, 401 F.3d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 2005) (stating that the Court should neither “strain to find inferences favorable to plaintiffs” nor accept “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions, or legal conclusions.”).

“When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court's review is limited to the complaint; any documents attached to the complaint; any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint; and matters subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.” Doe v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 653 F.Supp.3d 359, 370 (S.D. Tex. 2023) (citing Allen v. Vertafore, Inc., 28 F.4th 613, 616 (5th Cir. 2022); George v. SI Grp., Inc., 36 F.4th 611, 619 (5th Cir. 2022)). “Moreover, where video recordings are included in the pleadings, as is the case here, the video depictions of events, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, should be adopted over the factual allegations in the complaint if the video ‘blatantly contradict[s]' those allegations.” Harmon, 16 F.4th at 1163 (citing Scott, 550 U.S. at 380).

III. Discussion

Plaintiff asserts five separate causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Defendants move to dismiss all claims and raise a qualified-immunity defense. (Doc. 11). Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense. “The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials acting within their discretionary authority from liability when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional law of which a reasonable person would have known.” Wallace v. County of Comal, 400 F.3d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 2005). Because qualified immunity is an immunity from suit, these questions must be resolved at the earliest possible stage in litigation. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009). “[A] plaintiff asserting constitutional claims against an officer claiming [qualified immunity] must survive the motion to dismiss without any discovery.” Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307, 311 (5th Cir. 2022).

To overcome the defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” McLin v. Ard, 866 F.3d 682, 689 (5th Cir. 2017). To determine whether a right was clearly established, the Court looks to cases decided “at the time of the violation.” Grishman v. Valenciano, 93 F.4th 903, 908 (5th Cir. 2024). “Because qualified immunity protects officers who ‘reasonably but mistakenly' violate a plaintiff's constitutional rights, the deputies are entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable person in their position ‘would have believed that [their] conduct conformed to the constitutional standard in light of the information available to [them] and the clearly established law.'” Freeman, 483 F.3d at 415 (citing Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000)). “The law can be clearly established despite notable factual distinctions between the precedents relied on and the cases then before the Court, so long as the prior decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue violated constitutional rights.” Id. at 909. Because a plaintiff's § 1983 claim must overcome both prongs of qualified immunity, district courts have the discretion to analyze the two prongs in either order and can grant qualified immunity by addressing one or both steps. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.

A. Plaintiff's Unlawful Seizure Claims Against Defendants Rainey, Luna, and Pineda

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges he was unlawfully seized in both the hunting incident and the gunpoint incident. (Doc. 1 at 9). Defendants' Motion argues that the officers acted objectively reasonable in each situation. (Doc. 11). The Court will address each in turn.

i. Hunting Incident

Neither party disputes that Plaintiff was detained by Defendant Rainey during the hunting incident. However, the threshold issue before the Court is whether the seizure constituted an investigatory stop or a de facto arrest. See Smith v. Heap, 31 F.4th 905, 911 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal quotations omitted) (“De facto arrest requires restraint of the degree which the law associates with formal arrest.”). If Plaintiff was simply detained for an investigatory stop, the officers needed only reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff was violating the law. See Freeman, 483 F.3d at 412. On the other hand, a police detention that constitutes an arrest must be supported by probable cause. Id. at 413. A detention is considered an arrest “if a reasonable person in the suspect's position would understand the situation to be a restraint on freedom of the kind that the law typically associates with a formal arrest.” Id. The Fifth Circuit has recently noted that “[t]aking a suspect ‘to police headquarters usually marks the point at which an investigatory stop becomes a de facto arrest.'” Smith, 31 F.4th at 911 (citing United States v. Martinez, 808 F.2d 1050, 1055 (5th Cir. 1987)). However, “if unjustifiably prolonged, a Terry stop ‘can, due to its duration, transform into the equivalent of an arrest.'” Id. But, it is “reasonable to detain a suspect at gunpoint, handcuff [him], and place [him] in a police car during an investigatory stop.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

Plaintiff argues that his seizure was a de facto arrest for two reasons: (1) Plaintiff was detained for over 30 minutes and (2) the detention was longer than was necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. (See Doc. 14 at 6-11). The Court can quickly dismiss the argument that the length of the stop, especially on its own, transformed the detention into an arrest. There is “no constitutional stopwatch on traffic stops.” United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 511 (5th Cir. 2004); Windham v. Harris County, 875 F.3d 229, 241 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding a 90-minute traffic stop that ended in a release was not a de facto arrest). “Instead, the relevant question in assessing whether a detention extends beyond a reasonable duration is ‘whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.'” Brigham, 382 F.3d at 511 (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985)). Here, Plaintiff's detention lasted for almost exactly 30 minutes. (Doc. 1 at 6). However, the length of the detention was reasonable given the circumstances of the incident.

Defendant Rainey initially detained Plaintiff on suspicion that he was noncompliant with the local hunting laws. Plaintiff was handcuffed at that time “to be safe” and placed in the back of the police car. Axon Body 3 - X60A8074R, at 01:04:44. Defendant Rainey tells Plaintiff he is being detained while they wait for the game warden to come investigate. Id. at 01:06:24. About 17 minutes into the detention, Defendant Rainey is told that the game warden is not available to respond. Id. at 01:21:40. Defendant Rainey spends the next few minutes documenting the scene to pass information to the game warden, then drives Plaintiff back to the entrance of the property-where the rest of the individuals and other officers are located. Id. at 01:21:4001:24:11. During the drive back, at approximately 22 minutes into the detention, another officer can be heard telling Plaintiff that he was just being detained and he has not been arrested. Id. at 01:26:21. When Defendant Rainey gets back to the entrance, he spends about 8 minutes explaining the situation to the property owners while, simultaneously, waiting for another officer to arrive before releasing Plaintiff. Id. at 01:27:00-01:35:35. As soon as the other officer pulls up, Plaintiff is released. Id. at 01:35:00.

Based on the facts alleged in the Complaint, along with a review of Defendant Rainey's body camera footage, the Court finds that Plaintiff's detention was an investigatory stop, as opposed to a de facto arrest. From these facts, it is not reasonable that Plaintiff would believe he had been arrested, as he was specifically told he had not been. Id. at 01:26:21; Freeman, 483 F.3d at 413. In fact, the Complaint states, “at all relevant times during the hunting incident [Plaintiff] was never placed under arrest.” (Doc. 1 at 4). Further, the duration of the detention was reasonable to complete the investigation. For the first 17 minutes of the 30-minute detention, Defendant Rainey was waiting for the game warden to arrive because he would have more expertise to assess the potential criminal activity. After learning the game warden was unavailable, Defendant Rainey argues that he drove back to the property's entrance for his safety before releasing Plaintiff. (Doc. 11 at 13). In the course of an investigation, officers are “authorized to ‘take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo.'” United States v. Campbell, 178 F.3d 345, 348-49 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985)). The Court does not find it was unreasonable to wait for a game warden to come investigate a possible hunting violation or for Defendant Rainey to extend the detention by 13 minutes to drive Plaintiff back to the entrance of the property where the additional officers were located. See id. at 349 (“This court asks case-by-case whether the police were unreasonable in failing to use less intrusive procedures to conduct their investigation safely.”). As the detention was not unreasonably extensive, the Court does not consider it a de facto arrest. See Smith, 31 F.4th at 911.

Because Plaintiff's detention was an investigatory stop, Defendant Rainey only needed reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. “Reasonable suspicion exists if there are ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [a detention].'” Allen v. Cisneros, 815 F.3d 239, 245 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). Here, the parties disagree as to what conduct even initially could give rise to the reasonable suspicion. Plaintiff argues that the purpose of the detention was simply to investigate a hunter who refused to show his hunting license to a police officer. (Doc. 14 at 7). And because Plaintiff handed over his license before he was even placed in handcuffs, Defendant Rainey had no reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff was doing anything to warrant detention. Id. On the other hand, Defendants' Motion acknowledges that although Defendant Rainey's initial suspicion based on Plaintiff's failure to provide his hunting license was quickly dispelled, Plaintiff continued to refuse to answer any questions. (Doc. 11 at 10). Defendants argue that “Plaintiff's continued evasive behavior coupled with his misdemeanor offense [of refusing to provide a hunting license] supported a reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff was engaged in some illegal activity.” Id. The Court agrees.

While Defendant Rainey states to Plaintiff that he was being detained for failure to identify, it is clearer from the body camera footage, and specifically the phone call with Defendant Rainey's lieutenant, that Plaintiff was detained as the officers waited for the game warden to arrive to investigate the number of doves killed. Further, Defendant Rainey states, as he is putting Plaintiff into the police car, “Right now, we are waiting for a game warden.” Axon Body 3 -X60A8074R, at 01:06:24.

The Court must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether there were specific, articulable facts upon which to form reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff was engaged in criminal behavior. See Allen, 815 F.3d at 245. The initial police encounter began when Defendant Rainey responded to the property for a report of “shots fired.” (Doc. 1 at 3). When Defendant Rainey arrived, he learned that Plaintiff was dove hunting on the property. Id. at 1. Defendant Rainey asked for Plaintiff's driver's license, to which he refused. Id. at 3-4.

Defendant Rainey then asked for Plaintiff's hunting license, which again he refused. Id. When Plaintiff eventually handed over his hunting license to Defendant Rainey, Defendant Rainey asked him how many birds he has in his truck. Axon Body 3 - X60A8074R, at 53:45. In response, Plaintiff shook his head and said, “Contact Parks and Wildlife for me please.” Id. at 53:51. Following this, Defendant Rainey received permission from the property owners to go down to where Plaintiff's truck was parked. Id. at 01:00:55. Plaintiff, not yet detained, went as well. Id. at 01:03:32. Defendant Rainey again asked Plaintiff where his birds are, and Plaintiff does not answer. Id. at 01:03:45. Defendant Rainey can visibly see three dead doves in the bed of Plaintiff's truck. (Doc. 1 at 5); Axon Body 3 - X60A8074R, at 01:08:11.

“[N]o resident may hunt any bird or animal in this state without having acquired a hunting license.” TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 42.002(a) (West 2021).

“No person may kill or take more than the daily, weekly, or seasonal bag limits for game birds or animals as set out in this code.” TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 62.010(a) (West 1985).

“[T]he Fourth Amendment requires only some minimum level of objective justification for the officers' actions-but more than a hunch-measured in light of the totality of the circumstances, considering the facts available to the officer at the time of the detention” Allen, 815 F.3d at 245 (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Nervousness, hesitance to answer officers' questions, and evasive or strange answers to questions are relevant factors in the development of reasonable suspicion.” Washington v. Smith, 639 F.Supp.3d 625, 644 (E.D. La. 2022) (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 802 Fed.Appx. 90, 97 (5th Cir. 2020)). The facts here are sufficient to support reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff may have been hunting illegally. Defendant Rainey knew Plaintiff was hunting on the property and shot at least some birds, Plaintiff initially refused to identify himself or provide his hunting license, and Plaintiff declined to dispel Defendant Rainey's suspicions of illegal hunting by telling him how many birds he had killed. While this admittedly was not the original purpose of the police encounter, the circumstances permissibly created reasonable suspicion in Defendant Rainey that criminal activity may be occurring. See United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 350 (5th Cir. 2010) (“If the officer develops reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity during his investigation of the circumstances that originally caused the stop, he may further detain its occupants for a reasonable time while appropriately attempting to dispel this reasonable suspicion.”). Therefore, Defendant Rainey did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional right to be free from unlawful seizure.

ii. Gunpoint Incident

Unlike the hunting incident, Plaintiff alleges only that he was unlawfully detained, as opposed to arrested, during the gunpoint incident. Plaintiff argues that “[d]espite the fact that at no point during this entire encounter was Plaintiff a threat to the deputies or any other individuals, Deputies Luna and Pineda unjustifiably held [Plaintiff] at gun point.” (Doc. 14 at 14). Defendants counter that “[e]ven when hindsight might call for a different response, courts, including this one, recognize that an officer may hold someone at gunpoint to control a situation and this is not excessive.” (Doc. 11 at 16) (citing Garcia v. City of Kirby, No. SA-08-CV-430, 2010 WL 1379773, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2010)). Further, the parties have vastly different descriptions of what occurred during this encounter, and the Court finds that the body camera footage from Defendants Luna and Pineda contradict the narrative that Plaintiff provides.

The body camera video begins with the officers walking up to where Plaintiff was located. Axon Body 4 - D01A1289Z, at 01:50. The Complaint provides that Plaintiff was involved in a business dispute with XCU, and Plaintiff called the Ector County Sheriff's Department to have a deputy on civil standby. (Doc. 1 at 2). From the moment Defendants Luna and Pineda approach Plaintiff, he is combative and hostile. Axon Body 4 - D01A1289Z, at 01:50- 03:30. Defendant Luna quickly asks Plaintiff where his gun is and states that he would like Plaintiff to disarm for safety reasons. Id. at 01:53-02:22. After initially refusing, Plaintiff complies and puts his gun in a truck. Id. at 02:30. Still agitated, Defendant Luna tells Plaintiff that he needs to calm down so they can assess the situation. Id. at 02:45. Defendant Luna further states that the reason Plaintiff should not have a gun is because he is hostile and has an attitude. Id. at 03:15-03:29.

About three minutes into the interaction, Plaintiff gets into a white truck. Id. at 03:40. One of the XCU employees is standing directly behind the truck. Id. From Defendant Luna's body camera footage, the Court can see Plaintiff simultaneously start reversing the truck and turn around to see what is behind him. Id. at 03:44. As soon as the truck begins to reverse, Defendant Pineda yells, “He is going to hit the guy. Move out of the way!” Id. It is unclear whether Plaintiff does make contact with the employee at this point, but the employee does stumble backwards and yells to Plaintiff, “Don't hit me.” Id. at 03:46. Plaintiff then pulls slightly forward and again puts the truck in reverse. Id. at 03:50. The XCU employee is still standing in same spot and during this second reverse, Plaintiff clearly hits the employee with the truck. Id. at 03:55. It is only at this point that Defendant Luna draws his weapon, with Defendant Pineda following his lead. Id. at 03:56. As Plaintiff exits the truck, Defendant Luna orders him to get on the ground. Id. at 04:08. Plaintiff yells back, “F*** you,” and continues to walk away. Id. Defendant Luna again says, “Get on the ground. You just hit him with a . . . truck.” Id. at 04:18. Plaintiff replies, “That's cause the dumb motherf***** is stealing.” Id. Defendant Luna continues to hold Plaintiff at gunpoint and attempts to give him commands-get on the ground, turn around. Id. at 04:20-04:50. Plaintiff, however, continues refusing. Id. Defendants have their guns out of their holsters for less than 60 seconds. Id. at 03:56-04:39.

Plaintiff states three separate times in his Complaint and another three times in his Response that “Deputy Luna aggressively yelled that he was going to shoot [Plaintiff].” (Docs. 1 at 2, 8, 22; 14 at 3, 14, 16). From review of the body camera footage, the Court notes that this did not happen and neither Defendant Luna nor Pineda said anything close to that.

The Court finds that Defendants were well within reason to hold Plaintiff at gunpoint for that brief amount of time. The reasonableness of Defendants' conduct must be measured in light of the limited information on which they reasonably relied. See Garcia, 2010 WL 1379773, at *3. Plaintiff was agitated and hostile from the moment the officers arrived. The officers then witnessed him get in a truck and reverse into another individual, striking that person at least one time. Plaintiff argues that “even a cursory review of this footage reveals that Plaintiff was simply attempting to maneuver his truck from a tight location near large construction equipment; he was not intentionally moving his truck for the purpose of striking anyone.” (Doc. 14 at 15). While the Court-nor the officers at the time-need not determine Plaintiff's intentions, Plaintiff's own admission that he hit him “cause [he] is stealing,” is fairly informative. Axon Body 4 -D01A1289Z, at 04:18. Even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff's actions were not intentional, the “police may take reasonable actions under the circumstances to ensure their own safety, as well as the safety of the public, during an encounter with a suspect.” United States v. Abdo, 733 F.3d 562, 565 (5th Cir. 2013). Whether Defendants at the time thought Plaintiff was intentionally reversing the truck into the employee or not, it was reasonable for them to take action for the safety of the employees and themselves. See Smith, 31 F.4th at 911 (“It is reasonable to detain a suspect at gunpoint ....”). Because reasonable suspicion supported the brief detention at gunpoint, Plaintiff did not adequately plead an unreasonable seizure. Therefore, Defendants Luna and Pineda did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional right to be free from unlawful seizure.

Because the Court did not find that Defendants Rainey, Luna, or Pineda violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights as it related to unlawful seizure, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on these claims. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff's unlawful seizure claims against Defendants Rainey, Luna, and Pineda for both the hunting incident and the gunpoint incident and that those claims be DISMISSED. (Doc. 11).

B. Plaintiff's Excessive Force Claims Against Defendants Rainey, Luna, and Pineda

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants used excessive force by detaining and handcuffing him in the hunting incident, as well as detaining him at gunpoint in the gunpoint incident. (Doc. 1 at 12, 15). Whether an officer used excessive force in effecting a seizure is properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's “objective reasonableness” standard. Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). To prevail on an excessive force claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) injury (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.” Malbrough v. Stelly, 814 Fed.Appx. 798, 802-03 (5th Cir. 2020). Whether the force used was excessive or unreasonable depends on “the totality of the circumstances.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985). “The ‘reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.

For both the hunting incident and the gunpoint incident, the Court's excessive force analysis stops at the first prong. Plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead that he suffered a recognizable injury from either encounter. For an excessive force claim, while the injury does not need to be “significant,” it must be “more than de minimis.” Solis v. Serrett, 31 F.4th 975, 981 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 752 (5th Cir. 2005)).

“[A]lthough a de minimis injury is not cognizable, the extent of injury necessary to satisfy the injury requirement is ‘directly related to the amount of force that is constitutionally permissible under the circumstances.'” Id. Accordingly, “[a]ny force found to be objectively unreasonable necessarily exceeds the de minimis threshold, and, conversely, objectively reasonable force will result in de minimis injuries only.” Id. (citing Brown v. Lynch, 524 Fed.Appx. 69, 79 (5th Cir. 2013)). Further, “psychological harm” can satisfy the injury element, but the psychological injuries must be “substantial.” Flores v. City of Palacio, 381 F.3d 391, 400-01 (5th Cir. 2004).

Here, Plaintiff's Complaint provides a formulaic recitation of types of injuries for both incidents: “[Plaintiff's] injuries include but are not limited to, loss of constitutional and federal rights, physical injuries, impairments, disfigurements, great pain and emotional distress. [Plaintiff] continues suffering from emotion distress, frustration, and flashbacks from the unlawful detention.” (Doc. 1 at 6-9). Plaintiff also states that the “force used by Defendants Rainey, Luna and Pineda caused serious harm” and Plaintiff “suffered loss of his freedom and other injuries.” Id. at 12. The only true factual allegations that Plaintiff pleads are in relation to the hunting incident. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Rainey was “twisting his wrist in a manner in which his wrists do not turn and causing pain” and when Plaintiff was uncuffed, he “state[d] that his hands are blue and there was no air in the backseat.” Id. at 4, 6.

Even reading the pleadings in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court is unpersuaded that these statements allege an injury. Beginning with the hunting incident, the only plausible injury comes from Plaintiff being handcuffed in the back of the police car for about 30 minutes. (Docs. 11 at 15; 14 at 12). Plaintiff argues that from the outset there was no reason for Defendant Rainey to separate himself from his backup, such that Plaintiff needed to be restrained. (Doc. 14 at 12). However, whether an officer had a right to handcuff Plaintiff goes to Plaintiff's wrongful seizure claim, disposed of in the previous section. See Tarver, 410 F.3d at 752. Further, any degree of physical harm that Plaintiff experienced from the handcuffs is not greater than de minimis and does not satisfy the injury requirement. See id. Even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff was physically injured from the handcuffs, the Fifth Circuit has held that “handcuffing too tightly, without more, does not amount to excessive force.” Tarver, 410 F.3d at 752.

In the gunpoint incident, Plaintiff does not allege any facts surrounding an injury, but again relies on a conclusory recitation of forms of injury. Based on the facts surrounding the incident-namely, that the officers did not arrest Plaintiff, handcuff him, fire any shots, or even touch him-the Court cannot conceive how Plaintiff could be physically injured, impaired, or disfigured as Plaintiff does not offer any facts to back such pleadings. (See Doc. 1 at 7-9). While the Complaint does allege that Plaintiff suffers from “emotional distress, frustration, and flashbacks from the unlawful use of excessive force,” Plaintiff again provides no facts to support such psychological harm. Id. at 9. Further, Fifth Circuit precedent has also not previously placed much weight on psychological injuries as the Circuit has “rejected similar attempts by excessive-force plaintiffs to parlay their minimal injuries into more serious ones by tacking on allegations of psychological suffering.” Solis, 31 F.4th at 981-82 (holding a plaintiff that suffered mental anguish along with minor physical injuries did not meet the injury requirement); Buehler v. Dear, 27 F.4th 969, 983 (5th Cir. 2022) (“[Plaintiff's] self-reported mental suffering is entitled to relatively little weight in our Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis.”). Finally, even if the Court agreed with Plaintiff that he did suffer an injury during the gunpoint detention, as the Court explained above, this use of force was not excessive or unreasonable in light of the circumstances.

Therefore, Plaintiff cannot show that Defendants Rainey, Luna, and Pineda committed any constitutional violations as it relates to excessive force, so Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The Court RECOMMENDS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff's excessive force claims against Defendants Rainey, Luna, and Pineda for both the hunting incident and the gunpoint incident and that those claims be DISMISSED. (Doc. 11).

C. Plaintiff's Retaliatory Detention Claims in Violation of the First Amendment Against Defendants Rainey, Luna, and Pineda

Plaintiff argues that during both the hunting incident and the gunpoint incident the respective Defendants made the decision to detain Plaintiff “in retaliation for [Plaintiff] engaging in constitutionally protected speech and conduct. In both instances, the statements made by [Plaintiff] were not fighting words. The statements and conduct of [Plaintiff] are protected under the First Amendment.” (Doc. 1 at 13-14). On the other hand, Defendants assert that Plaintiff's retaliation claims should be dismissed because the claims hinge on whether the seizure was lawful and, in both incidences, the detentions were reasonable. (Doc. 11 at 15-17). The Court agrees with Defendants.

In this case, a retaliatory detention claim requires that (1) Plaintiff was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, (2) Defendants caused Plaintiff to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity, and (3) Defendants' adverse actions were substantially motivated by Plaintiff's exercise of constitutionally protected conduct. Grisham v. Valenciano, 93 F.4th 903, 909 (5th Cir. 2024). The requisite injury under this claim “is the deprivation of a constitutional right.” Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 259 (5th Cir. 2002). “The plaintiff pressing a retaliatory arrest claim must plead and prove the absence of probable cause for the arrest.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 402 (2019). “Moreover, the Nieves Court established that plaintiffs in retaliatory prosecution cases must ‘show more than the subjective animus of an officer and a subsequent injury; plaintiffs must also prove as a threshold matter that the decision to press charges was objectively unreasonable because it was not supported by probable cause.'” Grisham, 93 F.4th at 909 (citing Nieves, 587 U.S. at 400-01). “[E]ven where a citizen believes that he has been subject to a retaliatory detention or arrest, if there was reasonable suspicion or probable cause for an officer to seize the citizen, ‘the objectives of law enforcement take primacy over the citizen's right to avoid retaliation.'” Allen v. Cisneros, 815 F.3d 239, 244-45 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Keenan, 290 F.3d at 261-62).

Here, the Court finds Plaintiff's retaliation claims must be dismissed because, as explained above, Defendants had reasonable suspicion to detain Plaintiff in both the hunting and gunpoint incidents. Further, Plaintiff pleads no facts that would support a finding that Defendants' actions in either situation were substantially motivated by Plaintiff exercising his First Amendment right to free speech. In the gunpoint incident, Defendants Luna and Pineda detained Plaintiff at gunpoint following him hitting another individual with a truck. As soon as Plaintiff was away from the truck, Defendants holstered their weapons. This detention was wholly unrelated to Plaintiff's exercise of free speech. In the hunting incident, Defendant Rainey had reasonable suspicion to detain Plaintiff to investigate whether he was hunting illegally. As the Court explained, a part of the suspicion arose from Plaintiff providing evasive answers regarding the number of doves he had killed. On this point, Plaintiff argues that “Deputy Rainey's unlawful conduct was motivated by Plaintiff's constitutionally protected activity, namely, being a hunter who refused to speak with him.” (Doc. 14 at 14). However, the Fifth Circuit has previously held that this argument “cannot overcome the officers' qualified immunity, because ‘it was not clearly established that an individual has a First Amendment right to refuse to answer an officer's questions during a Terry stop.'” Alexander v. City of Round Rock, 854 F.3d 298, 308 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1244 (10th Cir. 2011)). As the Plaintiff points to no case law to the contrary, the Court finds Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claims.

The Court RECOMMENDS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants Rainey, Luna, and Pineda for both the hunting incident and the gunpoint incident and that those claims be DISMISSED. (Doc. 11).

D. Plaintiff's Second Amendment Claim Against Defendant Rainey

In his Complaint, and more clearly in his Response, Plaintiff appears to be making a Second Amendment claim based on a First Amendment retaliation theory. Plaintiff alleges that his Second Amendment right to bear arms was violated during the hunting incident when Defendant Rainey handcuffed and detained Plaintiff while he was “engaging in lawful Second Amendment conduct (hunting during dove season).” (Doc. 1 at 15). Defendants' Motion argues that this claim should be dismissed because “[w]hile there is a right to bear arms, there is no right to violate the law in bearing arms” and “[Defendant] Rainey was clear that the issue was never that Plaintiff had been shooting.” (Doc. 11 at 15-16).

The elements of a retaliatory detention claim remain the same as above. However, the Court need not even discuss how the elements apply because the Court can find no cases in the Fifth Circuit-and Plaintiff did not point to any-recognizing a § 1983 claim for retaliatory detention under the theory that the plaintiff was engaged in an activity protected under the Second Amendment. See Schaefer v. Whitted, 121 F.Supp.3d 701, 710 n.3 (W.D. Tex. 2015).

Therefore, even assuming, arguendo, the Complaint did state a claim for relief under the Second Amendment, it would still be barred under the doctrine of qualified immunity because it cannot be shown that Defendant Rainey's conduct was a violation of clearly established law under the Second Amendment.

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff's Second Amendment claim against Defendant Rainey and that claim be DISMISSED. (Doc. 11).

E. Plaintiff's Monell Claim Against Ector County

Finally, Plaintiff asserts a § 1983 claim against Ector County under a theory of municipal liability. To sufficiently plead such a claim, commonly referred to as a Monell claim, Plaintiff must allege: “(1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right.” Pena v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 621 (5th Cir. 2018). However, “[i]f no underlying constitutional injury is present, the alleged unconstitutional policy or custom is ‘quite beside the point' and cannot be a basis for municipal liability.” Robinson v. Midland County, No. 21-CV-111, 2022 WL 20653429, at *9 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2022) (quoting Gonzales v. City of Kerrville, 205 F.3d 1337 (5th Cir. 1999)). Therefore, because Defendants Rainey, Luna, and Pineda did not violate any of Plaintiff's rights, it follows that Ector County did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights, regardless of any alleged custom or policy.

The Court RECOMMENDS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff's Monell liability claim against Ector County and that those claims be DISMISSED. (Doc. 11).

F. Plaintiff's Request for Leave to Amend

In his Response, Plaintiff requests, in the alternative, that the Court grant him leave to amend his complaint for the first time. (Doc. 14 at 23). Federal Rule 15(a) provides that leave to amend pleadings “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). Rule 15(a) “favors granting leave to amend unless a substantial reason exists, such as ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment.'” Smith v. McDonough, SA-22-CV-01383, 2023 WL 5918322, at *9 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2023) (quoting Wimm v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 3 F.3d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1993)); Edionwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d 287, 294 (5th Cir. 2017) (“While it is true that the court should freely give a party leave to amend its pleadings when justice so requires, such leave is not required where, as here, the movant contends that his pleadings sufficed to state a due process claim throughout his briefing in opposition to the Rule 12[(b)(6)] motion and fails to apprise the district court of the facts that he would plead in an amended complaint, if necessary, to cure any deficiencies.”) (internal citations, quotations and alterations omitted). Based on this rationale, courts typically provide plaintiffs with the opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal; however, dismissal “is appropriate when the plaintiff was previously provided ample opportunity to cure the deficiencies.” Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 182, 182 (1962); Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002)).

In this case, Plaintiff chose not to amend his Complaint as of right or seek leave from the Court to amend. Further, Plaintiff makes only a cursory mention of his request to amend, does not state the substance of his proposed amendment, nor does he attach an amended complaint for the Court. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has been given ample opportunity to cure deficiencies in his Complaint, and further amendment would be futile. See Smith, 2023 WL 5918322, at *9. Thus, the Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff's request to amend his complaint be DENIED.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED and that Plaintiff's claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. (Doc. 11).

Instructions for Service and Notice of Right to Appeal/Object

In the event that a party has not been served by the Clerk with this Report and Recommendation electronically, pursuant to the CM/ECF procedures of this District, the Clerk is ORDERED to mail such party a copy of this Report and Recommendation by certified mail. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), any party who desires to object to this report must serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions, or recommendations to which objections are being made; the District Judge need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. Such party shall file the objections with the Clerk of the Court and serve the objections on all other parties. A party's failure to file such objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Judge. Additionally, a party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Judge. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996).


Summaries of

Spratlen v. Rainey

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Midland/Odessa Division
Dec 27, 2024
No. 24-CV-00053-DC-RCG (W.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2024)
Case details for

Spratlen v. Rainey

Case Details

Full title:MATTHEW SETH SPRATLEN, Plaintiff, v. JOHN RAINEY, in his individual…

Court:United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Midland/Odessa Division

Date published: Dec 27, 2024

Citations

No. 24-CV-00053-DC-RCG (W.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2024)