Opinion
Case No. 3:03CV7520.
March 3, 2005
ORDER
This is a pro se prisoner civil rights suit in which the defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the motion shall be granted.
The plaintiff is an inmate at Marion Correctional Institution. He worked for Ohio Prison Industries (OPI) as a materials handler. Following back surgery on November 1, 2001, at the OSU hospital, his surgeon noted "no strenuous activity for six weeks." Follow-up care was referred to the prison physician.
In an order dated November 7, 2001, the prison doctor, as the "physician responsible for the day to day medical care of inmates at the institution," on whom rests "final decision about any treatment protocol or subsequent management," ODRC Policy 320-01, issued a temporary "complete idle status" effective until December 14, 2001.
Pursuant to prison policies, an inmate who is away from his job for more than thirty days is reclassified into a non-OPI assignment. Because plaintiff was medically restricted for more than thirty days from returning to his OPI position as a materials handler, he lost that position.
Plaintiff's complaint alleges two claims: 1) imposition of cruel and unusual punishment and denial of fair and equal treatment; and 2) denial of due process and equal treatment. Both relate, as do all his factual allegations, to his loss of his OPI job due to his absence for more than thirty days.
Although the plaintiff alleges animus on the part of his OPI supervisor (i.e., that he, not doctors, runs OPI), such animus, even if based (as it appears not to be) on a suspect classification, such as race or ethnicity, is not determinative. In essence, the plaintiff challenges the determination by the prison doctor that he was not to return to work for six weeks after his discharge from the hospital. No animus is attributed to the doctor.
Plaintiff complains about a possible back-dating by a day of the date of the prison doctor's restriction. There was nothing wrong with such back-dating, if it occurred, as the date simply indicates the effective date of the restriction. In any event, whenever issued, the prison doctor's restriction kept the plaintiff away from his job for more than thirty days.
This is a medical judgment which this court cannot second-guess. The defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to this aspect of plaintiff's claims.
In any event, as defendants point out, an inmate has no protected state created property or liberty interest claim in continued employment in a particular job. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471 (1983); Newsom v. Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 374 (6th Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff also contends that loss of his OPI job violated the Americans With Disabilities Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794. Plaintiff's circumstances did not come within that statute because, due to his "complete idle status," he was not "otherwise qualified" to work for the temporary period of his incapacitation. His back condition, not a disability, kept him from working. He cannot, accordingly, prevail on his ADA claim. See generally Burns v. City of Columbus, 91 F.3d 836, 841 (6th Cir. 1996).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED THAT defendants' motion for summary judgment be, and the same hereby is granted.
Further, the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 USC 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Plaintiff may, accordingly, appeal only on prepayment of the requisite filing fee.
So ordered.