Summary
concluding that report of defendant's "erratic driving, occurring only minutes before" officer arrived, "was sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that" defendant "had been driving while intoxicated, or was otherwise driving in a reckless manner"
Summary of this case from Hoyt v. StateOpinion
No. 08-14-00098-CR
02-03-2016
LAURA ELISABETH RITA, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 7 of Tarrant County, Texas (TC# 1294426) OPINION
Appellant Laura Elisabeth Rita pled guilty to one count of driving while intoxicated and was given a probated sentence. In a single issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained during her traffic stop, arguing that the stop was unlawful because it was initiated without reasonable suspicion. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress and affirm.
This appeal was transferred from the Fort Worth Court of Appeals, and we apply the precedent of that court to the extent required by TEX.R.APP. P. 41.3.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Appellant was pulled over and arrested in the early morning hours of August 23, 2012, on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. Appellant filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained during her traffic stop, alleging that the arresting officer did not have "probable cause or reasonable suspicion" to initiate the stop.
At the hearing on Appellant's motion to suppress, the State presented the testimony of Andy Covington, a concerned citizen, who testified that he was driving shortly after midnight on August 23, 2012, when he noticed a black Cadillac Escalade "swerving back and forth from lane to lane" on the George Bush Tollway. Believing the driver of the Escalade was driving recklessly, and might have been either intoxicated or falling asleep at the wheel, Covington called 911 to report his concerns. Covington followed the Escalade for 10 to 15 miles, speaking with a 911 dispatcher throughout that time. Because the two vehicles traveled through three different cities after Covington first initiated the call, Covington was transferred to 911 dispatchers in each jurisdiction, ending his call with a 911 dispatcher in the city of Grapevine. The recording of his conversation with the Grapevine dispatcher, which lasted approximately eleven minutes, was introduced into evidence at the suppression hearing without objection. During the call, Covington provided updates on his location, as well as continual descriptions of the manner in which the Escalade was being driven, making the following observations during the call:
• The Escalade almost hit the wall (on the side of the highway) four times.
• The Escalade was "all over" the road.
• The Escalade was "everywhere."
• The Escalade was driving at variable speeds between 50 and 80 mph.
• The Escalade was weaving from "shoulder to shoulder, back and forth."
• The Escalade almost "ran off the road."
• The Escalade was "almost in the ditch."
• The Escalade almost hit a pole.
Covington at one point reported the Escalade's driving had improved and that the Escalade was "kind of" staying within its own lane and was proceeding very slowly over a bridge. Covington further speculated that the driver was being more cautious because he or she may have become aware of "what was going on," purportedly referring to the fact that he had been following the vehicle for several miles. At that point in the call, Covington and the dispatcher discussed the possibility that the Escalade's driver may have been texting when Covington had earlier observed the vehicle's erratic driving, which both agreed would have also been considered "dangerous." At the suppression hearing, Covington acknowledged that it was "possible" the Escalade's driver had been texting, but noted that it would have been "an awfully long text," given the length of time in which the erratic driving occurred.
During the 911 call, Covington provided to the dispatcher the license plate number of the Escalade, as well as his full name, phone number, and the make and model of his car.
The 911 dispatcher contacted local law enforcement and relayed the information she had received from Covington to the dispatcher for the Grapevine Police Department. The 911 dispatcher advised Covington that law enforcement was on its way to his location, and pursuant to their standard procedure, she advised Covington to turn on his emergency flashers so that the officers would be able to locate him. After confirming that the Grapevine police officers had arrived at the scene, the 911 dispatcher advised Covington that he could continue home, and that law enforcement would contact him if additional information was needed from him.
At the suppression hearing, city of Grapevine Police Officer Daniel McClain testified that he received a report from the police dispatcher at approximately 12:30 on the morning of August 23, 2012, advising him that a citizen had contacted 911 to report that a black Cadillac Escalade was being driven in an erratic or hazardous manner. Officer McClain recalled being informed that the Escalade had been driving "all over the road," and that it had "nearly hit some poles [and] had gone off the roadway."
Officer McClain testified that as he was driving to the scene, the police dispatcher gave him continual updates about the location of the vehicles, and the manner in which the Escalade was reportedly being driven. The dispatcher also gave him the Escalade's license plate number, and a description of Covington's vehicle. Based on this information, as well as the fact that Covington's vehicle had on its emergency flashers, Officer McClain was immediately able to identify the Escalade as the suspect vehicle as he approached the scene.
Officer McClain recalled that he followed the Escalade for a short period of time before he attempted to pull it over, and during that time, he did not observe the driver of the Escalade committing any traffic violations, or doing anything "extraordinarily out of the ordinary[.]" Office McClain did note that the Escalade drove on the white line of the road for a brief period of time before he turned on his overhead lights to signal the vehicle to pull over. He observed that the Escalade was traveling approximately 45 mph in a 60 mph zone, which he believed was consistent with the citizen's report that the vehicle had been driving at "varying speeds." The officer also testified that based on his training and experience, he believed that driving "extremely slowly," as the Escalade's driver was doing, while not in and of itself a traffic violation, was consistent with the driver being intoxicated because intoxicated individuals often "vary their speeds when they drive[.]"
At the hearing, the State introduced a recording of the officer's dashcam video, which confirmed that Appellant momentarily drove on the white line of the roadway before the traffic stop was initiated.
At the suppression hearing, Officer McClain acknowledged receiving a report from the police dispatcher indicating that Covington had reported that the Escalade's driving had "improved" shortly before he reached the scene. In response to defense counsel's questioning, Officer McClain testified that it was therefore possible the Escalade's driver had been texting when Covington had earlier observed the vehicle's more erratic driving. Officer McClain expressed his belief, however, that Covington's report was more consistent with someone driving while intoxicated. In reaching this conclusion, he pointed out that texting drivers will typically put down their phone when they have a near-accident, but that the Escalade's driver had reportedly continued driving erratically over the course of several miles despite having several near-collisions. Accordingly, based on Covington's report, the fact that the Escalade was going "extremely slowly" as he followed it, and the fact that the incident occurred in the early morning hours when most DWI offenses occur, Officer McClain formed a suspicion that the Escalade's driver was "possibly intoxicated," and he therefore "felt it necessary to make a stop and contact the driver."
Officer McClain explained that in his experience, most DWI offenses are committed between 10 p.m. and 3:30 a.m. when the bars are closing or when individuals are otherwise leaving the bars to drive home.
Officer McClain identified the driver of the Escalade as Appellant, and recalled that while speaking with Appellant at the scene of the stop, he immediately detected the odor of alcohol "strongly emitting from the interior of the vehicle," and observed that Appellant's eyes were bloodshot. After performing a field sobriety test on Appellant, and obtaining a breath specimen, Officer McClain placed Appellant under arrest for suspicion of DWI.
At the close of the hearing, the trial court rejected Appellant's contention that Officer McClain did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop, and denied Appellant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop. The trial court thereafter issued a brief written order stating that Appellant's motion was denied. Neither party requested the court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. Shortly thereafter, Appellant pled guilty to a Class B misdemeanor offense of DWI, and was placed on probation and assessed a $750 fine. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
In a single issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred when it denied her motion to suppress, arguing that Officer McClain did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. We disagree.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under an abuse of discretion standard and will disturb the lower court's ruling only if it falls "outside the zone of reasonable disagreement." Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011); State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006); see also Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010). We apply a bifurcated standard of review. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). With regard to factual determinations, the trial judge is the sole trier of fact and the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony; therefore, we must "give almost total deference to a trial court's express or implied determination of historical facts, especially if those are based on the trial court's assessment of credibility and demeanor." Hernandez v. State, 376 S.W.3d 863, 868 (Tex.App. - Fort Worth 2012, no pet.) (citing Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 48); State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). However, when the trial court's rulings do not turn on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, and instead involve pure questions of law or rulings on mixed question of law and fact, we review those rulings de novo. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (citing Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 139-41 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996)).
When, as in the present case, findings of fact and conclusions of law were not requested, and none are made, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, assuming that the trial court made implicit findings of fact that support its ruling, as long as those findings are supported by the record. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855-56 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); see also State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696, 698-99 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) (holding that the standard set forth in Ross applies when parties do not request findings of fact and no such findings are made); Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 328 (appellate court will "assume that the trial court made implicit findings of fact supported in the record that buttress its conclusion"). We will uphold the trial court's ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. Ramos v. State, 245 S.W.3d 410, 418 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008); see also Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447-48 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010).
Reasonable Suspicion
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution permits a warrantless investigatory detention of a person, short of a full-blown custodial arrest, if the detention is justified by "reasonable suspicion." State v. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270, 273-74 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Reasonable suspicion exists when the officer making an investigatory stop has "specific, articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity." Id. at 273 (citing York v. State, 342 S.W.3d 528, 536 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011)); see also Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). Reasonable suspicion "'permits the officer to stop the person for a brief time and take additional steps to investigate further.'" Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d at 273 (quoting Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 185, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004)). The test for reasonable suspicion is an objective one, and requires a court to look at the totality of the circumstances; reasonable suspicion may exist "even if those circumstances standing alone may be just as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity." Id. at 274 (citing York, 342 S.W.3d at 536); see also Fowler v. State, 266 S.W.3d 498, 501-02 (Tex.App. - Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref'd).
This objective standard requires an appellate court to ask whether a reasonable officer in the same situation would have believed that a crime had been or was being committed. State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 569 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013). Accordingly, the appellate court must place itself "in the shoes of the officer at the time of the inception of the stop—considering only the information actually known by or available to the officer at that time." Id. (citing Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 925). The key question is whether the specific, articulable "facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate." Id. (quoting Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997)). However, as the Fort Worth Court of Appeals has recognized, to "satisfy the standard of reasonable suspicion, the articulable facts need not lead inexorably to a conclusion that a particular penal code offense is imminent." State v. Houghton, 384 S.W.3d 441, 447 (Tex.App. - Fort Worth 2012, no pet.) (citing Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 916-17 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011)). Instead, "[i]t is enough to satisfy the standard that the information is sufficiently detailed and reliable to support more than an 'inarticulate hunch' that something of an apparently criminal nature is brewing." Id.
ANALYSIS
In arguing that Officer McClain did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop, Appellant raises two separate, but related questions: (1) whether Covington's report to the 911 dispatcher included sufficiently specific, articulable facts to support a reasonable inference that Appellant was driving while intoxicated; and (2) whether Covington's report was sufficiently "corroborated" to allow Officer McClain to rely on it when he initiated the traffic stop. We consider each question separately.
Covington's Report Provided Specific, Articulable Facts to the 911 Dispatcher
Appellant first contends that Covington did not provide sufficient facts to the 911 dispatcher that would have allowed Officer McClain to "positively identify the driver [of the Escalade] or any traffic violation to form the basis of a traffic stop." Appellant points out that Covington advised the 911 dispatcher that he was unable to see the driver of the Escalade because the Escalade's windows were tinted, and that Covington mistakenly referred to the Escalade's driver as a male throughout the 911 call.
Appellant is correct in asserting that an officer receiving a report of a vehicle being driven erratically must receive specific information that will allow him to properly identify the suspect vehicle, to ensure that he is pulling over the correct vehicle. See, e.g., Hall v. State, 74 S.W.3d 521, 523 n.1 (Tex.App. - Amarillo 2002, no pet.) (reasonable suspicion did not exist for traffic stop where an anonymous tipster failed to sufficiently describe the vehicle that he had observed traveling in the wrong direction down a roadway, and in particular failed to impart the "license of the vehicle supposedly traveling in the improper direction, the number of occupants therein, the year or make of the truck, or any other information describing the vehicle involved, save for the comment about it being small and red").
Appellant submits that "the only verifiable piece of information provided by the 911 caller was that there was a black Cadillac Escalade driving in a general direction," which she asserts was insufficient to link her to any criminal activity. To the contrary, this was not the only "verifiable piece of information" that Covington provided to the 911 dispatcher linking Appellant to the suspected criminal activity that Covington observed. Covington provided the 911 dispatcher with key information that was relayed to Officer McClain allowing him to properly identify Appellant's vehicle as being the subject of Covington's report, including the Escalade's license plate number. In addition, Covington provided continual updates on the Escalade's exact locations as he followed the vehicle; provided a description of the make and model of his own vehicle; and turned on his vehicle's emergency flashers so that law enforcement would be able to easily identify both vehicles when they arrived on the scene. Officer McClain testified at the suppression hearing that he was able to use all of this information, which was relayed to him by the police dispatcher, in order to ensure that he was stopping the correct vehicle.
Appellant also seeks to call into question Covington's credibility, in part by pointing to Covington's testimony at the suppression hearing that he was "tired" when he made his report to the 911 dispatcher. Appellant further finds it significant that Covington became excited at one point during the 911 call when he observed the Escalade almost going off the road, causing the 911 dispatcher to ask him to "calm down." Issues pertaining to the credibility of witnesses, however, are for the trial court to resolve. Although no findings of fact were made in this particular issue, we must assume that the trial court made an implied finding that Covington was a credible witness when the court denied Appellant's motion to suppress. Cf. Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 855-56 (in the absence of findings of fact, appellate court must presume that when the trial court granted a defendant's motion to suppress evidence of an allegedly unlawful arrest, the court impliedly determined that the arresting officer's testimony at the suppression hearing was not credible).
Moreover, we note that when Officer McClain initially approached the Escalade, he observed that it was driving at an unusually slow speed, as reported by Covington, which bolstered his belief that he had identified the correct vehicle. We therefore reject Appellant's argument that Officer McClain did not have sufficient information from which to identify the suspect vehicle when he initiated the traffic stop. See, e.g., State v. Stolte, 991 S.W.2d 336, 342-43 (Tex.App. - Fort Worth 1999, no pet.) (officer was justified in initiating an investigatory traffic stop based on a citizen's report of a vehicle being driven erratically when he confirmed that the vehicle he pulled over matched the description and license plate of the car described by the citizen, and was in the location where the citizen indicated).
Appellant also contends that the description Covington gave to the 911 dispatcher of how she had been driving was insufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that she was intoxicated, arguing that Covington's description of her allegedly erratic driving was just as consistent with a conclusion that she may have been texting, falling asleep, or even "messing with the radio." Appellant further points out that during a portion of the time Covington was following her, they were driving through construction zones, which could have made it "more difficult than usual to navigate the roads," which in turn, could have caused Covington to erroneously believe she was intoxicated.
We note, however, that although there may have been other possible explanations for Appellant's erratic driving, those possibilities are not relevant to our analysis. As set forth above, when considering whether an investigatory stop was reasonable, our role is to view the facts objectively, and determine whether the facts support a "reasonable suspicion" that criminal activity had occurred, regardless of whether the circumstances might be "just as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity." Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d at 273-74. Whether Appellant's erratic driving was also consistent with arguably "innocent" conduct such as texting or distracted driving, does not negate the fact that Appellant's driving gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that she was driving while intoxicated. See Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 917 (although appellant's "odd" conduct of following citizens in a parking lot, when viewed in isolation, could have been construed as being innocent in nature, the overall circumstances created a reasonable suspicion that "something of an apparently criminal nature [was] brewing," thereby justifying the officer's investigatory stop).
Further, we find it insignificant that Covington reported to the 911 dispatcher that Appellant's driving had temporarily improved just minutes before Officer McClain arrived on the scene. An officer is not required to have a reasonable suspicion that a crime is being committed at the very moment he initiates an investigatory stop. Instead, the officer need only have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has been committed in the past, is currently being committed, or is otherwise imminent. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d at 273-74. Covington's report of Appellant's extremely erratic driving, occurring only minutes before Officer McClain's arrival, was sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that Appellant had been driving while intoxicated, or was otherwise driving in a reckless manner.
Covington's Report was Sufficiently Corroborated
In a separate but related argument, Appellant also argues that Officer McClain was not entitled to rely solely on Covington's report no matter how detailed, and that Officer McClain was instead required to corroborate that report, either by a meeting in person with Covington to verify his reliability, or by personally observing the erratic driving himself, before he was justified in conducting the traffic stop.
Appellant is correct in pointing out that when a citizen informant provides a "tip" to law enforcement indicating that criminal activity may be afoot, the tip must generally be "corroborated." See Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 259 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). However, "[c]orroboration does not mean that the officer must personally observe the conduct that causes him to reasonably suspect that a crime is being, has been, or is about to be committed." Id. at 259 n.5 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)). Instead, "corroboration refers to whether the police officer, in light of the circumstances, confirms enough facts to reasonably conclude that the information given to him is reliable and a temporary detention is thus justified." Id. (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330-31, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990)). "[T]he reliability of a citizen-informant is generally shown by the very nature of the circumstances under which the incriminating information became known to him or her." Id. at 258.
In providing an example of how such reliability may be demonstrated, the Court in Brother favorably cited the Fort Worth Court of Appeal's opinion in Pipkin v. State, 114 S.W.3d 649 (Tex.App. - Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). In that case, a citizen called the police department on his cell phone to report that he had observed a driver traveling thirty miles per hour under the posted speed limit, and that he had also observed the driver smoking what appeared to be a "crack pipe." Pipkin, 114 S.W.3d at 652-53. The caller provided a detailed description of the defendant's vehicle, including its license plate number, and stayed on the phone with the police dispatcher while following the vehicle, providing the dispatcher with continual updates on the vehicle's location and actions. Id. at 655. The court noted that by giving the dispatcher this detailed information, which was in turned relayed to the arresting officers, the citizen allowed the arresting officers to ensure that they were pulling over the correct vehicle, thereby "corroborating" the information received by the citizen. Id.
The court in Pipkin found it significant that the citizen caller provided the dispatcher with his name, phone number, location, and destination, which in turn, made the citizen "accountable" for his report, a factor which the court noted should be given "great weight." Id. The court also noted that because the citizen was not a paid informant, and was instead voluntarily reporting what he believed was criminal activity, the citizen's report should be considered "inherently trustworthy." Id. The court in Pipkin held that, considering these three factors, i.e., the detailed nature of the citizen's report of his firsthand observations, the citizen's willingness to be held accountable for his report, and the fact that the citizen was not a paid informant, all provided sufficient "corroboration" to allow the officer to rely solely on the report in initiating the traffic stop. Id.
In Brother, the Court of Criminal Appeals was also presented with substantially similar facts, in which a non-paid citizen informant provided detailed information to a 911 dispatcher, which suggested the appellant had been driving in an "erratic" manner and was possibly intoxicated. Brother, 166 S.W.3d at 258. In particular, the citizen informed the 911 dispatcher that the appellant's vehicle was "speeding, tailgating, and weaving across several lanes of traffic," and further provided a detailed description of the appellant's vehicle and location. In addition, the citizen kept in contact with the 911 dispatcher while she followed the appellant's vehicle until the arresting officer arrived on the scene and initiated a traffic stop. Id. at 256-57. The citizen also activated her emergency lights before the arresting officer arrived at the scene, at the request of the dispatcher, so that the officer would be able to correctly identify the suspect vehicle. Id. at 258. The Court noted that the citizen provided her contact information to law enforcement at the scene, and came forward to testify at the defendant's suppression hearing. Id. Although the arresting officer did not personally observe the appellant commit any traffic violations, the Court concluded that the officer was justified in making the stop based solely on the citizen's report. Id.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court in Brother expressly rejected the same argument that Appellant is making in the present case, holding that it was not necessary for the arresting officer to "personally observe" any criminal conduct before initiating the traffic stop. In particular, the Court expressly held that the "factual basis for stopping a vehicle need not arise from the officer's personal observation, but may be supplied by information acquired from another person." Id. at 256-57 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)). The Court pointed out that the appellant's argument that the officer had to personally observe a traffic violation went "against the great weight of authority[,]" noting that "federal courts and our lower Texas courts have consistently held that a stop based on facts supplied by a citizen-eyewitness, which are adequately corroborated by the arresting officer, do not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 258-59. And finally, as a matter of policy, the Court noted that appellant's argument was "simply unsound[,]" as it would be "foolish and contrary to the balance of interests struck in Terry and its progeny" to require officers, who have been apprised of detailed reports of suspected criminal activity from citizen informants, to wait until the defendant commits "additional suspicious acts" before being allowed to initiate an investigatory stop. Id. at 259.
In Brother, the Court cited a long list of opinions in which both state and federal courts have reached similar conclusions, including, in addition to the Pipkins opinion, the following three opinions issued by the Fort Worth Court of Appeals: Glover v. State, 870 S.W.2d 198, 199-200 (Tex.App. - Fort Worth 1994, pet. ref'd) (upholding stop based solely on facts supplied by unidentified EMS personnel); State v. Stolte, 991 S.W.2d 336, 341 (Tex.App. - Fort Worth 1999, no pet.) (police officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop in DWI case based on information supplied by a cell phone caller); State v. Sailo, 910 S.W.2d 184, 188 (Tex.App. - Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref'd)). Brother, 166 S.W.3d at 259 n.4.
We similarly reject Appellant's argument that a law enforcement officer is required to meet "face-to-face" or speak personally with a citizen informant by telephone before making an investigatory stop. This argument is contrary to the holding in Brother, in which the Court expressly held that the detaining officer was justified in conducting an investigatory stop based on a citizen's report, as relayed to him by a police dispatcher. Further, this issue was indirectly discussed in Derichsweiler v. State, in which the Court clarified that a "detaining officer need not be personally aware of every fact that objectively supports a reasonable suspicion to detain[.]" Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914-15 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011). As the Court in Derichsweiler explained, in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the focus is not on what the detaining officer personally knew; instead, the focus is on the "cumulative information known to the cooperating officers," which includes the 911 dispatcher, as well as the detaining officer. Id.; see also Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 924 ("any information known to the police dispatcher is imputed to the detaining officer" and informs his or her decision of whether reasonable suspicion exists).
We conclude that Officer McClain was not required to corroborate Covington's report by either meeting or speaking with Covington personally to verify his information before initiating the traffic stop, and that Officer McClain was similarly not required to personally observe Appellant commit a traffic violation before initiating the stop. Instead, as set forth in Brother, the question whether Covington's report was sufficiently corroborated must be assessed by looking to the totality of the circumstances under which the report itself was made. Brother, 166 S.W.3d at 258.
The circumstances under which Covington made his report were virtually identical to the circumstances under which the citizen informants made their reports in both Pipkin and Brother. Like both the citizen informants did in Pipkin and Brother, Covington stayed on the line with the 911 dispatcher the entire time that he was following Appellant's vehicle, providing continual and detailed updates on Appellant's erratic driving and the vehicle's location; provided a clear description of the suspect vehicle, including the vehicle's license plate number; and turned on his emergency flashers, as requested by the 911 dispatcher, ensuring that law enforcement could easily identify the two vehicles. And, as in Pipkin and Brother, Covington provided the dispatcher with his name and phone number, and agreed to make himself available if needed in the future, thereby putting himself in a position to be held "accountable" for the information he provided, and thereby rendering the report itself inherently trustworthy.
Moreover, Officer McClain was able to corroborate the information received from Covington by the facts he observed when he arrived on the scene. In particular, he was able to verify the Escalade's license plate number, verify that the Escalade was in the location described by Covington, and verify that the Escalade was driving at varying speeds, as Covington had reported. Based on these facts, we conclude that Officer McClain was justified in concluding that Covington's report of Appellant's erratic driving was sufficiently reliable and provided him with reasonable basis for suspecting that Appellant was driving while intoxicated.
These facts also distinguish Appellant's case from the two cases Appellant cites for the proposition that Officer McClain was not entitled to rely on Covington's report. See, e.g., Hall, 74 S.W.3d at 525-26; Davis v. State, 989 S.W.2d 859, 862-65 (Tex.App. - Austin 1999, pet. ref'd). In both of those cases, the citizens placed only brief calls to 911 reporting that another vehicle was driving in a suspicious manner. Unlike the present case, the callers in both of those cases failed to provide an adequate description of the suspect vehicles; failed to stay on the phone with the 911 dispatcher to provide updates on the suspect vehicle's location and actions; provided only general, and in one instance incorrect, information to the dispatcher; and more importantly, failed to provide their contact information to the dispatcher. As the court noted in Hall, when a citizen's tip is truly anonymous, "caution must be taken," as an anonymous tip, standing alone, seldom provides the reasonable suspicion necessary to authorize an investigative stop and detention. Hall, 74 S.W.3d at 525 (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990)). This concern, however, simply does not exist when, as here, a citizen caller provides his contact information to law enforcement, thereby making himself accountable for making his report, and thereby ensuring the inherent reliability of his report. See, e.g., Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914-15 (information provided to police from a citizen-informant who identifies himself and may be held to account for the accuracy and veracity of his report may be regarded as inherently reliable).
In Hall, the anonymous tipster failed to provide a sufficient description of the suspect vehicle that he had witnessed driving in the wrong direction on a roadway, and failed to provide the dispatcher with his exact location of the vehicle, thereby leaving the arresting officers unable to corroborate any of the facts relayed by the tipster. Hall, 74 S.W.3d at 524. Similarly, in Davis, an anonymous caller provided only general information to the police dispatcher that a vehicle was driving "recklessly" as it passed the caller on the shoulder of the road in the city of Round Rock; however, the caller left "vague the time, the location of the roadway in Round Rock, whether the tipster was in a vehicle, and other circumstances supporting the stated conclusion of 'reckless driving.'" The arresting officers were unable to corroborate any of the information provided to the dispatcher, and therefore did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. Davis, 989 S.W.2d at 864-65. --------
Accordingly, given the inherently reliable nature of Covington's report, and the fact that Officer McClain was able to corroborate the facts that Covington provided in his report to the 911 dispatcher, we conclude that Officer McClain's belief that Appellant was driving while intoxicated was supported by reasonable suspicion and he was thereby justified in initiating the traffic stop. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion to suppress. Appellant's sole issue is overruled.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
STEVEN L. HUGHES, Justice February 3, 2016 Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Hughes, JJ. (Do Not Publish)