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Ray v. United States

U.S.
May 18, 1987
481 U.S. 736 (1987)
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Summary

holding that the "concurrent sentence doctrine" has no applicability under current sentencing law, which requires the imposition of separate financial assessments on each count (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3013)

Summary of this case from United States v. Ehmer
See 25 Summaries

Opinion

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 86-281.

Argued April 28, 1987 Decided May 18, 1987

Upon his convictions for one count of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, petitioner was sentenced to concurrent prison terms on all three counts and to concurrent special parole terms on the two possession counts. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conspiracy conviction and one of the possession convictions, but, applying the so-called "concurrent sentence doctrine," declined to review the second possession conviction because the sentences on the two possession counts were concurrent.

Held: The judgment below is vacated, and the case is remanded for the Court of Appeals to consider petitioner's challenge to his second possession conviction. Since, in addition to the concurrent prison and parole terms, the District Court imposed a $50 assessment on petitioner on each count pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3013 (1982 ed., Supp. III), and since petitioner's liability to pay the total $150 assessment depends on the validity of each of his three convictions, petitioner is not in fact serving concurrent sentences.

791 F.2d 929, vacated and remanded.

Joseph A. Connors III argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Matias Morin, Jr.

Deputy Solicitor General Bryson argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Weld, and Andrew J. Pincus.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner was found guilty of one count of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, and two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. He was sentenced to concurrent 7-year prison terms on all three counts, and to concurrent special parole terms of five years on the two possession counts. The Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's conspiracy conviction and one of his possession convictions. United States v. Sandoval, 791 F.2d 929 (CA5 1986) (judg. order). Applying the so-called "concurrent sentence doctrine," the court declined to review the second possession conviction because the sentences on the two possession counts were concurrent. We granted certiorari to review the role of the concurrent sentence doctrine in the federal courts. 479 U.S. 960 (1986).

It now appears, however, that petitioner is not in fact serving concurrent sentences. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3013 (1982 ed., Supp. III) provides that district courts shall assess a monetary charge "on any person convicted of an offense against the United States." Pursuant to this section, the District Court imposed a $50 assessment on each count, in addition to the concurrent prison and parole terms, for a total of $150. Since petitioner's liability to pay this total depends on the validity of each of his three convictions, the sentences are not concurrent. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore vacated, and the cause is remanded to that court so that it may consider petitioner's challenge to his second possession conviction.

It is so ordered.

Summaries of

Ray v. United States

U.S.
May 18, 1987
481 U.S. 736 (1987)

holding that the "concurrent sentence doctrine" has no applicability under current sentencing law, which requires the imposition of separate financial assessments on each count (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3013)

Summary of this case from United States v. Ehmer

holding that review of each conviction was required despite the defendant's concurrent prison terms because each conviction carried a $50 assessment

Summary of this case from United States v. Brooks

holding concurrent sentence doctrine does not apply where a monetary assessment is imposed on each count because of the collateral consequences of the multiple convictions, i.e. a defendant's "liability to pay th[e] total depends on the validity of each of his . . . convictions."

Summary of this case from U.S. v. McKie

holding that the concurrent sentence doctrine does not preclude review of a sentence including a special assessment

Summary of this case from U.S. v. Witek

holding that the concurrent sentence doctrine does not apply where the total amount of the monetary assessment is dependent on the validity of each of the convictions

Summary of this case from United States v. King

holding on a defendant's direct appeal that the concurrent sentence doctrine was inappropriate where the defendant was ordered to pay a $50 special assessment fee per Count

Summary of this case from United States v. Edwards

holding that, because the defendant's liability to pay the three $50 assessments imposed on each count of which he was convicted, totaling $150, depended on the validity of each of his three convictions, the defendant's sentences were not concurrent and the concurrent sentence doctrine was inapplicable

Summary of this case from Timmons v. Lee

finding the imposition of a special assessment on each count meant that the sentences were not concurrent

Summary of this case from Hernandez v. Sec'y, DOC

concluding that "petitioner is not in fact serving concurrent sentences" because he was ordered to pay multiple special assessments

Summary of this case from U.S. v. Robertson

rejecting application of "concurrent-sentence" doctrine to challenges to multiple convictions, since each conviction carried independent $50 assessments

Summary of this case from United States v. Smith

In Ray v. United States, 481 U.S. 736, 107 S.Ct. 2093, 95 L.Ed.2d 693 (1987) (per curiam), the Supreme Court vacated an appellate court’s invocation of the concurrent sentence doctrine in a direct appeal.

Summary of this case from Dhinsa v. Krueger

In Ray, the Fifth Circuit had invoked the concurrent sentence doctrine and declined to review one of the petitioner's two convictions on direct appeal for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute because the sentences on the two counts of possession were concurrent.

Summary of this case from United States v. Ross

In Ray, the trial court had imposed a $50 assessment on three separate counts, in addition to concurrent prison and parole terms.

Summary of this case from Steffes v. Pollard

In Ray v. United States, 481 U.S. 736, 737, 107 S.Ct. 2093, 95 L.Ed.2d 693 (1987) (per curiam), the Supreme Court held that the concurrent sentencing doctrine is inapplicable where a defendant must pay an assessment on each count of conviction.

Summary of this case from U.S. v. Ware

In Ray v. United States, 481 U.S. 736, 737, 107 S.Ct. 2093, 95 L.Ed.2d 693 (1987) (per curiam), the Supreme Court held that the doctrine cannot be applied when the district court assesses a monetary charge on a defendant pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3013.

Summary of this case from U.S. v. Wade

discussing applicability of concurrent sentence doctrine where special assessments are charged

Summary of this case from United States v. Segien

In Ray v. United States, 481 U.S. 736, 737, 107 S.Ct. 2093, 2093-94, 95 L.Ed.2d 693 (1987) (per curiam), the Supreme Court held that where a special assessment was imposed on three separate counts, they could not be considered concurrent sentences.

Summary of this case from U.S. v. Pardo

In Ray v. United States, 481 U.S. 736, 737, 107 S.Ct. 2093, 2093, 95 L.Ed.2d 693 (1987), the Supreme Court, however, refused to apply the doctrine where a defendant received, in addition to concurrent terms of incarceration, cumulative monetary assessments pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3013.

Summary of this case from U.S. v. Young

In Ray, the defendant was found guilty of one count of conspiracy and two counts of possession with intent to distribute.

Summary of this case from U.S. v. Young

In Ray v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 2093, 95 L.Ed.2d 693 (1987), the Court held that we could not apply the doctrine to refuse to review a concurrent sentence when the district court had imposed, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3013, a special assessment fee upon the defendant for that concurrent sentence.

Summary of this case from U.S. v. Stovall

In Ray v. United States, 481 U.S. 736 (1987), the Supreme Court “granted certiorari to review the role of the concurrent sentence doctrine in the federal courts,” but noted that “[i]t now appears... that petitioner is not in fact serving concurrent sentences.” Id.

Summary of this case from United States v. Padilla

In Ray v. United States, 481 U.S. 736, 737 (1987) (per curiam), the United States Supreme Court held that the concurrent sentencing doctrine does not apply where a defendant must pay an assessment on each count of conviction.

Summary of this case from Ocampo v. Hemmingway

In Ray v. United States, 481 U.S. 736 (1987)) (per curiam), the Fifth Circuit had invoked the concurrent sentence doctrine and declined to review one of the petitioner's two convictions on direct appeal for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute because the sentences on the two counts of possession were concurrent.

Summary of this case from Okafor v. Antonelli

refusing to apply the doctrine because the defendant would still have to pay an assessment for the invalid conviction

Summary of this case from Taylor v. United States

refusing to apply the doctrine because the defendant would still have to pay an assessment for the invalid conviction

Summary of this case from Whitmire v. United States
Case details for

Ray v. United States

Case Details

Full title:RAY v . UNITED STATES

Court:U.S.

Date published: May 18, 1987

Citations

481 U.S. 736 (1987)
107 S. Ct. 2093

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