Opinion
Civil Action: 3:00-CV0460-BF
January 16, 2001
ORDER
This is a consent case before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction on December 6, 2000 and Plaintiff filed his response on December 15, 2000. A hearing on the matter is unnecessary, and after reviewing the motions, briefs, and relevant law, the Court concludes that Defendant's Motion should be denied.
BACKGROUND
This is a Title VII action, arising under 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (e) et seq. (Pl.'s Original Compl. at 2.) George Rameriz ("Plaintiff") is an Hispanic male currently employed as a Criminal Investigator/Special Agent in the Dallas District Office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"). (Pl's Br. at 1.) The INS is an agency within the Department of Justice, which is administered by the United States Attorney General, Janet Reno ("Defendant"). Plaintiff claims he was, and is still being, sexually harassed by Immigration Records Technician Hope Berens ("Berens"). ( Id. at 1.) Plaintiff also alleges that because of his sex and national origin, he was refused promotions. ( Id. at 10.)
Plaintiff contacted an EEO counselor on January 12, 1996 complaining of the harassment and subsequently filed a formal complaint of discrimination with the Department of Justice EEO Office on February 26, 1996. ( Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff's EEO case was assigned to an EEO investigator on November 18, 1996, and an investigation into Plaintiff's claims was conducted from December 11, 1996 until March 11, 1997. (Def's Mot. at 2.) At the conclusion of the EEO investigation, Plaintiff was provided a copy of the Investigative Record which was also submitted to the EEO office of the TNS. ( Id. at 2.) On December 8, 1999, the Department of Justice issued a Final Decision in Plaintiff's case, finding that Plaintiff had been discriminated against because of his sex and subjected to a sexually hostile environment. (Pl's App., Ex. A at 1-14.) In the Final Decision letter, under the section entitled "Relief" the Department of Justice concluded, among other things, that Plaintiff might be entitled to compensatory damages. ( Id. at 13.) The letter directed Plaintiff to submit a claim for such damages to the INS EEO Officer in Washington, D.C. for further evaluation. ( Id. at 13.) On December 8, 1999, the Department of Justice also sent Plaintiff a letter detailing his rights pertaining to the issuance of the Department of Justice's Final Decision letter. Notably, the letter advised Plaintiff of his right to file a civil action in the appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) days of receiving the Final Decision. ( Id., Ex. B at 15-16.) Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on February 29, 2000.
Defendant argues that under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff's claim improperly abandoned the mandatory pre-trial procedures, thereby divesting this Court of subject matter jurisdiction. According to Defendant, Plaintiff did not cooperate with the Department of Justice's recognition of liability and corresponding compensatory damages offer because he did not provide evidence to support his compensatory damages claim. Thus, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies — as would be required in a Title VII cause of action. Plaintiff responds by arguing that he frilly exhausted his administrative remedies by participating in good faith in the EEO process. Plaintiff asserts that, contrary to what Defendant says, he did submit evidence to support the compensatory damages claim on not one, but two occasions. Furthermore, his decision to wait until receipt of the Department of Justice's Final Decision letter and Notice of Right to Sue, lends support to this conclusion. Plaintiff characterizes his conduct as cooperative, yet with a full appreciation of the filing deadlines followed by the federal district court. Plaintiff asks this Court to deny the Defendant's motion.
ANALYSIS
Motions filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a party to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court to hear a case. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances, through: (1) the complaint, (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or (3)-the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); see also Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996).
One way to use a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to attack a claim is referred to as a "factual attack." A factual attack challenges the existence of subject matter jurisdiction by looking beyond the pleadings. In reviewing a factual attack, the court may consider matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits. McDaniel v. United States, 899 F. Supp. 305, 307 (E.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd, 102 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 1996). A factual attack may occur at any stage of the proceedings. However, the Plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist. Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980). A party may claim that federal subject matter jurisdiction is lacking by virtue of the plaintiff's inability to prove the elements of the federal cause of action in question. See O'Quinn v. Manuel, 773 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1985).
In examining a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the district court is empowered to consider matters of fact which may be in dispute. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 413. Ultimately, a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be granted only if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his or her claim that would entitle him or her to relief Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1998).
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as applied to federal employees, Congress created certain mandatory administrative requirements as prerequisites to bringing employment discrimination claims in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. Specifically, a federal employee asserting an employment discrimination claim in federal court must stick to the guidelines listed in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (c). Brown v. General Serv. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 829 (1976). Building on these guidelines, the Fifth Circuit laid out the requirements for filing, and maintaining, a Title VII action as follows: (I) the complaint must be filed within the allocated time provided in Title VII and (2) the complainant must first have exhausted all administrative remedies. Randel v. United States Dept. of the Navy, 157 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 1998); see Tolbert v. United States, 916 F.2d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 1990); see Porter v. Adams, 639 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1981). Each of these requirements are prerequisites to federal subject matter jurisdiction. Tolbert, 916 F.2d at 247; see also Hampton v. Internal Revenue Serv., 913 F.2d 180, 182 (5th Cir. 1990).
Defendant cited cases from a variety of jurisdictions, only a few of which were Fifth Circuit opinions. For example, Defendant suggests that Plaintiff's failure to provide information relating to his compensatory damages prejudiced his claim as was the case in Wade v. Secretary of the Army, 796 F.2d 1369, 1377 (11th Cir. 1986). Concluding that the Plaintiff in Wade might not have exhausted his administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit, the Eleventh Circuit said, "the purpose of exhaustion is to give the agency the information it needs to investigate and resolve the dispute between the employee and the employer." Wade, 796 F.2d at 1377. Defendant argues that here, like in Wade, Plaintiff could have provided the information needed to resolve the dispute relating to compensatory damages.
However, one of the issues in Wade involved the amount and nature of information provided by the claimants at the investigative stage. As mentioned by the Eleventh Circuit, "it is not clear whether the complaints examiner ever received [a forty-nine page information packet]." Wade, 796 F.2d at 1372. Indeed, in a footnote at the end of the case, the Court pointed out that there appeared to be a "discrepancy" between the information upon which the complaints examiner based his report and the information alleged to have been provided by the complainants. Wade, 796 F.2d at 1378, n. 10.
Similarly, Defendant cites Crawford v. Babbitt, 186 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1999) for the proposition that when a Plaintiff fails to provide information relevant to resolving the claim at the administrative level, he fails to exhaust his administrative remedies for the purposes of a Title VII lawsuit.
The scenario in Crawford also differs from the present situation in a meaningful way. In Crawford, the issue of compensatory damages first arose during a pre-hearing conference where the parties discussed their settlement negotiations with the EEOC administrative judge. Crawford, 186 F.3d at 1324. At that time, the Plaintiff learned that the Agency did not intend to consider monetary settlement for compensatory damages because the Plaintiff had not provided any evidence of injury. Id. at 1324. The Plaintiff in Crawford had the opportunity to provide the evidence requested but failed to do so. Even after the judge warned the Plaintiff that her failure to submit evidence supporting her compensatory damages would bar recovery, she refused to submit evidence of her damages. Id. at 1324. Nearly three months later, the Agency issued its final decision on the matter. Id. at 1325. The Agency's final decision did not include an award of compensatory damages. Id. at 1325. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit considered the Supreme Court's holding in West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212 (1999) wherein it was determined that compensatory damages could be awarded in the administrative process. The Crawford court also referred to Wade v. Secretary of the Army, 796 F.2d 1369 (11th Cir. 1986), noting that the good faith effort by the employee to cooperate with the agency and EEOC in providing all relevant, available information was all that "exhaustion" required. Crawford, 186 F.3d at 1326. The record in Crawford indicated that the only information the Agency ever had relating to the Plaintiff's compensatory damages claim was her statement to an investigator that the harassment had upset her and that the stress of the harassment had led to physical problems for which she sought medical attention. Id. at 1327.
Defendant's position is clear, "in lieu of providing the evidence requested by the Department of Justice's Complaint Adjudication Office, Plaintiff filed this action." (Def's Mot. at 3.) Plaintiffs response is also clear, "[i]n this case, Plaintiff had previously sent the information requested . . . and [in response to the Final Decision letter,] again sent the information, with new information. ( See Pl.'s Br. at 7; Pl.'s App., Ex. D at 20-47; Pl.'s App., Ex. E at 48-92.) Therefore, if resolution of this issue turns upon Plaintiff's good faith efforts to cooperate with the investigating agency, then the question becomes, what did Plaintiff do to cooperate? Obviously, based on the arguments presented by both parties, this question involves disputed facts — principally, whether and to what extent Plaintiff cooperated in furnishing the investigating agency with the requested information.
CONCLUSION
In this case, it does not appear certain that Plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief as would be required by Home Builders. Judging from Plaintiff's submitted appendix in support of his response in opposition to the motion to dismiss, it appears as though Plaintiff tendered various types of information detailing and explaining his claim as early as February 26, 1996. Comparing Exhibits D and E, it appears as though much of the same information was tendered again on July 6, 2000 in response to the Department of Justice's request.
It is the conclusion of this Court that although Plaintiffs claim has lingered for several years, there is no evidence to support the contention that he has not acted in good faith in cooperating with the investigation of his discrimination claim. Thus, it is the conclusion of this Court that, for the purposes of this motion, Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies and that he acted in good faith in providing all relevant, available information to the Department of Justice when requested. Furthermore, this Court approves of Plaintiff's decision to file suit, as set forth in the Notice of Right to Sue letter, and as permitted by the Code of Federal Regulations. It is hard to envision the logic in notifying Plaintiff of his right to file a lawsuit while at the same time blocking his efforts in maintaining such an action.
Therefore, for these reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction is denied.