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Preston v. United States

U.S.
Mar 23, 1964
376 U.S. 364 (1964)

Summary

holding warrantless search illegal where "there was no danger that any of the men arrested could have used any weapons in the car"

Summary of this case from Speight v. U.S.

Opinion

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.

No. 163.

Argued February 25, 1964. Decided March 23, 1964.

Petitioner and two companions, who had been seated for several hours in a parked car, were arrested by the police for vagrancy, searched for weapons, and taken to the police station. The officers had the car towed to a garage, and soon thereafter they went themselves to the garage, and for the first time searched the car. Various articles found in the car were later turned over to federal authorities and used as evidence in a trial in federal court resulting in petitioner's conviction of conspiracy to rob a federally insured bank. Held: The evidence obtained in the search of the car without a warrant was inadmissible because, being too remote in time or place to be treated as incidental to the arrest, it failed to meet the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 364-368.

305 F.2d 172, reversed and remanded.

Francis M. Shea, by appointment of the Court, 374 U.S. 823, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.

Sidney M. Glazer argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller and Beatrice Rosenberg.


Petitioner and three others were convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky on a charge of conspiracy to rob a federally insured bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113, the conviction having been based largely on evidence obtained by the search of a motorcar. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the contentions, timely made in the trial and appellate courts, that both the original arrest, on a charge of vagrancy, and the subsequent search and seizure had violated the Fourth Amendment. 305 F.2d 172. We granted certiorari. 373 U.S. 931. In the view we take of the case, we need not decide whether the arrest was valid, since we hold that the search and seizure was not.

The police of Newport, Kentucky, received a telephone complaint at 3 o'clock one morning that "three suspicious men acting suspiciously" had been seated in a motorcar parked in a business district since 10 o'clock the evening before. Four policemen straightaway went to the place where the car was parked and found petitioner and two companions. The officers asked the three men why they were parked there, but the men gave answers which the officers testified were unsatisfactory and evasive. All three men admitted that they were unemployed; all of them together had only 25 cents. One of the men said that he had bought the car the day before (which later turned out to be true), but he could not produce any title. They said that their reason for being there was to meet a truck driver who would pass through Newport that night, but they could not identify the company he worked for, could not say what his truck looked like, and did not know what time he would arrive. The officers arrested the three men for vagrancy, searched them for weapons, and took them to police headquarters. The car, which had not been searched at the time of the arrest, was driven by an officer to the station, from which it was towed to a garage. Soon after the men had been booked at the station, some of the police officers went to the garage to search the car and found two loaded revolvers in the glove compartment. They were unable to open the trunk and returned to the station, where a detective told one of the officers to go back and try to get into the trunk. The officer did so, was able to enter the trunk through the back seat of the car, and in the trunk found caps, women's stockings (one with mouth and eye holes), rope, pillow slips, an illegally manufactured license plate equipped to be snapped over another plate, and other items. After the search, one of petitioner's companions confessed that he and two others — he did not name petitioner — intended to rob a bank in Berry, Kentucky, a town about 51 miles from Newport. At this, the police called the Federal Bureau of Investigation into the case and turned over to the Bureau the articles found in the car. It was the use of these articles, over timely objections, which raised the Fourth Amendment question we here consider.

The Amendment provides:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

The question whether evidence obtained by state officers and used against a defendant in a federal trial was obtained by unreasonable search and seizure is to be judged as if the search and seizure had been made by federal officers. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). Our cases make it clear that searches of motorcars must meet the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment before evidence obtained as a result of such searches is admissible. E. g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). Common sense dictates, of course, that questions involving searches of motorcars or other things readily moved cannot be treated as identical to questions arising out of searches of fixed structures like houses. For this reason, what may be an unreasonable search of a house may be reasonable in the case of a motorcar. See Carroll v. United States, supra, 267 U.S., at 153. But even in the case of motorcars, the test still is, was the search unreasonable. Therefore we must inquire whether the facts of this case are such as to fall within any of the exceptions to the constitutional rule that a search warrant must be had before a search may be made.

It is argued that the search and seizure was justified as incidental to a lawful arrest. Unquestionably, when a person is lawfully arrested, the police have the right, without a search warrant, to make a contemporaneous search of the person of the accused for weapons or for the fruits of or implements used to commit the crime. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925). This right to search and seize without a search warrant extends to things under the accused's immediate control, Carroll v. United States, supra, 267 U.S., at 158, and, to an extent depending on the circumstances of the case, to the place where he is arrested, Agnello v. United States, supra, 269 U.S., at 30; Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61-62 (1950). The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime — things which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on the accused's person or under his immediate control. But these justifications are absent where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest. Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest. Agnello v. United States, supra, 269 U.S., at 31. Here, we may assume, as the Government urges, that, either because the arrests were valid or because the police had probable cause to think the car stolen, the police had the right to search the car when they first came on the scene. But this does not decide the question of the reasonableness of a search at a later time and at another place. See Stoner v. California, post, p. 483. The search of the car was not undertaken until petitioner and his companions had been arrested and taken in custody to the police station and the car had been towed to the garage. At this point there was no danger that any of the men arrested could have used any weapons in the car or could have destroyed any evidence of a crime — assuming that there are articles which can be the "fruits" or "implements" of the crime of vagrancy. Cf. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1951). Nor, since the men were under arrest at the police station and the car was in police custody at a garage, was there any danger that the car would be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction. See Carroll v. United States, supra, 267 U.S., at 153. We think that the search was too remote in time or place to have been made as incidental to the arrest and conclude, therefore, that the search of the car without a warrant failed to meet the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, rendering the evidence obtained as a result of the search inadmissible.

Reversed and remanded.


Summaries of

Preston v. United States

U.S.
Mar 23, 1964
376 U.S. 364 (1964)

holding warrantless search illegal where "there was no danger that any of the men arrested could have used any weapons in the car"

Summary of this case from Speight v. U.S.

In Preston, supra, the arrest was for vagrancy; it was apparent that the officers had no cause to believe that evidence of crime was concealed in the auto.

Summary of this case from Chambers v. Maroney

In Preston the search was sought to be justified primarily on the ground that it was incidental to and part of a lawful arrest.

Summary of this case from Cooper v. California

In Preston, petitioner and others were arrested for vagrancy after they failed to give an acceptable explanation of their presence in a parked car late at night.

Summary of this case from Cooper v. California

In Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 366, 84 S.Ct. 881, 883, 11 L.Ed.2d 777, 780 (1964) ("Preston"), the Supreme Court held that evidence obtained by state officers is only admissible against a defendant in a federal trial if the search and seizure were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

Summary of this case from U.S. v. Sagaribay

In Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964), police arrested several men sitting in a car for vagrancy, then transported the arrested men to police headquarters and towed the car to a garage.

Summary of this case from Fornash v. Marshall

In Preston acting upon a telephone complaint that "three suspicious men acting suspiciously," police found Preston and two other men sitting in a parked car in a business district.

Summary of this case from Dombrowski v. Cady

In Preston, supra, for example, the post-impoundment exploratory search of a vehicle, in which four vagrancy suspects had been arrested, was held unconstitutional.

Summary of this case from United States v. Mitchell

In Preston, although acknowledging that police have the right to search and seizure contemporaneously with arrest (and this extends to things under the accused's immediate control), justification for such a warrantless search was held absent where the search was remote in time or place from the arrest.

Summary of this case from United States v. Mazzochi

In Preston, the Court, in referring to the considerations mentioned above, emphasized that "these justifications are absent where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest."

Summary of this case from Ramon v. Cupp

In Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367, 84 S.Ct. 881, 883, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964), the Court said, after discussing the need to seize weapons that might be used against the police and to prevent the destruction of evidence, "these justifications are absent where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest.

Summary of this case from Creasy v. Leake

In Preston the placement of the vehicle in the garage was only for protection of the automobile and in the interest of the defendant, and a warrantless search was held invalid.

Summary of this case from Smith v. Peyton

In Preston, the Court tacitly assumed, probably because of the way the case was argued, that the search would be unlawful if not incident to arrest.

Summary of this case from Williams v. United States

In Preston, the defendant was arrested for vagrancy because he had been sitting in a car parked in a business district for several of the nighttime hours and when questioned he admitted he had no job or money.

Summary of this case from Williams v. United States

In Preston, the Court held: "Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest."

Summary of this case from Government of Virgin Islands v. Berne

In Preston, defendants were arrested for vagrancy because they created suspicion when they were parked in the business district between 10:00 p.m. and 3:00 a.m. without a reasonable explanation.

Summary of this case from Leffler v. United States

In Preston, an arrest was made for vagrancy and the defendant's car was towed to a garage and some time later searched without a warrant, producing evidence which led to conviction for conspiracy to rob a bank.

Summary of this case from United States v. Maroney

In Preston the Court pointed out that the search was "too remote in time or place to have been made as incidental to the arrest", and held the search illegal.

Summary of this case from United States v. Trotta

In Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964), and Cooper v. State of California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967), cars were searched after the defendants had been arrested and after the cars had been taken into custody and removed from the scene.

Summary of this case from United States v. Trotta

In Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367, 84 S.Ct. 881, 883, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964), the Supreme Court asserted that the rule permitting such searches was justified "by the need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime * * *."

Summary of this case from Worthy v. United States

In Preston, the search of defendant's car was made by the police department some eight hours after defendant was committed to jail.

Summary of this case from Byrd v. Lane

In Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964), the defendants were arrested for vagrancy as they sat in their parked car in the middle of the night.

Summary of this case from United States ex Rel. Mahoney v. LaVallee

In Preston the arrest was for vagrancy and no claim was made that the vehicle there involved was related to the violation charged.

Summary of this case from Barnett v. United States

In Preston, on the other hand, the driver had been arrested for vagrancy, not car theft or any other crime, and the subsequent search had no relation to the charge of vagrancy. It was but a fishing expedition to determine whether the automobile contained evidence of any other crime.

Summary of this case from Schoepflin v. United States

In Preston petitioners were arrested while seated in an automobile in a business district at 4:00 a.m., searched for weapons and taken to police headquarters.

Summary of this case from Barnett v. United States
Case details for

Preston v. United States

Case Details

Full title:PRESTON v . UNITED STATES

Court:U.S.

Date published: Mar 23, 1964

Citations

376 U.S. 364 (1964)
84 S. Ct. 881

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