From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Porter v. Felker

Supreme Court of Georgia
Jun 20, 1991
261 Ga. 421 (Ga. 1991)

Summary

holding that “a trial court's award [of attorney fees under OCGA § 9–15–14 ] to a party whose motion for summary judgment was denied must be vacated except in unusual cases where the trial judge could not, at the summary judgment stage, foresee facts authorizing the grant of attorney fees”

Summary of this case from McClure v. McCurry

Opinion

S91G0273.

DECIDED JUNE 20, 1991. RECONSIDERATION DENIED JULY 10, 1991.

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 197 Ga. App. 476.

Chambers, Mabry, McClelland Brooks, Walter B. McClelland, for appellants.

William E. Mumford, Edward E. Carriere, Jr., King, Taylor Stovall, James F. Stovall III, Raiford, Dixon Thackston, Tyler C. Dixon, for appellees.


When we granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Felker v. Fenlason, 197 Ga. App. 476 ( 398 S.E.2d 754) (1990), we asked the parties to address the following question:

Did the Court of Appeals err in holding the denial of summary judgment precludes as a matter of law the exercise of the trial court's discretion under OCGA § 9-15-14 upon the trial of the case?

OCGA § 9-15-14 authorizes a trial court to award litigation costs and attorney fees for frivolous actions and defenses.

We hold that the Court of Appeals did err; therefore, we reverse.

1. The purpose of summary judgment is to eliminate jury trials where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A motion for summary judgment is analogous to a motion for a directed verdict. OCGA § 9-11-50. The function of the trial court in ruling on either requires the trial court to determine whether the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the facts established and whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact. OCGA §§ 9-11-56; 9-11-50; Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Ingalls Iron Works Co., 109 Ga. App. 574, 575 ( 136 S.E.2d 505) (1964). If the movant can show the court that any essential element, under any theory of recovery, is missing and incapable of proof, the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, notwithstanding any issue of material fact regarding any other essential element. Waldrep v. Goodwin, 230 Ga. 1, 2 ( 195 S.E.2d 432) (1973). When a motion for summary judgment is made and properly supported, the opposing party must respond and set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial or else summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered. OCGA § 9-11-56 (e); Meade v. Heimanson, 239 Ga. 177, 178 ( 236 S.E.2d 357) (1977). Summary judgment was designed to enable the trial judge to filter out sham issues which may cause needless and time-consuming litigation. "The trial judge must separate what is formal or pretended in denial or averment from what is genuine or substantial, so that only the latter may subject a party to the burden of a trial." Holland v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ga. App. 1, 5 ( 126 S.E.2d 442) (1962).

2. The party opposing the motion is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts and all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence; thus, in a close case, a trial court may deny summary judgment and anticipate a second opportunity to consider its ruling on a subsequent motion for directed verdict. Under the Court of Appeals holding, Felker, 197 Ga. App., supra at 477, denial of summary judgment becomes a "binding determination," and the trial court is thereafter powerless to grant relief to a party under OCGA § 9-15-14. We cannot require trial courts to be infallible. More importantly, if additional facts authorize an award and the trial court is powerless to make an award, then the purposes of the statute (deterrence of litigation abuses and recompensation for legal fees and costs) are thwarted.

3. The trial court's order must include findings of conduct that authorize an award under OCGA § 9-15-14, or the order must be vacated. Coker v. Mosley, 259 Ga. 781, 782 ( 387 S.E.2d 135) (1990). Additionally, a trial court's award to a party whose motion for summary judgment was denied must be vacated except in unusual cases where the trial judge could not, at the summary judgment stage, foresee facts authorizing the grant of attorney fees. The case must be remanded for consideration of the grant of attorney fees in light of this opinion.

Judgment reversed and remanded. All the Justices concur.


DECIDED JUNE 20, 1991 — RECONSIDERATION DENIED JULY 10, 1991.


Summaries of

Porter v. Felker

Supreme Court of Georgia
Jun 20, 1991
261 Ga. 421 (Ga. 1991)

holding that “a trial court's award [of attorney fees under OCGA § 9–15–14 ] to a party whose motion for summary judgment was denied must be vacated except in unusual cases where the trial judge could not, at the summary judgment stage, foresee facts authorizing the grant of attorney fees”

Summary of this case from McClure v. McCurry

vacating award of attorney fees under OCGA § 9–15–14 because trial court's order did not contain findings of conduct that authorized award under that Code section

Summary of this case from Garmon v. State

In Porter v. Felker, 261 Ga. 421, 422 (405 S.E.2d 31) (1991), the Supreme Court of Georgia determined that a trial court's failure to grant summary judgment to a party will not, as a matter of law, preclude a later finding that attorney fees are authorized pursuant to additional facts which were not foreseen at the summary judgment stage.

Summary of this case from Gantt v. Bennett

In Porter, the Court held that "a trial court's award to a party whose motion for summary judgment was denied must be vacated except in unusual cases where the trial judge could not, at the summary judgment stage, foresee facts authorizing the grant of attorney fees."

Summary of this case from Gantt v. Bennett

In Porter v. Felker, 261 Ga. 421, 422 (3) (405 S.E.2d 31) (1991), the Georgia Supreme Court held "[a] trial court's award [under OCGA § 9-15-14 (a)] to a party whose motion for summary judgment was denied must be vacated except in unusual cases where the trial judge could not, at the summary judgment stage, foresee facts authorizing the grant of attorney fees."

Summary of this case from Hallman v. Emory University

In Porter v. Felker, 261 Ga. 421, supra, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the "trial court's order must include findings of conduct that authorize an award under OCGA § 9-15-14, or the order must be vacated. Coker v. Mosley, 259 Ga. 781, 782 (387 S.E.2d 135) (1990)."

Summary of this case from Newman v. Filsoof

In Porter, the Supreme Court held that an order awarding attorney fees must include findings of conduct that authorize an award under OCGA § 9-15-14.

Summary of this case from MacDougald v. Phillips

In Porter, the Supreme Court noted that "[a] motion for summary judgment is analogous to a motion for a directed verdict.

Summary of this case from Ansa Mufflers Corp. v. Worthington
Case details for

Porter v. Felker

Case Details

Full title:PORTER et al. v. FELKER et al

Court:Supreme Court of Georgia

Date published: Jun 20, 1991

Citations

261 Ga. 421 (Ga. 1991)
405 S.E.2d 31

Citing Cases

Atwood v. Southeast Bedding

Appellants view as inapplicable the exception stated in Porter v. Felker because the court also denied…

Newman v. Filsoof

The trial court granted Pichulik's motion for attorney fees and expenses of litigation under OCGA § 9-15-14…