Opinion
Case No. 3:08-CV-404.
February 10, 2009
ENTRY AND ORDER REMANDING THIS MATTER TO THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CLARK COUNTY, OHIO BECAUSE THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
This matter arises from a vehicle accident in which Plaintiff Tina Pizzino ("Pizzino") was injured. Defendants Richard A. Miller ("Miller") and James Dempsey ("Dempsey") were allegedly operating other vehicles involved in the accident. Miller was allegedly operating a vehicle for Defendant Teton Transportation ("Teton") and Dempsey was allegedly operating a vehicle for Defendant D D Moving. Defendant Monumental Life Insurance "(Monumental") is Pizzino's former employer. Monumental/Lumenos paid medical expenses on behalf of Pizzino for injuries sustained in the vehicle accident. Defendant John Doe #3 is reported to be the AEGON USA, Inc. Medical Plan (the "Plan") from which the medical expenses were allegedly paid.
Pizzino's First Claim for Relief is against Miller, Dempsey, Teton and D D Moving for negligence. Pizzino's Second Claim for Relief is a demand that Monumental and the Plan enter an appearance and defend their rights of subrogation or be forever barred from doing so. Pizzino's Third, and final, Claim for Relief seeks a declaratory judgment that Senate Bill 80 violates the Ohio and U.S. Constitutions.
Monumental and the Plan have answered Pizzino's Complaint. (Doc. #3.) Their Answer includes no counterclaim. Further, the defenses stated in the Answer do not include an assertion that ERISA preempts Pizzino's claim.
Pizzino's Complaint was removed to this Court from the Court of Common Pleas of Clark County, Ohio by Monumental and the Plan on November 3, 2008. (Doc. #1.) The stated basis for removal is that federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over ERISA actions such as Pizzino's Second Claim for Relief. Pizzino has heretofore not objected to the removal.
Now before the Court is Monumental's and the Plan's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. #8.) Also before the Court is Pizzino's Motion To Dismiss. (Doc. #11.) Both of these Motions are now fully briefed and ripe for decision. However, before adjudicating these Motions, the Court must first assure itself that is has subject matter jurisdiction to do so.
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; they are empowered to hear only those cases which are within the judicial power of the United States as defined in the United States Constitution and as further granted to them by Act of Congress. Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. 8 (1799). Facts supporting subject matter jurisdiction must be affirmatively pleaded by the person seeking to show it. Bingham v. Cabot, 3 U.S. 382 (1798). Finally, a federal court is obliged to note lack of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. Franzel v. Kerr Mfg. Co., 959 F. 2d 628, 630 (6th Cir. 1992).
District Courts have subject matter jurisdiction over civil actions between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). No plaintiff and no defendant may be citizens of the same state. Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998). However, none of the Parties involved in this case has presented evidence of the citizenship of the Parties. Therefore, the Court concludes that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction due to the diversity of citizenship of the Parties.
District Courts also have subject matter jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This type of subject matter jurisdiction, termed "federal question jurisdiction," formed the basis for the removal of this action and will be considered.
Pizzino's Complaint consists of three Claims for Relief. Each will be examined to determine if this Court has federal question jurisdiction.
First Claim for Relief: Negligence
Pizzino's First Claim for relief is against two individuals and two business entities for negligence. This is a state-law negligence claim and does not arise under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the U.S. Therefore, this Court does not have original federal question jurisdiction over Pizzino's First Claim for Relief.
Third Claim for Relief: Declaration that Ohio Senate Bill 80 Is Unconstitutional
Pizzino's Third Claim for Relief seeks a declaratory judgment that Ohio Senate Bill 80 is unconstitutional because it violates the Ohio and U.S. Constitutions. Ohio Senate Bill 80 includes allegedly unconstitutional limitations for non economic damages, collateral benefits, seat belt defense, statute of repose and punitive damages.
"For federal jurisdiction to exist, unless citizenship is diverse, a plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint must raise an issue "arising under" the laws of the United States. . . ." Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Federal Exp. Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1252 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Franchise Tax Board of State of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1983)). However, it takes more than a federal element "to open the arising under door." Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 126 S.Ct. 2121, 2137 (2006).
There is no "single, precise, all-embracing" test for jurisdiction over federal issues embedded in state-law claims. Grable Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005). Merely referring to a federal law does not establish federal jurisdiction if the dispute does not involve a substantial question of federal law. American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, AFL-CIO v. WJBK-TV, 164 F.3d 1004, 1007 (6th Cir. 1999). Further there is no federal question jurisdiction when the complaint on its face states alternate theories supporting a state-law claim, at least one of which does not involve a federal question. Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988),
For example, where a complaint raised both state and federal policies regarding a wrongful discharge, the resolution of a federal question is not necessary or essential to the resolution of the wrongful discharge claim. Long v. Bando Mfg. of America, Inc., 201 F.3d 754, 760 (6th Cir. 2000): but see Roberts v. Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority, No. 3:07 CV 2642, 2008 WL 4114140 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 28, 2008) (pleading violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and federal statutory rights against discrimination which on their face, involve substantial questions of federal law are sufficient to invoke federal question jurisdiction). In another example, merely referring to a federal statute, does not establish federal jurisdiction if the dispute does not involve `a substantial question of federal law.' Ford v. Hamilton Investments, Inc., 29 F.3d 255, 258 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Franchise Tax Board, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2856 (1983)). In yet another example, the presence of a federal defense is inadequate because a state court can presumably resolve such a defense as ably as could a federal district court. Musson, 89 F.3d at 1253.
In addition to a consideration of the complaint as pled, federal courts are hesitant to become involved where there are unsettled questions of state law which, if settled by the state, would avoid the necessity of deciding the matter on federal constitutional law ground. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). In fact, it is a well-established principle that the federal courts should not decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case. See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 546 n. 12 (1974). Therefore, needless decisions regarding state law are avoided "both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law." J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1086 (6th Cir. 1981).
As part of the comity consideration, questions of state law cannot always be avoided for purposes of determining actual rights and obligations. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1982). This is because the substantive rights provided by the U.S. Constitution define only a minimum. Id. State law may provide more extensive rights and obligations than those independently protected by the U.S. Constitution. Id.
To treat a violation of state law as a violation of the U.S. Constitution is to make the federal government the enforcer of state law, which, of course is inappropriate. Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1217 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989). State, rather than federal, courts are the appropriate institutions to determine and enforce state laws. Id. A state should, of course, determine and follow its law. Id.
Turning now to Pizzino's Third Claim for Relief, it raises a violation of the U.S. Constitution on its face. However, it also raises the issue of whether an Ohio legislative act is unconstitutional under the Ohio Constitution.
The issue of whether an Ohio legislative act is unconstitutional is best left, at least initially, to the Ohio Courts. Comity requires so. State, rather than federal, courts are the appropriate institutions to determine state laws and Ohio has a substantial interest in determining the constitutionality of one of its legislative acts. Finally, federal courts should not decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case, that being the Ohio Constitution here.
This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the Ohio Constitution may provide protections beyond those provided by the U.S. Constitution. Pizzino's Third Claim for Relief on its face states alternate theories supporting a constitutional violation, at least one of which is the violation of the Ohio Constitution. Whether an Ohio legislative act violates the Ohio Constitution does not involve a federal question and Ohio courts are competent to adjudicate any federal implications if necessary.
The issue of a U.S. Constitutional violation in Pizzino's Third Claim for Relief is not enough to open the "arising under door." Therefore, this Court does not have original federal question jurisdiction over Pizzino's Third Claim for Relief.
Second Claim for Relief: Subrogation Demand
Pizzino's Second Claim for Relief is the basis for Monumental's and the Plan's removal of Pizzino's Complaint. This Claim for Relief is against Monumental and the Plan and demands that they enter an appearance and defend their rights of subrogation or be forever barred from doing so. Pizzino later asserts that Monumental and the Plan were joined as required by Ohio Civil Rule 19 to protect Monumental's and the Plan's interests.
Ohio Civil Rule 19 provides that a person who is subject to service of process must be joined as a party: (1) if, in his absence, complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) if he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may impede his ability to protect that interest or leave anyone already a party subject to a substantial risk of incurring multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations, or (3) if he has an interest relating to the subject of the action as an assignor, assignee, subrogor, or subrogee. Ohio Civ. R. 19.
Monumental and the Plan removed this action based upon this Court having federal question jurisdiction. This Court has federal question jurisdiction, according to Monumental and the Plan, because Pizzino's Second Claim for Relief is completely preempted by ERISA. It is completely preempted by ERISA, according to Monumental and the Plan, because it seeks an order compelling Monumental and the Plan to enter an appearance and defend their rights of subrogation and the rights of subrogation are set forth in the Plan. Monumental and the Plan later assert that the Plan Administrator has chosen not to exercise its subrogation right to participate in Pizzino's lawsuit and, instead points to its reimbursement right.
Monumental's and the Plan's Answer admits that the Plan has rights of subrogation but the Plan's reimbursement provision is not implicated by Pizzino's Complaint and that the reimbursement provision applies whether or not the Plan exercises it subrogation rights. (Ans. ¶ 15.) Finally, none of the defenses stated by Monumental and the Plan in their answer implicate ERISA on their face.
Pizzino's Second Claim for Relief on its face is not an ERISA claim. Monumental and the Plan have not made any counterclaims and none of Monumental's and the Plan's defenses implicate ERISA on their face.
ERISA may be implicated if Pizzino attempts to enforce some provision of the Plan, but this she has not yet done. She merely joined Monumental and the Plan pursuant to her interpretation of Ohio Civil Rule 19. Thus, there is no ERISA claim in the Complaint or Answer nor is there any claim pending that requires an interpretation of the Plan. If ERISA is implicated in one of Monumental's and the Plan's defenses, the Court assumes that a state court, subject to review by writ of certiorari, can resolve such a defense as ably as could a federal district court. See Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Federal Exp. Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1252 (6th Cir. 1996).
Contrary to Monumental's and the Plan's assertion, Pizzino's Complaint does not "seek an order" compelling Monumental and the Plan to enter an appearance. At this point in the litigation, whether Monumental and the Plan enter an appearance and defend their subrogation rights is, even according to them, their choice. Further, the applicability of Ohio Civil Rule 19 is, of course, for an Ohio Court to decide if asked to do so.
There is no ERISA claim or any issue that requires interpretation of an ERISA plan apparent on the face of the Complaint or the Answer. Nor is there a question pending that involves interpretation of an ERISA plan based upon subsequent pleadings of the Parties. Therefore, this Court does not have original federal question jurisdiction over Pizzino's Second Claim for Relief.
Conclusion
This Court does not have original federal question jurisdiction over any of Pizzino's Claims for Relief. Thus, this Court has no power to adjudicate the pending Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion To Dismiss.
The court has discretion to remand if there are no federal claims pending. Naragon v. Dayton Power Light Co., 934 F. Supp. 899, 901 (S.D. Ohio, 1996), citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 108 S. Ct. 614, 98 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1988). Therefore, since there are no federal claims pending, this matter is REMANDED to the Court of Common Pleas of Clark County, Ohio.