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Pinto v. Pierce

U.S.
Oct 23, 1967
389 U.S. 31 (1967)

Summary

In Pinto, the Supreme Court held that the challenged voluntariness hearing did not violate due process, though it was held in the presence of the jury, because "the respondent in this case did not object to having the voluntariness of his admission considered in the presence of the jury."

Summary of this case from Fryer v. Nix

Opinion

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.

No. 284.

Decided October 23, 1967.

The Federal District Court granted respondent's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that a hearing of testimony by the state trial court, in the jury's presence, regarding the voluntariness of an incriminating statement sought to be introduced by the prosecution, violated respondent's constitutional rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Respondent had not objected to the procedure, and after the evidence regarding voluntariness had been heard, the court had ruled the statement voluntary. Held: Previous cases in this Court have not determined that voluntariness hearings must necessarily be held out of the jury's presence, and where, as here, respondent's counsel consented to the procedure used, and the judge found the statement voluntary, respondent was deprived of no constitutional right.

Certiorari granted; 374 F.2d 472, reversed and remanded.

Thomas P. Ford, Jr., for petitioner.


Respondent was indicted by the grand jury of Essex County, New Jersey, on July 2, 1959, for the crime of robbery while armed. Following a plea of not guilty, he was tried before a jury, convicted and sentenced to a term of from 16 to 23 years in the New Jersey State Prison. On June 6, 1966, respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. The District Judge determined from the transcript of respondent's trial that the trial court had heard in the presence of the jury testimony regarding the voluntariness of an incriminating statement sought to be introduced by the prosecution, held that under prior decisions of this Court this procedure violated respondent's constitutional rights and granted the writ. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, and petitioner, the Superintendent of the New Jersey State Prison Farm, seeks a writ of certiorari.

The petition for certiorari is granted and the judgment is reversed. This Court has never ruled that all voluntariness hearings must be held outside the presence of the jury, regardless of the circumstances. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), held that a defendant's constitutional rights are violated when his challenged confession is introduced without a determination by the trial judge of its voluntariness after an adequate hearing. A confession by the defendant found to be involuntary by the trial judge is not to be heard by the jury which determines his guilt or innocence. Hence, because a disputed confession may be found involuntary and inadmissible by the judge, it would seem prudent to hold voluntariness hearings outside the presence of the jury. In this case, however, the confession was held voluntary and admitted as evidence suitable for consideration by the jury. In addition, there is no claim that because the hearing was held in the presence of the jury it was inadequate or had any other unfair consequences for the respondent.

The New Jersey Supreme Court has recently announced that from September 11, 1967, hearings on admissibility shall be outside the presence of the jury if the defendant so requests. See State v. Broxton, 49 N.J. 373, 386, n. 2, 230 A.2d 489, 496, n. 2 (1967).

In United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951), relied upon by the trial court, reversal of a conviction was affirmed because the trial judge, after hearing some evidence concerning voluntariness with the jury present, refused to permit the defendant to testify on the subject.
The other cases cited by the District Court granted writs of habeas corpus in cases in which trial judges had made no independent determination of voluntariness. See, for the citations to those cases, United States ex rel. Pierce v. Pinto, 259 F. Supp. 729, 731 (D.C. N.J. 1966).

Finally, it is clear that the respondent in this case did not object to having the voluntariness of his admission considered in the presence of the jury. At his trial the court asked defense counsel whether there was any objection to the testimony being taken in the presence of the jury. Defense counsel replied, "None whatsoever." The court continued, "As you know, it can be taken in their presence or outside of their presence, and that is a matter of discretion with the Court but I am inquiring of you if you have any objections. If you did I would hear you but I assume you have none." Again counsel replied, "I have none." The evidence regarding voluntariness, which included testimony by respondent, was then taken, after which the court ruled that the statement was voluntary.

Since trial counsel consented to the evidence on voluntariness being taken in the presence of the jury, and the judge found the statement voluntary, respondent was deprived of no constitutional right. The motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari are granted, the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the writ of habeas corpus.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs in the result.


I concur in the result because of trial counsel's consent to the taking of evidence on voluntariness in the presence of the jury. Otherwise, I disagree. The rule of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), should be more than ritual. It was not intended to assure a determination by the judge at the cost of diluting the jury's role in the determination of voluntariness and the weight to be given to admissions. "Just as questions of admissibility of evidence are traditionally for the court, questions of credibility, whether of a witness or a confession, are for the jury." Id., at 386, n. 13. See also id., at 378, n. 8, and cf. id., at 404 (separate opinion of BLACK, J.).

Jackson v. Denno means that the judge and the jury must each make an independent judgment of voluntariness of an admission, the judge for purposes of admissibility and the jury for evidentiary acceptability, credibility, and weight. A telescoped hearing before judge and jury, in which the judge finds voluntariness for purposes of admissibility, in reality reduces the jury function to an echo. Hearing the evidence simultaneously with the judge, the jury is not apt to approach disagreement with him. I believe that the procedure here sanctioned, by reducing the effectiveness of the jury, gravely impairs the constitutional principle of excluding involuntary confessions which Jackson v. Denno sought to serve.

The jury is the traditional and preferred arbiter of facts. The procedure countenanced here, by dicta, sanctions, in effect, a direction to the jury to accept and give full credence to the admission — because the judge, hearing the same testimony, has ruled that the admission is voluntary.


Summaries of

Pinto v. Pierce

U.S.
Oct 23, 1967
389 U.S. 31 (1967)

In Pinto, the Supreme Court held that the challenged voluntariness hearing did not violate due process, though it was held in the presence of the jury, because "the respondent in this case did not object to having the voluntariness of his admission considered in the presence of the jury."

Summary of this case from Fryer v. Nix

In Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 88 S.Ct. 192, 19 L.Ed.2d 31 (1967), the Supreme Court upheld a conviction even though the trial judge held a voluntariness hearing in the presence of the jury.

Summary of this case from Lufkins v. Solem

In Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. at 32-33, 88 S.Ct. at 193, the Supreme Court implicitly recognized that a defendant is entitled to an independent hearing outside of the presence of a jury unless he waives that right. Also, in United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. at 38, 72 S.Ct. at 98, the Supreme Court recognized that a defendant who challenges the voluntariness of a confession should be given an opportunity to testify as to the facts surrounding his confession in the absence of the jury.

Summary of this case from Lufkins v. Solem

In Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 88 S.Ct. 192, 19 L.Ed.2d 31 (1967), the Court while stating, "it would seem prudent to hold voluntariness hearings outside [of] the presence of the jury," nevertheless stated that "[t]his Court has never ruled that all voluntariness hearings must be held outside the presence of the jury, regardless of the circumstances.

Summary of this case from United States ex Rel. Hickman v. Sielaff

In Pinto, supra, it is obvious that there was a deliberate decision irrespective of whether it was to the tactical advantage of the defendant there. The trial court in Pinto, although indicating that it thought the matter was a matter of discretion, nevertheless, inquired as to whether defense counsel had any objections to the matter being heard in the presence of the jury.

Summary of this case from United States ex Rel. Hickman v. Sielaff

In Pinto, the judge did make the determination that the confession was voluntary and it was therefore admitted into evidence.

Summary of this case from United States ex Rel. Hickman v. Sielaff

In Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 32, 88 S.Ct. 192, 19 L.Ed.2d 31, the Supreme Court pointed out that Jackson v. Denno pertained to circumstances which, among others, included a trial court challenge to the admissibility of the admission or confession.

Summary of this case from Delaney v. Gladden

hearing outside presence of jury is “prudent” but not required

Summary of this case from State v. Bogguess

In Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 88 S.Ct. 192, 19 L.Ed.2d 31 (1967), the court held that a defendant's constitutional rights were not violated when a voluntariness hearing was held within the presence of the jury since: (1) the defendant's trial counsel consented to such procedure; and, (2) the trial judge found the admission(s) voluntary. This is a narrow holding and not applicable to the facts of the case before us.

Summary of this case from State v. Lufkins

In Pinto v. Pierce, supra, 389 U.S. at 33, the trial court had "ruled that the statement was voluntary" in the jury's presence, but the Supreme Court did not discuss this particular aspect of the confession procedure; instead, the issue concerned the judge's hearing the evidence in the jury's presence.

Summary of this case from Dempsey v. State

In Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 19 L.Ed.2d 31, 88 S.Ct. 192, the United States Supreme Court rejected an argument predicated upon the same basis now advanced.

Summary of this case from People v. Hickman

In Pinto v. Pierce (1967) 389 U.S. 31, 32 [19 L.Ed.2d 31, 33, 88 S.Ct. 192], the court said: "This Court has never ruled that all voluntariness hearings must be held outside the presence of the jury, regardless of the circumstances."

Summary of this case from People v. Lindsey

In Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 88 S.Ct. 192, 19 L.Ed.2d 31 (1967), the court held: "This Court has never ruled that all voluntariness hearings must be held outside the presence of the jury, regardless of the circumstances."

Summary of this case from Haggard v. State

In Pinto v. Pierce (1967), 389 U.S. 31, 19 L. Ed. 2d 31, 88 S. Ct. 192, it was held not to be error to hold the hearing in the jury's presence where the court ruled the confession voluntary and the defendant made no objection to the procedure.

Summary of this case from State v. Utsler

In Pinto, the Court notes that, in addition, there was no claim that because the hearing was held in the presence of the jury it was inadequate or had any other unfair consequences for the defendant and that the defendant did not object to having the voluntariness of his confession considered in the presence of the jury.

Summary of this case from Barnhart v. State
Case details for

Pinto v. Pierce

Case Details

Full title:PINTO, PRISON FARM SUPERINTENDENT v . PIERCE

Court:U.S.

Date published: Oct 23, 1967

Citations

389 U.S. 31 (1967)

Citing Cases

Lufkins v. Solem

Id. at 334. The Court, citing Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 88 S.Ct. 192, 19 L.Ed.2d 31 (1967), also found…

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