Summary
applying earlier date when plaintiff first expressed concern "about electrical issues" at his "service date put[ting] him on notice that there were issues with the car he had purchased and that he might have a viable claim against the defendants"
Summary of this case from Pagliaroni v. Mastic Home Exteriors, Inc.Opinion
No. 12–P–218.
2013-04-9
George MINASIDIS v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC & others.
By the Court (FECTEAU, HANLON & SULLIVAN, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, George Minasidis, appeals from a summary judgment in favor of the defendants, BMW of North America, LLC, and Herb Chambers 1172, Inc., on the ground that the suit was not timely filed. The plaintiff argues this was error because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to when the statute of limitations began to run. We affirm.
Background. Minasidis purchased a 2005 BMW automobile from Herb Chambers BMW on December 7, 2004. On May 17, 2005, he had the car serviced for the first time, to remove a compact disc (CD) that was stuck in the car's CD player, and to address other concerns about the car's electrical system. At that time, the technician removed the CD and reinstalled all components of the car communication computer (CCC). Minasidis brought the car for service a second time on September 27, 2005, complaining of problems with the car's engine belts, power windows, and engine, which was making strange noises. Following these first two service dates, several more issues with the car developed, including problems with the navigational system, check engine light, power windows, and battery; at one point, the listed complaint recited that the car had shut off completely, while it was being driven. In all, the plaintiff's vehicle was serviced on ten separate occasions for various issues between May 17, 2005, and April 5, 2009. The plaintiff filed his complaint on August 19, 2009, asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of warranty, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and violation of G.L. c. 93A.
The service record for May 17, 2005, the first complaint to the defendant of a malfunction, was attached as an exhibit to the complaint.
On May 5, 2009, and again on June 17, 2009, plaintiff's counsel sent a demand letter to the defendants putting them on notice of a potential claim pursuant to G.L. c. 93A.
During discovery, the plaintiff responded to the defendants' interrogatory 23 that he had “complained of a failure by the CD player to eject a CD, as well as other complaints regarding the vehicle's electrical functions” at the time of the May 17, 2005, service date. In response, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the cause of action had accrued on May 17, 2005, and, therefore, because the plaintiff did not commence his action until August, 2009, his claims were time-barred by the four-year statute of limitations permitted under § 2–725 of the Uniform Commercial Code. G.L. c. 106, § 2–725.
The judge allowed the motion, ruling that “Minasidis's admission to concerns about the BMW's CD player and electrical system on May 17, 2005, leaves no doubt that he knew of or should have known of the BMW's electrical problems during his first trip to Herb Chambers BMW” (emphasis original).
Summary Judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that his claims are not time-barred because, under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until September 27, 2005, the date on which he maintains that he knew or reasonably should have known of the possibility of injury. He also argues that the issue of when he knew or should have been put on notice of his injury is a material issue of fact to be decided only by the jury, and therefore should not have been decided on summary judgment.
Our review of a ruling on a motion for summary judgment is de novo. Chi–Sang Poon v. Massachusetts Inst. of Technology, 74 Mass.App.Ct. 185, 194 (2009). Under the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues when “an event or events have occurred that were reasonably likely to put the plaintiff on notice that someone may have caused her injury.” Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 455 Mass. 215, 228 (2009), quoting from Bowen v. Eli Lilly & Co., 408 Mass. 204, 207 (1990). However, the discovery rule does not require that a person be aware of the full extent of his or her injury for a claim to accrue. See Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 243 (1991). Instead, notice of the possibility of injury places the plaintiff on inquiry notice and is sufficient to trigger the beginning of the statute of limitations period. Szymanski v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 56 Mass.App.Ct. 367, 371 (2002). Here, the plaintiff's concern about electrical issues at the time of the May 17, 2005, service date put him on notice that there were issues with the car he had purchased and that he might have a viable claim against the defendants.
“In most instances, the question of when a plaintiff knew or should have known of his cause of action is one of fact that will be decided by the trier of fact.” Taygeta Corp. v. Varian Assocs. Inc., 436 Mass. 217, 229 (2002). However, where there is no factual issue as to when the plaintiff was aware of the harm or possibility of harm, summary judgment is appropriate. See Doe v. Harbor Schs., Inc., 446 Mass. 245, 247 (2006) (affirming summary judgment on statute of limitations issue where there was no genuine issue as to when the plaintiff was put on notice of harm).
Taken together, the facts contained in the record before us do not present a “genuine issue as to any material fact” and support a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002). Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it is clear that the defendants are “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Nutt v. Florio, 75 Mass.App.Ct. 482, 485 (2009).
Judgment affirmed.