Summary
In Merrill-Ruckgaber Co. v. United States, 241 U.S. 387, 36 S.Ct. 662, 663, 60 L.Ed. 1058, the contract provided that "the decision of the supervising architect as to the proper interpretation of the drawings and specifications [shall] be final."
Summary of this case from Tobin Quarries v. Central Nebraska Public P. I. Dist.Opinion
No. 281.
Argued March 17, 1916. Decided June 5, 1916.
In construing a contract the court must at first resort to its words, but not to one or a few of them, but to all of them as associated, and as well to the conditions to which they were addressed and intended to provide for; one word cannot be made dominant, controlling all others, and putting out of view the demands of physical conditions. In this case held that a contractor was bound to underpin the walls of both of two buildings on the line of the Government's property, notwithstanding the specification referred to building in the singular and not plural, and the wall of one of the buildings was only a light or curtain wall. Under the contract involved in this case, the decision of the supervising architect was made final upon any dispute regarding the proper interpretation of the specifications, and as the Secretary of the Treasury sustained the decision, and no foundation appears in the record for charges of unfairness on the part of the latter, such decision is final. 49 Ct. Cl. 553, affirmed.
"To which the Supervising Architect replied, on October 30, 1909: `Your statements are noted and you are now directed to proceed without further delay to complete the work in line with office letters of the 2d 20th and 26th instants, and without expense to the Government. And you are advised that unless you take action along this line within a reasonable time consideration will be given to serving the eight days' notice preparatory to the Government assuming charge of the work and completing it at your expense.'"Upon appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury the action of the Supervising Architect was ratified, and the claimant was directed in writing by the Secretary to proceed with said underpinning in accordance with the requirements of the Supervising Architect, otherwise the contract would be completed at claimant's expense. The claimant did the work under protest, and completed it and all of the work under said contract within the time stipulated in the contract. The actual cost of under-pinning to rock said building No. 25 Pine Street was $4,450. The contractor was paid the full amount of the contract price, $79,400."The use of the word "building" in the addendum to the specifications was the result of a clerical error in the office of the Supervising Architect. But before submitting a proposal for the work appellant through its president and agent made an investigation of the site of the work and the buildings surrounding the site and ascertained that the rear of both the buildings on Pine Street adjoined the site on the north.
Mr. John S. Flannery, with whom Mr. Frederic D. McKenney was on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Huston Thompson for the United States.
The case is in narrow compass. It involves for its solution the construction of a contract, and the rules to guide such construction we need not rehearse. To its words we at first resort, but not to one or a few of them but to all of them as associated, and as well to the conditions to which they were addressed and intended to provide for. The argument of appellant ignores this rule. As we shall see, it makes one word dominant, controls all others by it, and puts out of view the demands of the physical conditions.
The contract provided that whatever walls would have to be removed and excavations made would have to be done in such manner as not to endanger adjoining property, and that all necessary shoring and underpinning, etc., in connection therewith had to be done. To this provision there was subsequently added that "in the case of the building [italics ours] joining the north line of the site the underpinning of the main rear walls must be carried to rock by a method satisfactory to the Supervising Architect."
But there were two buildings "joining the north line of the site," and appellant selected one as the full measure of its obligation to carry the underpinning to rock as required by the specifications, giving as a reason, in a communication to the Architect's office, that it did not consider that there was any rear wall in No. 25 Pine Street, but only a metallic curtain wall.
The Architect's office was not impressed with the distinction between walls and the selection of one building joining the north line of the site but insisted that the underpinning of the main rear walls of both of the buildings joining such line must be carried to rock by a method satisfactory to the Supervising Architect. Appellant filed its appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury, who affirmed the action of the Architect.
Counsel intimates unfairness on the part of the Supervising Architect, but there is no just foundation for it; and, besides, there is no attempt to impugn the good faith of the Secretary of the Treasury who sustained the decision of the Architect, and the contract explicitly provides that "the decision of the Supervising Architect as to the proper interpretation of the drawings and specifications shall be final." If we may concede to appellant an ambiguity in the specifications arising from the use of the singular word "building" instead of the plural word "buildings" against the material conditions which appellant's officers had inspected and knew of and against as well the other parts of the specifications which among other things call for "rear walls" instead of a "rear wall," seemingly implying two buildings and not one only, at the utmost it could only be said that there was ground for dispute, and under the contract the decision of the Architect upon the dispute was final.
Judgment affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.