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McDonald v. Massachusetts

U.S.
Feb 25, 1901
180 U.S. 311 (1901)

Summary

holding that a habitual criminal statute, "imposing a punishment on none but future crimes, is not ex post facto."

Summary of this case from U.S. ex Rel. McDonald v. Page

Opinion

ERROR TO THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS.

Submitted January 25, 1901. Decided February 25, 1901.

The statute of Massachusetts of 1887, c. 435, by which "whoever has been twice convicted of crime, sentenced and committed to prison, in this or any other State, or once in this and once at least in any other State, for terms of not less than three years each, shall, upon conviction of a felony committed in this State after the passage of this act, be deemed to be an habitual criminal, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the State prison for twenty-five years," is constitutional.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. Francis P. Murphy for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Hosea M. Knowlton and Mr. Arthur W. DeGoosh for defendant in error.


The plaintiff in error was indicted at August term, 1898, of the Superior Court in the county of Suffolk and State of Massachusetts, on the statute of Massachusetts, of 1887, chapter 435, section 1, by which "whoever has been twice convicted of crime, sentenced and committed to prison, in this or any other State, or once in this and once at least in any other State, for terms of not less than three years each, shall, upon conviction of a felony committed in this State after the passage of this act, be deemed to be an habitual criminal, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the State prison for twenty-five years: provided, however, that if the person so convicted shall show to the satisfaction of the court before which such conviction was had that he was released from imprisonment upon either of said sentences, upon a pardon granted on the ground that he was innocent, such conviction and sentence shall not be considered as such under this act."

Section 2 provides that when it appears to the Governor and Council that the convict has reformed, they may release him conditionally from the rest of his sentence.

The indictment contained four counts, two charging the defendant with forging an order for money, and two with uttering as true a forged order for money; and further alleged that in April, 1890, he had been convicted in Massachusetts of perjury, and therefor sentenced and committed to the State prison for three years; and also in January, 1894, had been convicted in New Hampshire of obtaining property by false pretences, and therefor sentenced and committed to the State prison for four years.

The defendant pleaded not guilty, and was tried by a jury, who returned a verdict that he was guilty of the whole indictment; and the court thereupon adjudged him to be an habitual criminal, and sentenced him to be punished by imprisonment in the State prison for the term of twenty-five years.

The defendant sued out a writ of error from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which affirmed the judgment. 173 Mass. 322. He then sued out this writ of error from this court to the Superior Court, in which the record remains.

The fundamental mistake of the plaintiff in error is his assumption that the judgment below imposes an additional punishment on crimes for which he had already been convicted and punished in Massachusetts and in New Hampshire.

But it does no such thing. The statute under which it was rendered is aimed at habitual criminals; and simply imposes a heavy penalty upon conviction of a felony committed in Massachusetts since its passage, by one who had been twice convicted and imprisoned for crime for not less than three years, in this, or in another State, or once in each. The punishment is for the new crime only, but is the heavier if he is an habitual criminal. Statutes imposing aggravated penalties on one who commits a crime after having already been twice subjected to discipline by imprisonment have long been in force in Massachusetts; and effect was given to previous imprisonment, either in Massachusetts or elsewhere in the United States, by the statute of 1827, c. 118, § 19, and by the Revised Statutes of 1836, c. 133, § 13. It is within the discretion of the legislature of the State to treat former imprisonment in another State, as having the like effect as imprisonment in Massachusetts, to show that the man is an habitual criminal. The allegation of previous convictions is not a distinct charge of crimes, but is necessary to bring the case within the statute, and goes to the punishment only. The statute, imposing a punishment on none but future crimes, is not ex post facto. It affects alike all persons similarly situated, and therefore does not deprive any one of the equal protection of the laws. Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673; Ross's Case, 2 Pick. 165; Commonwealth v. Graves, 155 Mass. 163; Sturtevant v. Commonwealth, 158 Mass. 598; Commonwealth v. Richardson, 175 Mass. 202.

The statute does not impair the right of trial by jury, or put the accused twice in jeopardy for the same offence, or impose a cruel or unusual punishment. There is therefore no occasion to consider whether any of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States on these points can apply to the courts of the several States. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581.

The suggestion of misjoinder of counts in the indictment, and the objection that instructions on the habitual criminal charge were first given by the court to the jury after they had said that the defendant was guilty of the specific offences charged, present no Federal question.

Judgment affirmed.


Summaries of

McDonald v. Massachusetts

U.S.
Feb 25, 1901
180 U.S. 311 (1901)

holding that a habitual criminal statute, "imposing a punishment on none but future crimes, is not ex post facto."

Summary of this case from U.S. ex Rel. McDonald v. Page

finding habitual offender statute imposing heavier penalty for habitual criminal goes to "the punishment . . . . for the new crime only"; stating "[t]he statute, imposing punishment on none but future crimes, is not ex post facto"

Summary of this case from Rutledge v. Katavich

finding that a statute which imposes a punishment only on future crimes is not ex post facto, even though a conviction prior to the statute results in increased punishment

Summary of this case from Grant v. State

finding that a statute which imposes a punishment only on future crimes is not ex post facto, even though a conviction prior to the statute results in increased punishment

Summary of this case from State v. Moss

upholding Massachusetts's imposition of additional penalties for repeat offenders

Summary of this case from U.S. v. Martino

upholding Massachusetts' recidivism statute

Summary of this case from Hawks v. Mitchell

upholding Massachusetts' recidivism statute

Summary of this case from State v. Parks

affirming sentence under Massachusetts statute imposing a heavier penalty upon conviction of habitual criminal

Summary of this case from U.S. v. Hughes

In McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, the court considered and adversely disposed of a contention that a statute of the State of Massachusetts was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States because it provided for a punishment as an habitual criminal of any person convicted of a felony in Massachusetts who was found to have been "twice convicted of crime, sentenced and committed to prison, in this or any other State, or once in this and once at least in any other State,..."

Summary of this case from Carlesi v. New York

In McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 21 S.Ct. 389, 45 L.Ed. 542 (1901), the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's double jeopardy claim that his sentence for his latest crime could not be increased based on prior crimes for which he had already been punished.

Summary of this case from U.S. v. Cruce

increasing punishment for felony because of prior convictions does not violate ex post facto clause where punishment is for the new crime only

Summary of this case from U.S. v. Mettler

In McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 21 S.Ct. 389, 45 L.Ed. 542 (1901), the petitioner argued that a Massachusetts statute which increased the punishment for a felony when the defendant previously had been convicted of other crimes violated the ex post facto clause by increasing the punishment for the prior crimes.

Summary of this case from Schramm v. United States Parole Com'n

In McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 45 L.Ed. 542 (1901), the Court upheld a habitual offender statute from a double jeopardy challenge.

Summary of this case from United States v. Wise

In McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 313, 21 S.Ct. 389, 390, 45 L.Ed. 542 (1901), the Supreme Court in referring to a similar proceeding stated, "The allegation of previous convictions is not a distinct charge of crimes, but is necessary to bring the case within the statute, and goes to the punishment only."

Summary of this case from United States v. Clemons

In McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 21 S. Ct. 389, 390, 45 L. Ed. 542, the court, in considering a statute imposing greater punishment because of prior convictions for crimes, said: "The allegation of previous convictions is not a distinct charge of crimes, but is necessary to bring the case within the statute, and goes to the punishment only."

Summary of this case from Goodman v. Kunkle

In McDonald v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 312, 21 S.Ct. 389, 390, 45 L.Ed. 542 (1901), the Court held, "The fundamental mistake of the plaintiff in error is his assumption that the judgment below imposes an additional punishment on crimes for which he had already been convicted and punished... The punishment is for the new crime only, but it is heavier if he is an habitual criminal."

Summary of this case from Porter v. Singletary

In McDonald, the Supreme Court considered the identical issue presented in this case and declared that a recidivism statute's "punishment is for the new crime only.... The statute imposing a punishment on none but future crimes, is not ex post facto."

Summary of this case from Collins v. Duckworth, (N.D.Ind. 1983)

In McDonald, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he fundamental mistake of the [defendant] is his assumption that the judgment below imposes an additional punishment on crimes for which he had already been convicted and punished.

Summary of this case from Ex Parte Broxton

In McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 21 S. Ct. 389, 390, 45 L. Ed. 542, the court, in considering a statute imposing greater punishment because of prior convictions for crimes, said: `The allegation of previous convictions is not a distinct charge of crimes, but is necessary to bring the case within the statute, and goes to the punishment only.

Summary of this case from Wright v. People

In McDonald v. Massachusetts, supra, a statute was sustained providing for punishment of imprisonment for the term of twenty-five years of any person convicted of a felony after such person had been twice previously convicted of crime.

Summary of this case from In re Rosencrantz

In McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 21 Sup. Ct. 389, 45 L.Ed. 542, Mr. Justice Gray, reviewing an opinion upon the same case in 173 Mass. 322, 53 N.E. 874, said: "The punishment is for the new crime only, but is the heavier if he is an habitual criminal.... The allegation of previous convictions is not a distinct charge of crimes, but is necessary to bring the case within the statute, and goes to the punishment only."

Summary of this case from State v. Reilly

In McDonald v. Massachusetts, [180 U.S. 311, 21 S. Ct. 389, 45 L. Ed. 542 (1901) ], the Supreme Court held that the ex post facto law clause did not prevent the imposition of punishment under [a] habitual criminal statute even though the prior offenses had been committed prior to its passage.

Summary of this case from State v. King

In McDonald, the Supreme Court held that the enhancement statutes at issue in that case penalized the new criminal offense; therefore, the statutes did not constitute retroactive punishment for a former offense.

Summary of this case from Luna v. State

noting that since recidivist statutes impose punishment on only future crimes, they have no ex post facto implications

Summary of this case from Simmons v. State

noting that since recidivist statutes impose punishment on only future crimes, they have no ex post facto implications

Summary of this case from Simmons v. State
Case details for

McDonald v. Massachusetts

Case Details

Full title:McDONALD v . MASSACHUSETTS

Court:U.S.

Date published: Feb 25, 1901

Citations

180 U.S. 311 (1901)
21 S. Ct. 389

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