Opinion
Arika Hayes Matelyan, Plaintiff, Pro se, Los Angeles, CA.
For Supreme Court, Defendant: Robert Ira Lester, LEAD ATTORNEY, Office of U.S. Attorney, Civil Division, Los Angeles, CA.
Proceedings: IN CHAMBERS -- ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
PERCY ANDERSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Pro se plaintiff Arika Hayes Matelyan (" Plaintiff") filed this Complaint in the Superior Court of California for " wrongful judgment tort against Supreme Court Judge and Supreme Court 1-9." On June 15, 2015, the United States Attorney's Office removed the case to this Court.
Plaintiff has filed a number of unsuccessful lawsuits alleging copyright infringement. The Complaint presently before this Court alleges causes of action for " civil right[s], copyright rights, [and] discrimination" against the Supreme Court. The basis for the Complaint appears to be a letter Plaintiff received from the Office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States. (See Notice of Removal, Exh. 3.) The letter notes Plaintiff's petition for rehearing in one of her earlier cases was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States. See Hayes v. Minaj, 135 S.Ct. 699, 190 L.Ed.2d 406 (2014).
A court may dismiss a claim sua sponte pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361-62 (9th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff's claims against the Supreme Court are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity.
I. Legal Standard on Motion to Dismiss
Generally, plaintiffs in federal court are required to give only " a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). While the Federal Rules allow a court to dismiss a cause of action for " failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, " they also require all pleadings to be " construed so as to do justice." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 8(e). The purpose of Rule 8(a)(2) is to " 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). The Ninth Circuit is particularly hostile to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1997) (" The Rule 8 standard contains a powerful presumption against rejecting pleadings for failure to state a claim.") (internal quotation omitted).
However, in Twombly, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that " a wholly conclusory statement of a claim would survive a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some set of undisclosed facts to support recovery." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561, 127 S.Ct. at 1968 (internal quotation omitted). Instead, the Court adopted a " plausibility standard, " in which the complaint must " raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the alleged infraction]." Id. at 556, 127 S.Ct. at 1965. For a complaint to meet this standard, the " [f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004) (" [T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action") (alteration in original)); Daniel v. County of Santa Barbara, 288 F.3d 375, 380 (9th Cir. 2002) (" 'All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'") (quoting Burgert v. Lokelani Bernice Pauahi Bishop Trust, 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2000)). " [A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65 (internal quotations omitted). In construing the Twombly standard, the Supreme Court has advised that " a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
II. Analysis
Plaintiff's Complaint is largely indecipherable. To the extent the Court can understand Plaintiff's claims, they appear to be premised on her belief that " [t]he Judge at [the] Supreme Court refuse[d] to give me my right under Rule 102 Copy Rights Laws." The only named defendant is the " Supreme Court."
" Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction. . . ." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). " The judicial or quasi-judicial immunity available to federal officers is not limited to immunity from damages, but extends to actions for declaratory, injunctive and other equitable relief." Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Mullis v. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1040, 108 S.Ct. 2031, 100 L.Ed.2d 616 (1988)); Atkinson-Baker & Assocs. v. Kolts, 7 F.3d 1452, 1454 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (" Federal judges are absolutely immune from claims for declaratory and injunctive relief arising from their judicial acts."). The doctrine of judicial immunity has two limits. " First, a judge will be subject to liability . . . when he has acted in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction.'" Moore, 96 F.3d at 1244 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978)). Second, " absolute judicial immunity does not apply to non-judicial acts, i.e. the administrative, legislative, and executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned to perform." Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988)). Further, whether judicial immunity applies may be determined based on the allegations in the complaint. See Moore, 96 F.3d at 1243-44 (affirming dismissal based on Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)); Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1387 n. 6 (" The issue of entitlement to absolute judicial immunity for acts alleged in the complaint properly may be decided on a motion to dismiss.").
The doctrine of judicial immunity bars Plaintiff's claims against the Supreme Court of the United States. The Complaint does not allege that the United States Supreme Court Justices acted in the absence of jurisdiction. See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554 (noting doctrine of judicial immunity applies even if a judge is alleged to have acted maliciously or corruptly, as long as the judge did not act in the absence of all jurisdiction). Given the clear applicability of judicial immunity to this case, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Conclusion
The Court concludes that the Complaint fails to allege any viable claims. Ordinarily, because Plaintiff is appearing pro se, the Court would dismiss the Complaint with leave to amend. Here, however, the Court concludes that leave to amend would be futile. See Flowers v. First Hawaiian Bank, 295 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2002) (" A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it is obviously clear that the deficiencies in the complaint could not be cured by amendment . . . . A district court . . . does not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend where amendment would be futile."). Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Complaint without leave to amend.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
JUDGMENT
Pursuant to the Court's August 19, 2015 Minute Order dismissing this action, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that this action is dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiff take nothing and that Defendant shall have its costs of suit.