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sustaining a jury award of $800,000 in emotional distress damages
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Civil No. 99-220 (JRT/FLN)
July 5, 2001
RICHARD D. SLETTEN, CLERK
Donald H. Nichols and Nicholas G. B. May, NICHOLS, KASTER ANDERSON, Minneapolis, MN, for plaintiff.
James F. Baldwin and H. Le Phan, MOSS BARNETT, Minneapolis, MN, for defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Ling Kheit Luu brought this action against her former employer defendant Seagate Technology claiming that she was unlawfully retaliated against for reporting what she perceived to be an incident of sexual harassment in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17, and the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Minn. Stat. §§ 363.01 — 363.20. Following a full trial, the jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor and awarded plaintiff $31,922.39 in back pay, $800,000 in compensatory emotional distress damages and $1,100,000 in punitive damages. This matter is now before the Court on plaintiff's motion for entry of judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $1,183,625.90.
BACKGROUND
On March 16, 1992, plaintiff was hired by defendant as an operator/assembler. A few months later she was promoted to lead operator and then to group leader. Throughout her employment with defendant, plaintiff was an exemplary employee. At trial, each management employee with knowledge of plaintiff's performance record agreed that plaintiff was a good worker, her work evaluations demonstrated that she performed at a level which exceeded expectations and that there were no complaints or evidence of employee misconduct until the incident giving rise to her termination occurred.
On October 19, 1998, plaintiff was working at her station when two male co-workers, Rith Seang ("Seang") and Mohammad Shaarawi ("Shaarawi"), approached her work area and began talking. At least two other employees were present and overheard their conversation, including Abdukkadir Farah ("Farah") and Thu Ngo ("Ngo"). At some point in the conversation, Seang turned to plaintiff and said, "You do a blow job." Everyone present, other than plaintiff, began laughing. Plaintiff, a Vietnamese national whose English language skills are imperfect, was not sure what the statement actually meant, but she did comprehend that they were all laughing at her because of it.
When plaintiff asked her friend Shaarawi to explain what the term meant, Shaarawi did not respond because he and the others were engaged in uncontrollable laughter. In an attempt to get his attention and ask him again what the term "blow job" meant, plaintiff tapped Shaarawi on the arm. Again, Shaarawi failed to respond. After Shaarawi and Seang left the room, Farah explained to plaintiff the meaning of Seang's comment.
Believing that the statement constituted sexual harassment, plaintiff reported the incident to her manager Conrad Haak ("Haak") in compliance with the company's open-door policy for reporting sexual harassment. Haak agreed that the comment was inappropriate and recommended that plaintiff report the incident to Seang's manager, Antonio Holley ("Holley"). Plaintiff did so, and Holley also agreed that the comment was inappropriate. A meeting was then arranged between plaintiff, Shaarawi, Seang, Haak and Holley. During this meeting, Seang admitted to making the comment. Also, either during or shortly after this meeting, Shaarawi told Holley that plaintiff had hit him in the course of the incident.
Holley thereafter reported the incident to Doug Engelke ("Engelke") in the human resources department. Engelke advised Holley and Haak to obtain written statements from the individuals involved. Later that same day, Holley, Haak and Engelke reported the incident to Kenneth Tapper ("Tapper"), a management employee with supervisory authority over Holley and Haak. Tapper told Haak to suspend plaintiff immediately while the incident was investigated further; however, Tapper did not similarly instruct Holley to suspend Seang. Pursuant to Tapper's instruction, Haak informed plaintiff that she was suspended from her employment while defendant completed an investigation. He then collected plaintiff's badge and escorted her off the premises.
Engelke conducted an investigation in which he interviewed plaintiff, Shaarawi, Seang and Ngo about the events that transpired on October 19, 1998. Based on these interviews, he concluded that plaintiff had violated defendant's "zero-tolerance" policy against violence in the workplace. He also determined that Seang had violated defendant's sexual harassment policy. Engelke reported these results to Tapper, who determined that plaintiff's employment should be terminated. Plaintiff was formally discharged on October 22, 1998, about three days after she first reported the incident. The stated reason for plaintiff's termination was her violation of defendant's "zero tolerance" policy against violence in the workplace. Meanwhile, the employee who made the sexually offensive comment to plaintiff was not discharged despite Engelke's determination that he had violated the company's purported "zero tolerance" policy against sexual harassment. Instead, he received a one week suspension without pay.
Plaintiff thereafter filed this lawsuit, asserting claims of sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act. On June 28, 2000, the Court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's sexual harassment claim but denied the motion in all other respects. Plaintiff's retaliation claim under both statutes was tried to a jury on December 11, 12, 13, 18 and 19. On December 20, 2000, the jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor, awarding her $31,933.39 in back pay, $800,000 in compensatory emotional distress damages and $1,100,000 in punitive damages.
On January 30, 2001, plaintiff's counsel informed the Court that the parties were unable to reach agreement on plaintiff's damages under the governing statutes and that a separate motion on this issue was required. The Court held a telephone conference on February 1, 2001 to establish a briefing schedule for plaintiff's motion. Based on these pleadings and the arguments of counsel, which were heard on March 27, 2001, the Court now issues its ruling.
The Court refrained from issuing its Order while the parties tried again to mediate damages in this case, however, no settlement was reached at a June 14, 2001 mediation.
ANALYSIS
1. Damages under Title VII and the MHRAUnder Title VII, a complaining party who prevails in her claim for unlawful intentional discrimination may recover "compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b), in addition to any relief authorized by section 2000e-5(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a). Although compensatory and punitive damages are recoverable, Title VII statutorily caps these damages according to size of the employer. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay, . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
Minn. Stat. § 363.071.
Under the MHRA, a plaintiff may recover the following damages for violations of the Act:
. . . compensatory damages in an amount up to three times the actual damages sustained. In all cases, the judge may also order the respondent to pay an aggrieved party, who has suffered discrimination, damages for mental anguish or suffering and reasonable attorney's fees, in addition to punitive damages in an amount not more than $8,500. Punitive damages shall be awarded pursuant to section 549.20.
In this case, plaintiff brought her claims under both Title VII and the MHRA. Because of this, plaintiff claims she is not limited to the statutory caps under Title VII. Citing Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 576 (8th Cir. 1997), Passantino v. Johnson Johnson Consumer Prods.~ 212 F.3d 493, 509-10 (9th Cir. 2000) and Martini v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 178 F.3d 1136, 1349-50 (D.C. Cir. 1999) as precedential support, plaintiff argues that the Court can allocate damages, where applicable, between the two statutes.
In Kimzey, the plaintiff brought suit against her employer for sexual harassment and constructive discharge in violation of both Title VII and the Missouri Human Rights Act. 107 F.3d at 570. A jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor, awarding her $35,000 in compensatory damages, $1.00 in back pay and $50,000,000 in punitive damages, which the district court later reduced to $5,000,000. Id. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit rejected defendant's argument that the district court should have limited plaintiff's punitive damage award to the $300,000 cap under Title VII. Id. at 575-76. Noting that the standards for punitive damages under Title VII and the state anti-discrimination statute were the same and that the jury instructions provided no indication under which statute damages were submitted to the jury, the Eighth Circuit found no reason why the district court could not allocate these damages under the state statute:
There is no language in Title VII indicating that its upper limit is to be placed on awards under state anti-discrimination statutes, and Wal-Mart points to no legislative history showing this intent. State law cannot be displaced by federal law without the clear intent of Congress . . . and evidence of such intent is missing here. Wal-Mart's argument that the award under state law can be no larger than $300,000 thus fails.
Id. at 576. Other federal circuit courts have reached the same conclusion. In Passantino, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's allocation of $1 million in compensatory damages to the state law claim. 212 F.3d at 509-10. As in Kimzey, the court concluded that "[i]n the absence of a contrary directive, such as a statutory mandate that damages be allocated to one claim rather than another, the district court had authority to allocate the damages to either claim. Id. at 509; see also Martini, 178 F.3d at 1349-50 (affirming district court's damage award beyond Title VII's statutory maximum where standards of liability under both statutes are the same).
Despite the holdings in these cases, defendant claims that plaintiff's compensatory and punitive damage awards are limited to the $300,000 cap under Title VII. Specifically, defendant contends that the MHRA's exclusivity provision, Minn. Stat. § 363.11, precludes plaintiff's recovery under the MHRA. Section 363.11 provides:
Given defendant's argument, the Court presumes that Seagate Technology employs "more than 500 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D) (capping damages at $300,000 for employers with more than 500 employees).
The provisions of this chapter shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof. Nothing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to repeal any of the provisions of the civil rights law or of any other law of this state relating to discrimination because of race, creed, color, religion, sex, age, disability, marital status, status with regard to public assistance, national origin, sexual orientation, or familial status; but, as to acts declared unfair by section 363.03, the procedure herein provided shall, while pending, be exclusive.
(Emphasis added.) As support, defendant relies on two Minnesota Supreme Court decisions interpreting § 363.11, Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1990) and Williams v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr. Inc., 551 N.W.2d 483 (Minn. 1996). In Wirig, the plaintiff sued her former employer, alleging, among other claims, a sexual harassment claim under the MHRA and a common law battery claim. 461 N.W.2d at 377. In construing § 363.11, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the exclusivity provision did not preempt plaintiff's common law battery claim. See id. at 379. The court, however, limited plaintiff's recovery to the MHRA claim out of concern that permitting plaintiff to recover damages under both legal theories would be a double recovery for the same harm. See id. In Williams, the court held that the MHRA's exclusivity provision barred plaintiff's separate retaliation claim under Minnesota's Whistleblower Act. 551 N.W.2d at 486.
The jury awarded plaintiff $30,000 in compensatory damages, $7,100 in future damages and $5,000 in punitive damages on her harassment claim and $14,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages on her battery claim.
Defendant's reliance on § 363.11 is misplaced. Wirig and Williams, as well as other cases interpreting the preemptive scope of § 363.11, see Vaughn v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1997), Thompson v. Olsten Kimberly QualityCare, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 1035 (D.Minn. 1997); Wise v. Digital Equip. Corp., 1994 WL 664973 (Minn.Ct.App. Nov. 29, 1994); Huffman v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 1995 WL 434467 (Minn.Ct.App. July 25, 1995), all involve whether the MHRA's exclusivity provision abrogates either a common law claim or a state statutory claim. See Wirig, 461 N.W.2d at 377-79 (common law battery); Williams, 551 N.W.2d at 483-86 (Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(a), the Minnesota Whistleblower Act); Thompson, 980 F. Supp. at 1039 (negligent supervision and retention); Wise, 1994 WL 664973 at *2 (same); Huffman, 1995 WL 434467 at *5 (same).
The analogous argument in this case would be that § 363.11 preempts plaintiff's federal claim, a construction which, for obvious reasons, cannot be sustained. See Durr v. American National Prop. Casualty Co., 1999-CA-00482-SCT, 2001 WL 769611 at *4 (Miss. June 15, 2000) (rejecting plaintiffs' argument that state law preempts federal law on the basis that such an assertion is against "general principles of law"). Perhaps in recognition of this constructional dilemma, defendant argues that § 363.11 bars plaintiff's MHRA claim while her Title VII claim is pending. However, as the above discussion and a plain reading of § 363.11 reveal, application of § 363.11 would render plaintiff's MHRA claim exclusive, not the other way around.
At the motion hearing, it became more clear that defendant's argument has less to do with § 363.11 per se and more to do with the Minnesota Supreme Court's second holding in Wirig concerning plaintiff's double recovery for the same harm and election of remedies. Specifically, defendant maintains that plaintiff elected to present this case to the jury under the standards of Title VII and as such, she is now limited to recover damages under that statute. The Court disagrees. As Instruction No. 12 makes clear, plaintiff's retaliation claim was presented to the jury under both statutes. It is well-established that the standards of liability for retaliation under both Title VII and the MHRA are the same. Scott v. County of Ramsey, 180 F.3d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 1999); Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 444 (Minn. 1983).
Moreover, the double recovery concern raised in Wirig is inapplicable here where the express terms of § 2000e-7 protect a state law's "prerogative to provide greater remedies for employment discrimination than those Congress has afforded under Title VII." Martini, 178 F.3d at 1349-50. For these reasons, the Court finds this case on all fours with Kimzey, Passantino and Martini and concludes that the Court may allocate damages, where applicable, between the two statutes.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7, entitled, "Effect of State Laws," provides, in relevant part, that "[n]othing in this title shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law. . . ."
A. Backpay
There are no statutory limitations under either Title VII or the MHRA for backpay. In fact, Title VII expressly provides that a backpay award is excluded from the compensatory damages subject to the statutory caps. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2) ("Compensatory damages awarded under this section shall not include backpay, interests on backpay, or any other type of relief authorized under section 2000e-5(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"). Under the MHRA, the Court has the discretion to award three times the amount of backpay, however, plaintiff asks only for the actual amount awarded by the jury. Defendant does not appear to dispute this request. The Court thus sustains the jury's award of $31,922.39 in wage and benefit loss.
B. Front Pay
Plaintiff seeks five years of front pay in the amount of $51,703.51. Defendant claims that a front pay award is not warranted, however, if the Court finds otherwise, defendant alternatively contends that such damages should be limited to two years. Most courts, including the Eighth Circuit, have held that front pay is a viable equitable remedy to be awarded in the district court's discretion when reinstatement is impractical or impossible. See Kramer v. Logan County School Dist., 157 F.3d 620, 625-26 (8th Cir. 1998); Martini, 178 F.3d at 1348-49; Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 556 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Rivera v. Baccarat, Inc., 34 F. Supp.2d 870, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Bizelli v. Parker Amchem, 17 F. Supp.2d 949, 954 n. 2 (E.D.Mo. 1998). As an equitable remedy, front pay is not subject to the statutory caps of Title VII. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co., 121 S.Ct. 1946, 1952 (2001) (holding that an award of front pay in lieu of reinstatement is not limited by § 1981a); Kramer, 157 F.3d at 626.
At trial, the parties agreed that in light of Excel Corp. v. Bosley, 165 F.3d 635, 639 (8th Cir. 1999) and Newhouse v. McCormick Co., 110 F.3d 635, 641 (8th Cir. 1997), the issue of front pay would be submitted to the Court, not the jury.
As an initial matter, the Court finds that reinstatement is not an option given the polarization that defendant's treatment of plaintiff and the ensuing litigation have created between the parties. See Cowan v. Strafford R-VI School Dist., 140 F.3d 1153, 1160 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming trial court's determination that working relationship between plaintiff and defendant was so badly damaged as to make reinstatement impossible); Webner v. Titan Distrib., Inc., 101 F. Supp.2d 1215, 1235 (N.D.Iowa 2000) (listing "degree of hostility or animosity between the parties" as a relevant factor in determining whether reinstatement is an inappropriate remedy).
Having determined that reinstatement is not a viable option in this case, the Court next determines whether an award of front pay is warranted. Numerous factors weigh in favor of awarding plaintiff front pay. See Webner, 101 F. Supp.2d at 1236 (enumerating multiple factors for assessing front pay determination). The evidence reveals that plaintiff worked for defendant from 1992 until 1998. This relatively lengthy period of employment suggests that, absent the discrimination, plaintiff would have remained with defendant indefinitely. See id. at 1236-37 (noting that relative longevity of plaintiff's employment with defendant and likelihood that plaintiff would have remained with employer absent the discrimination weighs in favor of a front pay award). Indeed, the factual record in this case contains particularly compelling evidence that plaintiff would likely have remained in her position at Seagate for a substantial period of time. At trial, plaintiff's brother testified about the importance their culture places on long-term employment. Additionally, plaintiff's work record reveals that throughout her employment with defendant, she was an exemplary employee who performed her duties above expectations. Thus, although a plaintiff's at-will employment status is generally subject to speculation, the degree of speculation is significantly reduced under the particular facts and circumstances of this case.
These factors include:
1) the plaintiff's age;
2) the length of time the plaintiff was employed by the defendant employer;
3) the likelihood t he employment would have continued absent the discrimination;
4) the length of time it will take the plaintiff, using reasonable effort, to secure comparable employment;
5) the plaintiff's work and life expectancy;
6) the plaintiff's status as an at-will employee;
7) the length of time other employees typically held the position lost;
8) the plaintiff's ability to work;
9) the plaintiff's ability to work for the defendant-employer;
10) the employee's efforts to mitigate damages; and
11) the amount of any liquidated or punitive damages award made to the plaintiff.
Id. at 1236.
Plaintiff also properly mitigated her damages. See Excel Corp. v. Bosley, 165 F.3d 635, 639 (8th Cir. 1999) ("A Title VII claimant seeking either back pay or front pay damages has a duty to mitigate those damages by exercising reasonable diligence to locate other suitable employment and maintain a suitable job once it is located"); Webner, 101 F. Supp.2d at 1237 (evidence that plaintiff reasonably sought to gain other employment weighs in favor of front pay). As plaintiff's Exhibit 17 demonstrates, plaintiff secured other employment just over a month after her termination and continues to work at the present time. Exhibit 17 also reveals that plaintiff has not received, nor is she currently receiving, the same salary she received while working for defendant. While the pay differential is gradually diminishing, the fact that a differential still exists supports a front pay award. Based on these factors, the Court finds that a front pay award is appropriate.
Once a court determines that front pay is warranted, the Court must then calculate the actual award. The steps for calculating a front pay award include 1) determining the proper duration; and 2) estimating the loss yearly income less mitigating damages. Webner, 101 F. Supp.2d at 1238-39. As previously mentioned, plaintiff requests a front pay award of five years, while defendant argues the duration of the award should be limited to two years. Upon review of the relevant case law, the facts of this case, and the arguments of counsel, the Court concludes that three years of front pay under plaintiff's method of computation "strike[s] the proper balance between the need to make plaintiff `whole' and the need to avoid excessive front pay awards." Id. at 1238. An award of one additional year from defendant's proposed duration properly accounts for the particularly compelling evidence presented in this case that plaintiff had every intention to remain working for defendant, given the emphasis her culture places on long-term employment. The Court also finds that computing the award according to plaintiff's annual income approach, as opposed to defendant's hourly wage approach, is not "unduly speculative." Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1995). It is significant that the Court's calculation is based on the same approach and evidence adopted by the jury in awarding plaintiff's back pay award. See Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1065 (8th Cir. 1997) (approving the district court's calculation of front pay based on the same evidence that the jury awarded the back pay award). The Court thus awards plaintiff $31,022.28 in front pay.
C. Compensatory Damages
The jury awarded plaintiff $800,000 in emotional distress damages. While there is a cap on the amount of compensatory damages a plaintiff may recover under Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3), this cap is not applicable to the MHRA, and as previously discussed, the Court can award such damages under the MHRA rather than Title VII. The MHRA authorizes the trebling of compensatory emotional distress damages. See Minn. Stat. § 363.071, subd. 2 (allowing for the recovery of "compensatory damages in an amount up to three times the actual damages sustained"); see also Jones v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., No. C9-00-79, 2000 WL 105167 at *8 (Minn.Ct.App. Aug. 1, 2000) (upholding trial court's trebling of compensatory damages for past mental anguish/suffering and economic loss due to sexual harassment and hostile work environment). Despite the availability of trebled damages, plaintiff requests only the amount awarded by the jury. Defendant contests the jury's award on the basis that it is excessive and is the product of jury sympathy and prejudice.
Compensatory emotional distress damages are "highly subjective and should be committed to the sound discretion of the jury, especially when the jury is being asked to determine injuries not easily calculated in economic terms." Webner, 101 F. Supp.2d at 1225; Jenkins v. McLean Hotels, Inc., 859 F.2d 598, 600 (8th Cir. 1988); Morrissey v. Welsh Co., 821 F.2d 1294, 1299 n. 3 (8th Cir. 1987). A verdict should be set aside as excessive only where the amount of damages "shocks the conscience." Morse v. Southern Union Co., 174 F.3d 917, 925 (8th Cir. 1999); Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 990 F.2d 1051, 1061 (8th Cir. 1993). In determining whether the verdict amount is excessive, the trial court must consider all the evidence, including the parties' demeanors, and the circumstances of trial. Peoples Bank Trusts Co. v. Globe Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 978 F.2d 1065, 1070 (8th Cir. 1992).
Medical or other expert evidence is not required to prove emotional distress damages. See Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1065 (8th Cir. 1997). Rather, "a plaintiff's own testimony, along with the circumstances of a particular case, can suffice to sustain the plaintiff's burden in this regard." Id. (quoting Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1996)); see also Wilmington v. J.I. Case Co., 793 F.2d 909, 922 (8th Cir. 1986). Additionally, the Eighth Circuit has approved of corroborating testimony by a plaintiff's family members to support emotional distress damages. See Foster v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 250 F.3d 1189, 1196 (8th Cir. 2001) (testimony of plaintiff's husband supported evidence of plaintiff's emotional distress); Morse, 174 F.3d at 925; Kim, 123 F.3d at 1065 (corroboration by family members sufficient).
The record amply supports the jury's award of $800,000 for plaintiff's emotional distress damages. At trial, the jury heard testimony from plaintiff's brother and plaintiff herself concerning the loss of reputation and shame plaintiff experienced, and still experiences, as a result of her termination. Plaintiff's brother testified to the striking changes he witnessed in his sister's personality. (Nichols Aff. Ex. 2.) He testified that prior to her termination, plaintiff was a hard working, happy, kind and generous person who enjoyed helping her family and socializing with friends. Id. After her termination, he testified that plaintiff would "isolate herself in her room, [often times locking the door] and try not to talk to anybody else." Id. (quoting Tr. at 390). When asked about the importance of maintaining employment in his culture and the loss of respect and shame an individual and family members experience when a person is terminated, he responded:
People wants to stay in the company as long as they retire. That's their goal. If for some reason they got terminated, or got fired, people will look at that person, might think differently. Say, why she — I mean this bad thing that that person did in a company, that they get terminated. People always think of the bad way first in our culture.
Id. (quoting Tr. at 391).
Plaintiff herself testified that despite all her previous life experiences, including having her brothers sent to concentration camps, escaping from Vietnam and living on an island for over a year without adequate food, water and clothing, her termination was the most traumatic event of her life because it resulted in the loss of her reputation and dignity. Plaintiff's shame was so great that she could not bring herself to tell her family of her termination. She explained that, in her culture, losing a job brings a shame upon the terminated employee and the employee's family. Plaintiff's shame and cultural obligations also led her to end a special relationship she had with a man in Taiwan as a result of the events.
Defendant claims that this award far exceeds the average recovery for emotional distress damages. But as the testimony above demonstrates, this was not an average case. The Court cannot overlook the unique factual circumstances of this case and the tremendous impact these events have had on this particular plaintiff's life. See Hopkins v. McBane, 427 N.W.2d 85, 95 (N.D. 1988) (considering cultural factors in affirming trial court's compensatory damage award for mental anguish, grief and loss of companionship). Many of the emotions and demeanor of the witnesses, particularly those of plaintiff and her family, cannot be adequately captured on the trial court record. However, the twelve individual members of the jury were present in the courtroom and did hear and witness all these events. In deliberations, the jury took all these factors into consideration in evaluating the degree of shame and embarrassment experienced by plaintiff and in determining the appropriate amount of damages that would adequately compensate plaintiff for her harm. It is for these reasons that a jury's determination for compensatory damages is best left to the "sound discretion of the jury," Webner, 101 F. Supp.2d at 1225; Jenkins, 859 F.2d at 600, and it is for these reasons that this Court will not disturb that determination. Other courts have upheld compensatory damage awards of similar amounts. See Jones, 2000 WL 1052167 at *8 (upholding trial court's award of $630,000 of trebled compensatory damages under the MHRA); Passantino, 212 F.3d at 513-14 (upholding jury's $1 million compensatory emotional distress damage award). Thus, for all the above-stated reasons, the Court sustains the jury's award of $800,000 in compensatory emotional distress damages.
D. Punitive Damages
Under Title VII, punitive damages may be awarded if a plaintiff demonstrates that defendant "engaged in a discriminatory practice . . . with malice or with reckless § 1981a(b)(1). Based on this standard, the jury awarded plaintiff $1.1 million in punitive damages against defendant.
Because punitive damages under the MHRA must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, see Minn. Stat. § 549.20, a standard which was not presented to the jury, plaintiff's recovery for punitive damages is limited to Title VII.
Plaintiff argues that the evidence at trial supported a punitive damages award against defendant and asks the Court to award her $300,000 in punitive damages under the Title VII cap. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). Defendant maintains that the facts of this case do not support an award of punitive damages against defendant as a matter of law. Specifically, defendant claims the record conclusively shows that defendant's termination of plaintiff was based on its reasonable good faith belief that she violated the zero tolerance policy prohibiting violence in the workplace and that plaintiff cannot set forth any evidence which would place defendant's motivations in doubt as to the reason for her termination.
The controlling authority for assessing the sufficiency of a punitive damage award under Title VII is Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999). In Kolstad, the Court rejected an interpretation of § 1981a which would have required a plaintiff to demonstrate "egregious" conduct by an employer before punitive damages could be assessed. Id. at 535. Instead, the Court adopted "the view that § 1981a provides for punitive awards based solely on an employer's state of mind . . . . The terms `malice' or `reckless indifference' pertain to the employer's knowledge that it may be acting in violation of federal law, not its awareness that it is engaging in discrimination." Id. Thus, an employer who "discriminate[s] in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law [may] be liable in punitive damages. Id. at 536.
The Court also made clear that vicarious liability will be imposed where employee[s] who serve in managerial capacities commit the wrong while acting in the scope of their employment. Id. at 543. However, an employer may escape vicarious liability for the discriminatory actions of its managerial agents where the employer makes "good faith efforts" to comply with the requirements of federal law. Id. at 545.
Guided by the standards in Kolstad, the Court finds that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that defendant acted with reckless indifference to plaintiff's federally protected rights. On the day of the incident, management and supervisory employees learned from plaintiff that another employee had made a highly offensive sexual comment to her. Plaintiff reported this incident based on her reasonable belief that the comment constituted sexual harassment and in full compliance with defendant's written policy encouraging employees to report such incidents to upper management. There was testimony presented at trial that management personnel who were responsible for handling and responding to plaintiff's complaint of sexual harassment knew of these written policies and received workplace training concerning these policies. Yet, upon reporting the incident, plaintiff found herself suspended from her job that same day, while employee Seang, who made the comment to plaintiff, was permitted to return to work. A few days later, plaintiff was terminated from her job, while Seang received a one-week suspension.
These facts, and the inferences which can be drawn from them, more than adequately support a jury's finding that management employees, acting within the scope of their employment, had knowledge of Title VII's proscriptions, yet acted "in the face of a perceived risk that [their] actions [would] violate federal law." Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536; Ogden v. Wax Works, 214 F.3d 999, 1010 (8th Cir. 2000). While defendant claims to have terminated plaintiff for violating its zero tolerance policy against violence in the workplace, the jury obviously disbelieved defendant that this was the true motivation for plaintiff's termination.
At trial, plaintiff presented evidence of prior incidents of workplace violence that involved similar physical contact with other employees. Yet, in neither instance were the employees terminated for violating the zero tolerance policy against violence in the workplace. This evidence supports the jury's disbelief of defendant's stated reason for terminating plaintiff, and further supports the inference that management acted with the intent to retaliate against plaintiff for reporting an incident of sexual harassment.
Although defendant maintained written policies, this evidence is insufficient in the face of substantial evidence that the policies were not followed in actual practice. See Foster, 250 F.3d at 1197 ("The mere existence of a policy is not enough to establish good faith if there is evidence that managerial employees disregarded it in making employment decisions and issues a conflicting policy."); Ogden, 214 F.3d at 1010 ("Plainly, [pointing to a written sexual harassment policy, and policy of encouraging employees with grievances to contact the home office] does not suffice, as a matter of law, to establish `good faith efforts' in the face of substantial evidence that the company `minimized' [plaintiff's] complaints; performed a cursory investigation which focused upon [plaintiff's] performance, rather than [the supervisor's] conduct; and forced [plaintiff] to resign while imposing no discipline upon [the supervisor] for his behavior."); Kimzey, 107 F.3d at 579 (Heaney, J. concurring and dissenting) (stating that defendant's response to plaintiff's complaint of sexual harassment "essentially punished the wrong party and condoned the illegal behavior.").
Based on this record, the Court holds that there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could find defendant liable for punitive damages under the established standards of Kolstad. The Court accordingly awards plaintiff $300,000 in punitive damages, the maximum statutory amount permitted under Title VII. This amount is reasonable and sufficient to deter future similar conduct, and is entirely consistent with other Eighth Circuit decisions which have approved similar punitive damage awards to deter employment discrimination. See Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1067-68 (8th Cir. 1997) ($300,000 punitive damage award is an adequate sanction to prevent retaliation in violation of Title VII); Morse v. Southern Union Co., 174 F.3d 917, 925-26 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding trial court's $400,000 punitive damage award); Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 578 (8th Cir. 1997) (awarding $350,000 in punitive damages); Denesha v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 161 F.3d 491, 505 (8th Cir. 1998) ($700,000 in punitive damages); EEOC v. HBE Corp., 135 F.3d 543, 557 (8th Cir. 1998) ($380,000 in punitive damages).
For all the foregoing reasons, the Court awards plaintiff $31,922.39 in back pay, $31,022.28 in front pay, $800,000 in compensatory damages, and $300,000 in punitive damages. Judgment against defendant will be entered against defendant in the amount of $1,162,944.67.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all of the records, files and proceedings herein, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to enter judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $1,183,625.00 [Docket No. 65] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part:
1. Plaintiff's motion to enter judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $31,922.39 in back pay, $800,000 in compensatory emotional distress damages and $300,000 in punitive damages is GRANTED;
2. Plaintiff's motion to enter judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $51,703.51 in front pay is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. The Court awards $31, 022.28 in front pay.
3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and that she recover of defendant Seagate Technology Inc. the sum of $1,162,944.67.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.