Opinion
Civil Action. No. 06-1979.
July 25, 2006
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently before the Court are plaintiffs' brief in opposition to staying/dismissing the complaint pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine (Doc. No. 19), and defendants' response thereto (Doc. No. 22). For the following reasons, this Court abstains from adjudicating plaintiffs' claims for equitable relief based upon the alleged facial invalidity of the MC zoning ordinance and stays the remainder of plaintiffs' claims pending resolution of the land use appeal in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas for Berks County ("Berks County Court of Common Pleas").
I. Factual and Procedural History
The factual and procedural history of this litigation was extensively detailed in this Court's June 19, 2006 memorandum opinion denying plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. (See Doc. No. 16). The instant opinion briefly articulates this factual and procedural history, while presupposing familiarity with the factual and legal analysis of the June 19, 2006 memorandum opinion.
In 2003, plaintiffs Lighthouse Christian Center ("Lighthouse"), a church of approximately 300 members operating out of Reading, Pennsylvania, and Sherwood Behm ("Pastor Behm"), the pastor of Lighthouse, attempted to find a new facility for worship to accommodate the growth of Lighthouse's congregation. (See Compl., at ¶¶ 15-16). Plaintiffs ultimately located property (the "property") in Reading within a district which was zoned for manufacturing-commercial use ("MC zoning district"). (Id., at 21). The zoning ordinance applicable to the property ("MC zoning ordinance") removed religious use from the MC zoning district in 2001, even as a special exemption. (Id., at ¶¶ 23-24; see 2001 Amendments to § 27-811 of the City of Reading Zoning Code, attached as Ex. 4 to Pl. Br. In Support of TRO and PI).
On January 30, 2005, Lighthouse filed an application with the Zoning Hearing Board of the City of Reading, Pennsylvania ("Zoning Hearing Board") for a use variance to permit Lighthouse to utilize the property for religious worship. (See Compl., at ¶ 25). Following a hearing, the Zoning Hearing Board denied plaintiffs' application, finding the absence of a hardship, a prerequisite for a variance, in part because "there are many zoning districts which allow religious uses and which contain vacant buildings to house religious uses." (See February 8, 2006 Zoning Hearing Board Decision, at ¶ 13).
On April 7, 2006, Lighthouse appealed the decision of the Zoning Hearing Board to the Berks County Court of Common Pleas. (See Notice of Land Use Appeal). The appeal argues that the denial of the application for a use variance was arbitrary and capricious, and, in the alternative, asserts that the MC zoning ordinance, by limiting the operation of churches to certain restricted areas by special exception, "effectively precludes churches in the City in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA")." (Id., at ¶¶ 6, 10). The appeal is currently pending before the Berks County Court of Common Pleas. (See Compl., at ¶ 26).
On May 10, 2006, plaintiffs filed a complaint in federal court against the City of Reading, the City of Reading Council, and the Zoning Hearing Board ("defendants"). (See Doc. No. 1). Plaintiffs' complaint asserts that the MC zoning ordinance, on its face and as applied by defendants, violates various provisions of RLUIPA ("federal statutory claims"), the free exercise clause, the free speech clause, the freedom of assembly clause, and the equal protection clause of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution ("federal constitutional claims"), and the free exercise clause, the freedom of speech clause, the freedom of assembly clause, the due process clause, and the equal protection clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution ("state constitutional claims"). (Id.). On May 18, 2006, plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, asking this Court to enjoin defendants from prohibiting religious use, worship, and assembly in the MC zoning district in accordance with the Reading Zoning Code. (See Doc. No. 2). The Court held a hearing on plaintiffs' motion on May 31, 2006.
In its June 19, 2006 memorandum opinion, the Court denied plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, and required plaintiffs to file a brief explaining why this matter should not be stayed or dismissed pursuant to principles of abstention. (See June 19, 2006 Order, Doc. No. 16). On June 26, 2006, plaintiffs filed their brief. (See Doc. No. 19). Defendants responded on June 29, 2006. (See Doc. No. 22).
II. Discussion
This opinion analyzes the solitary issue of whether principles of abstention require this Court to stay and/or dismiss plaintiffs' action.
A. Younger Abstention
The Younger doctrine affords a federal district court "discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a particular claim where resolution of that claim in federal court would offend principles of comity by interfering with an ongoing state proceeding." Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Township of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 2005). Younger abstention is appropriate upon the satisfaction of the following three conditions: (1) the existence of ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assoc., 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982).
1. Existence of Ongoing State Judicial Proceedings
As discussed in the Court's June 19, 2006 memorandum opinion, the parties are involved in an ongoing state judicial proceeding of a similar factual and legal nature as the instant federal action. Lighthouse's land use appeal, which challenges the Zoning Hearing Board's decision to deny Lighthouse's request for a variance to employ the property in the MC zoning district for religious use, is currently pending before the Berks County Court of Common Pleas. See Addiction Specialists, 411 F3d at 408-409 (state land use appeal before Allegheny Court of Common Pleas constitutes ongoing state court proceeding, despite state court's stay of proceedings, because land use appeal was pending at time plaintiff filed complaint in federal court alleging that township zoning ordinance violated various constitutional and statutory rights); Gwynedd Prop., Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Township, 970 F.2d 1195, 1200 (3d Cir. 1992). The state land use appeal was filed on April 7, 2006, well before plaintiffs' complaint in federal court was filed. Id.
2. Important State Interests
Plaintiffs' federal action and state land use appeal both involve questions of zoning and land use, issues of "traditional significance to states." Addiction Specialists, Inc., 411 F.3d at 409; Izzo v. Borough of River Edge, 843 F.2d 765, 769 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Land use policy customarily has been considered a feature of local government and an area in which the tenets of federalism are particularly strong"). However, in determining whether the entirety of a land use complaint in federal court implicates important state interests, the Third Circuit has drawn a distinction between facial challenges to the legality of a zoning ordinance and challenges to the illegal application of a zoning ordinance by township officials. See Addiction Specialists, 411 F.3d at 410; Gwynedd Prop., 970 F.2d at 1202-1203. The former implicates important state interests within the meaning of the second prong of the Younger analysis; the latter does not. Id.; New Horizon Inv. Corp. v. Mayor And Municipal Council of Belleville, 2005 WL 2237776, at *5-6 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2005).
In this instance, plaintiffs bring both a facial challenge to the legality of the MC zoning ordinance and a challenge to the allegedly discriminatory manner in which the MC zoning ordinance was implemented. (See Compl., at ¶¶ 29-30, 41, 43, 47, 49, 51, 53, 58, 65, 67). Accordingly, under Third Circuit precedent, plaintiffs' federal constitutional and statutory claims, and plaintiffs' state constitutional claims, satisfy the second prong of the Younger analysis to the extent these claims challenge the facial validity of the MC zoning ordinance; plaintiffs' remaining claims, as-applied challenges to the implementation of the MC zoning ordinance, do not.
3. Adequate Opportunity to Raise Claims
The third prong of the Younger standard evaluates whether the state proceedings afford plaintiffs an adequate opportunity to raise the claims in their federal complaint. See Addiction Specialists, 411 F.3d at 408; Gwynedd Prop., 970 F.2d at 1195. Importantly, the appropriate test is not whether plaintiffs did in fact raise their claims in the state court proceedings, but, instead, whether plaintiffs had the opportunity to do so. See, e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977) (Younger abstention applicable to constitutional claims that federal plaintiffs had opportunity to raise, but failed to do so, during ongoing state court proceedings, as nothing more than "opportunity" is required to satisfy third prong of Younger abstention); Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 1989) (second prong of Younger satisfied when plaintiff had "adequate opportunity to raise federal claims," although plaintiff chose to proceed in state court without raising federal claims); 1A Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 1:629 (2006) (emphasizing that "it is only where, for procedural or other reasons, the state courts deprive the plaintiff of such an opportunity [to make claim in ongoing state court proceeding] that Younger does not apply" and that plaintiffs "have an opportunity to raise their claims in state court so long as they are not procedurally barred from raising such claims").
In applying the third prong of the Younger analysis, the Third Circuit has drawn a distinction between claims for damages and claims for equitable relief. According to the Third Circuit, the Pennsylvania Courts of Common Pleas possess the power to invalidate local zoning ordinances pursuant to 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 11006-A, thereby affording litigants the opportunity to raise constitutional and statutory challenges, under both federal and state law, to the facial validity of a land use regulation during a land use appeal. See Addiction Specialists, 411 F.3d at 411-412 (finding that Court of Common Pleas' jurisdiction is not necessary restricted by limited subject matter jurisdiction of Zoning Hearing Board and holding that plaintiff may raise state/federal constitutional and statutory challenges to land use statutes and ordinances in land use appeal before Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas). However, because damages are "probably unavailable" in Pennsylvania land use appeals, claims for damages in parallel land use litigation before a federal court do not meet the third prong of theYounger analysis. Id.
Based upon Third Circuit precedent, it is clear that plaintiffs had the opportunity to raise their federal and state claims for equitable relief, including declaratory and injunctive relief, before the Berks County Court of Common Pleas. In fact, taking partial advantage of this opportunity, Lighthouse requests equitable relief in its notice of land use appeal on the theory that the MC zoning ordinance, on its face and as applied, violates RLUIPA. (See Notice of Land Use Appeal, at ¶ 10 and "wherefore" clause). Consequently, the third prong of Younger abstention is satisfied to the extent that plaintiffs' federal and state claims in the instant complaint request equitable relief.
4. Conclusion
In summary, only certain claims in plaintiffs' complaint implicate important state interests and, within this category of claims, only certain forms of relief are clearly available in the land use appeal. Thus, the Court abstains from entertaining plaintiffs' RLUIPA, federal constitutional, and state constitutional claims for equitable relief based upon the facial invalidity of the MC zoning ordinance. These claims are accordingly dismissed pursuant to Younger abstention. See Addiction Specialists, 411 F.3d at 415 (affirming district court's dismissal pursuant to Younger of state and federal constitutional claims requesting declaration as to facial invalidity of township zoning ordinance); 1A Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 1:642 (2006) ("Younger doctrine contemplates the outright dismissal of the federal suit, and the presentation of all claims, both state and federal, to the state courts").
Plaintiffs suggest that the Court should stay, rather than dismiss, the claims subject to Younger abstention because the Berks County Court of Common Pleas need not hear additional evidence on the constitutionality of the MC zoning ordinance.See 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 11005-A ("If, upon motion, it is shown that proper consideration of the land use appeal requires the presentation of additional evidence, a judge of the court may hold a hearing to receive additional evidence . . ."). The Court, however, is unable to ascertain why plaintiffs would need to present "additional evidence," as compared to legal argument, regarding the alleged facial invalidity of the MC zoning ordinance. Nor have plaintiffs suggested that the Berks County Court of Common Pleas has refused to hear whatever "additional evidence" plaintiffs seek to present. Most importantly, however, the statutory grant of discretion to hear "additional evidence" in no way has jeopardized plaintiffs' opportunity to raise the statutory and constitutional claims identified in the federal complaint during the state land use appeal. Although plaintiffs may have chosen not to raise the litany of federal and state constitutional challenges detailed in the federal complaint during the state land use appeal, plaintiffs were not, nor are, procedurally barred from raising such claims, and therefore, dismissal of these claims pursuant to Younger abstention is appropriate. See Juidice, 430 U.S. at 337.
B. Stay
The Third Circuit has suggested that, when the Younger abstention analysis applies to certain claims in land use litigation before a federal court, a district court should evaluate whether to stay the remaining claims not subject toYounger abstention. For instance, in Addiction Specialists, the Third Circuit determined that the Younger doctrine does not apply to claims challenging the allegedly discriminatory application of a local township zoning ordinance and to claims for damages based upon facial and as-applied challenges to the ordinance. 411 F.3d at 414-415. However, although the Third Circuit reversed the district court's invocation of Younger abstention to dismiss the entirety of the federal complaint, the Third Circuit nonetheless remanded to the district court to determine the propriety of staying its adjudication of the non-Younger claims in the federal complaint pending the outcome of the state land use appeal. Id. The Third Circuit noted that a stay might be advisable "in order to avoid friction between the federal and state courts." Id.
Following the Third Circuit's instruction in Addiction Specialists, the Court now evaluates whether it is appropriate to stay, as compared to abstaining from resolving, plaintiffs' remaining claims, those not subject to Younger abstention. These claims can be classified into the following groups: (1) claims for damages based upon the alleged facial invalidity of the MC zoning ordinance; (2) claims for equitable relief based upon the allegedly discriminatory application of the MC zoning ordinance; and (3) claims for damages based upon the allegedly discriminatory application of the MC zoning ordinance. The decision to grant a stay rests with the sound discretion of the trial judge. See Addiction Specialists, 411 F.3d at 414 ("district court should consider staying the proceedings with respect to those claims [for damages] in order to avoid federal-state friction").
1. Claims for Damages Based Upon Facial Invalidity of MC Zoning Ordinance
It is clear that an adjudication of plaintiffs' state and federal claims for damages based upon the facial invalidity of the MC zoning ordinance "could virtually nullify the ongoing state proceeding." Addiction Specialists, Inc., 411 F.3d at 414. Indeed, this Court would need to ascertain the textual validity of the MC zoning ordinance in determining whether plaintiffs are entitled to damages based upon the allegedly discriminatory content of this ordinance, the very same issue that the Berks County Court of Common Pleas must decide in resolving Lighthouse's request to declare the MC zoning ordinance invalid and to permit Lighthouse to locate a church on the property. Id. (noting that it would "still be advisable" to stay immediate adjudication of damages claims in federal court pending outcome of land use appeal to avoid "federal-state friction"); Williams v. Hepting, 844 F.2d 138, 144-145 (3d Cir. 1988) (when district court abstains from adjudicating claim for injunctive relief, district court must stay, rather than dismiss, accompanying claims for damages when such relief is unavailable in ongoing state court proceedings). Consequently, the Court stays the adjudication of plaintiffs' state and federal claims for damages based upon the alleged facial invalidity of the MC zoning ordinance pending the outcome of the state land use appeal.
2. Claims For Equitable Relief Concerning the Allegedly Discriminatory Application of the MC Zoning Ordinance
The Court finds that it is appropriate to stay the adjudication of plaintiffs' state and federal claims for equitable relief regarding the allegedly discriminatory application of the MC zoning ordinance. Two reasons support this conclusion. First, plaintiffs' state and federal claims regarding the allegedly discriminatory application of the MC zoning ordinance raise an issue currently before the Berks County Court of Common Pleas: whether the implementation of the MC zoning ordinance violates RLUIPA. (See Notice of Land Use Appeal, at ¶ 10). In fact, both plaintiffs' brief in response to the Court's June 19, 2006 memorandum opinion and plaintiffs' oral argument at the May 31, 2006 preliminary injunction hearing indicate that one of Lighthouse's primary arguments before the Berks County Court of Common Pleas is that defendants' denial of the use variance through the implementation of the MC zoning ordinance violates RLUIPA. (See Transcript of May 31, 2006 Hearing ("Tr."), at 113) (conceding the RLUIPA claim is raised in state land use action "in the context of the zoning hearing board's denial of the use variance being a violation of RLUIPA"). Moreover, the factual and legal analysis required for the resolution of the RLUIPA claim overlaps with that required for the resolution of many of plaintiffs' claims in the federal complaint, particularly because RLUIPA embodies, if not enhances, the principles ingrained in the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment. See Midrash Sephradi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1239 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that RLUIPA's "equal terms" provision contains analytical echoes of free exercise, establishment, and equal protection clauses);Murphy v. Missouri Dep't of Correction, 372 F.3d 979, 986 (8th Cir. 2004) ("By enacting RLUIPA, Congress established a statutory free exercise claim encompassing a higher standard or review than that which applies to constitutional free exercise claims"). Consequently, this Court's determination of whether the implementation of the MC zoning ordinance violates RLUIPA, as well as federal and state constitutional provisions, would interfere with the Berks County Court of Common Pleas' evaluation of defendants' liability under RLUIPA.
Second, plaintiffs' claims in the federal complaint based upon the allegedly discriminatory application of the MC zoning ordinance seek the following equitable relief: permanent injunctive relief restraining defendants from enforcing the MC zoning ordinance to prohibit plaintiffs from building a church on the property; and a declaration that the application of the MC zoning ordinance to plaintiffs is invalid and unconstitutional. (See Compl., at "wherefore" clause). This relief is virtually identical to the relief plaintiffs seek in their state land use appeal, which requests equitable relief permitting Lighthouse to place a church on the property based upon the existence and allegedly improper implementation of the MC zoning ordinance. (See Notice of Land Use Appeal, at "wherefore" clause). The resolution of plaintiffs' land use appeal therefore carries the potential to moot plaintiffs' claims for equitable relief based upon the allegedly discriminatory application of the MC zoning ordinance, just as the Court's granting or denying of the particular equitable relief requested by plaintiffs in the instant action would effectively end the state land use appeal, including the Berks County Court of Common Pleas' consideration of the validity of the MC zoning ordinance. To avoid this tension, the Court stays these claims pending the outcome of the state land use appeal.
3. Claims For Damages Concerning the Discriminatory Application of the MC Zoning Ordinance
Although claims for damages are "probably unavailable" in the state land use appeal, the adjudication of plaintiffs' damages claims concerning the discriminatory application of the MC zoning ordinance requires this Court to determine whether defendants acted properly in implementing the MC zoning ordinance, indeed, whether defendants' denial of plaintiffs' variance request violated RLUIPA as well as federal and state constitutional principles. The question of whether defendants' implementation of the MC zoning ordinance violates RLUIPA is currently being litigated in the state land use appeal. Furthermore, due to the legal and factual overlap between this issue and plaintiffs' free exercise, equal protection, freedom of assembly, free speech, and due process claims, the completion of the state land use appeal may shed insight into, if not resolve, the validity of plaintiffs' state and federal constitutional claims. Accordingly, because the adjudication of plaintiffs' damages claims based upon the implementation of the MC zoning ordinance prior to the resolution of plaintiffs' land use appeal not only would offend principles of comity, needlessly preempting the state court's analytical treatment of the RLUIPA claim, but also could lead to a waste of scarce judicial resources, the Court stays plaintiffs' damages claims.
4. Conclusion
Although the Court finds that the Younger doctrine only applies to plaintiffs' claims for equitable relief based upon the alleged facial invalidity of the MC zoning ordinance, the teachings of Addiction Specialists requires this Court to stay the remainder of plaintiffs' claims pending the outcome of the state land use appeal.
III. Conclusion
For the preceding reasons, this Court applies the Younger doctrine to dismiss plaintiffs' claims for equitable relief based upon the alleged facility invalidity of the MC zoning ordinance, and stays the remainder of plaintiffs' claims pending the outcome of the state land use appeal.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 25th day of July 2006, upon consideration of plaintiffs' brief in opposition to staying/dismissing the complaint pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine (Doc. No. 19), and defendants' response thereto (Doc. No. 22), it is hereby ORDERED as follows:1. Plaintiffs' state and federal (statutory and constitutional) claims for equitable relief on the theory that the MC zoning ordinance is facially invalid are hereby DISMISSED pursuant to the Younger doctrine.
2. The adjudication of the remaining claims in plaintiffs' complaint is STAYED pending the resolution of the land use appeal presently before the Berks County Court of Common Pleas.
3. The parties shall notify the Court in writing within ten days after the completion of the state land use appeal.