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Lear Siegler Inc. v. Perez

Supreme Court of Texas
Nov 20, 1991
819 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1991)

Summary

holding that an alleged defect in a highway arrow sign was too remote to be the proximate cause of a highway department worker's death when a motorist, who would not have seen the sign even if it was functioning, fell asleep and struck the sign which struck and kills the worker

Summary of this case from Frank & Emma Persyn Family Ltd. P'ship v. Chi. Title of Tex. (In re Pettit)

Opinion

No. D-0584.

November 20, 1991.

Appeal from the 139th District Court, Hidalgo County, Raul L. Longoria, J.

Rose Guerra Reyna, McAllen, for petitioner.

Ramon Garcia, Catherine W. Smith, Edinburg, for respondents.


OPINION


In this personal injury action, we consider whether a fact issue was raised as to causation in a summary judgment proceeding. The trial court granted summary judgment in part on grounds that, as a matter of law, no causal connection existed between the product manufactured by Lear Siegler, Inc. and the injury. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding plaintiffs' evidence raised a fact issue that precluded summary judgment. 797 S.W.2d 222. Under the particular facts before us, we conclude that causation was negated as a matter of law. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm the trial court's judgment.

Rafael Perez, while working for the Texas Highway Department, drove a truck pulling a flashing arrow sign behind a sweeping operation on Highway 83. The function of the sign, which was manufactured by Lear Siegler, was to warn traffic of the highway maintenance. Perez had stopped his vehicle on the traveled portion of the road when a vehicle approached. A van driven by Alfonso Lerma, who had fallen asleep at the wheel, struck the sign, which in turn struck Perez and knocked him through the air to the pavement several yards away. Perez sustained severe injuries from which he subsequently died.

Plaintiffs, who are Perez's survivors and legal representatives of his estate, sued the manufacturer on negligence and product liability theories. Lear Siegler moved for summary judgment on grounds that the sign, as a matter of law, did not cause the accident. In support of its motion, Lear Siegler offered an uncontradicted affidavit of an eyewitness to the accident stating that the sign was working properly when Lerma's vehicle and other traffic approached.

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, asserted that Perez stopped his truck because the sign malfunctioned, and the defect in the sign thereby placed Perez in the "zone of danger" of Lerma's oncoming vehicle. They submitted a co-employee's affidavit stating that the same warning sign had malfunctioned when he pulled it the day before the accident. The affidavit further stated that, because the wire connections from the sign to the generator worked loose in bumpy driving, it was necessary to get out of the truck and push the wire connections back together. Plaintiffs thus contended that the sign malfunctioned on the day of the accident, that the malfunction was the reason Perez stopped his truck and positioned himself near the sign, and that the eyewitness saw the sign working shortly before the accident because Perez had pushed the wires back or otherwise corrected the malfunction.

To be entitled to summary judgment, Lear Siegler had the burden to establish that there existed no genuine issue of fact thereby entitling it to judgment as a matter of law. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority, 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979). All doubts are resolved against the movant, and the reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movants. Cate v. Dover Corp., 790 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex. 1990).

For a defendant to be entitled to summary judgment it must disprove, as a matter of law, one of the essential elements of each of plaintiffs' causes of action. Citizens First National Bank v. Cinco Exploration Co., 540 S.W.2d 292, 294 (Tex. 1976). Lear Siegler moved for summary judgment on grounds that causation was negated as a matter of law. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, Lear Siegler failed to establish that a malfunction of the sign was not the reason Perez stopped his truck. We must determine, however, assuming the facts are as asserted by plaintiffs, whether Lear Siegler is correct in asserting there is no causative link between the sign defect and the injury as a matter of law.

Negligent conduct is a cause of harm to another if, in a natural and continuous sequence, it produces an event, and without the negligent conduct such event would not have occurred. See, e.g., Rudes v. Gottschalk, 159 Tex. 552, 558-59, 324 S.W.2d 201, 207 (Tex. 1959). There may be more than one proximate cause of an event. Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. 1962); McAfee v. Travis Gas Corp., 137 Tex. 314, 323, 153 S.W.2d 442, 447 (1941).

Though we have not adopted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS in its entirety in Texas, we find its discussion of "legal cause" instructive:

In order to be a legal cause of another's harm, it is not enough that the harm would not have occurred had the actor not been negligent. * * * [T]his is necessary, but it is not of itself sufficient. The negligence must also be a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's harm. The word "substantial" is used to denote the fact that the defendant's conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that word in the popular sense, in which there always lurks the idea of responsibility, rather than in the so-called "philosophic sense," which includes every one of the great number of events without which any happening would not have occurred. Each of these events is a cause in the so-called "philosophic sense," yet the effect of many of them is so insignificant that no ordinary mind would think of them as causes.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431, comment a (1965) (emphasis in original).

Further, though stated in terms of negligent conduct, the distinctions between "legal cause" and "philosophic cause" are "equally applicable where the conduct . . . is such as to result in strict liability." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321, comment e (1965). It thus does not matter whether the causation standard is proximate cause for negligent conduct or producing cause for strict liability in tort.

We recognize there may be cases in which a product defect or a defendant's negligence exposes another to an increased risk of harm by placing him in a particular place at a given time. Nonetheless, there are certain situations in which the happenstance of place and time is too attenuated from the defendant's conduct for liability to be imposed.

It is undisputed that Lerma was asleep, and proper operation of the flashing arrow sign would have had no effect on his conduct. Plaintiffs assert that, had the sign functioned properly, Perez would not have been at the place where the collision occurred at the time it occurred. We conclude that these particular circumstances are too remotely connected with Lear Siegler's conduct to constitute legal cause. Cf. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 41, at 254 nn. 5-6 accompanying text (5th ed. 1984). If Perez had instead taken the sign back to the highway department office where the roof caved in on him, we likewise would not regard it as a legal cause.

The trial court correctly held the defect, whether under a products liability or negligence theory of recovery, was not a legal cause of the accident and resulting injuries and death. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm the trial court's summary judgment that plaintiffs take nothing against Lear Siegler.


Summaries of

Lear Siegler Inc. v. Perez

Supreme Court of Texas
Nov 20, 1991
819 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1991)

holding that an alleged defect in a highway arrow sign was too remote to be the proximate cause of a highway department worker's death when a motorist, who would not have seen the sign even if it was functioning, fell asleep and struck the sign which struck and kills the worker

Summary of this case from Frank & Emma Persyn Family Ltd. P'ship v. Chi. Title of Tex. (In re Pettit)

holding that it is not enough that harm would not have occurred had actor not been negligent and that actor's negligence must also be a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's harm

Summary of this case from Sheffield Dev. Co. v. Carter & Burgess, Inc.

holding that if the connection between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's injury is too attenuated, cause in fact is not established

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holding defect in a flashing arrow sign was not the proximate cause of injury to a Highway Department worker who stopped to examine malfunctioning sign and was struck by a driver who fell asleep at the wheel

Summary of this case from Rachal v. American Eagle Airlines

holding the "happenstance" of place and time were too attenuated from the defendant's conduct to constitute legal cause when a highway worker was killed when he was hit by a car after he stopped his street sweeper to check on a malfunctioning flashing arrow sign

Summary of this case from Roberts v. Healey

concluding that circumstances surrounding plaintiff's injuries were too remotely connected with defendant's conduct to constitute legal cause

Summary of this case from Phan Son Van v. Peña

determining that an allegedly malfunctioning flashing arrow sign was not a cause in fact of the injuries sustained by a state highway employee who had disembarked from his truck towing the sign and was hit by a van whose driver had fallen asleep

Summary of this case from Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clarence Dailey Elec., Inc.

adopting an "instructive" portion of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS but noting that the Texas Supreme Court has not adopted the RESTATEMENT in its entirety

Summary of this case from MGE UPS Systems, Inc. v. GE Consumer & Industrial, Inc.

adopting an "instructive" portion of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS but noting that the Texas Supreme Court has not adopted the RESTATEMENT in its entirety

Summary of this case from MGE UPS Systems Inc. v. GE Consumer

adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 cmt. a (substantial factor test for cause-in-fact analysis)

Summary of this case from KIPP v. DYNCORP TECH. SERV.

In Lear Siegler, the injury happened because the plaintiffs' decedent was located at a particular time and place in traffic where a passing motorist hit and killed him.

Summary of this case from Macias v. Dewitt Cnty. Tex.

In Lear Siegler, the Court notes the plaintiff's argument that the malfunction of the defendant's sign was a "but for" cause of the injury, but then concludes that the defendant's conduct was too attenuated "to constitute legal cause."

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In Lear Siegler, a mobile sign defect placed the plaintiff repairing it at the particular place and time where he was hit by a sleeping driver; the court held the defect was not a legal cause of the injury because proper operation of the sign would have had no effect on the driver’s conduct.

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discussing ideas of responsibility and legal causation underlying substantial factor analysis

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In Lear Siegler, Rafael Perez, while working for the Texas Highway Department, pulled a flashing arrow sign behind a sweeping operation to warn drivers about ongoing highway maintenance.

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explaining that the element of causation is subject to being conclusively negated in a summary judgment proceeding

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explaining that in certain circumstances, there may be no legal cause if the connection between the negligence and the injury is too attenuated or remote

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In Lear Siegler, the court determined that the manufacturer of a warning sign was not liable for the injuries a government employee sustained when he was struck by a sleeping driver while reconnecting loose wires in the sign.

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stating that conduct is a cause if in a natural and continuous sequence it produces an event and without it the event would not have occurred

Summary of this case from Texas First Nat. Bank v. NG

stating that conduct is a cause if in a natural and continuous sequence it produces an event and without it the event would not have occurred

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stating that conduct is a cause if in a natural and continuous sequence it produces an event and without it the event would not have occurred

Summary of this case from McWilliams v. Masterson

In Lear Siegler, the manufacturer of a flashing roadway sign was not held liable for an accident that resulted when a driver who had fallen asleep at the wheel struck a worker fixing a malfunctioning sign.

Summary of this case from Military Highway Water Supply Corp. v. Morin

In Lear Siegler, Perez, an employee of the Texas Highway Department, was driving a truck pulling a flashing arrow sign behind a highway sweeping operation.

Summary of this case from Ambrosio v. Carter's Shootg. C

In Lear Siegler, an employee of the Texas Highway Department was pulling a flashing warning sign behind a highway maintenance vehicle to warn other vehicles of the maintenance operation.

Summary of this case from Michael v. Travis County

In Lear Siegler, the appellant, a state employee for the highway department, was driving a truck pulling a flashing arrow sign to warn traffic of highway maintenance crews.

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Case details for

Lear Siegler Inc. v. Perez

Case Details

Full title:LEAR SIEGLER, INC., Petitioner, v. Herlinda PEREZ, Individually and as…

Court:Supreme Court of Texas

Date published: Nov 20, 1991

Citations

819 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1991)

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