Opinion
B299892
04-03-2020
In re A.J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALFRED J., Defendant and Appellant.
Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, Stephen D. Watson, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a). (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP01564) APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Commissioner. Affirmed. Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, Stephen D. Watson, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Alfred J. (father) appeals from the dependency court's order granting educational rights for his infant son, Aiden J., to Aiden's foster parent A.A. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 319. We dismiss father's appeal as moot.
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Factual and procedural background
The facts from earlier proceedings are reviewed in a companion opinion (B298057) affirming the court's jurisdictional findings and a dispositional order removing Aiden from parental custody. Referring to the record from father's first appeal we note that the court ordered a regional center developmental assessment for Aiden on March 13, 2019, and that Aiden changed foster placements and was placed with A.A. on April 8, 2019.
At a hearing on June 10, 2019, the court granted a request by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) for a permanent restraining order prohibiting mother from contacting certain Department social workers. At the hearing, father's counsel asked the court to schedule a hearing to review progress towards relative placement under section 361.3, and to ensure that father was receiving six hours a week of visitation. The hearing was scheduled for July 1, 2019.
The Department was unable to contact father's adult son regarding possible placement, but T.P., a family friend identified by father, expressed interest in providing placement. T.P. was in the process of relocating from New York to California and did not yet have her own residence, but would update the social worker when she was settled in. The social worker submitted a LiveScan referral, and noted that T.P.'s criminal history report showed some criminal activity in 2015-2016, but the LiveScan results were necessary before the Department could determine whether a waiver was needed. The Department stated it would continue to inquire with mother and father about other relatives, and when relatives were contacted, it would continue to assess them for possible placement.
At the July 1, 2019 hearing, father's counsel requested a continuance so that the Department could complete its evaluation of T.P and submit a more complete report. After some discussion, the court declined to continue the matter, instead giving the Department discretion to place Aiden and reiterating that both parents were to have six hours of monitored visitation, to take place separately.
On July 19, 2019, the court conducted an "appearance progress report" hearing, at which the Department requested that the parent's educational rights be limited so that A.A. could initiate a regional center evaluation. Minor's counsel had no objection, but noted that the parents would probably want to remain co-holders. Minor's counsel noted that the Department had submitted a blank form, and offered to "amend the form to show the parents' rights are retained if the court's inclined to make co-holder." The Department's attorney responded that the request was being made because parents would not consent for the child to be evaluated, and emphasized the need for an order that authorized the regional center evaluation. The court stated that if the parents tried to block the evaluation, then it would limit their educational rights. Counsel for both parents stated that they did not have notice or an opportunity to discuss the issue with their clients. Mother's attorney expressly objected to the caretaker becoming an educational rights holder. The court attempted to clarify, stating that it was "not limiting the parents' educational rights whatsoever. They're just going to allow the caregiver to be the co-holder of the educational rights to initiate the regional center evaluation." The court ordered that A.A. would be a co-holder of educational and developmental decision-making rights for minor, and ordered A.A. to initiate a regional center referral.
The intended purpose of the hearing, or when it was scheduled, is unclear from the record.
Father filed a notice of appeal on August 5, 2019. Post-appeal orders
We take judicial notice of these orders under Evidence Code, sections 451, subdivision (a), 452, subdivision (d), and 459, subdivision (a). --------
On November 18, 2019, at a review hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivision (e), the juvenile court continued the matter for a contested hearing and entered an order again designating A.A., as a co-holder of educational rights. Subsequently, at the contested hearing on February 4, 2020, the juvenile court appointed a different person (T.J.) as a co-educational rights holder, specifying "Parent's rights to make educational decisions is/are shared with the caretaker."
Father's due process contention on appeal
Father contends that by failing to give adequate notice of the possibility that his educational rights might be limited, the juvenile court violated his right to due process when it granted co-educational rights to A.A. at the July 19, 2019 hearing. The Department alternatively argues that father's failure to object forfeited the issue on appeal, father lacks standing because the order did not aggrieve him, the court's order was within its discretion, and any error was harmless.
"'Parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in directing their children's education. [Citations.] However, when a child is a dependent child, a court may limit a parent's ability to make educational decisions on the child's behalf . . . .' (In re R.W. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1276.) 'In all cases in which a minor is adjudged a dependent child of the court on the ground that the minor is a person described by Section 300, the court may limit the control to be exercised over the dependent child by any parent or guardian and shall by its order clearly and specifically set forth all those limitations. Any limitation on the right of the parent or guardian to make educational or developmental services decisions for the child shall be specifically addressed in the court order. The limitations may not exceed those necessary to protect the child.' (§ 361, subd. (a)(1).)" (In re D.C. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 41, 58.)
Father's appeal is moot
On February 24, 2020, we provided the parties an opportunity to address whether we should take judicial notice of the juvenile court's November 18, 2019 and February 4, 2020 orders and dismiss father's appeal as moot. The Department agreed that father's appeal was moot because reversal of the challenged order would have no practical effect, in light of the court's subsequent orders. Father's counsel conceded that the juvenile court's February 4, 2020 order had rendered father's appeal moot. However, father asked this court to exercise its discretion to resolve appeals that are "technically moot if they present important questions affecting the public interest that are capable of repetition yet evade review." (In re J.P. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 616, 623.)
"'[T]he critical factor in considering whether a dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error.' (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60.) A court ordinarily will dismiss an appeal when it cannot grant effective relief, but may instead 'exercise its inherent discretion to resolve an issue when there remain "material questions for the court's determination" [citation], where a "pending case poses an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur" [citation], or where "there is a likelihood of recurrence of the controversy between the same parties or others."' (Id. at p. 59.)" (In re David B. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 633, 644.)
This court cannot grant any effective relief to father, and we find no reason to exercise our discretion to consider father's contentions on appeal. Taking judicial notice of the minute orders entered on November 18, 2019 and February 4, 2020, (Evid. Code, §§ 451, subd. (a), 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a)), we dismiss the current appeal as moot.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
MOOR, J. We concur:
RUBIN, P. J.
KIM, J.