Opinion
No. 1 CA-JV 13-0208
01-07-2014
KENYATTA G., Appellant, v. ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY, T.W., Appellees.
Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa By Suzanne W. Sanchez Counsel for Appellant Arizona Attorney General, Phoenix By Nicholas Chapman-Hushek Counsel for Appellees
NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZ. R. SUP. CT. 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT
AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS12393
The Honorable Joan M. Sinclair, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa
By Suzanne W. Sanchez
Counsel for Appellant
Arizona Attorney General, Phoenix
By Nicholas Chapman-Hushek
Counsel for Appellees
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined. OROZCO, Judge:
¶1 Kenyatta G. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights regarding her son, T.W. (Child). For the following reasons, we affirm.
Terrell W. (Father) is not a party to this appeal.
FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 Child was born on August 2, 2012. Approximately ten months later, on June 10, 2013, the juvenile court found Child dependent as defined by the Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) and terminated Mother's parental rights of Child pursuant to A.R.S. section 8-533(B)(2) (2007).
¶3 For the first four months of his life, Child lived with Mother and Father. In November 2012, due to various health conditions and neglect, Child was diagnosed as Failure to Thrive. Father's 3-year-old daughter from another relationship (Stepdaughter) also resided in the home.
¶4 In early December 2012, Mother physically abused Stepdaughter in the family home when she placed Stepdaughter in a bathtub filled with scalding water. Days later, when Mother sought medical attention for Stepdaughter, doctors determined that Stepdaughter had suffered second degree burns from the incident. Stepdaughter required skin grafts to treat the burn injuries. Mother admitted the abuse allegations and was charged with two counts of felony abuse. As a result, the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES) took Child into custody on December 14, 2012.
¶5 After Child was removed from Mother's care, he began to thrive in his new placement. By April 2013, after Child had lived with a foster family for just four months, he had grown significantly. To illustrate, when Child was first placed with his foster care home, he was in the third percentile for body weight and height for children his age. After placement, Child grew and was in the eightieth percentile at the time of the severance trial.
¶6 In June 2013, the juvenile court held a combined dependency and severance hearing. After considering the evidence and arguments, the court found Child dependent and that ADES had proven by clear and convincing evidence Mother had neglected Child and willfully abused a child. The juvenile court further found that ADES had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of the parent-child relationship was in Child's best interests. ADES also presented testimony that Child was adoptable, and Child's current placement was willing to adopt Child.
¶7 At the hearing, Mother did not present any evidence in her defense, nor did she challenge any of the State's evidence presented in the petition or at the hearing. In fact, Mother stated at the hearing that she did not want a trial for either the severance or the dependency actions. Failure to argue a claim usually constitutes a waiver of that claim. See State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 175, 771 P.2d 1382, 1390 (1989). Accordingly, Mother has waived any challenge to the juvenile court's finding that ADES presented sufficient facts for at least one of the statutory grounds or that severance is in the best interest of Child. As a result, the juvenile court properly terminated the parent-child relationship between Mother and Child.
¶8 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-235, 12-120.21.A.1, and 12-2101.A.1.
DISCUSSION
¶9 We review termination orders for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8, 83 P.3d 43, 47 (App. 2004). "Because the trial court is in the best position to weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of the parties, observe the parties, and make appropriate factual findings, this court will not reweigh the evidence, but will look only to determine if there is evidence to sustain the court's ruling." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the juvenile court's decision. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282, ¶ 13, 53 P.3d 203, 207 (App. 2002). We will only disturb the juvenile court's decision upon a showing of abuse of discretion or that the juvenile court's findings of fact were clear error. Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 47, ¶ 8, 83 P.3d at 47. Unless no reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court's findings of fact, we will accept the juvenile court's findings of fact as true. Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 280, ¶ 4, 53 P.3d at 205.
¶10 In order to terminate Mother's parental rights, the court must find that ADES has proven: (1) any one of the statutory grounds for termination; and (2) termination is in the best interest of the child. See A.R.S. § 8-533.B; see also Jennifer G. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 450, 453, ¶ 12, 123 P.3d 186, 189 (App. 2005).
¶11 Mother has waived any challenge to the juvenile court's finding that ADES properly showed at least one statutory ground for termination. Instead, Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in failing to articulate a sufficient finding that severance was in Child's best interest. Mother also argues that the severance order is invalid because the juvenile court did not consider a particular adoption plan for Child, and therefore the severance order was not supported by reasonable evidence.
¶12 Whether severance is in a child's best interest is a factual question for the juvenile court's determination. See Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 282, ¶ 13, 53 P.3d at 207. To support a finding that termination is in a child's best interest, ADES must prove that the child will affirmatively benefit from the termination of Mother's parental rights. See Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 50, ¶ 19, 83 P.3d at 50. This means that the juvenile court must make a finding defining how the child would either (1) benefit from termination or (2) be harmed by a continued relationship with the parent. Id.
¶13 In this case, the juvenile court found that "[t]ermination of the relationship would benefit [Child. Child] deserves a home that will protect and take care of him. Child is adoptable." The juvenile court came to these conclusions after ADES presented evidence that: (1) Child was healthier in the care of his foster family than he was with Mother; (2) Child was thriving in his foster family's care; (3) Child's foster family was willing to adopt him; and (4) Child's current placement was the least restrictive environment for him. Therefore, the juvenile court made sufficient findings that Child would benefit from the termination.
¶14 Also, contrary to Mother's argument that a severance order without a specific adoption plan is invalid, the juvenile court may meet this requirement by finding that a child is adoptable or by considering evidence that the child's current placement is meeting his needs. See Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 50, ¶ 19, 83 P.3d at 50. Although a specific adoption plan may be presented at a severance hearing, ADES is not required to have a specific adoption plan in place before the juvenile court may terminate parental rights. See Maricopa Cnty. Juvenile Action JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 352, 884 P.2d 234, 238 (App. 1994).
CONCLUSION
¶15 Because we find the juvenile court made sufficient findings, which were properly supported by the evidence of record, the juvenile court did not err in granting ADES' petition to terminate. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court's termination of Mother's parental rights.