From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Johnson v. Payless Drug Stores Northwest, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Dec 6, 1991
950 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1991)

Summary

holding proper venue for actions brought under Title VII must be determined by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(e)

Summary of this case from Beberman v. U.S. Dep't of State

Opinion

No. 90-16173.

Submitted October 31, 1991.

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R.App.P. 34(a); 9th Cir. R. 34-4. Furthermore, Johnson's emergency motion filed on October 10, 1991, requesting that this court render a decision in this case within twenty-one days is granted.

Decided December 6, 1991.

Leroy H. Johnson, Jr., Boston, Mass., for plaintiff-appellant.

Janet M. Schroer, Schwabe, Williamson Wyatt, Portland, Or., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.

Before FLETCHER, O'SCANNLAIN and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.



Leroy H. Johnson, Jr., appeals pro se the district court's dismissal without prejudice of his employment discrimination action against Payless Drug Stores Northwest, Inc. ("Payless"), which he brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

I

Johnson contends that the district court erred by dismissing his action without prejudice for lack of venue under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) because the Northern District of California is an appropriate venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391. This contention lacks merit.

The relevant statutory language demonstrates that the venue provisions in section 2000e-5(f)(3) apply to this case. Section 2000e-5(f)(3) of Title VII provides in relevant part:

[A]n action may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice. . . .

Section 1391, in contrast, is the general federal venue statute; its provisions apply in a civil action not founded solely on diversity of citizenship "except as otherwise provided by law." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Thus, it is clear that section 1391 "has its limitations." Bolar v. Frank, 938 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam). "Moreover, venue for [Johnson's] right of action is circumscribed by the very statute that gives [him] the right to sue in the first place." See id. (citing Stebbins v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 413 F.2d 1100, 1102-03 (D.C.Cir.) (per curiam) (applying section 2000e-5(f), not section 1391(c), to Title VII claim), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 895, 90 S.Ct. 194, 24 L.Ed.2d 173 (1969)). Title VII also provides that "[t]he provisions of section 2000e-5(f) through (k) of this title, as applicable, shall govern" employment discrimination actions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d). "The `shall govern' language is mandatory." Bolar, 938 F.2d at 379. "Finally, given the conflict between the two statutes, well settled principles of statutory construction dictate that the later, specific venue provision (section 2000e-5(f)(3)) applies rather than the earlier, general venue provision (section 1391[b]))." Id.

Here, under section 2000e-5(f)(3)), the Northern District of California was not the appropriate venue for this action. When the alleged employment discrimination occurred, Johnson was working for Payless in Las Vegas, Nevada; Payless maintains and administers its employment records for its Nevada employees in Las Vegas; and Johnson would have worked in Nevada but for the alleged unlawful employment practice. Thus, under section 2000e-5(f)(3), the District of Nevada was the appropriate venue for Johnson's action. Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing Johnson's action without prejudice for lack of venue.

Johnson alleges that Payless maintains its employment records in Oregon, while Payless alleges that these records are maintained in Nevada. Thus, if Johnson were correct, it is possible that venue also might be appropriate in the District of Oregon. Nevertheless, venue clearly is not appropriate in the Northern District of California.

II

In the alternative, Johnson contends that the district court should have transferred his action to an appropriate venue rather than dismiss it. This contention is meritless.

Johnson did not ask the district court to transfer his action. Indeed, in his response to the district court's order to show cause why the action should not be dismissed, Johnson stated that (1) "as far as bringing suit against the company in Oregon[,] [i]t simply will not be done and it isn't necessary," and (2) various events that had occurred in Nevada made "it a certainty that a suit will not be brought in Las Vegas." Therefore, under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the action without prejudice rather than transferring it sua sponte. Cf. Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, 705 F.2d 1515, 1523 (9th Cir. 1983) (justice would not be served by transferring claim to a jurisdiction that plaintiff purposefully sought to avoid), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1081, 104 S.Ct. 1446, 79 L.Ed.2d 765 (1984).

AFFIRMED.

Appellees' request for attorney's fees on appeal is denied.


Summaries of

Johnson v. Payless Drug Stores Northwest, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Dec 6, 1991
950 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1991)

holding proper venue for actions brought under Title VII must be determined by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(e)

Summary of this case from Beberman v. U.S. Dep't of State

holding that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) is the appropriate venue statute for actions brought under Title VII

Summary of this case from Boudouin v. Department of Navy

finding that satisfaction of the 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) venue provision is "mandatory" in Title VII actions

Summary of this case from Smith v. Wackenhut Corporation

concluding that it was not in the interests of justice to transfer an action to a district which the plaintiff sought to avoid

Summary of this case from Schreiber v. Redhawk Holdings Corp.

determining that § 2000e-5(f) trumps § 1391 in Title VII employment discrimination actions

Summary of this case from Boutwell v. Advance Construction Services, Inc.

noting that courts have "significant discretion" in choosing

Summary of this case from Inhale, Inc. v. Gravitron, LLC

applying Title VII venue provision instead of section 1391

Summary of this case from Rosiere v. United States

describing 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 as "mandatory"

Summary of this case from Kim v. McHugh

noting Title VII's venue provision exclusively governs venue in a Title VII action and cannot be supplemented by the general venue provisions found in 28 U.S.C. § 1391

Summary of this case from Amochaev v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
Case details for

Johnson v. Payless Drug Stores Northwest, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:LEROY H. JOHNSON, JR., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. PAYLESS DRUG STORES…

Court:United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

Date published: Dec 6, 1991

Citations

950 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1991)

Citing Cases

Tamashiro v. Harvey

However, this general venue statute "has its limitations." Johnson v. Payless Drug Stores Northwest, Inc.,…

Walker v. United States Dep't of Commerce

Venue in Title VII actions is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), rather than the general federal venue…