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Jackson v. Caruso

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Northern Division
Apr 26, 2011
Case No. 2:10-cv-268 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 26, 2011)

Opinion

Case No. 2:10-cv-268.

April 26, 2011


OPINION


This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff's action will be dismissed on the grounds of immunity and failure to state a claim.

Discussion

I. Factual allegations

Plaintiff presently is incarcerated at the Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility, serving a number of concurrent sentences. After a jury trial in 1999, Plaintiff was convicted of unlawfully driving away a automobile, receiving stolen property over $100 and assault with intent to rob while armed. The Wayne County Circuit Court sentenced Plaintiff to prison terms of two to five years, two to five years and three years to ten years, respectively. After a consolidated jury trial in 2001, the Plaintiff was convicted of escape while awaiting trial and of unlawfully driving away a motor vehicle. The Wayne County Circuit Court sentenced Plaintiff to respective prison terms of two to four years and three to five years. After a guilty plea in 2008, the Berrien County Circuit Court convicted Plaintiff of bribery of a public official, for which he was sentenced to a prison term of 32 to 48 months. Plaintiff sues Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) Office of Parole and Commutation Board, MDOC Director Patricia Caruso, Parole Board Chairperson Barbara Sampson, and Parole Board Members Anthony King and James Atterberry.

See the Michigan Department of Corrections' Offender Tracking Information System at

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Atterberry and King denied him his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff, a black prisoner, argues that, during July 2010, he was denied a parole hearing while the parole board granted interviews to unidentified, "similarly situated" white prisoners with the same parole scores and "crime severity levels." (Compl., Page ID #3, docket #1.) Plaintiff also argues that Defendants Atterberry and King denied his parole because he is black and his victim was white. Plaintiff states that other similarly situated white prisoners who had the same parole guidelines and crime severity levels were released on parole in 2010. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Atterberry and King failed to provide reasons in support of their decision to deny Plaintiff's parole, ostensibly in violation of his right to due process. Following the denial of the parole hearing and parole, Plaintiff sent numerous complaints to Defendants Caruso, Sampson and the Office of Parole and Commutation Board, none of whom responded.

For relief, Plaintiff requests declaratory and injunctive relief and a rehearing.

II. Immunity

Plaintiff has named the Office of Parole and Commutation Board as a Defendant in the action. The Michigan Parole Board is part of the Michigan Department of Corrections. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.231a(1). Regardless of the form of relief requested, the states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O'Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). Therefore, the Office of Parole and Commutation Board, as part of the Michigan Department of Corrections, is immune from injunctive and monetary relief. See Fleming v. Martin, 24 F. App'x 258, 259 (6th Cir. 2001) (Michigan Parole Board entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Carson v. Mich. Parole Bd., No. 88-1277, 1988 WL 79688, at *1 (6th Cir. July 27, 1988) (same).

III. Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if "'it fails to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."). The court must determine whether the complaint contains "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a "'probability requirement,' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not 'show[n]' — that the pleader is entitled to relief." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

A. Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff fails to make specific factual allegations against Defendants Caruso and Sampson, other than his claim that they failed to conduct an investigation in response to his complaints and grievances about Atterberry and King's conduct. Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948; Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one's subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 575; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). "[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948. Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants Caruso and Sampson engaged in any active unconstitutional behavior. Accordingly, he fails to state a claim against them.

B. Procedural Due Process

Although his claim is vague, Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendants Atterberry and King violated his due process rights by failing to hold a parole interview before denying his parole and by failing to provide adequate reasons for denying his parole. To establish a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must prove that (1) he was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest, and (2) such deprivation occurred without the requisite due process of law. Club Italia Soccer Sports Org., Inc. v. Charter Twp. of Shelby, 470 F.3d 286, 296 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Swihart v. Wilkinson, 209 F. App'x 456, 458 (6th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff fails to raise a claim of constitutional magnitude because he has no liberty interest in being released on parole. There is no constitutional or inherent right to be conditionally released before the expiration of a prison sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Although a state may establish a parole system, it has no duty to do so; thus, the presence of a parole system by itself does not give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole release. Id. at 7, 11; Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). Rather, a liberty interest is present only if state law entitles an inmate to release on parole. Inmates of Orient Corr. Inst. v. Ohio State Adult Parole Auth., 929 F.2d 233, 235 (6th Cir. 1991).

In Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1164-165 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc), the Sixth Circuit, noting "the broad powers of the Michigan authorities to deny parole," held that the Michigan system does not create a liberty interest in parole. Subsequent to its 1994 decision, the Sixth Circuit has recognized the continuing validity of Sweeton and has continued to find that Michigan's parole scheme creates no liberty interest in being released on parole. See, e.g. Foster v. Booker, 595 F.3d 353, 368 (6th Cir. 2010); Ward v. Stegall, No. 03-1804, 2004 WL 614581, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 24, 2004). Also, in unpublished decisions, the Sixth Circuit has held that particular parts of Michigan's statutory parole scheme do not create a liberty interest in parole. See Fifer v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., No. 96-2322, 1997 WL 681518, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 1997); Moran v. McGinnis, No. 95-1330, 1996 WL 304344, at *2 (6th Cir. June 5, 1996); Leaphart v. Gach, No. 95-1639, 1995 WL 734480, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 11, 1995). In addition, the Michigan Supreme Court has recognized that there exists no liberty interest in parole under the Michigan system. Glover v. Mich. Parole Bd., 596 N.W.2d 598, 603-04 (Mich. 1999).

Until Plaintiff has served his ten-year maximum sentence, he has no reasonable expectation of liberty. In the absence of a liberty interest, even an allegation of arbitrary or capricious denial of release on parole states no federal claim. See Haynes, 1990 WL 41025, at *1. The discretionary parole system in Michigan holds out "no more than a mere hope that the benefit will be obtained." Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim for a violation of his procedural due process rights.

C. Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state may not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). When a law adversely impacts a "suspect class" such as one defined by race, alienage, or national origin, or invades a "fundamental right" such as speech or religious freedom, the rigorous "strict scrutiny" standard ordinarily governs, whereby such laws "will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest." City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. To establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, an inmate must show that the defendants purposefully discriminated against him. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). Such discriminatory purpose must be a motivating factor in the actions of the defendants. Id. at 265-66.

Plaintiff, an African-American, is a member of a suspect class. Plaintiff's allegations, however, fall far short of demonstrating that Defendants intentionally discriminated against him based on his race. First, Plaintiff does not present any allegations regarding any similarly situated prisoners who were treated differently. Instead, he simply alleges the existence of other white prisoners who were interviewed or paroled. Conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim under § 1983. See Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Chapman v. City of Detroit, 808 F.2d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 1986)); Smith v. Rose, 760 F.2d 102, 106 (6th Cir. 1985).

There are numerous factors and considerations used by the Michigan Parole Board in determining whether parole is appropriate. Consideration of the nature of particular offense of an inmate is a proper consideration. See Hopkins v. Mich. Parole Bd., 604 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.233. Indeed, under MICH. ADMIN. CODE. r. 791.4410(1)(b), a mandatory condition for placement to a community status requires that a prisoner "[i]s not currently serving a sentence of imprisonment for prison escape." Id. Here, in addition to his serious theft and assault convictions, Plaintiff was previously convicted of escape and of bribery of a public official. Plaintiff alleges no fact suggesting that an individual who was similarly situated in all relevant respects was either interviewed or paroled. See Tri-Health, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 430 F.3d 783, 791 (6th Cir. 2005) (discussing requirement that similarly situated inquiry requires disproving all conceivable bases for distinguishing comparables). Instead, he simply claims that unidentified white prisoners had similar scores on their parole worksheets and had comparable crime severity levels. Such allegations fall far short of identifying a comparable individual who was similarly situated in all relevant respects.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's allegations demonstrate only that racial discrimination is a hypothetical possibility. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not 'show[n]' — that the pleader is entitled to relief." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). Plaintiff therefore fails to state an Equal Protection claim.

D. Pending Motions

Since filing his complaint, Plaintiff has filed six motions (docket ##3, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14), in which he seeks a variety of relief, such as the appointment of counsel, a temporary restraining order, and a change of venue from the Northern to the Southern Division of this Court. In light of the Court's determination that Plaintiff's claim fails to state a claim, his pending motions are now moot.

Conclusion

Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff's action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Plaintiff's pending motions (docket ##3, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14) will be denied as moot.

The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $455.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the "three-strikes" rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $455.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.

This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

An Order and Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

http://www.state.mi.us/mdoc/asp/otis2profile.asp?mdocNumber=282320.


Summaries of

Jackson v. Caruso

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Northern Division
Apr 26, 2011
Case No. 2:10-cv-268 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 26, 2011)
Case details for

Jackson v. Caruso

Case Details

Full title:CURTIS O. JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. PATRICIA L. CARUSO et al., Defendants

Court:United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Northern Division

Date published: Apr 26, 2011

Citations

Case No. 2:10-cv-268 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 26, 2011)

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