From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Ivan V. v. City of New York

U.S.
Jun 12, 1972
407 U.S. 203 (1972)

Summary

holding that In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 applies retroactively

Summary of this case from Procter v. Butler

Opinion

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

No. 71-6425.

Decided June 12, 1972

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, which held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is essential to due process at the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, must be given fully retroactive effect.

Certiorari granted; 37 A.D.2d 822, 324 N.Y.S.2d 934, reversed and remanded.


The Court held in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, decided March 31, 1970, that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is among the essentials of due process and fair treatment that must be afforded at the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. In this case, on January 6, 1970, before Winship was decided, petitioner was adjudged a delinquent in the Family Court of Bronx County, New York, on a finding, based on the preponderance-of-evidence standard, that, at knifepoint, he forcibly took a bicycle from another boy, an act that, if done by an adult, would constitute the crime of robbery in the first degree. On direct appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, reversed on the ground that Winship should be retroactively applied to all cases still in the appellate process, 35 A.D.2d 806, 316 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1970). The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that Winship was not to be applied retroactively, 29 N.Y.2d 583, 272 N.E.2d 895 (1971). On remand, the Appellate Division thereupon affirmed the delinquency adjudication, 37 A.D.2d 822, 324 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1971), and the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal from that affirmance, 29 N.Y.2d 489 (1972). We disagree with the holding of the Court of Appeals that Winship is not to be applied retroactively.

The Court of Appeals followed Matter of D., 27 N.Y.2d 90, 261 N.E.2d 627 (1970), where Winship was said not to be retroactive but that even if it were, appellant there had waived the claim when he entered a guilty plea to the charges. In that circumstance this Court dismissed an appeal and denied certiorari in that case. D. v. County of Onandaga, 403 U.S. 926 (1971).

"Where the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule has been given complete retroactive effect. Neither good-faith reliance by state or federal authorities on prior constitutional law or accepted practice, nor severe impact on the administration of justice has sufficed to require prospective application in these circumstances." Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971). See Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 280 (1972); Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 295 (1968).

Winship expressly held that the reasonable-doubt standard "is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence — that bedrock `axiomatic and elementary' principle whose `enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law' . . . . `Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of . . . convincing the factfinder of his guilt.' To this end, the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable, for it `impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue.'" 397 U.S., at 363-364.

Plainly, then, the major purpose of the constitutional standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt announced in Winship was to overcome an aspect of a criminal trial that substantially impairs the truth-finding function, and Winship is thus to be given complete retroactive effect. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Judicial Department, is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


Summaries of

Ivan V. v. City of New York

U.S.
Jun 12, 1972
407 U.S. 203 (1972)

holding that In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 applies retroactively

Summary of this case from Procter v. Butler

holding Winship retroactive

Summary of this case from Holloway v. McElroy

holding that the purpose of a reasonable doubt standard is "to overcome an aspect of a criminal trial that impairs the truth-finding function, and Winship is thus to be given complete retroactive effect"

Summary of this case from U.S. v. OKAI

holding that the purpose of a reasonable doubt standard is "to overcome an aspect of a criminal trial that impairs the truth-finding function, and Winship is thus to be given complete retroactive effect"

Summary of this case from U.S. v. Huerta-Rodriguez

holding that the purpose of a reasonable doubt standard is "to overcome an aspect of a criminal trial that impairs the truth-finding function, and Winship is thus to be given complete retroactive effect"

Summary of this case from U.S. v. Kelley

holding that criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt applied retroactively

Summary of this case from AZIZ v. FABIAN

holding In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 fully retroactive

Summary of this case from State v. Garcia

In Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203, 205 (1972) (per curiam), the Court held the rule in Winship to be retroactive, because "the major purpose of the constitutional standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt announced in Winship was to overcome an aspect of a criminal trial that substantially impairs the truth-finding function."

Summary of this case from Murray v. Carrier

In Ivan V. v. City of New York, supra, at 204-205, this Court addressed the question whether our decision in In re Winship, supra — holding the reasonable-doubt standard applicable to state juvenile proceedings — was to be applied retroactively.

Summary of this case from Hankerson v. North Carolina

applying In re Winship retroactively

Summary of this case from Jones v. Zych

giving retroactive effect to In re Winship , 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368

Summary of this case from Ybarra v. Filson

In Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203, 92 S.Ct. 1951, 32 L.Ed.2d 659 (1972), a pre- Teague case, the Court unanimously made In re Winship retroactively applicable on collateral review.

Summary of this case from Crayton v. United States

In Ivan v. New York, 407 U.S. 203, 92 S.Ct. 1951, 32 L.Ed.2d 659 (1972), the Supreme Court gave retroactive effect to In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1969), which required proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile delinquency proceedings.

Summary of this case from United States ex Rel. Morgan v. Sielaff

In Ivan the court gave retroactive application to In re Winship, requiring the government to bear the burden of the reasonable doubt standard.

Summary of this case from Santos v. Brown

giving retroactive effect to In re Winship, supra

Summary of this case from Rivera v. Coombe

In Ivan v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203, 205, 92 S.Ct. 1951, 1952, 32 L.Ed.2d 659 (1972) (per curiam), the Supreme Court held that In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), a case relied upon in Sandstrom, was to be accorded retroactive application.

Summary of this case from Austin v. Israel

In Ivan v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203, 92 S.Ct. 1951, 32 L.Ed.2d 659 (1972), the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether In re Winship, supra, holding that the reasonable doubt standard was to be applied to juvenile proceedings, was to be applied retroactively.

Summary of this case from Harris v. Israel

In Ivan V., which like Winship involved an adjudication of delinquency based on a "preponderance of the evidence standard of proof', the Court determined that the holding of Winship should be applied retroactively so as to require reversal of the outcome of a juvenile proceeding that took place before Winship was decided.

Summary of this case from Breest v. Perrin

In Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203, 92 S.Ct. 1951, 32 L.Ed.2d 659 (1972) (decided six days after oral argument in this case), the Court squarely held that Winship was to be given complete retroactive effect.

Summary of this case from Wilbur v. Robbins

In Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203, 92 S.Ct. 1951, 32 L.Ed.2d 659 (1972), the Court mandated complete retroactivity to the rule announced in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).

Summary of this case from Ex Parte Hemby

In Ivan V. v. City of New York (1972) 407 U.S. 203 [32 L.Ed.2d 659, 92 S.Ct. 1951], the issue was the retroactivity of the rule of Inre Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358 [25 L.Ed.2d 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068], which required the states to comply with the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile proceedings.

Summary of this case from People v. Guerra

In Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972), and Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977), the Court made completely retroactive the rules in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), respectively.

Summary of this case from Reddick v. Commonwealth

In Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203, 204-205, 92 S.Ct. 1951, 32 L.Ed.2d 659 (1972), this Court addressed the question whether our decision in In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) — holding the reasonable doubt standard applicable to state juvenile proceedings — was to be applied retroactively.

Summary of this case from Com. v. Hilbert

applying Winship retroactively

Summary of this case from Matter of Spalding

In Ivan V. the court (p. 204) quoted from Williams v. United States (401 U.S. 646, 653) thus: "`Where the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in fact trials, the new rule has been given complete retroactive effect.'"

Summary of this case from Matter of John C
Case details for

Ivan V. v. City of New York

Case Details

Full title:IVAN V. v . CITY OF NEW YORK

Court:U.S.

Date published: Jun 12, 1972

Citations

407 U.S. 203 (1972)
92 S. Ct. 1951

Citing Cases

State v. Garcia

Because Hunter established a new constitutional principle, it is a "significant change in the law" requiring…

Smart v. State

Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64, 90 S.Ct. at 1072-73 (internal quotation marks omitted). Two years later, in Ivan…