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Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein

U.S.
Jun 25, 1962
370 U.S. 713 (1962)

Summary

holding that abstention under the Pullman doctrine to allow a state court to interpret and clarify state law put plaintiff effectively out of court

Summary of this case from Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. South Florida Water Management District

Opinion

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

No. 138.

Argued February 28, 1962. Decided June 25, 1962.

Together with No. 180, Misc., Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Bicks et al., U.S. District Judges, on petition for writ of mandamus.

Having been informed by officials of the State of New York that its business of selling bottled wines and liquors for export from the United States and delivery to international airline passengers at their overseas destinations was illegal under a state statute, petitioner sued in a Federal District Court for a judgment declaring that the statute, as applied, was repugnant to the Commerce Clause, the Export-Import Clause, and the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution and for an injunction against its enforcement. A request for a three-judge court under 28 U.S.C. § 2281, 2284 was denied, and the single District Judge to whom it was presented simply retained jurisdiction of the cause, in order to give the state courts an opportunity to pass upon the constitutional issues presented, although there was no relevant litigation then pending in the state courts. The Court of Appeals expressed the opinion that a three-judge court should have been convened but that it was powerless to direct such action. Thereafter petitioner moved again for a three-judge court; but the motion was again denied. Held: A three-judge court should have been convened, and the case is remanded to the District Court for expeditious action in accordance with this view. Pp. 714-716.

Reported below: 289 F.2d 426.

Charles H. Tuttle argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was John F. Kelly.

Julius L. Sackman argued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs were Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, and Paxton Blair, Solicitor General.



The petitioner is in the business of selling bottled wines and liquors for export from the United States and delivery to international airline passengers at their overseas destinations. Upon advice of the Attorney General of New York, the State Liquor Authority informed the petitioner that its business was illegal under the provisions of the New York Alcoholic Beverage Control Law. The petitioner then instituted an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the respondents, members of the State Liquor Authority. The complaint asked for a judgment declaring that the state statutes, as applied, were repugnant to the Commerce Clause, the Export-Import Clause, and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, and for an injunction restraining the State Liquor Authority from interfering with the petitioner's business.

A request for a three-judge court under 28 U.S.C. § 2281, 2284, was denied. Instead, the district judge to whom the request was presented simply retained jurisdiction of the cause, in order to give the state courts an opportunity to pass upon the constitutional issues presented, although there was no relevant litigation then pending in the state courts. 188 F. Supp. 434.

The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. That court dismissed the appeal, one judge dissenting. 289 F.2d 426. Unambiguously stating its opinion that the District Court had acted erroneously, and that "a three-judge district court should have been convened," the Court of Appeals was nevertheless of the view that it was powerless to take formal corrective action in light of this Court's decision in Stratton v. St. Louis S.W. R. Co., 282 U.S. 10.

During the pendency of the appeal another judge of the District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a temporary injunction restraining the respondents from harassing the petitioner's business, but, relying on the original judge's order, refused a renewed request for a three-judge court.

The Court of Appeals properly rejected the argument that the order of the District Court "was not final and hence unappealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 1292," pointing out that "[a]ppellant was effectively out of court." 289 F.2d, at 428.

Thereafter the petitioner once again filed a motion in the District Court requesting that a statutory three-judge court be impaneled. The request was again refused upon the ground that the previous ruling made by other judges of the District Court had established "the law of this case," and that the Court of Appeals' opinion that a three-judge court should be appointed was merely a "dictum." 194 F. Supp. 3. We granted certiorari and a motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus. 368 U.S. 812.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that a three-judge court should have been convened in this case. When an application for a statutory three-judge court is addressed to a district court, the court's inquiry is appropriately limited to determining whether the constitutional question raised is substantial, whether the complaint at least formally alleges a basis for equitable relief, and whether the case presented otherwise comes within the requirements of the three-judge statute. Those criteria were assuredly met here, and the applicable jurisdictional statute therefore made it impermissible for a single judge to decide the merits of the case, either by granting or by withholding relief.

This is not a case like Chicago, Duluth Georgian Bay Transit Co. v. Nims, 252 F.2d 317, where a three-judge court was requested only in the event that it should first be held that the state statute was by its terms applicable to the plaintiff's business operations.

In the Stratton case it was held that a court of appeals was precluded from reviewing on the merits a case which should have originally been determined by a court of three judges. Stratton does not stand for the broad proposition that a court of appeals is powerless ever to give any guidance when a single judge has erroneously invaded the province of a three-judge court. The Court of Appeals clearly stated its opinion that a court of three judges ought to have been convened to consider this litigation. That view was correct and should have been followed upon the petitioner's renewed motion that such a statutory court be impaneled.

We deem it unnecessary to take formal action on the petition for a writ of mandamus. The case will be remanded to the District Court for expeditious action consistent with the views here expressed. Cf. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 34.

It is so ordered.

MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER took no part in the decision of these cases.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE WHITE took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.


Summaries of

Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein

U.S.
Jun 25, 1962
370 U.S. 713 (1962)

holding that abstention under the Pullman doctrine to allow a state court to interpret and clarify state law put plaintiff effectively out of court

Summary of this case from Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. South Florida Water Management District

holding that Idlewild was "effectively out of court" where the district court's stay allowed the state court to address issues that would not necessarily dispose of the case

Summary of this case from Dependable Highway v. Navigators Ins. Co.

In Idlewild, a district court declined to convene a three-judge panel to consider a federal suit challenging the constitutionality of a state statute, on the ground that it should abstain from deciding the case under R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941).

Summary of this case from Doe v. Fitzgerald

In Idlewild the Court held that the district court's stay order was final and appealable because a Pullman stay puts the appellant "effectively out of court."

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noting that although courts of appeals are "precluded from reviewing on the merits of a case which should have originally been determined by a court of three judges," they are not "powerless ever to give any guidance when a single judge has erroneously invaded the province of a three-judge court"

Summary of this case from Nat'l Ass''n for Advancement of Colored People v. Merrill

noting that where statute requires a three-judge district court to be empaneled, "the applicable jurisdictional statute ... made it impermissible for a single judge to decide the merits of the case, either by granting or withholding relief"

Summary of this case from Nat'l Ass''n for Advancement of Colored People v. Merrill

noting that appellate court properly rejected jurisdictional challenge where appellant "was effectively out of court"

Summary of this case from Gillette v. Prosper

noting that a court of appeals is "precluded from reviewing on the merits a case which should have originally been determined by a court of three judges"

Summary of this case from Igartúa v. Obama

In Idlewild, a federal district court stayed an action seeking to invalidate a New York law to allow the state court the opportunity to address the plaintiffs various claims.

Summary of this case from Dependable Highway v. Navigators Ins. Co.

In Idlewild, plaintiff Idlewild Liquor had sought a declaratory judgment in federal district court that the New York Alcoholic Beverage Law was unconstitutional.

Summary of this case from Lockyer v. Mirant Corp.

explaining that a court of appeals may not review the merits of a case that should originally have been determined by a court of three judges, although it may review the district judge's decision not to request such a court

Summary of this case from Page v. Bartels

In Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 82 S.Ct. 1294, 8 L.Ed.2d 794 (1962), the district court had stayed an action, retaining jurisdiction, in order to give the state courts a chance to pass on the constitutional issues presented.

Summary of this case from Hovsons v. Secretary of Interior of U.S.

In Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 82 S.Ct. 1294, 8 L.Ed.2d 794 (1962), the Supreme Court required the convening of a three-judge court in circumstances materially indistinguishable from those present here.

Summary of this case from Apel v. Murphy

In Idlewild, plaintiff had brought suit challenging certain aspects of the New York Alcoholic Beverage Control Law as violative of the Commerce, Import-Export, and Supremacy Clauses of the United States Constitution.

Summary of this case from Gray Line Motor Tours, v. City of New Orleans

In Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715, 82 S.Ct. 1294, 8 L.Ed.2d 794 (1962) (per curiam), the Supreme Court stated that when an application for a three-judge court is addressed to a district judge, his inquiry is limited to determining (1) whether the constitutional question is substantial; (2) whether the complaint at least formally alleges a basis for equitable relief; and (3) whether the case otherwise comes within the requirements of the three-judge statute. If all criteria are established, the single judge must convene a statutory three-judge court.

Summary of this case from Nieves v. Oswald

discussing a prior version of section 2284

Summary of this case from Lepre v. N.Y. State Ins. Fund

discussing pre-1976 version of § 2284

Summary of this case from Reynolds v. Greene

discussing a prior version of section 2284

Summary of this case from Yagan v. Syracuse C. Ct. Judges Fifth Judicial Dist

discussing pre-1976 version of § 2284

Summary of this case from Loeber v. Spargo

In Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715-716, 82 S.Ct. 1294, 8 L.Ed.2d 794 (1962), the Court held that a single federal judge may not deny a request to convene a three-judge court under § 2281 and "simply [retain] jurisdiction of the cause, in order to give the state courts an opportunity to pass upon the constitutional issues presented * * *." 370 U.S. at 714, 82 S.Ct. at 1296.

Summary of this case from Doe v. State Bar of California

In Idlewild, however, the Court did not hold expressly that a single judge may not abstain whenever a case comes within the purview of § 2281.

Summary of this case from Cooper v. Meskill

In Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., supra, there is no count in the complaint dealing with the question of the construction of unresolved state law.

Summary of this case from General Foods Corp. v. Henderson

In Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 82 S.Ct. 1294, 8 L.Ed.2d 794 (1962), the Supreme Court stated that the District Court's function in deciding whether to convene such a court is appropriately limited to determining whether the constitutional question raised is substantial, whether the complaint at least formally alleges a basis for equitable relief, and whether the case presented otherwise comes within the requirement of the three-judge statute.

Summary of this case from Gesicki v. Oswald

In Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corporation v. Epstein, 1962, 370 U.S. 713, 82 S.Ct. 1294, 8 L.Ed.2d 794, the court set out the rule that a three-judge district court is necessary only where a substantial constitutional question is presented.

Summary of this case from McMichen v. State Board of Bar Examiners of Georgia

In Idlewild the Court indicated that a single judge's inquiry "is appropriately limited to determining whether the constitutional question raised is substantial, whether the complaint at least formally alleges a basis for equitable relief, and whether the case presented otherwise comes within the requirements of the three-judge statute."

Summary of this case from Landry v. Daley
Case details for

Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein

Case Details

Full title:IDLEWILD BON VOYAGE LIQUOR CORP. v . EPSTEIN ET AL

Court:U.S.

Date published: Jun 25, 1962

Citations

370 U.S. 713 (1962)
82 S. Ct. 1294

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