Hubbard v. Google LLC

Full title: NICHOLE HUBBARD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GOOGLE LLC, et al., Defendants.

Court: United States District Court, Northern District of California

Date published: Jan 13, 2025

19-cv-07016-SVK (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2025)

Opinion

19-cv-07016-SVK

01-13-2025

NICHOLE HUBBARD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GOOGLE LLC, et al., Defendants.

SUSAN VAN KEULEN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND

RE: DKT. NO. 295

SUSAN VAN KEULEN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Defendants Google LLC and YouTube, LLC (collectively, “Google”) operate a video-sharing website (also called “YouTube”) where users may post videos on their “channels” and view videos posted by others free of charge. “Free products are not, however, truly free.” In re Google, Inc. Priv. Pol'y Litig., 12-cv-01382-PSG, 2015 WL 4317479, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2015). Google collects data from YouTube users, which it uses to generate advertising revenue for both itself and those who own some of the more-popular YouTube channels. Plaintiffs- minor children represented by their parents and legal guardians-commenced this putative class action against Google and the owners of certain YouTube channels to remedy the harm they allegedly suffered as a result of Google's collection of their data.

The Court previously dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims with limited leave to amend.¹ See Dkt. 281 (the “Prior Order”). Plaintiffs subsequently filed a sixth amended complaint (see Dkt. 292 (the “SAC”); see also Dkt. 286), and Defendants again now move to dismiss. See Dkts. 295 (the “Motion”), 297 (the “Opposition”), 300 (the “Reply”). The Parties appeared for a hearing on the Motion on December 17, 2024. See Dkt. 316 (“Hr'g Tr.”). After considering the Parties' briefing, relevant law and the record in this action, after hearing oral argument and for the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Motion WITHOUT LEAVE TOAMEND.

1 The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned. See Dkts. 259, 276.

I. BACKGROUND

The following discussion of background facts is based on the allegations contained in the SAC, the truth of which the Court accepts for purposes of resolving the Motion. See Boquist v. Courtney, 32 F.4th 764, 772 (9th Cir. 2022); Queen v. Mooney, No. 24-cv-02161-SVK, 2024 WL 3363572, at *1 n.2 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2024).

A. Google's Collection Of Plaintiffs' Data

Google operates YouTube, a website where anyone can post and watch user-created videos for free. See SAC ¶¶ 3, 64-66, 68. Although it does not charge for access to YouTube, Google does leverage the website as a revenue source; it partners with advertisers and the owners of popular YouTube channels to show advertising on certain videos, with Google and the channel owners splitting the payments received from the advertisers. See Id. ¶ 85.

How Google selects which advertisements to show varies at the election of each channel owner. See Id. ¶ 86. Some choose the “contextual” approach, under which Google presents advertisements based on the “central theme” of the channel. See Id. ¶ 83. For example, Google may show a user watching a cooking channel an advertisement for kitchen supplies. The “preferred” and “most lucrative” approach (both for Google and the channel owners), however, is the “behavioral” approach. See Id. ¶ 82. Under that approach, Google presents advertisements based on the information it possesses about a user, which it passes through an algorithm in an effort to “infer[] which types of advertisements [are] likely to have the greatest impact on the user . . . (i.e., most likely to be clicked).” See Id. ¶ 81.

But how does Google obtain information about YouTube's users? Quite simply-it collects it. When an individual visits a Google-affiliated website (such as YouTube), Google “stores some unique identifiers in a text file” called “cookies.” See Id. ¶¶ 64, 69, 71. Cookies allow Google to determine which “websites the user has previously visited, the duration of website visits, videos viewed, advertisements viewed, duration of video views, and advertisements clicked, among other information.” See Id. ¶ 71. Google also collects users' “persistent identifiers,” i.e., data points that users may not “easily delete[] or reset” and that stick with them as they browse the internet. See Id. ¶¶ 72, 74. Examples include users' IP addresses and International Mobile Equipment Identity numbers.² See Id. ¶ 73. Together, cookies and persistent identifiers allow Google to “track[] individuals over 80% of the internet.” See Id. ¶ 74 (emphasis and footnote citation omitted). The information collected about them includes, inter alia, “searches run, videos watched, views and interactions with content and ads, voice and audio information, purchase activity, people with whom a user communicated, browsing history, [] activity on third-party sites and apps that used Google services, . . . GPS, . . . device sensor data, [] data from devices located near a user [and] . . . advertising ID.”³ See Id. ¶ 70.

2 “An IP address is a numerical label assigned to each device connected to a computer network, such as the internet. . . . Every mobile phone and smartphone is assigned a unique [International Mobile Equipment Identity number] that cannot be changed.” SAC ¶ 73.

3 Plaintiffs do not explain what they mean by “voice and audio information,” “device sensor data” or “advertising ID.”

Enter Plaintiffs. During the relevant period (July 1, 2013, through April 1, 2020), they were children under the age of 13 who watched YouTube videos. See Id. ¶¶ 1, 336-461. Google collected their data without their parents' consent, and they now seek to recover for the harm they allegedly suffered as a result of Google's non-consensual collection of their data. See Id. ¶ 1. Specifically, they allege that Google's collection of their data caused them to “suffer[] economic loss and injury” and “destroyed the private quality of” their personal information. See Id. ¶¶ 168-201. In addition to Google, they also name as Defendants the owners of some of the most-popular YouTube channels for children (the “Channel Owners”). See Id. ¶¶ 120-55.

B. Google's History Of Collecting Children's Data

The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (the “COPPA”) “regulate[s] the online collection of personal identifying information about children under the age of 13.” Jones v. Google LLC, 73 F.4th 636, 639 (9th Cir. 2023); see also SAC ¶ 13. It does not contain a private right of action; rather, only the Federal Trade Commission (the “FTC”) and state attorneys general may sue to enforce the statute. See Jones, 73 F.4th at 641. Pursuant to that enforcement authority, the FTC and the New York Attorney General jointly commenced an action against Google in 2019 for alleged violations of the COPPA in connection with its collection of data of children who watch YouTube videos. See SAC ¶ 16; FTC v. Google LLC, No. 19-cv-02642-BAH, Dkt. 1 (D.D.C. Sept. 4, 2019). The parties settled, with Google stipulating to an injunction prohibiting it “from [d]isclosing, using, or benefitting from” the information collected, subject to certain limitations. See FTC v. Google LLC, No. 19-cv-02642-BAH, Dkt. 5 (D.D.C. Sept. 10, 2019) (the “FTC Order”) at 12.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants move to dismiss under both Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

Rule 12(b)(1). Under Rule 12(b)(1), a court must dismiss a complaint if it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted. A defendant can challenge a court's subject-matter jurisdiction by mounting either: (1) a facial attack based solely on the allegations of the complaint; or (2) a factual attack based on evidence outside the pleadings. See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). Whether a plaintiff has Article III standing to proceed in federal court implicates Rule 12(b)(1). See Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011).

Rule 12(b)(6). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must dismiss a complaint if it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This facial-plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to allege facts resulting in “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court may consider only “the complaint, materials incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters [subject to] judicial notice.” See UFCW Loc. 1500 Pension Fund v. Mayer, 895 F.3d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). A court must also presume the truth of a plaintiff's allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. See Boquist, 32 F.4th at 773. However, a court need not accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” See Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 1008 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).

If a court grants a motion to dismiss, it may exercise discretion to grant or deny leave to amend the complaint, and it “acts within its discretion to deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile, when it would cause undue prejudice to the defendant, or when it is sought in bad faith.” Natl Funding, Inc. v. Com. Credit Counseling Servs., Inc., 817 Fed.Appx. 380, 383 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs bring 42 claims under the laws of 18 states. See SAC ¶¶ 500-1080; see also Appendix A (chart of claims on state-by-state basis). Broadly speaking, their claims fall into three categories:

. Intrusion upon seclusion.

. Unjust enrichment.

. Violations of consumer-protection statutes.

Plaintiffs seek to obtain, inter alia, damages and equitable relief. See SAC at 212. As discussed below: (1) the intrusion-upon-seclusion claims survive; (2) the unjust-enrichment claims do not; (3) certain consumer-protection claims survive; (4) the remaining consumer-protection claims do not; and (5) the requests for equitable relief survive. Plaintiffs may pursue any surviving claims against Google only, as the Court will dismiss the Channel Owners from this action.

A. The Privacy Claims Survive Because Plaintiffs Sufficiently Allege That Google Engaged In Highly Offensive Behavior

“As it has developed in the courts, the invasion of the right of privacy has been a complex of four distinct wrongs ....” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A cmt. b (Am. L. Inst. 1977). Plaintiffs assert that Defendants committed the specific privacy tort of intrusion upon seclusion. They also assert that Defendants violated the right to privacy guaranteed by the constitution of California, a violation which parallels intrusion upon seclusion. See Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 47 Cal.4th 272, 285-88 (2009). Under the laws of the 11 states in question, analysis of these alleged violations requires the Court to consider whether Defendants' alleged conduct constituted a highly offensive intrusion into an area where Plaintiffs maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy.⁴ This standard presents a “high bar” for Plaintiffs to satisfy, even at the pleading stage. See Belluomini v. Citigroup Inc., No. 13-cv-01743-CRB, 2013 WL 5645168, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2013). They meet it here.

4 See Doe v. Roe, 638 So.2d 826, 827-28 (Ala. 1994); Hogin v. Cottingham, 533 So.2d 525, 531 (Ala. 1988); Hernandez, 47 Cal.4th at 286; Pearson v. Kancilia, 70 P.3d 594, 599 (Colo. Ct. App. Div. III 2003); Johnson v. Northshore Univ. Judge Presiding Healthsystem, No. 1-10-0399, 2011 WL 10069086, at *4 (Ill.App.Ct. 1st Dist. Mar. 31, 2011); Kaczmarek v. Cabela's Retail IL, Inc., No. 1-14-3813, 2015 WL 6156352, at *6 (Ill.App.Ct. 1st Dist. 6th Div. Oct. 16, 2015); Froelich v. Werbin, 219 Kan. 461, 464 (1976); Houck v. Corrections Corp., of Am., No. 15-cv-09586-JAR, 2017 WL 747847, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 27, 2017); Sofka v. Thal, 662 S.W.2d 502, 510 (Mo. 1983); Cooper v. Hutcheson, 472 F.Supp.3d 509, 515-16 (E.D. Mo. 2020); Karch v. BayBank FSB, 147 N.H. 525, 534-35 (2002); Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 149 N.H. 148, 156 (2003); Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 466, 470 (2020); Guilbeau v. Durant H.M.A., LLC, 533 P.3d 764, 771 (Okla. 2023); Murphy v. Spring, No. 13-cv-00096-TCK, 2013 WL 5172951, at *10 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 12, 2023); Pro Golf Mfg., Inc. v. Trib. Rev. Newspaper Co., 570 Pa. 242, 248 (2002); Tagouma v. Investigative Consultant Servs., Inc., 4 A.3d 170, 175-78 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010); Mark v. Seattle Times, 96 Wash.2d 473, 497 (1981); Mancini v. City of Tacoma, No. 71044-3-I, 2015 WL 3562229, at *11-12 (Wash.Ct.App. Div. 1 June 8, 2015).

“Determining whether a defendant's [alleged] actions were ‘highly offensive to a reasonable person' requires a holistic consideration of factors such as the likelihood of serious harm to the victim, the degree and setting of the intrusion, the intruder's motives and objectives, and whether countervailing interests or social norms render the intrusion inoffensive.” In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 606 (9th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). Assessing the degree of offensiveness thus presents a policy question that often evades resolution at the pleading stage. See Id. Even so, “[c]ourts do in fact, decide the ‘highly offensive' issue as a matter of law at the pleading stage when appropriate.” See Boring v. Google Inc., 362 Fed.Appx. 273, 279 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

The Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs' privacy claims because Plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege that Defendants engaged in highly offensive conduct. See Prior Order at 10-14. Specifically, the Court concluded that Defendants' data collection constituted “ubiquitous, commercial behavior,” uncoupled from any “secrecy or deception or some other ‘bad act[.]'” See Id. at 14. In the absence of any such “plus factors,” Defendants' conduct simply did not rise to the requisite level of offensiveness. See Id. at 12-14. Accordingly, the Court permitted Plaintiffs narrow leave to amend their privacy claims “[t]o the extent [that they could] allege in good faith that sufficient plus factors accompanied Defendants' conduct.” See Id. at 19-20. Accepting that offer, Plaintiffs assert several new allegations in the SAC to demonstrate the highly offensive nature of Defendants' conduct. See SAC ¶¶ 222-97. Defendants argue that none of these new allegations suffices (see Motion at 11-13), but the Court holds that at least two do.

First , Plaintiffs allege that in response to a content creator's inquiry as to YouTube's COPPA compliance, Google “develop[ed] and circulat[ed]” an internal “narrative” in which it explained that “YouTube is a MUST buy for kids 6-11.” See SAC ¶¶ 262-63. Notably, Google addresses YouTube, not YouTube Kids, in this statement; while Google intended for YouTube to provide content to a broad audience, it designed YouTube Kids specifically for children and “did not . . . employ its tracking and behavioral advertising scheme” on that platform.⁵ See Id. ¶¶ 110-11, 263, 265. Based on these allegations, the Court may reasonably infer at the pleading stage that, despite the existence of YouTube Kids, Google nevertheless targeted children in connection with the main YouTube website and that platform's data tracking. The Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that targeting children with a website that will collect their data does not constitute highly offensive behavior. To be sure, the Court held in the Prior Order that “routine behavior . . . does not obtain a more-offensive status merely because the behavior happened to involve children in a particular instance.” Prior Order at 13-14 (citations omitted). But Plaintiffs' new allegations extend beyond routine behavior that merely “happens” to impact children in some instances, as these latest allegations allow the Court to reasonably infer that Google affirmatively targeted children with their otherwise routine behavior. Cf. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Priv. Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 294-95 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[The plaintiffs argue] that the use of cookies to track children is particularly odious. We are not so sure. Google used third-party cookies on Nick.com in the same way that it deploys cookies on myriad others websites. Its decision to do so here does not strike us as sufficiently offensive, standing alone, to survive a motion to dismiss.” (emphasis added)).

5 Google also refers to YouTube Kids as a “must buy” in the same narrative, indicating that the reference to YouTube elsewhere in the narrative concerns the main website through which Google collects data. See SAC ¶ 263.

Second , Plaintiffs allege that several content creators notified Google of their concerns that YouTube did not comply with the COPPA. See SAC ¶¶ 258, 262, 267. Google responded in a few instances that it believed YouTube did comply with the COPPA or did not implicate the COPPA in the first place. See Id. ¶¶ 259, 265, 269. Yet at the same time, according to Plaintiffs, Google understood that young children regularly used YouTube. See Id. ¶¶ 115-17. Based on these allegations, the Court may reasonably infer at the pleading stage that Google knew it was collecting children's data through YouTube in violation of the COPPA. The Court cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that knowingly violating a statute does not constitute highly offensive behavior. Such knowledge distinguishes this case from the scenario described in the Prior Order. There, the Court held that common commercial behavior that happens to violate the law does not per se rise to the level of highly offensive. See Prior Order at 13. But here, Plaintiffs' new allegations reach a step further to allow the Court to reasonably infer a knowing violation of law.⁶

6 The Court, therefore, rejects the argument raised by Defendants at the December 17 hearing that prior versions of Plaintiffs' complaint contained similar, insufficient allegations of targeting children and knowing violations of the COPPA. See Hr'g Tr. at 10:20-11:7. The undersigned has addressed the “highly offensive” inquiry with respect to just one prior version of the complaint (see Prior Order at 10-14), and to the extent that version contained allegations of targeting and knowing violations, those allegations were insufficient. As described above, however, the SAC does contain sufficient allegations of targeting and knowing violations.

Defendants counter that, despite any of Plaintiffs' allegations of highly offensive conduct, Google's collection of data necessarily cannot rise to the requisite level of offensiveness given that Google disclosed its data-collection practices through its privacy policies and terms of service. See Motion at 13-14. Defendants do not, however, explain whether these terms would have been conspicuously presented to Plaintiffs or provide any reason for the Court to accept at the pleading stage that Plaintiffs were on notice of these terms, and the Court will not presume awareness or notice (concerning minor children under the age of 13, no less) merely because these terms existed.⁷ This lack of notice distinguishes this case from those where a disclosure contained in terms or a policy justified dismissal of privacy claims.⁸ See, e.g., Lloyd v. Facebook, Inc., No. 23-15318, 2024 WL 3325389, at *2 (9th Cir. July 8, 2024) (privacy policy governing Facebook account); Gray v. Amazon.com Inc., No. 23-35377, 2024 WL 2206454, at *1 (9th Cir. May 16, 2024) (“Plaintiffs do not challenge the district court's finding that they accepted and are bound by the Alexa Terms of Use, which expressly incorporated the Amazon.com Privacy Notice.”); Hammerling v. Google, LLC, No. 22-17024, 2024 WL 937247, at *2-3 (9th Cir. Mar. 5, 2024) (contract containing policy that discloses data tracking); In re Google, Inc. Priv. Pol'y Litig., 12-cv-01382-PSG, 2013 WL 6248499, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013) (privacy policy governing Gmail account).

7 Plaintiffs do not allege that they created YouTube or Google accounts through which they presumably would have, upon creation, agreed to comply with Google's terms. See also Hr'g Tr. at 7:10-13.

8 Because the Court need not review these terms in rejecting their application at the pleading stage, it TERMINATES ASMOOT Defendants' request that the Court judicially notice them or treat them as incorporated by reference into the SAC. See Motion at 3 n.1; see, e.g., Mattson Tech., Inc. v. Applied Materials, Inc., No. 23-cv-06071-SVK, 2024 WL 3558849, at *4 n.3 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2024).

In sum, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that Google engaged in highly offensive conduct. The Court, therefore, will not dismiss the privacy claims.

B. The Court Will Dismiss The Unjust-Enrichment Claims Because Plaintiffs Do Not Dispute That Defendants' Enrichment Was Not Unjust And Did Not Occur At Plaintiffs' Expense

As required under the laws of the 17 states in question, to pursue a claim of unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant enriched itself through means unjust.⁹ Further, “[r]eceipt of a benefit at the expense of another is a necessary . . . condition of liability.” Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 2 cmt. b (Am. L. Inst. 2011). Applying those principles here, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' unjust-enrichment claims fail “because the benefits Defendants allegedly received were not unjustly conferred,” and Plaintiffs “allege no facts showing Defendants were enriched at Plaintiffs' expense.” See Motion at 17-19 (citations omitted). Specifically, according to Defendants, they remain insulated from claims of unjust enrichment because: (1) Plaintiffs received access to YouTube “without payment”; (2) Defendants did not receive a benefit as the result of any alleged “mistake, fraud, coercion, or request”; and (3) Plaintiffs did not suffer any loss as a result of Defendants' conduct. See id.

9 See Mantiply v. Mantiply, 951 So.2d 638, 654-55 (Ala. 2006); Lewis v. Lewis, 189 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Colo. 2008); Pincus v. Am. Traffic Sols., Inc., 333 So.3d 1095, 1097-98 (Fla. 2022); HPI Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hosp., Inc., 131 Ill.2d 145, 160 (1989); Zoller v. E. Chi. Second Century, Inc., 904 N.E.2d 213, 220 (Ind. 2009); Haz-Mat Response, Inc. v. Certified Waste Servs. Ltd., 259 Kan. 166, 177 (1996); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Cotter, 464 Mass. 623, 643-44 (2013); Wright v. Genesee Cnty., 504 Mich. 410, 417-19 (2019); Hughes v. Shipp, 324 So.3d 286, 290-91 (Miss. 2021); Hargis v. JLB Corp., 357 S.W.3d 574, 586 (Mo. 2011); Axenics, Inc. v. Turner Constr. Co., 164 N.H. 659, 669-73 (2013); VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 135 N.J. 539, 554 (1994); Georgia Malone & Co., Inc. v. Rieder, 19 N.Y.3d 511, 516 (2012); French Energy, Inc. v. Alexander, 818 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Okla. 1991); Mitchell v. Moore, 729 A.2d 1200, 1203-04 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999); Whitehaven Cmty. Baptist Church v. Holloway, 973 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Tenn. 1998); Young v. Young, 164 Wash.2d 477, 483-85 (2008).

Despite Defendants raising these arguments, which extend across three pages of the Motion, Plaintiffs do not address the arguments in their Opposition. At the December 17 hearing, the Court offered Plaintiffs an opportunity to direct the Court to those portions of the Opposition where Plaintiffs respond to these arguments. See Hr'g Tr. at 18:3-25. Plaintiffs attempted to do so, but the identified portions of the Opposition do not address Defendants' direct attacks on Plaintiffs' claims of unjust enrichment; instead, those portions address an argument raised by Defendants in support of dismissal of all of Plaintiffs' requests for equitable relief. See Id. at 19:1-20:18 (citing Opposition at 4, 6). At best, the Court could read the identified portions of the Opposition as arguing, in general, that Defendants engaged in unjust conduct. But that general proposition does not respond to Defendants' specific arguments. Plaintiffs also explained at the hearing that the fundamental nature of their allegations clearly implicated the unjust nature of Defendants' conduct and how that conduct occurred at Plaintiffs' expense. See Id. at 21:10-22:6. Yet a plaintiff does not oppose a Rule 12(b)(6) motion with the implicit gestalt of their allegations but with express argument.¹⁰ To hold otherwise would substitute the Court for Plaintiffs in responding to the Motion, as the Court would have to sua sponte select Plaintiffs' responses for them. The Court declines to assume such a role and “will not manufacture arguments for [Plaintiffs], . . . particularly when, as here, a host of other issues are presented.” Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). If Plaintiffs wish to respond to an argument, they must do so clearly, for “[j]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs,” or, as Plaintiffs would have it, outside the briefing as well. United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991).

10 Plaintiffs requested an opportunity to provide such express argument via a one-page brief at the December 17 hearing. See Hr'g Tr. at 25:6-16. The Court, however, declines to permit further briefing here, where Plaintiffs simply failed to address arguments that Defendants conspicuously raised in the Motion.

Although the consequences for failing to address an argument are harsh, Plaintiffs had already been cautioned about the importance of properly structuring their responsive briefing. In a prior hearing on a previous motion to dismiss, the Honorable Beth Labson Freeman expressly instructed Plaintiffs to match the organization of their briefing to that of Defendants:

As a courtesy to me, in the future when you are responding to a motion, please don't scramble the order of the issues. The moving party gets to set the table and you come and sit and eat. So I want your forks on the left and your knife and spoon on the right here, because I had to whip through your briefs to sync the arguments so I could consider them.

Dkt. 256-1 at 28:21-29-2. In failing to heed Judge Freeman's instructions, Plaintiffs neglected to respond to critical arguments in Defendants' Motion.¹¹

11 In opposing Defendants' attempt to dismiss their unjust-enrichment claims, Plaintiffs did request that the Court consider arguments raised in prior briefing concerning Defendants' “state-specific challenges to unjust enrichment liability in some of the States at issue.” See Opposition at 8 n.3. These “state-specific challenges” did not encompass the two arguments identified above, as those arguments apply to all of Plaintiffs' unjust-enrichment claims (and not just to certain state-specific claims), and so the Court does not read Plaintiffs' request as an attempt to incorporate any prior briefing on those two, non-state-specific arguments. Even if Plaintiffs did intend for the Court to review prior briefing on those specific arguments, the Court would decline to do so. See, e.g., Aldini AG v. Silvaco, Inc., No. 21-cv-06423-JST, 2023 WL 3749792, at *3 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2023); see also Obeso v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 23-cv-02793-SVK, 2023 WL 6278880, at *7 n.6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2023) (“The Court trusts litigants to marshal forth their strongest arguments and evidence and will consider only those arguments and evidence presented.”).

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have conceded the point on Defendants' two arguments, and the Court will therefore dismiss the unjust-enrichment claims. See, e.g., Tovar v. City of San Jose, No. 21-cv-02497-EJD, 2021 WL 6126931, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2021); Tyler v. Travelers Com. Ins. Co., 499 F.Supp.3d 693, 701 (N.D. Cal. 2020).¹²

12 The Court does not opine on the merits of any of Defendants' arguments for why it should dismiss the unjust-enrichment claims.

C. Some Of Plaintiffs' Consumer-Protection Claims Survive Based On Plaintiffs' Alleged Loss Of Privacy

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the consumer-protection statutes of 13 states when they appropriated Plaintiffs' information without parental consent. The Court dismissed these claims in the Prior Order to the extent that Plaintiffs sought to recover damages because Plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently allege that they suffered a loss as a result of Defendants' conduct.¹³ See Prior Order at 14-19. Defendants argue that the Court should again dismiss these claims because Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege that they suffered a loss. See Motion at 14-17. They also offer arguments tailored to the requirements of specific statutes. See Id. at 17.

13 In the Prior Order, the Court did not address whether this failure to sufficiently allege loss impacted Plaintiffs' requests for equitable relief under the consumer-protection statutes in question because the Court had already dismissed those requests for equitable relief. See Prior Order at 6-10 (dismissing requests for equitable relief); see also Id. at 14 (“Under each [consumer-protection] statute in question, a plaintiff may recover damages only after experiencing a loss, injury or damages.” (emphasis added) (footnote citation omitted)).

1. Plaintiffs Sufficiently Allege That They Suffered A Loss In The Form Of Their Lost Privacy

Defendants' loss argument yields different results depending on whether aimed at requests for damages or equitable relief under the statutes in question. The Court will divide its analysis of this argument accordingly.

a. Plaintiffs May Pursue Damages Under The Laws Of Three States

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs may not pursue damages under the California statute in question because that statute offers equitable remedies only. See Guzman v. Polaris Indus. Inc., 49 F.4th 1308, 1313 (9th Cir. 2022). As for the remaining statues at issue, a plaintiff may recover damages only after experiencing a loss, injury or damages.¹⁴ Plaintiffs allege that they suffered the requisite loss, injury or damages because Defendants, inter alia, “destroyed the fundamental quality of their information, i.e., their “right to maintain [its] privacy.” See Opposition at 17-20; see also SAC ¶¶ 169, 195-201. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the collection of internet-browsing data can constitute a privacy harm.¹⁵ See Facebook, 956 F.3d at 598-99.

14 See Stewart Agency, Inc. v. Arrigo Enters., 266 So.3d 207, 212-14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2019); Oliveira v.Amoco Oil Co., 201 Ill.2d 134, 148-49 (2002); Anderson v. OLeary Paint Co., No. 10-cv-00269-JTM, 2011 WL 4529364, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 28, 2011); Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 629 (2008); Chapman v. Alawi, No. 331750, 2018 WL 472211, at *3-4 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2018); WatsonLab'ys, Inc. v. State, 241 So.3d 573, 592 (Miss. 2018); Hess v. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA, N.A., 220 S.W.3d 758, 773 (Mo. 2007); State v. Hynes, 159 N.H. 187, 196 (2009); Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 183 N.J. 234, 246 (2005); Gregg v. AmeripriseFin., Inc., 664Pa. 567,582(2021); Tucker v. Sierra Builders, 180 S.W.3d 109, 115 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); Indoor Billboard/Wash., Inc. v. Integra Telecom of Wash., Inc., 162 Wash.2d 59, 73 (2007).

15 The Court, therefore, rejects the contention raised by Defendants at the December 17 hearing that Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege a loss of privacy. SeeHr'gTr. at 9:15-24. The Court also declines to impose at the pleading stage, as Defendants argue it should, a requirement that Plaintiffs specifically allege that they considered their data to be private and attempted to maintain its secrecy. See idat 6:16-7:9.

Defendants counter that a loss of privacy does not constitute “cognizable damage” for purposes of Plaintiffs' statutory claims. See Motion at 15. With respect to nine of the statutes in question, the Court agrees:

. The Florida, Illinois, New Jersey and Tennessee statutes permit recovery for only economic losses. See Calderonv. Sixt Rent a Car, LLC, 114 F.4th 1190, 1209 (11th Cir. 2024) (Florida statute requires “out-of-pocket damages” (citation omitted)); MacLeod v. Commonwealth Edison, No. 2-23-0237, 2024 WL 1865728, at *9 (Ill.App.Ct. Apr. 29, 2024) (“The statute provides remedies for purely economic injuries . . . .” (citation omitted)); Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 148 N.J. 582, 613 (1997) (“[W]e are reluctant to read the Act to encompass non-economic losses.”); Akers v. Prime Succession of Tenn., Inc., 387 S.W.3d 495, 510 (Tenn. 2012) (Tennessee statute requires loss of money or property with “tangible economic value”).¹⁶ Privacy loss is not economic loss.

. The Michigan statute applies to “actual economic damages or the frustration of the plaintiffs reasonable expectations.” See Chapman, 2018 WL 472211, at *3 (citations omitted).¹⁷ Again, loss of privacy does not constitute an economic loss, and as the Court explained in the Prior Order, a reasonable consumer would expect the collection of their data while browsing the internet. See Prior Order at 11.

. The Mississippi, Missouri and Pennsylvania statutes apply only to losses of “money or property.” See Miss. Code. Ann. § 75-24-15(1); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.025.1; 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 201-9.2(a). The Court is unaware of any decisions interpreting these statutes and concluding whether such losses of money or property could encompass a loss of privacy. However, the New Jersey statute similarly applies solely to losses of “moneys or property” (see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-19), and, as discussed above, the courts of that state interpret that limitation as imposing a requirement of economic loss. This Court agrees with that sensible interpretation and concludes that the Mississippi, Missouri and Pennsylvania statutes' references to losses of “money or property” also implicate solely economic losses.

Therefore, those statutes do not apply to Plaintiffs' alleged loss of privacy.¹⁸

. The Washington statute requires an injury to business or property, which occurs when a plaintiffs “property interest or money isdiminished because of the unlawful conduct.” SeePanagv. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 166 Wash.2d 27, 39, 57 (2009) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). As discussed in more detail below (see Section III.C.2, infra), elimination of the private quality of Plaintiffs' information does not in any way diminish their interest in that information. The statute, accordingly, does not apply to Plaintiffs' alleged loss of privacy.

16 Relying on Harrington v. Fay Servicing LLC, No. 18-cv-06467-EEC, 2019 WL 4750140 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2019), Plaintiffs insist that the Illinois statute encompasses a broad interpretation of loss. See Opposition at 19. The Court defers to the interpretation set forth in MacLeod, a more-recent decision issued by the Appellate Court of Illinois. The Court recognizes that in Harrington the Honorable Edmond E. Chang acknowledged that his interpretation contravened many decisions of the Appellate Court of Illinois but nevertheless applied his interpretation in light of “persuasive indications” that the Illinois Supreme Court “would disagree with the intermediate appellate court.” See Harrington, 2019 WL 4750140, at *8-9. In particular, Judge Chang relied on an earlier decision of his in which he performed a detailed analysis of the statute and concluded that the statute does not require economic loss. See Duarte v. Convergent Outsourcing Inc., No. 17-cv-06051-EEC, 2018 WL 3427910, at *4-7 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 2018). “With due respect to this thoughtful analysis, the Court declines to adopt it.” Clark v. Receivables Mgmt. Partners, LLC, No. 21-cv-00298-JRB, 2022 WL 767149, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2022). This Court is not aware of any other decision adopting Judge Chang's interpretation, and at least one other judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has rejected that interpretation. See Id. at *4-6. Further, Plaintiffs merely cite to Harrington without grappling with the leading interpretation of the Illinois courts, and in the face of such a widely understood interpretation, the Court will not delve into a detailed analysis of the Illinois statute without an express invitation from Plaintiffs to do so.

17 Relying on Gilkey v. Central Clearing Company, 202 F.R.D. 515 (E.D. Mich. 2001), Plaintiffs insist that the Michigan statute encompasses a broad interpretation of loss. See Opposition at 18-19. The Court defers to the interpretation set forth in Chapman, a more-recent decision issued by the Michigan Court of Appeals.

18 Relying on Opris v. Sincera Reproductive Medicine, No. 21-cv-03072-JHS, 2022 WL 1639417 (E.D. Pa. May 24, 2022), Plaintiffs insist that “misappropriation of [personal information can] constitute cognizable injury” under the Pennsylvania statute at issue. See Opposition at 19. The Court already distinguished Opris in the Prior Order. See Prior Order at 18. Further, the reasoning of the Opris court does not convince this Court that loss of privacy constitutes loss of money or property under the Pennsylvania statute. As Plaintiffs point out, the Opris court did accept loss of value of information as loss under the Pennsylvania statute in question. See Opposition at 19 n.9. But as this Court noted in the Prior Order, the Opris court based that conclusion on three decisions that this Court distinguished in the Prior Order. See Prior Order at 18.

With respect to the remaining three statutes, however, privacy loss suffices:

. The Indiana statute applies to “damages actually suffered.” See Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-4(a). The Court is unaware of any authority interpreting this broad provision in such a way that it could not encompass a loss of privacy, and Defendants offer no argument addressing this specific provision. At the December 17 hearing, Defendants did cite to I.C. v. Zynga, Inc., 600 F.Supp.3d 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2022), which involved a claim under the Indiana statute, but the court there focused its analysis primarily on whether the plaintiffs satisfied the requirements of Article III standing and did not discuss the “damages actually suffered” requirement of the Indiana statute. See Id. at 1045-47; Hr'g Tr. at 27:5-17.

. The Massachusetts statute applies to non-economic injuries. See Nightingale v. Nat'l Grid USA Serv. Co., 107 F.4th 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2024). That is broad enough to include loss of privacy.

. The New Hampshire statute applies to “[a]ny person injured.” See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:10(I). The Court is unaware of any authority interpreting this broad provision in such a way that it could not encompass a loss of privacy, and Defendants offer no argument addressing this specific provision.¹⁹

19 At the December 17 hearing, Defendants cited to In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, 996 F.Supp.2d 942 (S.D. Cal. 2014), for the proposition that a plaintiff may not pursue class claims under the New Hampshire statute in the absence of damages. See Id. at 1002-03; Hr'g Tr. at 30:3-11. Defendants did not raise this argument in the briefing, and so the Court will not evaluate it in this Order. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Tesla, No. 22-cv-07849-SVK, 2024 WL 4178676, at *7 n.6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2024).

B. Plaintiffs' allegations of privacy loss also suffice for purposes of obtaining equitable relief under five of the statutes in question:

. The Florida statute permits an “aggrieved” plaintiff to obtain injunctive relief. See Fla. Stat. § 501.211(1). The Florida courts interpret the “definition of‘aggrieved' as being more expansive than‘damaged' or‘suffered a loss[.]'” See Ahearn v. Mayo Clinic, 180 So.3d 165, 172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1stDist. 2015). Defendants offer no argument addressing this specific provision, which appears broad enough to encompass privacy loss. At the December 17 hearing, Defendants cited to DiPierro v. Florida Health Sciences Center, Inc., No. 23-cv-01864-KKM, 2024 WL 3051320 (M.D. Fla. June 18, 2024), for the proposition that privacy loss does not suffice under the Florida statute. See Hr'g Tr. at 27:5-16. But the court in DiPierro focused its analysis primarily on whether the plaintiffs satisfied the requirements of Article III standing and did not discuss the “aggrieved” requirement of the Florida statute. See DiPierro, 2024WL 3051320, at *2. This Court, therefore, views a loss of privacy as sufficient to aggrieve a plaintiff within the meaning of the statute.

. The Massachusetts and New Hampshire statutes permit injured persons to pursue equitable relief and do not distinguish between the types of injuries required for legal and equitable

relief. See Mass. Gen Laws ch. 93A § 9(1); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:10(I). Accordingly, because loss of privacy satisfies the injury requirements for purposes of damages under these statutes, it necessarily satisfies the injury requirements for purposes of equitable relief.

. The Michigan statute permits a plaintiff to obtain injunctive relief regardless of whether they suffered a loss. See Chapman, 2018 WL 472211, at *3. At the December 17 hearing, Defendants cited to Deacon v. Pandora Media, Inc., 901 F.Supp.2d 1166 (N.D. Cal. 2012), which involved a claim under the Michigan statute, for the proposition that the Michigan statute does not permit a plaintiff to pursue injunctive relief in the absence of damages. See Hr'g Tr. at 29:16-30:3. That decision, however, supports the opposite conclusion: “[A] plaintiff bringing a claim under the [Michigan statute] is not required to show actual damages if he or she is seeking injunctive relief only.” Deacon, 901 F.Supp.2d at 1177.²⁰

. The Tennessee statute permits “anyone affected by a violation of the statute to obtain injunctive relief. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-109(b). “Affected” is necessarily broader than the economic loss required to obtain damages under the statute, and Defendants offer no argument addressing this specific provision. The Court, therefore, views a loss of privacy as sufficient to affect a plaintiff within the meaning of the statute.

20 The Deacon court did hold that the Michigan statute does not permit a plaintiff to pursue injunctive relief on a classwide basis in the absence of a qualifying loss. See Deacon, 901 F.Supp.3d at 1177-78. But Defendants do not argue that Plaintiffs may not pursue class claims under the Michigan statute, and so the Court need not evaluate the issue in this Order. The Court will also not evaluate the issue because Defendants did not raise it in the briefing. See, e.g., McLaughlin, 2024 WL 4178676, at *7 n.6.

With respect to the remaining statutes, however, loss of privacy does not suffice for purposes of obtaining equitable relief:

. Under the California statute, a plaintiff may obtain equitable relief only if they suffer economic loss. See Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Ct., 51 Cal.4th 310, 323 (2011). Privacy

loss is not economic loss.²¹

. As discussed above, the Illinois, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey and Pennsylvania statutes require economic losses. The statutes also do not distinguish between the types of losses required to obtain legal, equitable and injunctive relief.²² See 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/10a(a), (c); Miss. Code. Ann. § 75-24-15(1); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 407.025.1-2; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-19; 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 201-9.2(a). Likewise, the Washington statute permits an injured person to obtain an injunction and does not distinguish between the types of injuries required for legal and injunctive relief. See Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.090. Accordingly, because loss of privacy does not satisfy the loss or injury requirements for purposes of damages under these statutes, it necessarily does not satisfy the loss or injury requirements for purposes of equitable or injunctive relief.

. The Indiana statute does not authorize a court to award equitable relief to a private plaintiff. See Ind. Code §§ 24-5-0.5-4(a), (c).²³

21 Relying solely on cases interpreting California law, Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs do not even maintain a property interest in their personal information in the first place such that they necessarily cannot suffer any loss (economic or otherwise) associated with Google's appropriation of their information. See Motion at 14-15; Reply at 9; Doe I v. Google LLC, No. 23-cv-02431-VC, 2024 WL 3490744, at *7 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2024); Campbell v. FacebookInc., 77 F.Supp.3d 836, 849 (N.D. Cal. 2014); In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F.Supp.2d 1040, 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2012). Because the cited authorities address the issue under only California law, the Court interprets this argument as concerning the California statute only and accordingly declines to resolve the argument, as it has already concluded that the claim under the California statute fails.

22 The Mississippi and Pennsylvania statutes do not expressly permit private plaintiffs to pursue equitable relief and instead authorize private plaintiffs to pursue both damages and, respectively, “all other statutory and common law rights, remedies and defenses” (see Miss. Code. Ann. § 75-24-15(1)) and “such additional relief as [a court] deems necessary or proper” (see Pa. Cons. Stat. § 201-9.2(a)).

23 At the December 17 hearing, Defendants also cited to Pruchnicki v. Envision Healthcare Corporation, 845 Fed.Appx. 613 (9th Cir. 2021), and Adkins v. Facebook, Inc., 424 F.Supp.3d 686 (N.D. Cal. 2019), to support their position that privacy loss does not constitute a qualifying loss under the statutes at issue. See Hr'g Tr. at 27:5-28:4; see also Motion at 15 (citing Adkins); Reply at 9 (citing Pruchnicki). Pruchnicki concerned a Nevada statute and involved an assertion of diminution in value stemming from the misappropriation of information. See Pruchnicki, 845 Fed.Appx. at 614-15. Plaintiffs here do not pursue a claim under Nevada law, and the Court focuses its analysis in this section on privacy loss, not diminution in value. As for Adkins, the court there merely held that privacy loss does not automatically result in economic loss. See Adkins, 424 F.Supp.3d at 696-97. This Court agrees, but as explained above, some of the at-issue statutes permit recovery for non-economic losses.

2. Plaintiffs Do Not Sufficiently Allege That They Suffered Any Loss Other Than A Privacy Loss

Plaintiffs argue that they sufficiently allege various forms of loss other than privacy loss in the SAC. See Opposition at 13-20. The Court disagrees.

First , Plaintiffs argue that they suffered a loss when Defendants “fail[ed] to compensate them for the profits [they] garnered from their exploitation of” Plaintiffs' information. See Id. at 15. As an initial matter, the Court disagrees with the fundamental premise of this argument; Plaintiffs did receive compensation in the form of “free” access to YouTube. Further, that Google profited from its use of Plaintiffs' information does not translate to a loss for Plaintiffs. See Prior Order at 16 (“[J]ust because Defendants received a gain does not mean Plaintiffs suffered a loss.” (citation omitted)). Plaintiffs' reliance on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Facebook to bolster their position on this point is misplaced. See Opposition at 15. There, the court explained that a plaintiff could satisfy the injury requirement of Article III standing by sufficiently alleging that a defendant “unjustly earned” profits using that plaintiff's information. See Facebook, 956 F.3d at 599-601. Here, however, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs' unjust-enrichment claims. Further, the Court will not simply assume that an injury for purposes of Article III standing doubles as a loss, injury or damages under the consumer-protection statutes at issue. Anticipating this distinction, Plaintiffs point to the Honorable Lucy H. Koh's decision in Brown v. Google LLC, No. 20-cv-03664-LHK, 2021 WL 6064009 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2021), in which she explained that an economic injury that satisfies the requirements of Article III standing necessarily satisfies the economic-injury requirement of the California statute at issue. See Id. at *17; Opposition at 15-16. However, this principle from Brown assists Plaintiffs only if they first establish that they suffered an economic injury, and as explained above, Plaintiffs' claims of unjust enrichment do not supply such an injury.

Second , Plaintiffs argue that Defendants' appropriation of their information reduced the value of their information. See Opposition at 16-17. The Court already rejected this argument in the Prior Order. See Prior Order at 14-19; see also Katz-Lacabe v. Oracle Am., Inc., 668 F.Supp.3d 928, 943 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2023) (“The weight of the authority in the district and the state, however, point in the opposite direction: that the mere misappropriation of personal information does not establish compensable damages.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)). Plaintiffs cited authorities do not convince the Court to reverse itself now (see Opposition at 16-17):

. In Brown, the court presented two theories of economic loss under the California statute in question where Google collected data from individuals using “Incognito Mode” without compensating them: (1) “Google caused Plaintiffs to acquire in a transaction less[] than [they] otherwise would have” as “it [wa]s plausible that, had Plaintiffs been aware of Google's data collection, they would have demanded payment for their data”; and (2) Google sold the collected data to advertisers, thereby reducing its value. See Brown, 2021 WL 6064009, at *1, *15 (quotations marks and citations omitted). Neither theory applies here. With respect to theory (1), Plaintiffs do not allege that they used “Incognito Mode” or some similar method of private browsing. Had they done so, they reasonably would not have known that Google was collecting their data, and under those circumstances it may have been plausible that they would have bargained for some compensation in exchange for their data beyond what they otherwise received (i.e., beyond mere “free” access to YouTube). As explained in the Prior Order, however, “[contemporary internet browsing involves the collection of users' data, including by tracking users across the internet, and a reasonable user should expect as much.” Prior Order at 11 (citations omitted). Thus, the Court cannot reasonably assume that Plaintiffs would have bargained for anything more than what they received. Theory (2) also fails because Plaintiffs do not allege that Google sold their data. Had Google done so, it would be plausible to assume that Plaintiffs' data lost value, as those who purchased the data would presumably no longer consider buying the same data from Plaintiffs, thereby shrinking the market of buyers and hindering Plaintiffs' ability to sell their data. Here, however, Plaintiffs allege only that Google used the data it collected to determine which advertising to show Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs do not

allege that anyone outside of Google gained access to their data. Under these facts, the Court does not see why an interested buyer would no longer consider purchasing (or value as highly) Plaintiffs' data.

. In a subsequent decision in Brown, the court explained that, “[b]y selling users' information, Google prevents users from monetizing their own data,” which satisfied the economic-loss requirement of the California statute at issue. See Brown v. Google LLC, 685 F.Supp.3d 909, 920, 942 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (emphasis added). Again, however, that rationale does not apply here, as Plaintiffs do not allege any sale (or external dissemination of any kind) of their data by Google.

. The Court distinguished Calhoun v. Google LLC, 526 F.Supp.3d 605 (N.D. Cal. 2021), in the Prior Order. See Prior Order at 17.

. In A.B. ex rel. Turner v. Google LLC, No. 23-cv-03101-PCP, 2024 WL 3052969 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2024), the court, relying in part on Brown and Calhoun, held that Google's collection of the plaintiffs' data caused them an economic injury in light of the existence of “a market for consumers to monetize Personal Information.” See Id. at *7. This Court rejected similar allegations in the Prior Order as sufficient to demonstrate loss. See Prior Order at 15. The Court has also distinguished Brown and Calhoun in this Order and the Prior Order.

Third, Plaintiffs argue that their privacy loss constitutes an economic loss. See Opposition at 17-20. They primarily rely on In re Meta Pixel Tax Filing Cases, 724 F.Supp.3d 987 (N.D. Cal. 2024), in which the court explained that the defendant's collection of the plaintiffs' data violated “their [property] right to exclude” the defendant from their data. See Id. at 1024-25. The Meta court, in turn, relied on the California Supreme Court's decision in Kwikset, in which the court explained that a plaintiff may establish economic injury under the California statute in question by, inter alia, “hav[ing] a present or future property interest diminished.” See Kwikset, 51 Cal.4th at 323; see also Meta, 724 F.Supp. at 1023-25. In the view of the Meta court, a violation of a right to exclude falls under the rubric of a diminished property interest and therefore constitutes an economic loss. Respectfully, this Court disagrees. A violation of a right to privacy does not constitute diminishment of a property interest. Yes, Google allegedly violated Plaintiffs' right to maintain the privacy of their information, but without more, the Court does not view that violation as diminishing any interest in the information. See also Prior Order at 15 (“Plaintiffs do not, however, allege facts explaining how Defendants' collection and use of their information reduces the value of that information, and an explanation as to how does not appear so obvious that the Court may simply infer one.” (citations omitted)).

Fourth , Plaintiffs allege that their privacy loss caused an economic loss (as opposed to constituted an economic loss in itself). See SAC ¶¶ 196-97. They cite to two papers that purportedly support the proposition that Google's collection of their data reduces the amount a third-party buyer would pay to purchase their information. See Id. at 49 nn. 82, 85. The first paper supports the proposition that once a single buyer acquires an individual's information, it will place a smaller value on other information from that same individual and on the information of others. See Daron Acemoglu et al., Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 14(4), 218-256 at 219 (2022). The second paper supports the proposition that once a single buyer acquires an individual's information, that buyer will be able to learn about other persons whose information it did not obtain. See Jay Pil Choi et al., Privacy and personal data collection with information externalities, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 173, 113-124 at 115 (2019). Neither of these propositions supports Plaintiffs' contention that Google's collection of Plaintiffs' data reduces the value that other entities would place on that data.²⁴

24 The second paper notes in passing that collection of data could result in “direct economic losses due to personalized pricing enabled by the detailed knowledge of personal preferences.” See Choi at 115. Plaintiffs, however, do not allege that they suffered any such economic loss here.

3. The Court Rejects Defendants' State-Specific Arguments

With respect to the statutory claims that survive following the Court's analysis above, Defendants offer two arguments in support of dismissal. The Court rejects both.

First , Defendants argue that the Court must dismiss the Indiana claim because the Indiana statute applies to “consumer transaction[s]” only, and “Plaintiffs do not allege that they transacted to access YouTube.” See Motion at 17; see also McKinney v. State, 693 N.E.2d 65, 67 (Ind. 1998) (“The Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act . . . provides remedies to consumers and the attorney general for practices that the General Assembly deemed deceptive in consumer transactions.”). Yet the statute broadly defines “consumer transaction” to include, inter alia, the “disposition of . . . a service . . . to a person for purposes that are primarily personal.” See Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-2(a)(1). Google's provision of YouTube access to Plaintiffs (i.e., a service that they used to watch videos) falls within that definition.

Second , Defendants argue that the Tennessee statute prohibits a plaintiff from pursuing claims on a class basis. See Motion at 17. The statute, however, limits its restriction on class actions to only claims for damages. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-109(g) (“No class action lawsuit may be brought to recover damages . . . .”). The Court's conclusion above that Plaintiffs may not pursue damages under the Tennessee statute renders that limitation on classwide relief irrelevant here. Of course, the Court did conclude above that Plaintiffs could pursue injunctive relief under the Tennessee statute, but the statute does not limit a plaintiff's ability to pursue injunctive relief on a classwide basis. See Id. (limiting classwide relief only to extent a plaintiff pursues damages); see also Ciccio v. SmileDirectClub, LLC, No. 19-cv-00845-AAT, 2020 WL 2850146, at *16 n.8 (M.D. Tenn. June 2, 2020) (acknowledging that the statute appears to permit classwide injunctive relief).

***

In sum, Plaintiffs may pursue: (1) damages under the statutes of Indiana, Massachusetts and New Hampshire; and (2) equitable and injunctive relief under the statutes of Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire and Tennessee. To the extent that any of these statutes permits a particular form of recovery only upon a showing of loss, injury or damages, Plaintiffs may pursue such recovery only in connection with their alleged loss of privacy. Plaintiffs may not pursue these claims to the extent based on any other alleged harm they suffered, and the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs' claims under the remaining consumer-protection statutes.

D. Plaintiffs May Pursue Equitable Relief

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs may not pursue any of their requests for equitable relief because they do not sufficiently allege that they lack an adequate remedy at law. See Motion at 6-9. Defendants also offer additional reasons for dismissing Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief in particular. See Id. at 9-11. The Court rejects all of Defendants' arguments.

1. Plaintiffs Sufficiently Allege That They Suffered An Injury That Legal Relief Cannot Remedy

To obtain any equitable relief in federal court, a plaintiff must allege that they lack an adequate remedy at law. See Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834, 844 (9th Cir. 2020). Applying this principle in the Prior Order, the Court dismissed all of Plaintiffs' requests for equitable relief because their “allegations of harm focus[ed] on economic injuries already suffered[, and t]he legal remedy of damages [c]ould serve as an adequate form of retrospective relief for such harm.” See Prior Order at 6 (citations omitted). As discussed above, however, Plaintiffs' surviving claims may proceed only to the extent that they are based on Plaintiffs' loss of privacy and not to the extent that they are based on any economic harm. Courts frequently recognize that legal relief cannot adequately remedy a loss-of-privacy harm. See, e.g., Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 2012) (loss of privacy resulted in “irreparable harm”); Brooks v. Thomson Reuters Corp., No. 21-cv-01418-EMC, 2021 WL 3621837, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2021) (“Even if Plaintiffs could obtain damages [for] the unauthorized sale of their personal information to third parties, that amount will not compensate them adequately for the irreparable loss of their privacy.”); see also Ne. Fla. Chapter of Ass'n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[I]nvasions of privacy, because of their intangible nature, could not be compensated for by monetary damages . . . .”). Thus, Plaintiffs satisfy the Sonner requirement.

Defendants argue that loss of privacy cannot serve as a valid harm for purposes of obtaining equitable relief because Plaintiffs' privacy claims fail. See Reply at 4. The Court rejects this argument because Plaintiffs' privacy claims survive. In any event, a failure to satisfy the requirements of a privacy tort would not necessarily indicate that no invasion of privacy occurred. For example, a defendant could violate a plaintiff's privacy, thereby causing a privacy loss, even if it did not do so in a manner highly offensive, thereby defeating an intrusion-upon-seclusion claim.

2. Plaintiffs Have Article III Standing To Pursue Injunctive Relief

Federal courts may preside over an action only where a plaintiff has Article III standing. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021). Article III standing “consists of three elements. The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (citations omitted). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the injury requirement such that they cannot pursue injunctive relief. See Motion at 9. To satisfy the injury requirement in connection with seeking an injunction, a plaintiff must show an “actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical” threat of injury. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009). “In other words, the threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact and allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient.” Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 967 (9th Cir. 2018) (quotations marks and citation omitted).

According to Defendants, Plaintiffs do not satisfy the “certainly impending” requirement. See Motion at 9. The Court disagrees. As discussed above, Plaintiffs' loss of privacy remains the sole wrong sufficiently alleged for purposes of pursuing injunctive relief under their surviving claims. That loss of privacy stems from Google's collection and retention of their information. The harm from this privacy loss is necessarily impending because it is ongoing-every moment that Google holds onto Plaintiffs' information presents a privacy violation. Defendants' reliance on In re BetterHelp, Inc. Data Disclosure Cases, No. 23-cv-01033-RS, 2024 WL 4504527 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2024), is therefore misplaced because the plaintiffs there did not argue that they faced a threat of future harm based on the defendant's mere retention of their information. See Dkt. 302; see also In re BetterHelp, Inc. Data Disclosure Cases, No. 23-cv-01033-RS, 2024 WL 3416511, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2024).

Thus, Plaintiffs satisfy the injury requirement for purposes of obtaining injunctive relief.

3. The FTC Order Does Not Compel Dismissal Of Plaintiffs' Request For Injunctive Relief

Defendants insist that the injunction issued as part of the FTC Order moots Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief in this action for two reasons, both of which the Court rejects.

First , Defendants argue that the FTC Order “provides substantially the same relief” that Plaintiffs seek here. See Motion at 9. Yet Plaintiffs convincingly argue that the FTC Order contains a “gaping loophole” that potentially leaves them outside the scope of its protection. See Opposition at 1. Specifically, the FTC Order prohibits Google “from [d]isclosing, using, or benefitting from” the personal information of children who watched YouTube that it collected in alleged violation of the COPPA. See FTC Order at 12. But that prohibition contains a key limitation: it applies only to information “previously [c]ollected from users of [c]ontent that is designated as directed to [c]hildren” by the owner of the YouTube channel that uploaded that content. See Id. As Plaintiffs note, this limitation “leaves Google free to continue to use any of Plaintiffs' [information] . . . if a channel owner failed to provide Google with a timely designation of its channel as child-directed.” See Opposition at 1 (citation omitted). Thus, the FTC Order does not address or mirror Plaintiffs' request for an injunction requiring, inter alia, Google to destroy and not use their information. See SAC ¶ 312; cf. BetterHelp, 2024 WL 4504527, at *3 (dismissing request for injunctive relief where plaintiffs sought “a second injunction requiring similar action” to that required by injunction obtained by FTC); In re Pre-Filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litig., 893 F.3d 1047, 1054-55 (8th Cir. 2018) (no standing to pursue injunctive relief already provided by FTC consent order); Nat'l Farmers' Org., Inc. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 850 F.2d 1286, 1309 (8th Cir. 1988) (“[T]here is nothing to be gained by entering an injunction that substantially duplicates the relief already available.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). Indeed, it is entirely possible that Google has used Plaintiffs' information following the issuance of the FTC Order without running afoul of the injunction contained therein, and Plaintiffs simply seek to impose an additional layer of restrictions going beyond what the FTC Order requires.

Defendants counter that Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege that the owners of any YouTube channels failed to designate their content as directed to children following the issuance of the FTC Order. See Motion at 9-10. But Plaintiffs do offer a reasonable explanation for why they believe there is a strong likelihood that at least some did fail to do so.²⁵ See SAC ¶¶ 301-05 (foreign companies unconcerned about risk of COPPA enforcement and financial incentive for content creators to ensure behavioral advertising presented on their channels). In any event, the fact remains that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Google retains their information, thereby causing them ongoing privacy harm. That continuing harm persists even if their information falls within the limited scope of the FTC Order.

25 Defendants assert that “each of the Channel Owners has made [the required] designation for their channels, and Plaintiffs have been aware of this fact since before they filed the” SAC. See Motion at 10 n.8. Defendants offer no support for this proposition which remains outside the allegations of the SAC.

Second , relying on two circuit-court decisions, Defendants argue that this Court should defer the granting of further injunctive relief to the court that issued the FTC Order, as this Court “would interfere with and usurp the inherent power of” the issuing court by issuing an injunction “covering the same subject matter” as the FTC Order. See Motion at 10 (quotations marks and citation omitted). Defendants misapply their cited authorities. In Lapin v. Shulton, Inc., 333 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1964), the Ninth Circuit explained that a district court should defer to a different district court that issued an injunction in entertaining a request to dissolve that injunction. See Id. at 170, 172. And in Feller v. Brock, 802 F.2d 722, (4th Cir. 1986), the Fourth Circuit vacated an injunction issued by one district court that “directly conflict[ed]” with an injunction issued by a different district court. See Id. at 724. Neither decision supports deference to the issuing court here, where Plaintiffs request injunctive relief (as opposed to dissolution of an injunction) that would not conflict with the FTC Order.

E. Plaintiffs Do Not Sufficiently Allege That The Channel Owners May Be Held Liable For Google's Collection Of Their Data

Plaintiffs' allegations focus on Google's conduct. Accordingly, the Channel Owners request that the Court dismiss them from this action because Plaintiffs' allegations do not establish their direct or secondary liability for the claims at issue. See Motion at 19-24. The Court agrees with the Channel Owners and will dismiss them from this action.

1. Plaintiffs Do Not Sufficiently Allege The Direct Liability Of The Channel Owners

Plaintiffs base their claims on the collection of their data. Unquestionably, the Channel Owners did not engage in that collection. Necessarily, therefore, the Court cannot hold them directly liable under Plaintiffs' claims. Searching for an alternative hook to direct liability, Plaintiffs argue that the Channel Owners violated the COPPA and that a violation of the COPPA per se constitutes a sufficient allegation of Plaintiffs' various claims. See Opposition at 20-23. This argument fails because Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege that the Channel Owners violated the COPPA. The statute prohibits “an operator of a website or online service directed to children, or any operator that has actual knowledge that it is collecting personal information from a child, [from] collect[ing] personal information from a child in a manner that violates the regulations prescribed.” See 15 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(1) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs focus their argument on whether the Channel Owners qualify as “operators” under the statute (see Opposition at 20-21), but even if they do, the fact remains that they did not collect any of Plaintiffs' information. Without such collection, no violation occurs.

Acknowledging that the Channel Owners did not themselves collect any data, Plaintiffs argue that the Channel Owners effectively collected Plaintiffs' data because the Channel Owners “direct[ed]” Google to collect data by choosing to show behavioral advertising on their YouTube channels. See Id. at 21; see also SAC ¶ 10. Notably, Plaintiffs point to no allegations supporting this contention that the Channel Owners directed Google's data collection other than their allegation that the Channel Owners “elected to show behavioral advertising on their YouTube channels.” See Opposition at 21. Plaintiffs themselves discredit this “direction” theory by expressly alleging that qualifying YouTube channels defaulted to showing behavioral advertising. See SAC ¶¶ 12, 82, 86-87. Mere acquiescence to a default setting does not constitute direction.

Plaintiffs similarly argue that Google collected their data “on behalf of” the Channel Owners, thereby sweeping the Channel Owners within the scope of the COPPA and the FTC's regulations. See Opposition at 20-21; see also 15 U.S.C. § 6501(2) (defining operator to include those “on whose behalf” a website collects data); 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (similar definition promulgated by FTC). The Court rejects this theory of liability for the same reason it rejects Plaintiffs' “direction” theory-the only supporting allegation (i.e., that the Channel Owners permitted behavioral advertising through passive acceptance of a default setting) does not lead to the reasonable inference that Google collected Plaintiffs' data on the Channel Owners' behalf. Plaintiffs also cite to a rule issued by the FTC to support their position, but that rule is irrelevant. See Opposition at 22-23. In issuing the rule, the FTC clarified its position that a strict-liability standard applies “for child-directed sites and services that allow other online services to collect personal information through their sites.” See 78 Fed.Reg. 3972, 3976 (Jan. 17, 2013). The FTC was concerned about a situation where one entity owns a child-directed website, and another entity uses that website to collect information about the website's users. In that situation, if no liability is imposed on the website owner, the owner would have no incentive to ensure that their child-directed website was not contributing to children's information being collected without parental consent. See Id. at 3975. That's not the situation here: Google collects information through its own website (YouTube), and the third-party entities putting content on the website (the Channel Owners) are not collecting any data. Thus, the FTC rule does not apply.

2. Plaintiffs Do Not Sufficiently Allege The Secondary Liability Of The Channel Owners

In an effort to foreclose any attempt to hold them indirectly liable for Google's collection of Plaintiffs' data, the Channel Owners propose and reject two potential theories of secondary liability: (1) aiding and abetting; and (2) “common plan.” See Motion at 22-24. In lieu of offering their own theories of secondary liability, Plaintiffs argue in favor of the Court applying these two theories. See Opposition at 23-25. Plaintiffs' allegations do not support the application of either theory.

a. Plaintiffs Do Not Sufficiently Allege That The Channel Owners Aided And Abetted Google's Collection Of Their Data

“[A]iding and abetting liability under California law, as applied by the California state courts, requires a finding of actual knowledge . . . . [T]he defendant must have actual knowledge of the specific primary wrong [that they] substantially assisted.”²⁶ In re First Alliance Mortg. Co., 471 F.3d 977, 993 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Howard v. Superior Ct., 2 Cal.App.4th 745, 749 (2d Dist. Div. 2 1992) (“[A]iding and abetting . . . necessarily requires a defendant to reach a conscious decision to participate in tortious activity for the purpose of assisting another in performing a wrongful act.”). “[T]he actual knowledge standard does require more than a vague suspicion of wrongdoing.” See First Alliance, 471 F.3d at 993 n.4.

26 It is not clear whether California law should govern the standard for imposing aiding-and-abetting liability with respect to each of the Channel Owners (or any of the Channel Owners). Regardless, the Parties do not raise this issue, and Plaintiffs engage with Defendants' reference to California law on this point in the Opposition without objection. The Court will therefore analyze the issue under California law.

Plaintiffs do not satisfy the actual-knowledge standard because they offer no non-conclusory allegations that the Channel Owners knew Google engaged in wrongdoing. They attempt to demonstrate knowledge of wrongdoing by arguing that the Channel Owners “elect[ed]” to present behavioral advertising with their videos, which led to improper data collection. See Opposition at 24. But, as discussed above, Google offered behavioral advertising as a default setting, thereby contradicting any notion that the Channel Owners affirmatively elected to present behavioral advertising. Even if the Court accepted that the Channel Owners affirmatively chose to present their viewers with behavioral advertising, it does not follow from that choice that the Channel Owners knew that doing so would assist Google in its data collection, let alone improper data collection.²⁷ See, e.g., Casey v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 127 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1152 (4th Dist. Div. 3 (2005) (insufficient allegations of aiding and abetting money laundering where, inter alia, banks “did not know that allowing the DFJ Fiduciaries to withdraw money from the accounts was assisting a diversion of corporate funds-the primary violation”). For the same reason, “providing the child-directed content that baited the trap, enabling Google to access” Plaintiffs' information (see Opposition at 24) does not lead to a reasonable inference of actual knowledge, as Plaintiffs do not connect the Channel Owners' provision of child-directed content with their knowledge that doing so would contribute to the wrongful collection of children's data. That Google split its advertising revenue with the Channel Owners also does not indicate actual knowledge (see id.); again, Plaintiffs' allegations do not support a reasonable inference that the Channel Owners knew that Google engaged in wrongful data collection, and Plaintiffs offer no allegations that the Channel Owners knew Google derived the advertising revenue it split with them from supposedly improper data collection.

27 To be sure, the Court did explain in the Prior Order that reasonable persons understand that contemporary internet browsing involves data collection. See Prior Order at 11. But it does not follow from that understanding that the Channel Owners should have expected their acceptance of a default setting of behavioral advertising to result in data collection. Indeed, it is not at all clear based on the allegations in the SAC whether Google collects users' data only if a content creator accepts the default setting of behavioral advertising. Plaintiffs have given the Court no reason to think that Google's decision to collect users' data at all depends on whether a channel offers contextual advertising or behavioral advertising. It is entirely possible-and indeed reasonable to assume, based on the allegations in the SAC-that Google collects users' data regardless of any decisions made by the Channel Owners. See SAC ¶ 64 (Google collects information from users of, inter alia, any “websites it owns”).

b. Plaintiffs Do Not Sufficiently Allege That The Channel Owners Acted In A “Common Plan” With Google To Collect Their Data

In support of their proffer and rejection of a “common plan” theory of secondary liability, Defendants cite to a single case (see Motion at 24) in which the California Supreme Court explained that a joint-tortfeasor relationship exists upon the satisfaction of three conditions: “(1) A concert of action; (2) A unity of purpose or design; (3) Two or more defendants working separately but to a common purpose and each acting with the knowledge and consent of the others.” See Weinberg Co. v. Bixby, 185 Cal. 87, 106-07 (1921); accord Mayhugh v. Cnty. of Orange, 141 Cal.App.3d 763, 768 (4th Dist. Div. 2 1983) (McDaniel, J., dissenting). Plaintiffs argue that their allegations satisfy these requirements. See Opposition at 24 n.13. The Court disagrees for two reasons.

First , as discussed above, Plaintiffs do not offer sufficient allegations of the Channel Owners' knowledge of Google's data collection. Accordingly, the Channel Owners do not satisfy the third element of common-plan liability.

Second , Plaintiffs merely rehash their arguments in support of imposing aiding-and-abetting liability to support imposing common-plan liability. See Id. (discussing “luring” children “with child-directed content” for purposes of earning advertising revenue). The Court has already rejected these arguments as insufficient to satisfy the knowledge requirement.

F. Plaintiffs May Not Amend Their Claims Further

The Court declines to permit Plaintiffs another chance to amend their claims.

With respect to the consumer-protection claims, the Court dismisses some of those claims for the same reason it did so before (i.e., insufficient allegations of loss). In the Prior Order, the Court provided Plaintiffs' leave to amend that deficiency, but their amendments simply weren't enough for some of those claims to survive. The Court does not believe that any further amendment could fix the SAC's deficiencies. See, e.g., Snapkeys, Ltd. v. Google LLC, No. 19-cv-02658-LHK, 2020 WL 6381354, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2020) (dismissing claim without leave to amend where, inter alia, plaintiff “has already failed multiple times to adequately allege a . . . claim”); Martin v. CSAA Ins. Exch., No. 17-cv-04066-MEJ, 2018 WL 1242069, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2018) (denying request for leave to amend where, inter alia, “Plaintiffs repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies in their pleading”); see also Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court's discretion to deny leave to amend is ‘particularly broad' where the plaintiff has previously amended.” (citation omitted)).

The unjust-enrichment claims fall into a different category, as the Court will dismiss them for a different reason than before. In the Prior Order, the Court dismissed those claims because Plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege that they were entitled to pursue any equitable remedies. In this Order, however, the Court will dismiss those claims because Plaintiffs do not oppose two of Defendants' arguments and accordingly concede the point. Under these circumstances, the Court will not permit leave to amend. Cf. Kamath v. Itria Ventures, LLC, No. 23-cv-05153-SVK, 2024 WL 3408218, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2024) (“With respect to Plaintiff's FCA claim, Plaintiff has abandoned that claim, and the Court need not provide leave to amend an abandoned claim.” (citations omitted)).

As for the Court's decision to dismiss the Channel Owners, it does so because the Channel Owners' conduct does not sufficiently tie them, either directly or secondarily, to Google's allegedly wrongful data collection. The Court does not believe that Plaintiffs could cure that deficiency without fundamentally altering their allegations. See, e.g., Friend v. Google LLC, No. 24-cv-03571-SVK, 2025 WL 43561, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2025) (no leave to amend where plaintiff could not plead around deficiency stemming from “fundamental nature” of his claim).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Motion as follows:

. The Court declines to dismiss the privacy claims.

. The Court DISMISSES the unjust-enrichment claims WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

. For purposes of seeking damages, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims arising under the consumer-protection statutes of Indiana, Massachusetts and New Hampshire. For purposes of seeking equitable or injunctive relief, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims arising under the consumer-protection statutes of Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire and Tennessee To the extent that any of these statutes permits a particular form of recovery only upon a showing of loss, injury or damages, Plaintiffs may pursue such recovery only in connection with their alleged loss of privacy. The Court otherwise DISMISSES Plaintiffs' consumer-protection claims to the extent based on any other alleged harm Plaintiffs suffered and to the extent arising under any other state's consumer-protection statutes WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

. The Court DISMISSES all of Plaintiffs' claims to the extent asserted against the Channel Owners WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND

The Parties who remain in this action following the issuance of this Order shall appear for a joint case-management conference on February 11, 2025, and shall file a joint case-management statement on February 4, 2025. The joint case-management statement shall contain a proposed case schedule, and the Parties need not otherwise submit a proposed schedule as directed in the Court's July 18, 2024 order. See Dkt 285.

SO ORDERED.

APPENDIX A

State Claim Alabama Intrusion Upon Seclusion Unjust Enrichment California Violation of Constitutional Right to Privacy Intrusion Upon Seclusion Violation of the Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.) Colorado Intrusion Upon Seclusion Unjust Enrichment Florida Violation of the Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (Fla. Stat. § 501.201 et seq.) Unjust Enrichment Illinois Intrusion Upon Seclusion Violation of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/1 et seq.) Unjust Enrichment Indiana Violation of the Deceptive Consumer Sales Act (Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-0.1 et seq.) Unjust Enrichment 36 State Claim Kansas Intrusion Upon Seclusion Unjust Enrichment Massachusetts Violation of the Consumer Protection Act (Mass. Gen Laws ch. 93 A) Unjust Enrichment Michigan Violation of the Consumer Protection Act (Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.901 et seq.) Unjust Enrichment Mississippi Violation of the Consumer Protection Act (Miss. Code. Ann. § 75-24-1 et seq.) Unjust Enrichment Missouri Intrusion Upon Seclusion Violation of the Merchandising Practices Act (Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.005 et seq.) Unjust Enrichment New Hampshire Intrusion Upon Seclusion Violation of the Consumer Protection Act (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:l et seq.) Unjust Enrichment 37 State Claim New Jersey Intrusion Upon Seclusion Violation of the Consumer Fraud Act (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1 et seq.) Unjust Enrichment New York Unjust Enrichment Oklahoma Intrusion Upon Seclusion Unjust Enrichment Pennsylvania Intrusion Upon Seclusion Violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (73 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 201-1 et seq.) Unjust Enrichment Tennessee Violation of the Consumer Protection Act(Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-101 et seq.) Unjust Enrichment Washington Intrusion Upon Seclusion Violation of the Consumer Protection Act (Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.010 et seq.) Unjust Enrichment