Opinion
No. CV03-0519406S
November 19, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is an action for declaratory judgment brought by the plaintiff, Hartford Casualty Insurance Company, insurer, against the defendant, Beatrice Myers, the insured, and her son, Joseph Myers. The plaintiff seeks a determination that the homeowner's policy (the "Policy") issued to the defendant does not require it to defend or indemnify for an accident involving an all-terrain cycle on a public road. The suit underlying this action was brought on November 21, 2001 in the Waterbury Superior Court by the defendant on behalf of another minor son, Christopher Myers, against Jordan Thomas, his parents and Joseph Myers. The amended complaint in the underlying action, dated April 18, 2002, alleges in pertinent part that Christopher's injuries were caused by the negligent act or omission of Joseph Myers in operating the Honda trike All Terrain Cycle (ATC). Myers' Complaint, Fourth Count, ¶¶ 10, 11, 13.
The parties note that the vehicle in issue is an all-terrain cycle, but both parties discuss the vehicle as an all-terrain vehicle (ATV).
In the declaratory judgment action, the plaintiff has made a motion for summary judgment giving two reasons why it is not required to defend the underlying Waterbury action. First, it claims that the Policy does not cover bodily injuries arising from the operation of an ATV. Second, it states that public policy should preclude coverage as the ATV was stolen.
The pertinent language of the Policy is found in Section II, which obligates the insurer to pay the insured's claim to the liability limit and defend claims against insured for damages due to bodily injury or property damage. See Policy § III — Coverage B — Personal Liability. This duty to defend and indemnify is limited by Section II — Exclusions, which excludes personal liability or medical payments to others due to bodily injury "[a]rising out of: (1) The ownership, maintenance, use, loading, or unloading of motor vehicles or all other motorized land conveyances, including trailers, owned or operated by or rented or loaned to an insured . . . However, there is an exception to this exclusion stating that coverage extends to "[a] motorized land conveyance designed for recreational use off public roads, not subject to motor vehicle registration and: (a) Not owned by an insured. (Emphasis added.) Policy § II(1)(f). The plaintiff's first claim focuses on whether the ATV operated by Joseph Myers is subject to motor vehicle registration satisfying the exception to the motor vehicle exclusion.
"It is the function of the court to construe the provisions of the contract of insurance . . . The interpretation of an insurance policy . . . involves a determination of the intent of the parties as expressed by the language of the policy . . . [including] what coverage the . . . (insured] expected to receive and what the [insurer] was to provide, as disclosed by the provisions of the policy . . ." QSP, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 256 Conn. 343, 351-52 (2001) (quoting Springdale Donuts, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. of Ill., 247 Conn. 801, 805-06, n. 11 (1999)). When performing this analysis to determine if the insurer has a duty to defend the insured, the court must look just to the policy in issue and the factual and legal allegations in the underlying complaint. Cmty. Action for Greater Middlesex County, Inc. v. Am. Alliance Ins. Co., 254 Conn. 387, 398 (2000). If an allegation in the underlying complaint "falls even possibly within the coverage, then the insurance company must defend the insured." QSP, at 353 (citing Moore v. Continental Cas. Co., 252 Conn. 405, 409 (2000)). "On the other hand, if the complaint alleges a liability which the policy does not cover, the insurer is not required to defend." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cmty. Action, 254 Conn. at 399 (quoting Springdale Donuts, 247 Conn. at 807).
In construing the policy, the court "look[s] at the [policy] as a whole, consider[s] all relevant portions together and, if possible, give[s] operative effect to every provision in order to reach a reasonable overall result." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Israel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 503, 509 (2002) (quoting Hansen v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 239 Conn. 537, 545-46 (1996)). However, if upon reading the policy "from the perspective of a reasonable layperson in the position of the purchaser of the policy," and the terms are ambiguous they will be construed in the favor of the insured and against the party responsible for its drafting, the insurer. Id. (quoting Ceci v. National Indemnity Co., 225 Conn. 165, 168 (1993)); Norfolk Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Wysocki, CT Page 13324 45 Conn. Sup. 144, 153, 17 Conn. L. Rptr. 293 (1997) (holding that use of term "motor vehicle" was ambiguous and should be construed against the insurer since it was not defined in the policy and adoption of statutory definition would impact coverage), aff'd per curiam, 243 Conn. 239 (1997). Yet ambiguity does not result from a term having multiple dictionary definitions nor because the parties differ on its meaning. QSP, at 352, n. 11 Cmty. Action, 254 Conn. at 400. Further, where a term in an insurance policy can be interpreted in two ways, courts "adopt the construction that covers the loss." Remington v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 35 Conn. App. 581, 589 (citing Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 203 Conn. 667, 672 (1987)).
Summary judgment is an appropriate procedural step in a suit to determine the duty to defend. The court takes the facts as alleged in the underlying complaint and measures them against the language of the policy. If there is no coverage, it is proper to grant summary judgment. See Tri-Coastal v. Hartford U/W, 981 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Tex. 1998) (stating this rule in summary judgment sought by insurer on duty to defend); Doe v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 667 N.E.2d 1149 (Mass. 1996) (summary judgment based solely on comparison of allegation of civil rights violation and policy).
In considering plaintiff's first claim, the legal and factual allegation in the underlying complaint is that the insured's son caused bodily injury through negligent use of an ATV. Myers' Compl. Fourth Count ¶¶ 10, 11, 13. Turning to the four corners of the Policy, coverage hinges on whether the exception to the motor vehicle exclusion applies. In turn, this relies on whether an ATV is subject to motor vehicle registration in Connecticut.
This particular language excluding certain types of vehicles from coverage in a liability policy and its interplay with the statutory scheme for registering motor vehicle has not been previously considered by Connecticut courts. However, identical policy language has been analyzed by courts of neighboring New England states. In MacLean v. Hingham Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 750 N.E.2d 494 (Mass.App. 2001), the court held that ATVs are not subject to motor vehicle registration. In its analysis, the court considered "language of the exclusion and exception, considered in context of the respective statutes, common understanding and usage, and the risks contemplated by homeowners policies." Id. at 496. Accordingly, the court first determined that ATVs are not motor vehicles under Massachusetts law because motor vehicles must be designed for regular use on the highways. Id. Therefore, ATVs were not subject to the normal statutory process to register a motor vehicle. Id. at 497. However, ATVs were subject to an environmental registration "with the director of the division of law enforcement of the Department of Fisheries, Wildlife and Environmental Law Enforcement . . ." Id.
The MacLean court found further support for the conclusion that ATVs were not subject to motor vehicle registration within the meaning of the insurance policy by looking at "how motor vehicles are commonly understood and used . . ." Id. The court concluded that "certain motorized products, even those capable of speeds exceeding twelve miles per hour, such as tractors or riding lawn mowers, are not motor vehicles because they are not designed for regular use in the transportation of persons and property on the traveled part of public highways." Id. The court placed ATVs within this category along with tractors and riding mowers. Id.
Finally, the MacLean court considered what risks are typically excluded from coverage under a homeowner's policy. The court concluded that the statutorily defined motor vehicles that are used on public highways typically involve more catastrophic loss than ATVs. Id. "Therefore, speaking broadly, risks associated with the operation of a [statutorily defined] "motor vehicle" . . . are specifically covered by a motor vehicle liability policy. In contrast ATVs . . . are not subject to motor vehicle insurance requirements . . . and would fall within the purview of a homeowner's policy." Id.
The Vermont Supreme Court in Concord General Mut. Ins. Co. v. Woods, 824 A.2d 572, 576 (Vt. 2003), held that the ATV in issue was not subject to motor vehicle registration. Concord argued that the ATVs are subject to motor vehicle registration because the Vermont statute requires the registration be obtained from the commissioner of motor vehicles. Id. at 575. However, the court rejected this argument because ATVs were explicitly excluded from Vermont's statutory definition of motor vehicles. Id. In addition, the court rejected Concord's broader interpretation of motor vehicle registration because the policy's use of the word registration invokes a statutorily created and controlled process, therefore resorting to the common usage would be inappropriate. Id. at 577. The plaintiff here attempts to distinguish Concord on the ground that the ATV was not subject to registration because at the time of accident it was being operated on the insured's property and therefore not subject to registration under Vermont law. Id. at 576.
The plaintiff's Policy does not define the relevant terms and therefore the court's analysis, like that of MacLean, must begin by turning to the statutory definition of "motor vehicle." The General Statutes define a motor vehicle to include "any vehicle propelled . . . by any nonmuscular power" but excludes any "vehicle not suitable for operation on a highway." General Statutes § 14-1(a)(47) (2002). This broadly worded definition does not include ATVs, which are separately defined as vehicles "determined by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to be unsuitable for operation on the public highways . . ." General Statutes § 14-379 (2002). See also Wysocki, 45 Conn. Sup. at 150 (concluding that an ATV does not come within the statutory definition of a motor vehicle). Furthermore, the statutory definition of ATVs goes on to explicitly preclude them from registration as a motor vehicle under § 14-12. General Statutes § 14-379 (2002).
G.S. § 14-379 (2002) defines an ATV as "a self-propelled vehicle designed to travel over unimproved terrain and which has been determined by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to be unsuitable for operation on the public highways which is not eligible for registration under chapter 246 . . ." G.S. § 14-1(a)(47) (2002) defines a motor vehicle as "any vehicle propelled or drawn by any nonmuscular power, except aircraft, motor boats, . . . and any other vehicle not suitable for operation on a highway." See generally G.S. § 14-12 (2002) (describing the registration process for motor vehicles).
The plaintiff argues, further, that the exception to the exclusion does not apply because Section 14-380 of the General Statutes separately requires ATVs to be registered with the commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). The plaintiff argues in contradistinction to MacLean that General Statutes § 14-380 requires ATVs used off the owner's premises to be registered with the commissioner of the DMV and not the Department of Fisheries, Wildlife and Environmental Law Enforcement. Furthermore, the DMV is responsible for administering and maintaining ATV registrations. The plaintiff urges that this role of the DMV in ATV registration makes the ATV subject to motor vehicle registration within the meaning of the Policy.
G.S. § 14-380 requires that "[o]n or after October 1, 1971, no person shall operate and no owner shall permit the operation of any snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle unless the owner holds a valid, effective registration awarded by this state or by another state or by the United States, provided such state or district of registration grants substantially similar privileges for snowmobiles or all-terrain vehicles owned by residents of this state and registered under its laws . . . The provisions of this section shall not apply (1) to the operation of a snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle on premises owned or leased by the owner of such snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle . . ."
The plaintiff's interpretation was squarely rejected, albeit in dicta, by the Woods court because, as in Connecticut, ATVs are not included in the statutory definition of motor vehicles. Furthermore, construing the Policy's language to make it hinge on the administrative agency to which a registration is sent is the type of tortured interpretation that the courts have warned against. See Cmty. Action., 254 Conn. at 399-400 (stating that "the policy words must be accorded their natural and ordinary meaning . . . [and] construed from the perspective of a reasonable lay person in the position of the purchaser of the policy."). One could easily image the odd results that would follow from such an interpretation. For example, to follow the plaintiff's argument, were the Department of Revenue Services made the regulatory agency, then ATVs would no longer be subject to "motor vehicle registration" but to revenue services registration, and injuries arising from ATV accidents would now be covered under homeowner's policies.
Additionally, plaintiff's distinction from MacLean addresses only part of the court's holding. The MacLean court's decision did not rest solely on the differing termini of a vehicle registration, but buttressed its conclusion based on its perception of the common understanding of "motor vehicle" and the risks meant to be insured in a homeowner's policy. Connecticut like Massachusetts defines a "motor vehicle" based on the requirement that it be operable on a highway. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that Connecticut would commonly understand motor vehicles differently from the Massachusetts lawmakers. Furthermore, as in Massachusetts, ATVs are not subject in Connecticut to motor vehicle insurance. See General Statutes § 38a-334(a) (2002). Therefore, the insurance of the risk associated with ATV usage would likely fall under homeowners policies without risk of duplicative coverage. Cf. U.S.A.A. Property and Cas. Ins. v. McKeever, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, CV 92 51968S (August 8, 1995, Klaczak, J.) ( 14 Conn. L. Rptr. 588) (rejecting coverage of a claim under homeowners insurance because it arose out of an automobile accident and would duplicate coverage under compulsory automobile insurance harming consumers by raising homeowners insurance premiums without a commensurate decrease in automobile insurance premiums).
In rejecting plaintiff's interpretation of "motor vehicle registration," the court must be mindful of resolving the resulting ambiguities in favor of the insured and adopting the construction that covers the loss. Wysocki, 45 Conn. Sup. at 153; Remington, 35 Conn. App. at 589. The present case devolves into a situation similar to that encountered by the Wysocki court, supra. In Wysocki, the defendant sought coverage under the uninsured motorist provision of his and his mother's insurance policies for an accident that occurred between two ATVs. 45 Conn. Sup. at 145. The policies contained exclusionary provisions that would block recovery if defendant was in his own motor vehicle at the time of the accident. Id. at 152. However, the term "motor vehicle" was not defined within the insurance policy. Id. at 153. If the statutory definition of "motor vehicle" were applied, then the ATV would be included and the policy's exclusionary provision would not apply. Id. However, if the statutory definition did not apply the provision would be ambiguous and as such would be construed against the insurer. Id.
Likewise here neither "motor vehicle" nor "motor vehicle registration" are defined in the Policy. If the statutory definitions of these terms are used, then the exception to the motor vehicle exclusion would apply and the defendant would be covered. However, if the statutory definitions are not applied and the plaintiff's broader definition of motor vehicle registration applies, the language is ambiguous and should be resolved against the plaintiff insurer.
The plaintiff's second claim that public policy precludes the extension of coverage is as unavailing as its first. The plaintiff argues that if the ATV were owned by the insured and operated off-premises, there would not be coverage, and therefore it is illogical for the insured to be rewarded for stealing the ATV by extending coverage. Before embarking on an evaluation of plaintiff's substantive claim, it must be remembered that a court looks only to the language of the policy and the legal and factual allegations of the underlying complaint when considering an insurer's duty to defend. Cmty. Action, 254 Conn. at 398. In the underlying complaint there is no mention that the ATV in question was stolen.
However, even if the court considers facts outside the underlying complaint, Connecticut courts have not expressed such a public policy relating to theft, particularly when the injury was not caused by the criminal act. The illegal act did not cause the defendant's son's injuries. In Becker v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 83 N.W.2d 499, 500 (Wis.App. 1998), the Wisconsin Court of Appeals considered applying a public policy exclusion to the insured's coverage in a factual scenario similar to the instant case. To avoid individuals profiting from their wrongdoing and to deter crime, Wisconsin courts read into each insurance contract an exclusion when damages are intentionally caused by the insured. In Becker a group of high school students, including the insured, who were not licensed to drive, took a car of their parents without permission and proceeded to drive recklessly resulting in the death of the insured and injury to the plaintiff. Id. at 499-500. The defendant, insurance company, sought to avoid coverage for plaintiff's injuries based on the common-law exclusion. Id. at 500. However, the court rejected this argument because the insured's reckless driving caused the injury, and not the criminal acts (driving without a license, using a vehicle without a license and transporting stolen beer). Id. at 501. As here, the theft played no role in Joseph Myers' alleged negligence.
Since the plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the motion for summary judgment is denied.
So ordered.
HENRY S. COHN, JUDGE.