Summary
finding that "whether or not [plaintiff's relevance arguments] are well-founded, [p]laintiff has no standing to move to quash" subpoena against nonparty
Summary of this case from Schaumleffel v. Muskingum Univ.Opinion
Civil Action 2:05-cv-876.
February 6, 2009
ORDER
This matter is before the Court pursuant to Plaintiff's Motion to Quash Subpoenas Issued by Defendants Auto-Owners Insurance and Owners Insurance to Thompson-Cunningham Insurance and Motorists Mutual Insurance Company (Doc. 161). Plaintiff, as the caption of his motion indicates, seeks to quash subpoenas issued by Defendants upon two third parties.
Rule 45(c)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part:
(3) Quashing or Modifying a Subpoena.
(A) When Required. On timely motion, the issuing court must quash or modify a subpoena that:
(i) fails to allow a reasonable time to comply; [. . .]
(iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies; or
(iv) subjects a person to undue burden.
Rule 45(c) is intended to protect nonparties to litigation from, in effect, suffering inconvenience or expense from having to participate in someone else's quarrel. It allows a party served with a subpoena to ask the issuing court to relieve it from the burden of having to comply with a demand which might be difficult or impossible to obey, or which might subject the respondent, if it were to comply, to liability to another person for violating a privilege.
The movant here, however, is not the party which was served with the subpoena. In Donahoo v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services, 211 F.R.D. 303 (N.D. Ohio 2002), a terminated employee sued his former employer for race discrimination and retaliation. In this course of this litigation, he served three subpoenas upon nonparty witnesses. Defendant moved to quash these subpoenas on the basis that the testimony of these witnesses was not relevant. The Court, despite finding that the subpoenas did not allow a reasonable time for compliance, nevertheless denied the defendant's motion to quash, holding that it did not have standing to challenge subpoenas issued to nonparties.
The law is clear, absent a claim of privilege, a party has no standing to challenge a subpoena to a nonparty. See Clayton Brokerage Co., Inc. of St. Louis v. Clement, 87 F.R.D. 569, 571 (D.C. Md. 1980) (citation omitted). The party to whom the subpoena is directed is the only party with standing to oppose it. See U.S. v. Tomison, 969 F.Supp. 587, 591-592 (E.D. Cal. 1997). Thus, Defendant Ohio Department of Youth Services, a party, does not have standing to challenge the subpoenas served upon the three nonparty witnesses in the instant case, and for that reason Defendant's motion to Quash is without merit.Donahoo, 211 F.R.D. at 306.
The only basis for Plaintiff to have standing to move to quash Defendants' subpoenas served upon the two nonparties would be a claim of some sort of personal right or privilege. See, Nova Products, Inc. v. Kisma Video, Inc., 220 F.R.D. 238, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Brown v. Braddick, 595 F.2d 961, 967 (5th Cir. 1979). Courts have identified some such rights and privileges. See, e.g., Schmulovich v. 1161 Route 9, LLC, 2007 WL 2362598 (D.N.J. 2007) (personal bank records); Richards v. Convergys Corp., 2007 WL 474012 (D.Utah 2007) (information in personnel file); Transcor, Inc. v. Furney Charters, 212 F.R.D. 588 (D.Kan. 2003) (corporate bank records); Catskill Dev., LLC v. Park Place Entertainment Corp., 206 F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (Indian tribal records).
Plaintiff has not asserted that he has any recognized privilege in the records sought. He has made bald statements that the material demanded "is pertaining to matters personal to the Plaintiff" and "relates exclusively to Plaintiff's personal and private matters". (Doc. 168 at 3.) That papers are personal, or even confidential, is not in itself grounds for quashing a subpoena. Plaintiff claims that "Defendants are seeking disclosure of information that would otherwise not be available to them." (Id.) This is, of course, the point of discovery. Plaintiff has not, however, stated with any particularity why the documents requested are of such a nature that they should never become available to Defendants at all.
Movant has also argued that the information sought is not relevant to the issues remaining in this case, even going so far as to suggest that Defendants should be sanctioned for having made such requests. (Doc. 168 at 2-3.) He also states, producing correspondence from one respondent to Defendants' counsel, that the requests are unduly burdensome. (Doc. 168 at 5.) Whether or not these arguments are well-founded, Plaintiff has no standing to move to quash. The Court will not examine the merits of relief which it has no power under Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 45(c)(3) to grant.
Therefore, accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to Quash (Doc. 161) is DENIED. Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), Rule 72(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. and Eastern Division Order No. 91-3, pt. F, 5, either party may, within ten (10) days after this Order is filed, file and serve on the opposing party a motion for reconsideration by the District Judge. The motion must specifically designate the order, or part thereof, in question and the basis for any objection thereto. The District Judge, upon consideration of the motion, shall set aside any part of this Order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.