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Friedlander v. Nims

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
Mar 19, 1985
755 F.2d 810 (11th Cir. 1985)

Summary

holding that dismissal with prejudice was not an abuse of discretion when the court gave the pro se plaintiff a chance to amend

Summary of this case from Moody v. Shoultes

Opinion

No. 84-8110.

March 19, 1985.

Edward L. Greenblatt, Lipshultz, Frankel, Greenblatt, King Cohen, Atlanta, Ga., Henry A. Brachtl, Richard B. Dannenberg, Lowey, Dannenberg Knapp, New York City, for Herman Friedlander, etc., et al.

Richard Sinkfield, Rogers Hardin, C.B. Rogers, Janice E. Garlitz, Atlanta, Ga., for J.C. Nims and Lo.

Kent E. Mast, Hansell, Post, Brandon Dorsey, Atlanta, Ga., Ralph J. Savarese, Gaspare J. Bono, Jean M. Allison, Howrey Simon, Washington, D.C., Kent E. Mast, Richard M. Kirby, Hansell Post, Atlanta, Ga., for Timex.

Oscar Persons, Atlanta, Ga., for Nimslo, et al.

Thornton W. Morris, Atlanta, Ga., for Bostic.

Emmet J. Bondurant, II, Trotter, Bondurant, Miller Hishon, Atlanta, Ga., for Seifert.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before VANCE and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and PITTMAN, District Judge.

Honorable Virgil Pittman, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Alabama sitting by designation.


Appellant Friedlander contends that the district court erred in granting defendant Timex's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for failure to plead fraud with particularity as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). Because we find that appellant deliberately chose to forego his opportunity to cure the defects of his complaint despite specific and repeated warnings from the trial judge that such amendment was necessary to avoid dismissal, we affirm.

Friedlander brought this class action on behalf of the minority shareholders of Nimslo Technology, Inc. (Nimslo) alleging that Timex and several other corporations and individuals entered into a conspiracy to "freeze out" Nimslo's minority shareholders at an unconscionably unfair price through fraud and deception. Fred Olsen and James Davidson, who are controlling shareholders and officers of Timex, were among the individuals named as defendants. The complaint contained four counts, only three of which pertained to Timex. Those counts alleged violations of (1) Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; (2) section 12(d) of the Georgia Securities Act, O.C. G.A. § 10-5-12(d); and (3) various sections of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1961-68. Timex responded to the complaint with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, for failure to plead fraud with particularity as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b).

At the hearing on Timex's motion, the district court specifically expressed concern over "whether Timex [was] properly in the case." On several occasions during appellant's argument on the motion, the court asked why the complaint did not allege specifically that Olsen's and Davidson's acts were undertaken on behalf of Timex. Each time counsel responded, in essence, that it was a mere oversight which could easily be corrected if the court granted leave to amend. Typical of these exchanges is the following:

At this hearing the court also heard arguments on Friedlander's motion for class certification.

THE COURT: Why then — I mean if these are your contentions, why didn't you allege in your complaint that Mr. Olsen was acting on behalf of Timex?

MR. DANNENBERG: Just error of the scrivener, your honor. We tried to draw a very careful complaint and we were not perfect. Yes, I would have preferred if I were arguing before you today, as I am, that that clause be in there but it's not there, but that was our intention and certainly at the outset of the case, if you were to grant us leave, I would spell these details out even further.

Later during appellant's argument, the district judge made it clear that he felt some amendment was necessary and stated, "I'm not satisfied that those bare allegations are sufficient to hold a corporation [liable]." The judge was even more specific during Timex's rebuttal and after stating that he thought Friedlander "could state a claim" against Timex, he admonished appellant's counsel that "I don't believe that Mr. Olsen's activities are necessarily attributable to Timex unless they are properly plead [sic] to be."

At the close of argument on the motion, the district judge indicated without ruling that his initial conclusion was that Timex was not properly in the case, but he was also inclined to give Friedlander an opportunity to amend the complaint. He cautioned Friedlander against recklessly alleging facts just to keep Timex in the case, warning that appropriate sanctions would follow such conduct. Not surprisingly, the court's subsequent order granted Timex's motion to dismiss subject to Friedlander's right to amend the complaint within fifteen days. Friedlander v. Nims, 571 F. Supp. 1188, 1199 (N.D.Ga. 1983). The order stated that the court was granting Timex's motion because the complaint failed to state a cause of action against Timex. It further stated that even if the complaint had stated a cause of action against Timex the court would have granted the motion for failure to plead fraud with particularity as required by rule 9(b). In granting Friedlander an opportunity to amend, the district judge reminded counsel of the requirements of rule 11 and reiterated that sanctions would be imposed for false pleadings. Id. at 1194-95. Friedlander, apparently after re-evaluating his original complaint in light of the court's order, determined that it adequately stated a 10b-5 claim against Timex and chose to forego his opportunity to amend. He contends in this appeal that the district court erred in finding that his original complaint failed to state a 10b-5 claim against Timex.

Friedlander chose not to appeal the district court's dismissal of the Georgia securities law and RICO claims.

We are reluctant to approve rule 12(b)(6) dismissals in light of the well-established rule that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (footnote omitted); McKinnis v. Mosely, 693 F.2d 1054, 1058 (11th Cir. 1982). Our strict adherence to this rule has led us to hold that a district court should give a plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint rather than dismiss it when it appears that a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Investment Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 597-99 (5th Cir. 1981); Sarter v. Mays, 491 F.2d 675, 676 (5th Cir. 1974). This is precisely the situation the district court below faced. The court not only gave Friedlander the opportunity to amend, but even told Friedlander the deficiency in the complaint and how it could be remedied. The district court therefore properly granted Friedlander the opportunity to amend his complaint once it determined that the original complaint was deficient.

We are well aware of the potential conflict that exists between the concept of "notice pleading" which is embodied in Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 and the particularity requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). The federal rules governing pleading were designed to "reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). In seeming contrast to this, rule 9(b) requires that "[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). The particularity rule serves several purposes. See Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 431 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 636 F.2d 1201 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 636 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 636 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1980). Its clear intent is to eliminate fraud actions in which all the facts are learned through discovery after the complaint is filed. See Elster v. Alexander, 75 F.R.D. 458, 461 (N.D. Ga. 1977). Rule 9(b) must not be read to abrogate rule 8, however, and a court considering a motion to dismiss for failure to plead fraud with particularity should always be careful to harmonize the directives of rule 9(b) with the broader policy of notice pleading. See Zuckerman v. Franz, 573 F. Supp. 351, 356 (S.D.Fla. 1983); Xaphes v. Shearson, Hayden, Stone, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 882, 887 (S.D.Fla. 1981).

While Friedlander made no formal request to amend pursuant to rule 15(a), he made an oral request at the hearing. Further, the judge's comments at the close of the hearing on the motion certainly alerted both sides that he was considering allowing Friedlander the opportunity to amend.

A district court may dismiss a case for failure to comply with the pleading rules. Although this is a severe sanction, its imposition is justified when a party chooses to disregard the sound and proper directions of the district court. See, e.g., Maddox v. Shroyer, 302 F.2d 903, 904 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 825, 83 S.Ct. 45, 9 L.Ed.2d 64 (1962) (affirming dismissal of complaint after plaintiff's refusal to amend despite the trial court's instruction that amendment was necessary to avoid dismissal); see also Hyler v. Reynolds Metal Company, 434 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 912, 91 S.Ct. 2219, 29 L.Ed.2d 689 (1971) (affirming dismissal of complaint for refusal to amend despite specific instructions to do so and for failure to appear at the pre-trial conference). It is difficult to imagine how the district court could have been more explicit in expressing its concern over the complaint's deficiencies and in recommending the changes necessary to correct them. Friedlander acknowledges that he does not specifically allege anywhere in his detailed, forty-five page complaint that Olsen's actions were within the scope of his employment or for the benefit of Timex. He also acknowledges that the district court repeatedly raised this issue and asked for an explanation at the hearing on Timex's motion for dismissal. Friedlander's counsel offered at the hearing to amend the complaint to include these allegations. When given the opportunity to amend, however, Friedlander chose not to do so. Without deciding whether we would reach the same result had this complaint been dismissed without a hearing and an opportunity to amend, we find that under the circumstances the district court did not err in granting Timex's motion.

In brief and at oral argument before this court Friedlander asserted that he chose not to amend the complaint because any such attempt would have been futile. According to Friedlander, even if he had amended the complaint to allege that Olsen was acting within the scope of his employment, the district court's order indicates that the court still would have dismissed the complaint. We find this argument totally unpersuasive in light of the district court's exchange with counsel at argument on the motion and in light of our reading of the district court order. Friedlander also asserts that he was somewhat reluctant to amend the complaint because the court intimidated him by reminding him of the basis in fact requirement of rule 11 and warning that sanctions would follow if the complaint were amended falsely or recklessly. Without expressly endorsing the warnings, we find that the district court's statements do not justify the failure to amend the complaint.

Because of our reluctance to dismiss complaints for failure to state a claim, we cannot say that our decision would be the same had the district court dismissed this complaint without pointing out the specific deficiencies in the complaint and giving Friedlander the opportunity to amend. Since Friedlander has had an opportunity to amend and failed to do so, however, we are unwilling to disturb the district court's ruling.

AFFIRMED.


Summaries of

Friedlander v. Nims

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
Mar 19, 1985
755 F.2d 810 (11th Cir. 1985)

holding that dismissal with prejudice was not an abuse of discretion when the court gave the pro se plaintiff a chance to amend

Summary of this case from Moody v. Shoultes

holding that dismissal with prejudice was not an abuse of discretion when the court gave the pro se plaintiff a chance to amend

Summary of this case from Moody v. Shoultes

holding that dismissal with prejudice was not an abuse of discretion when the court gave the plaintiff a chance to amend

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concluding that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate where the district court gave "specific and repeated warnings," which went ignored by the plaintiff, that the complaint required amendment

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concluding that although Rule 9(b) dismissal is "severe sanction," plaintiff's decision to ignore court's "sound and proper" recommendations about how to correct pleading deficiencies concerning scope of employee's authority warranted dismissal

Summary of this case from U.S. ex Rel. Clausen v. Laboratory Corp.

concluding that although a Rule 9(b) dismissal is a "severe sanction," plaintiff's decision to ignore the court's "sound and proper" recommendations about how to correct the pleading deficiencies concerning the scope of an employee's authority warranted dismissal

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concluding that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate given the district court's "specific and repeated warnings," that the complaint required amendment

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concluding that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate where the district court gave "specific and repeated warnings" that the complaint required amendment

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concluding that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate where the district court gave "specific and repeated warnings," that the complaint required amendment that went ignored by the plaintiff

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affirming dismissal where "[t]he court not only gave [the plaintiff] the opportunity to amend, but even told [him] the deficiency in the complaint and how it could be remedied"

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affirming dismissal where "[t]he court not only gave [the plaintiff] the opportunity to amend, but even told [him] the deficiency in the complaint and how it could be remedied"

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stating that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate where district court gave "specific and repeated warnings" that amendment was necessary

Summary of this case from Skyles v. McCoy

stating that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate where district court gave "specific and repeated warnings" that amendment was necessary

Summary of this case from Bryant v. Dupree

In Friedlander v. Nims, 755 F.2d 810 (11th Cir. 1985), during a hearing the district judge indicated several times to plaintiff's counsel that the complaint was deficient with regard to one defendant and recommended appropriate changes.

Summary of this case from Bank v. Pitt

In Friedlander, a corporation's management "decided to effect a series of transactions that ended with the minority shareholders being hopelessly frozen out of continued participation in the company."

Summary of this case from Siegmund v. Bian

stating that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate [for pro se litigants] where the district court gave "specific and repeated warnings" that amendment was necessary

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stating that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate [for pro se litigants] where the district court gave "specific and repeated warnings" that amendment was necessary

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stating that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate where district court gave ‘specific and repeated warnings' that amendment was necessary

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stating that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate where district courtgave 'specific and repeated warnings' that amendment was necessary

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applying Rule 9(b) to an allegation of conspiracy to defraud

Summary of this case from U.S. v. Gericare Medical Supply, Inc.

stating that Rule 9(b) must not be read to abrogate the notice pleading requirements of Rule 8

Summary of this case from Florida Dept. Ins. v. Debenture Guar.

In Friedlander v. Nims, 755 F.2d 810 (11th Cir. 1985), the Eleventh Circuit stated that the intent behind Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) "is to eliminate fraud actions in which all the facts are learned through discovery after the complaint is filed."

Summary of this case from Capital Factors, Inc. v. Heller Financial

In Friedlander v. Nims, 755 F.2d 810 (11th Cir. 1985), during a hearing the district judge indicated several times to plaintiff's counsel that the complaint was deficient with regard to one defendant and recommended appropriate changes.

Summary of this case from In re Weichman

In Friedlander v. Nims, 755 F.2d 810 (11th Cir.1985), during a hearing the district judge indicated several times to plaintiff's counsel that the complaint was deficient with regard to one defendant and recommended appropriate changes.

Summary of this case from In re Young
Case details for

Friedlander v. Nims

Case Details

Full title:HERMAN FRIEDLANDER, ETC., ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, CROSS-APPELLEES…

Court:United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

Date published: Mar 19, 1985

Citations

755 F.2d 810 (11th Cir. 1985)

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