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Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson

Supreme Court of Texas
Feb 25, 2005
157 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2005)

Summary

holding that post-termination conduct including refusing to give plaintiff a reference letter, declining to take reference calls on plaintiff's behalf during business hours, and instructing another employee to evict plaintiff did not constitute “extreme and outrageous” conduct, and noting that “except in circumstances bordering on serious criminal acts ... such acts will rarely have merit as intentional infliction claims.”

Summary of this case from Jones v. Dall. Cnty.

Opinion

No. 02-1076.

Argued October 19, 2004.

Decided February 25, 2005.

Appeal from the 17th District Court, Tarrant County, Fred W. Davis, J.

Ralph C. Perry-Miller, Vial Hamilton Koch Knox, LLP, Marlow James Muldoon, Perry-Miller Associates, P.C., Dallas, for petitioners.

Nathan Butler Schattman, E. David Fielding, Fielding Parker Beck, L.L.P., Fort Worth, for respondent.


For the tenth time in little more than six years, we must reverse an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim for failing to meet the exacting requirements of that tort.

See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 441 (Tex. 2004); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola, 121 S.W.3d 735, 737 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam); Tiller v. McLure, 121 S.W.3d 709, 710-11 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam); Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Cos. v. Sears, 84 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. 2002); Bradford v. Vento, 48 S.W.3d 749, 751-52 (Tex. 2001); City of Midland v. O'Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 211 (Tex. 2000); Brewerton v. Dalrymple, 997 S.W.2d 212, 213-14 (Tex. 1999); Standard Fruit Vegetable Co. v. Johnson, 985 S.W.2d 62, 63 (Tex. 1998); Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Franco, 971 S.W.2d 52, 53 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam).

Denise Jackson filed suit against Creditwatch, Inc. and its chief executive officer, Harold E. "Skip" Quant, on June 17, 1996. Initially, she alleged numerous acts of sexual harassment in violation of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA), but withdrew those claims when the defendants moved for summary judgment based on limitations.

Jackson's suit was joined by Brenda Simcox, and later by Terri Blevins, both Creditwatch employees asserting similar claims. After the trial court granted summary judgment on Jackson's claims, the other employees' claims were settled during trial.

See Tex. Lab. Code §§ 21.001-.556.

See id. § 21.202 (requiring administrative complaint to be filed within 180 days of occurrence); Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. DeMoranville, 933 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) (holding failure to file timely administrative complaint bars suit).

In her amended complaint, Jackson alleged only an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, still based on Quant's sexual advances and on retaliatory conduct allegedly continuing even after her termination on January 3, 1995. The defendants continued to press their motion for summary judgment, asserting the sole remaining claim was barred by (1) preemption, (2) limitations, and (3) no evidence of outrageous conduct. The trial court granted the motion, and Jackson appealed.

The court of appeals (one justice dissenting) affirmed the summary judgment as to pre-termination conduct, holding Jackson's affidavits described an "unpleasant and uncomfortable" workplace but not "the ring of hell" required to establish an intentional infliction claim. But the court reversed and remanded for trial her infliction claim based on post-termination conduct. Applying the usual standard of review, we reverse for two of the reasons stated in the defendants' motion.

Id. at 407-08.

See Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 290 n. 137 (Tex. 2004) (citing Provident Life Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215-16 (Tex. 2003) (reviewing summary judgment de novo, viewing all evidence in nonmovant's favor to see if no genuine issue of material fact exists and movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law)).

On the third, limitations, the court of appeals held Quant's acts more than two years before suit could not form the basis for damages, but were admissible as "background and context." 84 S.W.3d at 405. As the defendants do not appeal that ruling, we do not reach the court of appeals' invocation of the "continuing tort doctrine," a doctrine we have neither endorsed nor addressed, but that has been used by some courts of appeals to toll limitations until the last act of intentional infliction occurs. See Toles v. Toles, 45 S.W.3d 252, 262 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied); Newton v. Newton, 895 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ); Twyman v. Twyman, 790 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Tex.App.-Austin 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993).

First, assuming the court of appeals is correct that nothing in the TCHRA preempts other common-law causes of action, the tort involved here nevertheless has its own boundaries. As we recently reiterated, intentional infliction of emotional distress is a "gap-filler" tort never intended to supplant or duplicate existing statutory or common-law remedies. Even if other remedies do not explicitly preempt the tort, their availability leaves no gap to fill.

Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d at 447.

Here, Jackson's complaints all stemmed from Quant's lewd advances, including the subsequent retaliation that often follows when offensive advances are refused. Jackson suggests no other reason for Quant's actions. As her complaints are covered by other statutory remedies, she cannot assert them as intentional infliction claims just because those avenues may now be barred.

See id. at 448-49.

Id. at 447.

Second, we disagree with the court of appeals' conclusion that some of the defendants' post-termination actions were sufficiently outrageous to constitute intentional infliction. It is for the court to determine in the first instance whether conduct is extreme and outrageous, and such claims are submitted to a jury only when reasonable minds may differ. Even assuming the acts alleged here were independent of Jackson's sexual harassment claims, they do not rise to the level necessary to establish the tort.

Id. at 445; GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 616 (Tex. 1999).

See Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d at 448-49 (expressing skepticism but not deciding whether subsequent retaliatory acts were independent of sexual harassment claim).

The court of appeals recognized that intentional infliction claims do not extend to ordinary employment disputes, but concluded that such disputes end upon termination. But some employment disputes are not so easily ended. As a result, while post-termination conduct may constitute intentional infliction if it goes "beyond all possible bounds of decency," "ordinary" post-termination disputes are insufficient to support liability.

84 S.W.3d at 405-06; see also GTE Southwest, 998 S.W.2d at 612-13.

See Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Cos. v. Sears, 84 S.W.3d 604, 612 (Tex. 2002) (holding employer's post-termination reports about employee to federal and state agencies insufficient to establish intentional infliction absent proof that employer violated any laws or knew reports were false); Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 735-36 (Tex. 1993) (holding that having security guard escort terminated employee from premises insufficient to establish intentional infliction).

Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d at 445 (citing Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1993)) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (1965)).

Sears, 84 S.W.3d at 611; see also Wornick, 856 S.W.2d at 735 (holdings acts within legal rights cannot constitute outrageous behavior).

Here, Jackson alleged that Quant refused to give her a reference letter, and other Creditwatch employees declined to take reference calls on her behalf during business hours. She also complains of a company-wide email stating a general policy forbidding employees to contact ex-employees. Even assuming all of these actions were the result of a vendetta directed at Jackson, we hold this post-termination conduct is legally insufficient.

See Sears, 84 S.W.3d at 612 (holding personal vendetta insufficient to constitute intentional infliction if act taken was not outrageous); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. g ("The actor is never liable, for example, where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal rights in a permissible way, even though he is well aware that such insistence is certain to cause emotional distress.").

Finally, the court of appeals reversed based on a post-termination eviction allegedly orchestrated by Creditwatch. Shortly before her termination, Jackson had moved out of corporate housing due to financial difficulties, and into the home of another Creditwatch manager, Terri Blevins, who provided shelter gratis. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Jackson, two months after the termination Quant told Blevins to evict Jackson, and implied that Blevins' own job was in jeopardy if she did not. Blevins complied, and Jackson moved elsewhere the next day.

Assuming all this is true, it was callous, meddlesome, mean-spirited, officious, overbearing, and vindictive — but not "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Roommates — sadly, even family members — may find mutual living arrangements unsuitable, and juries generally need not decide which evictions are tortious absent conditions much more "intolerable" than those involved here. Moreover, Texas law already recognizes claims for wrongful eviction and tortious interference with contract, neither of which allow mental anguish damages. Intentional infliction claims cannot be used "to circumvent the limitations placed on the recovery of mental anguish damages under more established tort doctrines." Accordingly, we hold Jackson may not assert such a claim here.

Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d at 445 (citing Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 621) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d).

See Tex. Prop. Code § 92.0081 (providing for lockout damages of one month's rent plus $500, actual damages, court costs, and reasonable attorney's fees); Am. Nat'l Petroleum Co. v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 798 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex. 1990) (holding damages for tortious interference with contract are the same as damages for breach of contract interfered with, thus putting claimant in same economic position as if contract had been performed).

Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d at 447 (quoting Standard Fruit Vegetable Co. v. Johnson, 985 S.W.2d 62, 68 (Tex. 1998)).

* * *

We certainly understand judicial reticence to dismiss claims like this one stemming from heinous acts. But except in circumstances bordering on serious criminal acts, we repeat that such acts will rarely have merit as intentional infliction claims.

See, e.g., Morgan v. Anthony, 27 S.W.3d 928, 930-31 (Tex. 2000); GTE Southwest v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 613-14, 617 (Tex. 1999).

This tort was never intended as an easier and broader way to pursue claims already protected by our expanding civil and criminal laws. If the tort is to remain viable where "gaps" still remain, litigants and judges cannot entertain it as a catchall that avoids the careful balancing behind alternate legal claims.

Accordingly, we reverse that part of the court of appeals' judgment remanding Jackson's claims, and render judgment that she take nothing.


Summaries of

Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson

Supreme Court of Texas
Feb 25, 2005
157 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2005)

holding that post-termination conduct including refusing to give plaintiff a reference letter, declining to take reference calls on plaintiff's behalf during business hours, and instructing another employee to evict plaintiff did not constitute “extreme and outrageous” conduct, and noting that “except in circumstances bordering on serious criminal acts ... such acts will rarely have merit as intentional infliction claims.”

Summary of this case from Jones v. Dall. Cnty.

holding that statutory remedies for sexual harassment precluded emotional distress claim

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holding similar post-termination conduct legally insufficient to support intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress liability

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holding that IIED claims "cannot be used to 'circumvent the limitations placed on the recovery of mental anguish damages under more established tort doctrines'" and that "[t]his tort was never intended as an easier and broader way to pursue claims already protected by our expanding civil and criminal laws"

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finding a plaintiff cannot bring a claim against employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress where the plaintiff could rely on a statutory provision or other recognized tort claim against his employer based on the same conduct

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finding that a plaintiff may not assert a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on a supervisor's harassment because her complaints were covered by a state antidiscrimination statute

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finding "intentional infliction claims do not extend to ordinary employment disputes"

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dismissing a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on a supervisor's alleged sexual advances and retaliatory conduct because even if true, the conduct “was callous, meddlesome, mean-spirited, officious, overbearing, and vindictive-but not so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”

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noting that tortious interference with contract claims do not allow mental anguish damages

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In Creditwatch, the Texas Supreme Court stated in passing that "Texas law already recognizes claims for wrongful eviction and tortious interference with contract, neither of which allow mental anguish damages."

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In Creditwatch, the Texas Supreme Court again held unequivocally that where a plaintiff's "complaints are covered by other statutory remedies, she cannot assert them as intentional infliction claims...."

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In Creditwatch, the existence of statutory remedies precluded the plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress even though her statutory claims were time-barred.

Summary of this case from Brandon v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc.

In Creditwatch, Jackson sued Creditwatch and its CEO Harold Quant, initially alleging numerous acts of sexual harassment in violation of the TCHRA but withdrawing those claims to allege only an IIED claim against both defendants based on Quant's sexual advances.

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In Creditwatch, neither side presented to the Texas Supreme Court the issue of whether an IIED claim against a supervisor-harasser should be treated differently from one against an employer when the employee sues both the employer and supervisor.

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noting that when plaintiff's complaints fall within the purview of other legal remedies, plaintiff cannot assert an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim merely because those other avenues of relief are barred

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stating that "Texas law already recognizes claims for wrongful eviction and tortious interference with contract, neither of which allow mental anguish damages," and plaintiff could not circumvent that restriction by bringing her action as claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress

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stating that IIED is a "gap-filler" tort never intended to supplant or duplicate existing statutory or common-law remedies and that even if other remedies do not explicitly preempt the tort, their availability leaves no gap to fill

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indicating that IIED claims must typically be based on circumstances that border on "serious criminal acts"

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In Creditwatch, a former supervisor made lewd advances toward a woman whose employment had been terminated. 157 S.W.3d at 816.

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terminating employee and instructing another employee to evict her

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terminating employee and instructing another employee to evict her

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noting that "intentional infliction of emotional distress is a `gap-filler' tort never intended to supplant or duplicate existing statutory or common-law remedies."

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Case details for

Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson

Case Details

Full title:CREDITWATCH, INC. Harold E. "Skip" Quant, Petitioners, v. Denise JACKSON…

Court:Supreme Court of Texas

Date published: Feb 25, 2005

Citations

157 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2005)

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