Opinion
1203 WDA 2023 J-A16039-24
10-22-2024
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. RAYMONT WALKER Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 18, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0006204-2007
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., MURRAY, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM
McLAUGHLIN, J.
Raymont Walker appeals pro se from the order dismissing his Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") petition as untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm and deny Walker's application for writ of mandamus.
A panel of this Court previously summarized the facts and procedural history in this matter as follows:
[A] jury convicted [Walker] of first-degree murder and related offenses that occurred between December 22 and December 23, 2006, when [Walker] was fifteen years old. On August 2, 2010, the trial court sentenced [Walker] to a term of life imprisonment followed by a consecutive term of twelve-and-one-half to twenty-five years' imprisonment. [Walker] filed a timely direct appeal on October 25, 2010 . . . This Court affirmed [Walker's] judgment of sentence on April 30, 2012. Commonwealth v. Walker, No. 1667 WDA 2010 (Pa.Super. filed Apr. 30, 2012) (unpublished mem.) (Walker I). [Walker] did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court.
[Walker] filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on July 30, 2012, and the PCRA court appointed counsel on August 13,
2012.Counsel asked for and was granted two extensions of time to file, and [Walker] subsequently filed a counseled amended first PCRA petition on January 7, 2013. A series of appeals followed, and ultimately our Supreme Court granted PCRA relief in part pursuant to Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012),[FN] and remanded to this Court. Commonwealth v. Walker, 132 A.3d 980 (Pa. 2016) (Walker II) (per curiam order). This Court, in turn, remanded to the trial court for resentencing. Commonwealth v. Walker, No. 2019 WDA 2013, 2016 WL 1545177 (Pa.Super. filed Apr. 15, 2016) (unpublished mem.) (Walker III).
[FN] The United States Supreme Court, in Miller, held that sentences of "mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel and unusual punishments.'" Miller, 567 U.S. at 465. In Montgomery, the High Court held that Miller applied retroactively. Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 208-13.
The PCRA court held a hearing on February 9, 2018, to address both [Walker's] outstanding second PCRA petition raising a claim of after-discovered evidence and the remand for resentencing pursuant to Walker III. The PCRA court denied [Walker's] after-discovered evidence claim and resentenced him on February 9, 2018, to an aggregate term of thirty years to life in prison. [Walker] appealed, arguing that the PCRA court erred by denying his after-discovered evidence claim and challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, and our Supreme Court denied [Walker's] petition for allowance of appeal on November 2, 2020. Commonwealth v. Walker, No. 1025 WDA 2018, 2020 WL 777785 (Pa.Super. filed Feb. 18, 2020) (Walker IV) (unpublished mem.), appeal denied, 240 A.3d 1216 (Pa. 2020) (Walker V).Commonwealth v. Walker, No. 110 WDA 2022, 2022 WL 17258593, at *1, (Pa.Super. filed Nov. 29, 2022) (unpublished mem.) (some footnotes omitted).
In October 2021, Walker filed a third PCRA petition, which was dismissed by the PCRA court as untimely. We affirmed the order dismissing his petition. See id.
On June 30, 2023, Walker filed the instant pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA court dismissed the petition as untimely. On October 3, 2023, Walker filed a notice of appeal.
Prior to filing his notice of appeal, Walker filed a motion for disciplinary action against the Commonwealth on August 24, 2023, in the PCRA court. The PCRA court did not rule on the motion before Walker's notice of appeal was filed. On July 18, 2024, Walker filed an application for writ of mandamus in this Court requesting that we compel the PCRA court to rule on his motion for disciplinary action. We decline to do so because once the appeal was taken, the trial court could no longer proceed in the matter. See Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a). We thus deny Walker's application for writ of mandamus.
Walker raises the following issues:
I. Did [the] PCRA court err when it dismissed [Walker's] claim of deprivation of counsel for his PCRA petition?
II. Did [the] PCRA court err when it dismissed [Walker's] PCRA petition as untimely notwithstanding the claim of governmental interference with the Commonwealth's false statement of law at [the] 02/09/2018 resentencing hearing?
III. Did [the] PCRA court err when it dismissed [Walker's] PCRA as untimely notwithstanding the claim that [Walker] acquired newly discovered evidence that [the] Commonwealth intentionally made false statements of law to courts?
IV. Did [the] PCRA court err when it failed to grant [Walker] his 1 day time credit claim?
V. Did [the] PCRA court err when it failed to allow [Walker] the opportunity to amend his PCRA petition in the interest of justice and to show how [Walker] acquired newly discovered evidence?Walker's Br. at 7 (suggested answers omitted).
Walker first argues that the court erred by not appointing counsel for his previous PCRA petition filed in October 2021. Id. at 15. He alleges that after he was resentenced in 2018, he filed a timely pro se PCRA petition requesting that counsel be appointed. Id. Walker maintains that he was entitled to the appointment of counsel for his 2021 petition. Id. at 17.
On appeal from the denial or grant of relief under the PCRA, our review is limited to determining "whether the PCRA court's ruling is supported by the record and free of legal error." Commonwealth v. Presley, 193 A.3d 436, 442 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted).
"To be entitled to PCRA relief, [the petitioner] must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the circumstances enumerated in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9543(a)(2), and that the allegation of error has not been previously litigated or waived." Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 105 A.3d 1257, 1265-66 (Pa. 2014); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3) (stating that to be eligible for relief, the petitioner must plead and prove "the allegation of error has not been previously litigated or waived"). A claim is waived for the purposes of the PCRA when "the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, . . . on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b).
Here, Walker could have raised his claim at the time of his PCRA proceedings in 2021. Accordingly, this claim is waived. See id. Moreover, although Walker asserted this claim in the instant PCRA petition, because the petition was untimely, as explained below, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
Walker's next two issues involve the timeliness of his instant PCRA petition. Any petition for PCRA relief, including second and subsequent petitions, must be filed within one year of the date on which the judgment of sentence becomes final, unless the petitioner pleads and proves an exception to the one-year bar. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). For purposes of the PCRA, "a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review." Id. at § 9545(b)(3).
Courts may consider a PCRA petition filed after the one-year deadline only if the petitioner pleads and proves at least one of the three statutory exceptions:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.Id. at § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Any petition attempting to invoke an exception "shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented." Id. at § 9545(b)(2).
Here, Walker's PCRA petition is facially untimely. In his second issue, Walker attempts to invoke the governmental interference exception to the PCRA time-bar. To establish the governmental interference exception, a petitioner must plead and prove that the government interfered with the petitioner's ability to present a claim, "in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States." See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i). The petitioner must show that he would have filed his claim sooner, if not for the interference of a government actor. Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 955 (Pa. 2018). The petitioner also must plead and prove that "the information could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence." Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008).
Walker argues that governmental interference occurred when the Commonwealth allegedly made a false statement of law at his February 2018 resentencing hearing. Walker's Br. at 19. He alleges that the Commonwealth falsely informed the sentencing court that "[u]nder the current statute, [18 Pa.C.S.A. §] 1102.1, the sentence would start at 35 years to life. That would be the minimum." Id. (quoting N.T., 2/9/18, at 103). He asserts that, based on the Commonwealth's statement, the court fashioned his sentence under an inapplicable sentencing statute. Id. at 19-20.
The statute provides that for first-degree murder convictions after June 24, 2012, a defendant who was over age 15 at the time of the offense, but under age 18, "shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without parole, or a term of imprisonment, the minimum of which shall be at least 35 years to life." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(a)(1). Despite Walker's insistence that the trial court sentenced him under the allegedly inapplicable statute, Walker received a sentence for first-degree murder of 30 years to life.
The PCRA court concluded Walker failed to plead and prove the governmental interference exception to the PCRA time-bar. It reasoned:
[T]he 2/9/2018 [resentencing] hearing occurred two PCRAs ago. [Walker] has had the opportunity to fully litigate all claims related to this hearing. The present PCRA [p]etition does not explain why [Walker] did not raise this issue earlier or what due diligence [Walker] exercised to obtain the information which formed the basis of his assertion. This issue is not new as it relates to subsection (i)[.]PCRA Court Opinion, filed 12/1/23, at 5.
The court did not err. Walker does not explain why he did not raise the issue of the Commonwealth's alleged false statement at the 2018 resentencing hearing sooner. Thus, the court correctly determined that Walker did not satisfy the governmental interference exception to the PCRA time-bar.
In his third issue, Walker attempts to invoke the unknown facts exception to the PCRA time-bar. To succeed in raising that exception, a petitioner must establish that: (1) "the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown" and (2) the facts "could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence[.]" 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). "[T]he due diligence inquiry is fact-sensitive and dependent upon the circumstances presented." Commonwealth v. Burton, 121 A.3d 1063, 1070 (Pa.Super. 2015) (en banc).
In this claim, Walker asserts that the Commonwealth made the same false statement at his 2018 resentencing hearing as to the applicability of a sentencing statute as he claimed in his previous issue. Walker's Br. at 23. Walker argues that he first learned of the Commonwealth's alleged false statement from a fellow inmate on March 20, 2023. Id. (citing Walker's pro se response to court's Rule 907 notice). He alleges that the inmate alerted him to a transcript of a resentencing hearing in the unrelated case of Ricky Moorefield, in which the Commonwealth made a similar false statement. Id. at 24. Walker maintains that since he filed his current PCRA petition within one year of learning about the transcript, his petition is timely under the unknown facts exception to the PCRA time-bar. Id.
This claim is without merit. Walker fails to explain how learning of the Commonwealth allegedly making a false statement about the applicability of the sentencing statute in another case constitutes an unknown "fact" impacting the instant case. Furthermore, Walker would have known of the statement at the time the prosecutor made it in 2018. Yet he does not attempt to explain how he exercised due diligence in discovering the allegedly unknown "fact" before he asserted it in the instant PCRA petition. He thus failed to invoke the unknown facts exception to the PCRA time-bar.
Walker's fourth claim is that the court erred when it miscalculated his time credit. Walker's Br. at 26. He argues that he was entitled to one day of credit for time served. Id. at 27.
"[A] legality of sentencing issue must be raised in a timely filed PCRA [p]etition over which we have jurisdiction." Commonwealth v. Olson, 179 A.3d 1134, 1137 (Pa.Super. 2018); see also Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999) (stating that "[a]lthough legality of sentence is always subject to review within the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA's time limits or one of the exceptions thereto"); Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 995-96 (Pa.Super. 2014) (stating that this Court may not review a challenge to the legality of the sentence where there is no basis for our jurisdiction to review the claim).
As set forth above, Walker's instant PCRA petition is time-barred, and no exception was established. Thus, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of this claim.
Walker's final claim is that the PCRA court erred when it failed to grant his request to amend his PCRA petition. Walker's Br. at 28. He maintains that he was "deprived of the opportunity to better explain[] how his [instant] PCRA petition met the time bar exceptions[.]" Id. at 29.
Walker first requested leave to amend his petition in his pro se response to the PCRA court's Rule 907 notice. See Pro Se Response to Court's Notice, filed 9/7/23, at ¶ 11. However, he did not explain the nature of the amendment he wanted to make to his PCRA petition. The PCRA court dismissed Walker's petition without addressing this issue.
There is no absolute right to amend a PCRA petition. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 905 provides that a PCRA court "may grant leave to amend" a PCRA petition, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(A) (emphasis added), "thus vesting the decision to permit amendment within the PCRA court's discretion [.]" Commonwealth v. Williams, 732 A.2d 1167, 1191 (Pa. 1999).
Walker did not identify the facts or other information that he wished to raise in an amended PCRA petition, either when he asked the trial court for leave to amend or in his brief to this Court. "[I]t is an appellant's duty to present arguments that are sufficiently developed for our review." Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 A.3d 327, 331 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citation omitted). Waiver also occurs when a party fails to adequately preserve an issue in the lower court. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Walker's failure to develop this issue both in the lower court and on appeal constitutes waiver.
Order affirmed. Application for writ of mandamus denied.
Judgment Entered.