Opinion
No. 03-1991.
February 5, 2007.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS
INTRODUCTION
The defendant, Tony Ancrum (Ancrum), moves to suppress statements he made at the roadside, after State police stopped his car. Determining that Ancrum was in custody for the purposes of Miranda, and that the statements were not preceded by Miranda warnings, the court allows his motion to suppress statements.
BACKGROUND
Ancrum and his co-defendants were stopped on Route 2 in a Cadillac that State police thought was fleeing a shooting in Fitchburg. The occupants were taken out of the car, placed on the shoulder of the road and questioned while the car was searched.
This case has already been the subject of a motion to suppress based on claims of an illegal stop, seizure and search of Ancrum, his co-defendants and their car. A judge of this court allowed the motion to suppress and the Appeals Court reversed that order in an opinion at 65 Mass. App. Ct. 647 (2006), and returned the case to this court for trial.
Ancrum now moves to suppress his roadside statements related to where the defendants were coming from, when and where they stopped at a Burger King restaurant and whom they were visiting. The Commonwealth objects to consideration of the motion but does not suggest that the decision lies outside the court's sound discretion, or, in this court's view, any compelling reason to decline to decide Ancrum's claims on the merits.
The parties agree that if the court determines that it will decide the motion on the merits, no evidentiary hearing is needed, instead all agree that the court should consider the facts in the transcript of the motion to suppress hearing, the motion judge's findings, the Appeals Court's decision and the impounded police report. The court has marked the impounded police report "A for I.D.," the report may also be referred to in the court form titled "Reporter, Exhibits, Witnesses" as Exhibit 1.
FACTS
The facts are largely drawn from the Appeals Court's decision. On September 2, 2003, at about 9:30 P.M., State police, acting on a radio call of a shooting in Fitchburg thirty minutes earlier, stopped the defendants' car on Route 2. It was nighttime. Police thought that the defendants' car and some of the defendants matched, in some respects, the description of the car and persons involved in the shooting. Police followed the defendants for three or four miles, the defendants were not speeding and police did not observe any traffic violations.
Police pulled alongside, illuminated the car with an alley light, activated the cruiser's blue lights and pulled the car over. Using the loudspeaker on the police cruiser, one of the troopers ordered the driver to open his window, turn off the engine and place the car keys on the roof. One trooper stood outside the police car, using the car door as a shield with his gun drawn. Several minutes passed before the driver did as instructed.
Police ordered the defendants out individually, handcuffed them, pat-frisked them and sat them down on the shoulder of the road separately. This court infers that the defendants were held at gunpoint until all were handcuffed. The defendants were placed sitting or kneeling on the shoulder of the road far enough from their car that they could not see it clearly. One of the troopers told the defendants that he was going to search the car for weapons for "officer safety." During the sweep of the car he saw and felt a warm Burger King bag.
He returned from the car and spoke to Ancrum asking where he was coming from. Ancrum said they were coming from a "girl" named Charlene's house. In response to questioning from the trooper, Ancrum said he did not know her last name, address or phone number. The trooper asked if Ancrum could lead them back to the house and Ancrum said, "No." The trooper asked when they had purchased the Burger King items in the car. Ancrum said they hadn't stopped at Burger King that day and that he thought they went to Burger King the day before. Ancrum was not advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda until after the conversation.
DISCUSSION
Custodial interrogation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way." Commonwealth v. Jung, 420 Mass. 675, 688 (1995), quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 Mass. 436, 444 (1966). "The determination of custody depends primarily on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, and not on the subjective views of either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned. The critical question in making the custody determination is `whether, considering all the circumstances, a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have believed that he was in custody.'" Commonwealth v.Sneed, 440 Mass. 216, 220 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Brum, 438 Mass. 103, 111 (2002).
In Commonwealth v. Haskell, 438 Mass. 790, 795 (2003), the Commonwealth did not contest the issue of whether a question put to the defendant after he was stopped and approached at gunpoint, but not handcuffed, was a custodial interrogation for the purposes of Miranda.
In making the custody determination, the court examines four factors: (1) the place of interrogation; (2) whether the police conveyed any belief or opinion that the person being questioned was a suspect; (3) whether the questioning was aggressive or informal; and (4) whether the suspect was free to end the interview by leaving the place of interrogation, or whether the interview ended with the defendant's arrest. Sneed, 440 Mass. at 220.
The place of the interrogation was neutral, the shoulder of Route 2. Other than the suggestion inherent in approaching Ancrum at gunpoint and handcuffing him, police did not convey any belief or opinion that Ancrum was a suspect. The questioning was informal and not aggressive. The questioning ended with Ancrum's arrest.
"There is no specific formula for weighing the relevant factors (citation omitted) . . . but `[r]arely is any single factor conclusive.'Commonwealth v. Bryant, 390 Mass. 729, 737 (1985)" Sneed at 220. "[D]etermining whether an interrogation is custodial for the purposes ofMiranda is not always as easy as meets the eye." J.A. Grasso C.M. McEvoy, Suppression Matters Under Massachusetts Law § 18-3[b], 18-17 (2006).
In Commonwealth v. Damiano, 422 Mass. 10, 13 (1996), the "defendant was handcuffed in the back seat of a police cruiser in the middle of the night on a multi-lane State highway. As a matter of law no reasonable person in that situation would believe that he or she was free to leave."Commonwealth v. Jones, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 378, 382-3 (1997) (interrogation custodial when defendant was not handcuffed but locked in back of a police car and told not to leave, and was confronted by his accusers during questioning, and questioning terminated with the defendant's arrest.).
In Commonwealth v. Gordon, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 825, 827 (1999), the Appeals Court addressed a similar situation, "The Terry justification for the stop, however, did not insulate it from the possible application ofMiranda principles. `Miranda warnings are necessary even during a Terry stop if the suspect has been taken into custody or if the questioning otherwise takes place in a police dominated or compelling atmosphere' (citation omitted). For purposes of Miranda warnings, "[t]he crucial question is whether, considering all the circumstances, a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have believed that [she] was in custody." (citations omitted). We see no tenable way to avoid answering the crucial question in the affirmative. The defendant was handcuffed and locked in the back of a cruiser at the time [the police officer] put his question. (citation omitted). Certainly a reasonable person who, like the defendant, is pursued and apprehended by police, handcuffed, and locked in a police cruiser, would not feel free to leave. Although not decisive, for Miranda purposes that is one hallmark of custody . . . the combined indicia of handcuffs and restraint in the back of a police cruiser attain the level of custody associated with formal arrest."
This case presents a close question. Ancrum was not locked in the back of a police car. However, he was approached at gunpoint, handcuffed and placed far from his car sitting or kneeling on the ground, at night. This was custody to the degree associated with formal arrest andMiranda warnings were required.
ORDER
Defendant Tony A. Ancrum's motion to suppress his roadside statements is ALLOWED .