Opinion
Civil Action No. SA-97-CA-1245.
December 4, 1998.
ORDER
On this date came to be considered plaintiff's Motion For Attorney's Fees, filed October 2, 1998, the defendant's response, filed October 29, 1998, and the plaintiff's First Amended Motion for Attorney's fees, filed November 16, 1998 in the above-styled and numbered cause. After careful consideration, the court is of the opinion that the plaintiff's Amended Motion for Attorney's Fees should be granted to the extent discussed below.
STANDARD FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
The standard in this circuit governing the computation of attorney's fees is set out in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) and its progeny. Graves v. Barnes, 700 F.2d 220, 221 (5th Cir. 1983). The Fifth Circuit provided the following criteria: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and the difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorneys due to the acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitation imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-719. The Johnson standard has been further refined by the Fifth Circuit's adoption of the "lodestar" method of calculating attorneys' fees. Graves, 700 F.2d at 222. Under this refinement of the Johnson text, the lodestar is equal to the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the prevailing hourly rate in the community for similar work. The lodestar is then adjusted to reflect other factors such as the contingent nature of the suit and the quality of the representation. Id. The District Court "should not award a contingency multiplier in every case. Under appropriate circumstances, attorneys may be adequately compensated through the reasonable calculation of the lodestar."Id. at 224.
The District Court is afforded broad discretion to determine the award of attorneys' fees. Brady v. Fort Bend County, 145 F.3d 691 (5th Cir. 1998). The district court "should pay special heed to Johnson criteria numbers (1) the time and labor involved; (5) the customary fee; (8) the amount involved and the result obtained; and (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of counsel. Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 624 F.2d 575, 583 (5th Cir. 1980). The District Court should refer to the particularly applicable Johnson factors in the following framework: (1) Ascertain the nature and extent of the services supplied by the attorney; (2) Value the services according to the customary fee and quality of the legal work; and (3) Adjust the compensation on the basis of the other Johnson factors that may be of significance in the particular case. Gulf Union Indus., Inc. v. Formation Sec., Inc., 842 F.2d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 1988);Johnson v. El Paso Pathology Group, P.A., 868 F. Supp. 852 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
ANALYSIS
On November 9, 1998, this Court examined the plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees and the defendant's response; the Court conducted an analysis and ordered additiqnal briefing. The plaintiff's attorney, Cindy R. Weir ("Weir"), has now responded to the Court's order and has come up with an amount of $37,942.50 as her attorney's fees. The Court finds this amount acceptable, except for the fact that Weir is seeking attorney's fees for a motion to compel that she prepared, which was denied and which she was sanctioned for filing. Clearly, the court will not award her attorney's fees for the preparation of this motion. Therefore, the court will subtract .4 hours from Weir's total number of hours. The final result will be $37,882.
The original number of hours was 169.9. The new number of hours is 169.5. rate. Weir has complied with this court's Order to reduce her hourly billing rate to $150.00.
The defendant originally raised objections to Weir's original amount of attorney's fees. The court now addresses each of its objections. First, the defendant objected to Weir's hourly rate of $175.00 per hour as excessive. The court ordered Weir to reduce that rate to $150.00, which the court finds is a reasonable hourly rate. Weir has complied with this court's Order to reduce her hourly billing rate to $150.00.
Weir's legal assistant bills $75.00 per hour, which the defendant did not object to, and which the court finds is reasonable.
The defendant also originally objected to the total billing time as excessive, stating that there was substantial duplication of involvement by Weir and her paralegal. For example, the defendant stated that both Weir and her paralegal attended the depositions. However, the defendant now acknowledges that he was incorrect in making this statement; the paralegal did not attend any of the depositions. See Defendant's Motion For Leave to File This Reply Brief, filed November 18, 1998. Therefore, the Court will disregard this objection to the plaintiff's attorney's fees.
Finally, the defendant originally objected to Weir's requested amount of attorney's fees (which at that time was $41,220.00), stating that it was excessive since it was "approximately twice the amount of the verdict award to Plaintiff, including liquidated damages." However, this Court finds that this amount is appropriate for several reasons. First, this does not take into account the fact that the plaintiff was awarded an additional $10,500 as front pay, which makes the plaintiff's award $33,700. Further, the plaintiff and the Court have now reduced the amount to $37,882.50. Finally, the Supreme Court has held that fees under 1988 need not be proportionate to damages recovered. See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986). The defendant has filed no further objections to the plaintiff's first amended motion for attorney's fees.
The Court finds that under the lodestar, the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the prevailing hourly rate in the community for similar work is $37,882.50. this number need not be adjusted in this case. The attorney in this case is adequately compensated through the reasonable calculation of the lodestar.
This figure is found by multiplying total attorney hours of 196.5 times $150.00 per hour, and adding that to the total paralegal hours of 112.1 hours multiplied by $75.00 per hour.
The court believes that $37,882.50 is the appropriate amount based on the Johnson factors.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that plaintiff's first amended motion for attorney's fees is ACCEPTED IN PART such that the plaintiff's attorney, Cindy R. Weir, should be awarded $37,882.50 in attorney's fees.