Opinion
C21-1562JLR
05-24-2022
MICHAEL BOONE, Plaintiff, v. JOHN ALLABEN, Defendant.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO CERTIFY QUESTIONS TO THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT
JAMES L. ROBART UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the court is Defendant John Allaben's motion to certify questions to the Washington State Supreme Court. (Mot. (Dkt. # 44); Reply (Dkt. # 47).) Plaintiff Michael Boone opposes the motion to certify. (Resp. (Dkt. # 46).) The court has considered the motion, all materials submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion, and the governing law. Being fully advised, the court DENIES Mr. Allaben's motion to certify questions to the Washington Supreme Court.
On May 10, 2022, the court denied Mr. Boone's request, contained in the same motion, to reconsider its April 25, 2022 order granting Mr. Boone's motion for reconsideration. (See 5/10/22 Order (Dkt. # 45); 4/25/22 Order (Dkt. # 42).)
II. BACKGROUND
The factual and procedural background of this case is set forth in detail in the court's since-vacated order granting Mr. Allaben's motion for summary judgment. (See 3/21/22 Order (Dkt. # 36) (vacated on reconsideration by 4/25/22 Order).) Therefore, the court discusses below only the background relevant to the instant motion.
This case arises from an ill-fated encounter between Mr. Allaben and Mr. Boone on July 7, 2019. (See generally Am. Compl. (Dkt. # 23).) Mr. Boone alleges that after he “staggered and accidentally touched” Mr. Allaben's wife, Carolynne Allaben, Mr. Allaben “pushed [Mr. Boone] from behind as [Mr. Boone] was approximately 10 feet forward from the accidental touching.” (Id. ¶¶ 2-3.) He further alleges that Mr. Allaben's “actions were unintentional and were not meant to cause harm” and that Mr. Allaben “either committed negligence, gross negligence, or recklessness” when he pushed Mr. Boone. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 7.)
On March 21, 2022, the court granted Mr. Allaben's motion for summary judgment. (3/21/22 Order.) In that order, the court agreed with Mr. Allaben that Mr. Boone's claim was properly categorized as a claim for battery, an intentional tort, rather than a claim for negligence. (Id. at 9.) Mr. Allaben's motion relied in part on Swank v. Valley Christian School, 374 P.3d 245 (Wash.Ct.App. 2016), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 398 P.3d 1108 (Wash. 2017), in which the Washington State Court of Appeals held that “[a] plaintiff cannot avoid the battery limitation period ‘by disguising the real cause of action in a different form.'” (MSJ (Dkt. # 25) at 6-7); Swank, 374 P.3d at 256 (quoting Boyles v. City of Kennewick, 813 P.2d 178, 179 (Wash.Ct.App. 1991)). The court concluded that because it was undisputed that Mr. Allaben intended to push Mr. Boone, that conduct amounted to a battery-despite Mr. Boone's attempt to plead a negligence claim and was thus barred by Washington's two-year statute of limitations for intentional torts. (3/21/22 Order at 8-9 (citing RCW 4.16.100(1)).)
Mr. Boone moved for reconsideration of the court's March 21, 2022 order. (Boone MFR (Dkt. # 38).) He argued that under the Washington Supreme Court's decision in Beltran-Serrano v. City of Tacoma, 442 P.3d 608 (Wash. 2019), a battery claim does not preclude a negligence claim that arises from the same incident. (Boone MFR at 3-4.) Indeed, the Beltran-Serrano Court held that because “ordinary negligence principles apply in situations that involve both a claim of battery and a duty to act reasonably, ” the fact that the plaintiff may have had a valid intentional tort claim “ha[d] no bearing on the viability of his negligence claim for violation of the duty to act reasonably.” Beltran-Serrano, 442 P.3d at 612-13. This court agreed with Mr. Boone that under Beltran-Serrano, a plaintiff can pursue a negligence claim even where the defendant's use of force was indisputably intentional. (See 4/25/22 Order at 3-6.) The court granted Mr. Boone's motion for reconsideration and vacated its order granting summary judgment to Mr. Allaben. (Id. at 8.)
Mr. Allaben then filed the instant motion. In the portion of the motion considered in this order, Mr. Allaben asks the court to certify three questions to the Washington Supreme Court:
1. “[W]hether and how the Washington Supreme Court's opinion in [Beltran-Serrano] applies outside the law enforcement context;”
2. “[W]hether, after Beltran-Serrano, a plaintiff can avoid the limitation period for an intentional tort by arguing the defendant's understanding or handling of the situation preceding the intentional tort is negligent;” and
3. “[W]hether the decision in Beltran-Serrano means that every intentional tort has an inseparable negligence component for the same act.” (Mot. at 1.) The motion is now ripe for decision.
III. ANALYSIS
Under RCW 2.60.020, “[w]hen in the opinion of any federal court before whom a proceeding is pending, it is necessary to ascertain the local law of [Washington] in order to dispose of such proceeding and the local law has not been clearly determined, such federal court may certify to the [Washington] supreme court for answer the question of local law involved and the supreme court shall render its opinion in answer thereto.” The certification process serves the important judicial interests of efficiency and comity: as noted by the United States Supreme Court, certification saves “time, energy and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism.” Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974). The decision whether to certify a question to the Washington Supreme Court rests in the discretion of the federal court considering certification. Micomonaco v. Washington, 45 F.3d 316, 322 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Lehman Bros., 416 U.S. at 391). Even when state law is unclear, the court is not obligated to use the certification process. Riordan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 589 F.3d 999, 1009 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Lehman Bros., 416 U.S. at 390).
The court concludes that the local law of Washington is sufficiently clear following Beltran-Serrano and thus certification of Mr. Allaben's proposed questions is not warranted. Although Beltran-Serrano involves police misconduct, the Washington Supreme Court's discussion of the relationship between intentional tort and negligence claims is grounded in general principles of tort law. See Beltran-Serrano, 442 P.3d at 611-13. The court concludes, therefore, that Beltran-Serrano's holding that intentional tort and negligence claims may coexist is not limited to the law enforcement context. Moreover, Beltran-Serrano explains that Boyles upon which Swank relied-does not preclude “overlapping claims of negligence and assault and battery” and, indeed, recognizes that a plaintiff may pursue both battery claims and negligence claims where the factual allegations of the complaint support both claims. Id. at 613 (discussing Boyles, 813 P.2d at 179). Because the local law is not unclear, the court declines to certify Mr. Allaben's proposed questions and DENIES his motion to certify.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES Mr. Allaben's motion to certify questions to the Washington State Supreme Court (Dkt. # 44).