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Askew v. Hargrave

U.S.
Mar 8, 1971
401 U.S. 476 (1971)

Summary

holding that abstention may be called for when a state-court case brings state-law "claims, [which,] if sustained, will obviate the necessity of determining the [constitutional] question"

Summary of this case from Scahill v. Dist. of Columbia

Opinion

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

No. 573.

Argued February 23-24, 1971 Decided March 8, 1971

Appellees brought this suit in federal court challenging Florida's Millage Rollback Law as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the ground that it had an invidiously discriminatory effect in its distribution of taxing authority for educational purposes by a standard related solely to a county's wealth. Appellants contended that the statute was only part of a total plan more nearly to equalize schoolchildren's educational opportunities on a statewide basis. A three-judge District Court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment on the basis of the pleadings and appellees' affidavit, having rejected appellants' argument that the District Court should abstain from considering the case because of an intervening state court proceeding attacking the law on state constitutional grounds. Held:

1. The District Court mistakenly relied upon Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, and McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, in refusing to abstain from deciding the case on the merits pending resolution by the state courts of state constitutional claims, the sustainment of which would obviate the need for determining the Fourteenth Amendment issue. Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, is an example of the line of decisions that should inform the discretion of the District Court in determining whether to abstain.

2. Since the manner in which Florida's overall program operates may be critical in resolving the equal protection claim, that claim should be decided not by summary judgment but after a full hearing.

313 F. Supp. 944, vacated and remanded.

Charles E. Miner, Jr., argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Rivers Buford, Jr., and Stephen Marc Slepin.

Hershel Shanks argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Allan I. Mendelsohn, Robert M. Perce, Jr., Richard H. Frank, and David Rubin. William H. Adams III filed a brief for the Florida Education Research Foundation as amicus curiae urging reversal.


In 1968, Florida enacted a new law for the financing of public education through state appropriations and local ad valorem taxes assessed by each school district. A section of the new law, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 236.251 (Supp. 1970), known as the "Millage Rollback Law," provided that, to be eligible to receive state moneys, a local school district must limit ad valorem taxes for school purposes to not more than 10 mills of assessed valuation, with certain exceptions. Appellees filed this class action in the District Court for the Middle District of Florida alleging that the Millage Rollback Law effected an invidious discrimination, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, against school children of property-poor counties in that 10 mills of ad valorem tax in school districts in such counties would produce less dollars per child for educational purposes than would 10 mills of ad valorem tax in other counties. A three-judge District Court entered a summary judgment in appellees' favor upon a declaration that the Millage Rollback Law was unconstitutional, and enjoined the appellants from withholding state funds from any school district by virtue of the provisions of that Act. Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 (1970). We noted probable jurisdiction. 400 U.S. 900 (1970). We vacate and remand.

I

Subsequent to the filing of this suit, School Board of Broward County v. Christian, No. 69-932, was filed in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Leon County, Florida. That action attacks the Millage Rollback Law primarily on state law grounds, as violative of provisions of the Florida Constitution. The District Court, however, rejected appellants' argument that the court "should abstain from considering the case in deference to [the] state court proceeding," 313 F. Supp., at 946-947, holding that under Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), and McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1963), "[t]he fact that a state remedy is available is not a valid basis for federal court abstention." 313 F. Supp., at 947. The reliance upon Monroe v. Pape and McNeese was misplaced. Monroe v. Pape is not in point, for there "the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice." 365 U.S., at 174. McNeese held that "assertion of a federal claim in a federal court [need not] await an attempt to vindicate the same claim in a state court." 373 U.S., at 672 (emphasis added). See also Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). Our understanding from the colloquy on oral argument with counsel for the parties is that the Christian case asserts, not the "same claim," that is, the federal claim of alleged denial of the federal right of equal protection, but primarily state law claims under the Florida Constitution, which claims, if sustained, will obviate the necessity of determining the Fourteenth Amendment question. In such case, the line of decisions of which Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970), is a recent example, states the principles that should inform the exercise of the District Court's discretion as to whether to abstain.

II

Since the case must be remanded, we add another comment. The appellees' motion for summary judgment was considered on the pleadings and an affidavit which essentially merely verified the allegations of the amended complaint. Our examination of the pleadings and the affidavit persuades us that they are inadequate as a basis for deciding the equal protection claim. They do not sufficiently present the facts related to appellants' argument that the Millage Rollback Law was only one aspect of a comprehensive legislative program for reorganizing educational financing throughout the State to more nearly equalize educational opportunities for all the school children of the State. Appellants contend that this program enacted a formula calling for "a massive infusion of state money into the several school districts," which more than made up the loss suffered by a school district under the limitation of 10 mills in the assessment of ad valorem taxes: "The net effect of the 1968 educational financing enactments was not only to make up for the loss of funds suffered by the counties required to reduce local millage but to greatly increase the moneys available to the counties on a per pupil basis." Appellants' Reply Brief 4. Since the manner in which the program operates may be critical in the decision of the equal protection claim, that claim should not be decided without fully developing the factual record at a hearing.

The judgment of the District Court is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs in the judgment and Part II of the opinion.


Summaries of

Askew v. Hargrave

U.S.
Mar 8, 1971
401 U.S. 476 (1971)

holding that abstention may be called for when a state-court case brings state-law "claims, [which,] if sustained, will obviate the necessity of determining the [constitutional] question"

Summary of this case from Scahill v. Dist. of Columbia

finding summary judgment inappropriate when "pleadings and an affidavit" were inadequate to decide the claim and holding that the "claim should not be decided without fully developing the factual record at a hearing"

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abstaining from deciding a section 1983 theory because the "state law [causes of action] . . . , if sustained, will obviate the necessity of determining the Fourteenth Amendment question"

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observing that pleadings and an affidavit provided an inadequate basis for deciding an equal protection claim because they did "not sufficiently present the facts"

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cautioning against grant of declaratory judgment on the basis of sparse and inadequate record

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In Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 91 S.Ct. 856, 28 L.Ed.2d 196 (1971), the Supreme Court ordered abstention in a case that involved state and federal constitutional provisions that mirrored one another.

Summary of this case from Herald Co. v. McNeal

In Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 91 S.Ct. 856, 28 L.Ed.2d 196 (1971) the Supreme Court held that a district court should have abstained from determining whether a Florida statute is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause until the Florida courts ruled upon a challenge to the law based on the Florida constitution.

Summary of this case from Drexler v. Southwest Dubois School Corporation

In Askew, the plaintiffs attacked the constitutionality of a new Florida statutory method of financing public education.

Summary of this case from Drexler v. Southwest Dubois School Corporation

In Hargrave another action making the same challenge was pending in the Florida courts, a factor on which the Court relied.

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In Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 91 S.Ct. 856, 28 L.Ed.2d 196 (1971) the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the three judge court and held that the district court should have abstained where there was pending in the state courts a claim which if sustained would "obviate the necessity of determining the Fourteenth Amendment question."

Summary of this case from Bland v. McHann

In Askew a three-judge federal court was asked to declare unconstitutional under the equal protection clause a Florida public education financing scheme whereby property-poor counties received less money than property-rich counties.

Summary of this case from Hobbs v. Thompson

In Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971), the Supreme Court was confronted with a case in which a Florida statute was challenged in federal court as violative of the federal constitution.

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remanding for consideration of abstention under Pullman abstention principles explained in Reetz where plaintiffs alleged that Florida statute violated federal constitution and another action pending in state court challenged same statute under state constitution

Summary of this case from Hickerson v. City of New York

In Hargrave another action making the same challenge was pending in the Florida courts, a factor on which the Court relied.

Summary of this case from Donohoe C. Co., Inc. v. Maryland-National C. P.

In Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 478, 91 S.Ct. 856, 28 L.Ed.2d 196 (1971), the Court took occasion to distinguish Monroe and McNeese stating that in Monroe the administrative remedy, although available in theory, was not adequate in practice, and that McNeese held that the assertion of a federal claim in a federal court need not await an attempt to vindicate the same claim in a state court.

Summary of this case from O'Brien v. Galloway

In Hargrave, the Court held that the federal district court should have stayed its hand in an equal protection challenge to the Florida Millage Rollback Law pending state resolution of accompanying state constitutional claims which would have obviated the need for determining the Fourteenth Amendment issue.

Summary of this case from Norman v. Duval County School Bd.

distinguishing McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622

Summary of this case from Brier v. Luger

In Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 91 S.Ct. 856, 28 L.Ed.2d 196 (1971), a class action was brought challenging the constitutionality of Florida's "Millage Rollback Law". This law provided that a local school district must limit its ad valorem taxes for school purposes to not more than 10 mills of assessed valuation, with certain exceptions, in order to receive state moneys.

Summary of this case from United A., A., A.I.W. of America v. State Farm M.A.I. Co.

In Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 91 S.Ct. 856, 28 L.Ed.2d 196 (1971), the Supreme Court ordered a three-judge court to abstain pending a decision in a state court case challenging a state statute on state grounds.

Summary of this case from Jarvis v. Brown

In Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 91 S.Ct. 856, 28 L.Ed.2d 196 (1971) (per curiam), the Court vacated and remanded a judgment of a three-judge district court which had struck down on equal protection grounds a state law relating to the financing of public education.

Summary of this case from Egner v. Texas City Independent School District
Case details for

Askew v. Hargrave

Case Details

Full title:ASKEW, GOVERNOR OF FLORIDA, ET AL. v . HARGRAVE ET AL

Court:U.S.

Date published: Mar 8, 1971

Citations

401 U.S. 476 (1971)
91 S. Ct. 856

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