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Ammerman v. Sween

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
May 10, 1995
54 F.3d 423 (7th Cir. 1995)

Summary

holding that § 1367 requires a "loose factual connection between claims"

Summary of this case from Heather Painter v. Atwood

Opinion

No. 94-3701.

Submitted April 27, 1995.

Subsequent to the scheduling of oral argument for this case, the parties agreed that oral argument would not be necessary and requested that the appeal be submitted for decision based solely on the briefs and the record. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(f); Cir.R. 34(e). This court granted their request. Accordingly, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

Decided May 10, 1995.

Sharon Gisselman, Wausau, WI, for plaintiff-appellee.

Kevin P. Crooks, Crooks, Low Connell, Wausau, WI, for defendant-appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.

Before POSNER, Chief Judge, and CUMMINGS and BAUER, Circuit Judges.



Robert Sween appeals from a jury award of $60,000 in compensatory and punitive damages to Lynne Ammerman for assault and battery as defined under Wisconsin tort law. The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over this state law claim. We affirm.

Ammerman worked as a micro lab instructor at North Central Technical College in Wausau, Wisconsin. In January 1994, she filed a complaint against her employer and Sween, another instructor at the college, raising several claims arising from Sween's alleged sexual assault of Ammerman on February 15, 1992 and the college's refusal to pursue remedial measures against Sween. Specifically, she alleged that both defendants were liable for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Ammerman also raised state tort claims against both defendants for the negligent infliction of emotional distress and against Sween for assault and battery. In addition, she accused North Central Technical College of wage discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of the Equal Pay Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).

The district court dismissed the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim against North Central Technical College and the Title VII claim against Sween pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Despite Sween's objection, the court retained supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) over the remaining state tort claims because they were factually related to Ammerman's Title VII claim against the college. Subsequently, the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim against Sween was also dismissed. During trial, the court granted North Central Technical College's motion for judgment as a matter of law, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 50, and dismissed the Title VII claim. The jury then rendered a verdict on the remaining two claims, finding in favor of Ammerman on the assault and battery claim in the amount of $60,000 and against her on the wage discrimination claim.

On appeal, Sween does not argue that the district court erred in exercising its discretion to try the assault and battery claim once the other Title VII and state tort claims were dismissed; rather, he contends that subject matter jurisdiction over the state claim was never conferred upon the district court. This case, therefore, concerns the district court's power to hear state law claims rather than its discretionary exercise of that power. See Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 349, 108 S.Ct. 614, 618, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988).

In 1990, Congress codified the common law rules of pendent jurisdiction under the term "supplemental jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); see also Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Company, 6 F.3d 1176, 1182 (7th Cir. 1993). Section 1367(a) expressly encompasses both pendent claim and pendent party jurisdiction. Brazinski, 6 F.3d at 1181-82. The statute confers supplemental jurisdiction to the limits Article III of the Constitution permits, authorizing federal courts to hear all claims that "are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Accordingly, judicial power to hear both state and federal claims exists where the federal claim has sufficient substance to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, and the state and federal claims derive from a common nucleus of operative facts. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966); Myers v. County of Lake, 30 F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 666, 130 L.Ed.2d 600 (1994); see also 13B Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3567.3 (2d ed. 1984 Supp. 1994) (statute ratified and incorporated the Supreme Court's constitutional analysis in the Gibbs case). A loose factual connection between the claims is generally sufficient. 13B Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3567.1, at 117 (2d ed. 1984).

Sween argues that the Title VII and the assault and battery claims did not arise from a common nucleus of facts because it was not necessary to establish that the assault occurred as Ammerman alleged to prove that the college failed to take effective remedial action. His argument is rather incredible given his acknowledgment that Ammerman needed to establish the college's failure to take appropriate remedial action to prove a Title VII claim.

An employer has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to discover and rectify acts of sexual harassment of its employees. Baskerville v. Culligan International Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431-32 (7th Cir. Mar. 20, 1995). Reasonableness depends on the gravity of the harassment. Id. at 432-33 (stating in dicta that had the manager assaulted the female employee, due care might have required the company to fire the manager on the spot). Accordingly, Ammerman's factual allegations regarding the extent of the harassment by Sween were highly relevant to the determination of whether appropriate remedial action had been taken by the college. We are not persuaded by Sween's argument that the claims did not share a common nucleus of operative facts because the essential facts of the Title VII claim related to the college's actions following the alleged assault: without reference to the facts surrounding the assault, there could have been no sexual harassment claim against the employer. We hold, therefore, that the assault and battery claim was sufficiently connected to the Title VII claim against North Central Technical College to confer jurisdiction on the court to hear the state claim.

AFFIRMED.


Summaries of

Ammerman v. Sween

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
May 10, 1995
54 F.3d 423 (7th Cir. 1995)

holding that § 1367 requires a "loose factual connection between claims"

Summary of this case from Heather Painter v. Atwood

holding that § 1367 requires a loose factual connection between the claims"

Summary of this case from Bakewell v. Federal Financial Group, Inc.

holding that Section 1367 requires a "loose factual connection between the claims"

Summary of this case from Campos v. Western Dental Services, Inc.

holding that § 1367 requires a "loose factual connection between the claims"

Summary of this case from Sparrow v. Mazda American Credit

holding that state law claim against sexual harasser for assault and battery was part of same case as Title VII claim against employer for failure to stop harassment

Summary of this case from Williams v. Jeffersonville City Council, (S.D.Ind. 2003)

concluding that § 1367 ratified Gibbs

Summary of this case from Johnson v. Sun & Chang Corp.

affirming supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim where the federal claim cannot be discussed without reference to the essential facts of the state law claim

Summary of this case from McGuire v. Reg'l Acceptance Corp.

In Ammerman, the plaintiff brought a Title VII claim against her employer for sexual harassment by a co-worker and a state tort claim against her co-worker for assault and battery.

Summary of this case from McCoy v. Iberdrola Renewables, Inc.

noting that only Gibbs now limits pendent party jurisdiction

Summary of this case from Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co.

In Ammerman v. Sween, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that supplemental jurisdiction existed for state law assault and battery claims against a co-worker where the plaintiff also asserted Title VII claims against her employer for its handling of the assault and battery.

Summary of this case from DaSilva v. Ind. House of Representatives

In Ammerman v. Sween, 54 F.3d 423, 424-25 (7th Cir. 1995), the plaintiff alleged a Title VII sexual harassment claim and state law claims for assault and battery.

Summary of this case from Freelain v. Vill. of Oak Park

In Ammerman, 54 F.3d at 423-25, the Seventh Circuit held that section 1367(a) was satisfied by facts similar to those present here.

Summary of this case from Lucarino v. Con-Dive, LLC

explaining that "judicial power to hear both state and federal claims exists where the federal claim has sufficient substance to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, and the state and federal claims derive from a common nucleus of operative facts"

Summary of this case from State v. Helman

stating that "the state and federal claims derive from a common nucleus of operative facts"

Summary of this case from Golden v. Nadler

In Ammerman v. Sween, 54 F.3d 423 (7th Cir. 1995), a college laboratory instructor brought a Title VII action against her employer and a coworker who allegedly sexually harassed her, and a state law assault claim against the harasser.

Summary of this case from Mazeika v. Architectural Speciality Products, Inc.
Case details for

Ammerman v. Sween

Case Details

Full title:LYNNE M. AMMERMAN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ROBERT SWEEN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

Court:United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit

Date published: May 10, 1995

Citations

54 F.3d 423 (7th Cir. 1995)

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