Opinion
Civ. No. 3:00-cv-211 (EBB).
July 6, 2000.
Ruling on Motion for Reconsideration
Plaintiff moves pursuant to D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 9(e) for reconsideration of a judgment of dismissal, which was granted absent objection after the requisite twenty-one days to respond had expired. See Def's. Mot. to Dismiss [Doc. No. 7] (filed April 10, 2000, served April 27, 2000, and endorsed May 19, 2000); see also Judgment [Doc. No. 17] (entered May 22, 2000) Plaintiff has exhausted the court's patience with his persistent, meritless and vexatious filings. See, e.g., Aguilar v. United States, Nos. 3:99-mc-304 (EBB), 3:99-mc-408 (EBB), 1999 WL 1067841, at *1 (D. Conn. Nov. 8, 1999) (denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis to file an action against the government based in part on the mail fraud statute "because the purported claims are frivolous, baseless and irremediable"). The court takes this final opportunity to set forth briefly the procedural history of this case and why as a matter of law plaintiff cannot state a cognizable claim against the defendant under any set of facts.
Defendant People's Bank (the "Bank") initially served its motion to dismiss on plaintiff at his FCI address in Leavenworth, Kansas, where he is serving a forty-year sentence for drug trafficking. See Def's. Mot. to Dismiss at 2 (certifying service at U.S. Penitentiary). At that time, however, plaintiff was being held in a local jail here in the district where he was litigating the same civil forfeiture cases over which he sued the bank. See Plf's. Mot. to Strike for Lack of Service [Doc. No. 15] (May 10, 2000). The court denied plaintiff's motion to strike because, in the interim, the Bank served its motion to dismiss on plaintiff at the local facility in Bridgeport, Connecticut, where he was housed during the civil forfeiture trial. See Letter from Andrew J. McDonald, counsel for the Bank, to plaintiff of April 27, 2000. In fact, by his own admission, plaintiff knew of the pending motion to dismiss by April 19, 2000. See Plf's. Mot. to Inform the Court [Doc. No. 10] (dated April 19th and filed April 24, 2000)
Despite docketing no fewer than a dozen filings in response to the Bank's motion to dismiss, plaintiff has not offered a single reason to deny defendant's motion. See Plf's. filings [Doc. Nos. 9 (Am. Compl.), 10 (Mot. to Inform the Ct.), 11 (Demand for Jury Trial), 12 (Second Am. Compl.), 13 (Statement of Amount in Demand), 14 (Second Mot. to Inform the Ct.), 15 (Mot. to Strike), 16 (Mot. to Stay), 18 (Mot. to Enlarge Time), 19 (Mot. to Reconsider), 20 (Third Mot. to Inform the Ct.) and 21 (Mem. in Opp'n). Because this case is so utterly lacking in merit, the court saw no reason to prolong its demise by enlarging the time nunc pro tunc to permit plaintiff additional time to respond. See Plf's. Mot. [Doc. No. 18] (May 26, 2000) (denied as moot after case was closed). After reconsidering plaintiff's spurious claims, the court can conceive of no response to the motion to dismiss, nor any further amendment to the twice-amended complaint, that could possibly state a claim upon which this court could grant relief.
In connection with his criminal conviction, plaintiff was a claimant before this court in related civil forfeiture proceedings, which were recently tried before a jury. See United States v. One Parcel of property Located at 2030-32 Main St., Bridgeport, Connecticut, No. 5:90-cv-544 (EBB), 2000 WL 620424 (D. Conn. April 3, 2000) (determining that the government had probable cause to seize and forfeit properties, of which a jury found Aguilar not to be an innocent owner). Prior to trial, the court granted summary judgment in favor of People's Bank, the defendant here and claimant in two of the forfeiture actions. See United States v. One Parcel of property Located at 8 Drumlin Rd., Westport, Connecticut and 2034-32 Main St., Bridgeport, Connecticut, Nos. 5:90-cv-545 (EBB), 5:90-cv-546 (EBB), 2000 WL 194668 (D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2000) (ruling in favor of the bank over Aguilar's opposition attacking the validity of the state default judgment).
After his arrest in 1991, plaintiff defaulted on his mortgage obligations with the Bank on two of the properties contested in the forfeiture action. See People's Bank v. Aguilar, No. CV 96 0337761 5 (Conn.Super.Ct. Nov. 3, 1997) (granting default judgment in favor of Bank). Not only has this court recognized the lack of merit in Aguilar's efforts to attack that state default judgment, see 8 Drumlin Rd., 2000 WL 194668, at *7, even the Second Circuit found his appeal of this court's denial of his attempt to enjoin the state default proceedings to be "so indisputably lacking in merit as to be frivolous." Id. (citing United States v. One Parcel of Property Located at 414 Kings Hwy., Bridgeport, Connecticut, No. 97-6004 (2d Cir. April 23, 1997)
Apparently unsatisfied with the court's rulings in the forfeiture cases, plaintiff filed this civil action naming People's Bank, the prevailing claimant in the forfeiture cases. Plaintiff's three complaints in their various iterations again seek to reverse the state court default judgment entered on the mortgages held by the bank. See Compl. [Doc. No. 1] (Jan. 19, 2000), Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 9] (April 19, 2000), Second Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 12] (April 24, 2000). Plaintiff purports to invoke this court's supplemental jurisdiction to assert a civil violation of the criminal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, against the Bank for foreclosing under "false pretenses." Because this is the only jurisdictional predicate upon which this civil suit is purportedly based, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiff's asserted claims. By its own terms, the supplemental jurisdiction statute extends only to related state law claims where the court has original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a). This court does not have original jurisdiction to entertain a civil violation of the criminal mail fraud statute. See, e.g., Aguilar, 1999 WL 1067841, at *6 ("Aguilar also fails to state a valid mail fraud claim as that criminal code provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, may only be prosecuted by the government, not against it.")
Even if plaintiff could plead a cognizable federal cause of action, he may not use this forum to seek to overturn a state court default judgment. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) (holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review state court decisions). As cogently explained in the Bank's memorandum, under the Rooker doctrine, federal courts are precluded from hearing appeals from state court judgments. See Def's. Mem. [Doc. No. 8] at 6— 9 (April 10, 2000). Plaintiff's remedy —-if any — should have been sought in the state court or on appeal from the forfeiture actions.
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. No. 19] is hereby GRANTED. After reviewing the record, the court adheres to its prior ruling. Since this case was closed when judgment entered for defendants over a month ago, the clerk is directed to accept no further filings in this matter.
So ordered.