Wiers International Trucks, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 31, 2008

353 N.L.R.B. 475 (N.L.R.B. 2008)

353 NLRB No. 48
Wiers International Trucks, Inc. and Great Lakes
International Trucks, LLC d/b/a Wiers Interna-
tional Trucks, joint employers and/or a single
employer, and its successor Great Lakes Inter-
national Trucks, LLC and International Union
of Operating Engineers, Local 150 a/w Interna-
tional Union of Operating Engineers, AFL–CIO.
Cases 25–CA–30375 and 25–RC–10389
October 31, 2008
DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION
BY CHAIRMAN SCHAMBER AND MEMBER LIEBMAN
On July 23, 2008, Administrative Law Judge Paul
Bogas issued the attached decision. Respondent Great
Lakes International Trucks, LLC (Respondent Great
Lakes) filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the Gen-
eral Counsel and the Charging Party filed answering
briefs, and the General Counsel filed cross-exceptions
and a supporting brief.1
The National Labor Relations Board2 has considered
the decision3 and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs, and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings,
findings,4 and conclusions5 and to adopt the recom-
mended Order.6

1 Weirs International Trucks, Inc. is not a party to this proceeding,
except to the extent it is alleged to be a single employer and joint em-
ployer with Respondent Great Lakes.
2 Effective midnight December 28, 2007, Members Liebman,
Schaumber, Kirsanow, and Walsh delegated to Members Liebman,
Schaumber, and Kirsanow, as a three-member group, all of the Board’s
powers in anticipation of the expiration of the terms of Members Kir-
sanow and Walsh on December 31, 2007. Pursuant to this delegation,
Chairman Schaumber and Member Liebman constitute a quorum of the
three-member group. As a quorum, they have the authority to issue
decisions and orders in unfair labor practice and representation cases.
See Sec. 3(b) of the Act.
3 In adopting the judge’s findings that Respondent Great Lakes
unlawfully transferred employees Timothy Burelison, John Bussey, and
Eric Reamer from its Elkhart, Indiana facility, we do not rely on his
statement that the Respondent offered no explanation for transferring
employee Gary Morton to that facility when it allegedly did not have
enough work for service technicians already employed there. Supervi-
sor Drew Hettich testified, without contradiction, that Morton was
transferred to the facility in order to train less experienced service tech-
nicians. We nevertheless adopt the judge’s findings that the transfers of
Burelison, Bussey, and Reamer were discriminatorily motivated, for the
other reasons he cited.
4 Respondent Great Lakes has excepted to some of the judge’s credi-
bility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an
administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear pre-
ponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are in-
correct. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188
F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and
find no basis for reversing the findings.
Respondent Great Lakes also argues that the two-member Board
does not constitute a quorum as required by statute and, therefore, the
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that Respondent Great Lakes International Trucks,
LLC, Elkhart and South Bend, Indiana, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Order.
DIRECTION
IT IS DIRECTED that the Regional Director for Region
25 shall, within 14 days from the date of this Decision,
Order, and Direction, open and count the ballots of
Timothy Burelison, John Bussey, and Eric Reamer. The
Regional Director shall then prepare and serve on the
parties a revised tally of ballots and issue the appropriate
certification, identifying Great Lakes International
Trucks, LLC as the employing entity.
Derek A. Johnson, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Steve Shoup, Esq. (Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart,
P.C.), of Indianapolis, Indiana, for Respondent Great Lakes
International Trucks, LLC.
Bryan P. Diemer, Esq. and Karl E. Masters, Esq., of Country-
side, Illinois, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PAUL BOGAS, Administrative Law Judge. I heard these con-
solidated unfair labor practices and representation cases in Elk-
hart, Indiana, on March 4 and 5, 2008. The International Union
of Operating Engineers 150, a/w International Union of Operat-
ing Engineers, AFL–CIO (the Union or the Charging Party)
filed the original charge on June 26, 2007, and amended

Board has no authority to issue a ruling in this case. That argument is
without merit, for the reasons stated in fn. 2.
5 There are no exceptions to the judge’s findings that Respondent
Great Lakes violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by coercively interrogating employ-
ees, and threatening them with more onerous conditions and closure of
the facility if they selected the Union. There are also no exceptions to
the judge’s finding that Respondent Great Lakes violated Sec.
8(a)(1)and (3) by implementing a new benefit for the purpose of dis-
couraging union support.
In adopting the judge’s determination that Respondent Great Lakes
and Respondent Wiers IT operated neither as a single employer nor as
joint employers at the Wiers IT-Plymouth, Indiana location, we rely
particularly upon the absence of evidence that Respondent Great Lakes
took part in any aspect of the operation of the Plymouth facility. The
record is clear that Respondent Great Lakes had no role whatsoever in
the management, operation, or control of any Respondent Wiers IT-
owned facility. In these circumstances, we agree that Respondent Great
Lakes should not be held liable for unfair labor practices alleged to
have occurred at Respondent Wiers IT’s Plymouth facility.
6 The General Counsel seeks compound interest computed on a quar-
terly basis for any monetary amounts owing to the discriminatees.
Having duly considered the matter, we are not prepared at this time to
deviate from our current practice of assessing simple interest. See, e.g.,
Glen Rock Ham, 352 NLRB No. 69, slip op. at fn. 1 (2008), citing
Rogers Corp., 344 NLRB 504 (2005).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
charges on August 24 and September 28, 2007. The Regional
Director for Region 25 of the National Labor Relations Board
(the Board) issued the unfair labor practice complaint and no-
tice of hearing on November 30, 2007, alleging that the Re-
spondents had committed various unfair labor practices in ad-
vance of a representation election that was held on June 19,
2007, for a unit of employees at a truck dealership in Elkhart,
Indiana. The complaint alleges that the Respondents violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act)
by: coercively interrogating employees, soliciting grievances
from employees, promising benefits to employees, threatening
employees with plant closure and reduced terms and conditions
of employment, and prohibiting employees from discussing the
Union. In addition, the complaint alleges that the Respondents
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by beginning to pro-
vide a training and certification benefit in order to discourage
employees from supporting the Union.
The complaint further alleges that the Respondents violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by discriminatorily transfer-
ring three prounion employees from the Elkhart facility, and
subsequently disciplining and terminating one of those employ-
ees, because the employees engaged in union and other pro-
tected concerted activities. It is also alleged that two of the
transfers violated Section 8(a)(1) and (4) of the Act because
those transfers were based on the employees’ participation as
union witnesses at a preelection hearing.
Seven ballots were cast at the representation election on June
19—two in favor of the Union, two against the Union, and
three determinative ballots that were challenged by the em-
ployer. The challenged ballots were cast by the same three
employees who the unfair labor practices complaint alleges the
employer unlawfully transferred, and in one case, unlawfully
discharged. The employer contends that the three determina-
tive ballots should not be counted because the employees who
cast them were no longer working at the Elkhart facility at the
time of the election. The Union counters that the challenges
should be overruled because the employer transferred and dis-
charged the employees for reasons that violated the Act.
On December 5, 2007, the Regional Director issued an order
directing a consolidated hearing on the alleged unfair labor
practices, the three ballot challenges, and determination of the
name of the employing entity.
Shortly before the hearing, one of the named Respondents—
Wiers International Trucks, Inc. (Wiers IT)—reached a settle-
ment with the Region regarding both the unfair labor practices
case and the representation case. At the start of the hearing, the
General Counsel stated that it was proceeding only against
Great Lakes International Trucks, LLC (Respondent Great
Lakes, the Respondent, or the Company), not Wiers IT.1 Al-
though counsel for Wiers IT had participated in prehearing
conferences prior to reaching the settlement, no representative
entered an appearance on behalf of Wiers IT at the hearing.

1 Counsel for the General Counsel stated. “that Wiers International
Trucks, Inc., as an entity has settled with the Region,” and “as regards
. . . the proceedings here today we’re only proceeding against Great
Lakes and whatever entity that constituted at the time in terms of the
Elkhart facility that’s at issue here.” Tr. 8; see also GC Br. 13 fn. 4.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel, Respondent Great Lakes, and the Un-
ion, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent Great Lakes sells and services trucks at its facili-
ties in Elkhart and South Bend, Indiana. In conducting these
activities during the 12-months preceding issuance of the com-
plaint, Respondent Great Lakes sold and shipped from its Indi-
ana facilities goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to
points outside the State of Indiana, and received at those facili-
ties goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points
outside the State of Indiana. Respondent Great Lakes admits,2
and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the
Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
II. RESPONDENT GREAT LAKES AND ITS RELATIONSHIP
TO WIERS IT
International Truck and Engine Corp. is a truck manufacturer
that also owns dealerships where it sells and services its prod-
ucts. Respondent Great Lakes is an entity that International
Truck and Engine created to purchase, operate, and/or sell four
such dealerships. Those four dealerships are located in Elkhart,
Indiana, South Bend, Indiana, Jackson, Michigan, and Kalama-
zoo, Michigan (the Great Lakes facilities). The Elkhart dealer-
ship became the subject of a union organizing campaign in
2007 and most of the allegations in the complaint involve that
location.
Wiers IT is an independently owned dealer of International
trucks that does business in the same general geographic region
as Respondent Great Lakes. Wiers IT sells and services Inter-
national trucks at three dealerships located in Lafayette,
Logansport, and Plymouth, Indiana (the Wiers IT facilities).3
Its headquarters are located at the Plymouth facility. Thomas
Wiers (T. Wiers) has, for at least 14 years, owned Wiers IT and
serves as its president and chief executive officer. Drew Het-
tich has been the director of parts and service for Wiers IT
since August 2005.
At some point, T. Wiers became interested in purchasing the
four Great Lakes dealerships. On February 24, 2006, T. Wiers
entered into an agreement to purchase those dealerships from
an entity that International Truck and Engine uses for selling
dealerships to independent operators. That seller entity is In-
ternational Dealcor Operations (International Dealcor). The

2 At the start of trial, Respondent Great Lakes amended its answer to
admit that it was, at all relevant times, a statutory employer. Tr.14–15.
In its brief, Respondent Great Lakes concedes that it was the employer
of all employees at the Elkhart facility from February 24, 2006, until
July 13, 2007.
3 For convenience, and consistent with the suggestion of the General
Counsel, I use the term “Great Lakes facilities” to refer to the Elkhart,
Jackson, Kalamazoo, and South Bend locations, and the term “Wiers IT
facilities” to refer to the Lafayette, Logansport, and Plymouth locations.
(GC Br. 3 fn. 2.)
WIERS INTERNATIONAL TRUCKS 3
purchase agreement installed T. Wiers as president of Respon-
dent Great Lakes. Under the agreement, T. Wiers did not ac-
quire full ownership of Respondent Great Lakes. Rather,
T. Wiers began with a six percent ownership interest in the
Company and was entitled to purchase additional shares of
Great Lakes from International Dealcor4 using bonuses that he
could earn as president of Respondent Great Lakes. Under the
purchase agreement, the board of managers of Great Lakes
and/or International Dealcor had the absolute right to remove
T. Wiers from his position as president of Respondent Great
Lakes. In the event that T. Wiers was removed, his right to
purchase Respondent Great Lakes would be extinguished. As
is discussed below, subsequent to the time when the unfair
labor practices are alleged to have occurred, the board of man-
agers of Great Lakes and/or International Dealcor did, in fact,
remove T. Wiers from his position as Great Lakes’ president.
On the same day that T. Wiers and International Dealcor en-
tered into the purchase agreement, they also entered into an
agreement on bonuses, the stated purpose of which was to
compensate T. Wiers, as president of Respondent Great Lakes,
“in relation to the degree of his success in managing the busi-
ness and affairs of [Respondent Great Lakes].” Under the
agreement, T. Wiers promised that as president of Respondent
Great Lakes, he would “devote 100 percent of his efforts to
[Respondent Great Lakes’] business,” and would “adhere to its
business management and other policies, as determined from
time to time by its Board of Managers.” T. Wiers would re-
ceive a salary plus a bonus based on a percentage of Respon-
dent Great Lakes’ earnings. As with the purchase agreement,
this document stated that the board of managers of Great Lakes
and/or International Dealcor had the “absolute” right to termi-
nate T. Wiers’ service as president of Respondent Great Lakes.
In addition to serving as president of Great Lakes, T. Wiers was
made a member of Great Lakes’ board of managers. A number
of the approximately five other members of the Great Lakes
board of managers were officials of International Truck and
Engine and/or International Dealcor.
During the time that he was president of Respondent Great
Lakes, T. Wiers had authority over day-to-day employment and
labor relations at the Great Lakes facilities. He had the power
to discipline employees, hire, and fire employees, transfer em-
ployees between locations, recommend wage rate changes, and
direct employees in the performance of their duties.5 How-

4 International Dealcor owned the other 94 percent of the shares of
Respondent Great Lakes.
5 In its answer, Respondent Great Lakes denied that T. Wiers was its
agent or supervisor during the period when the violations at the Great
Lakes facilities are alleged to have occurred. In its brief, however,
Respondent Great Lakes concedes that T. Wiers was its agent during
the relevant time period. R. Br. at 11. To the extent that Respondent
Great Lakes may still be arguing that T. Wiers was not acting as its
agent with respect to the specific conduct alleged to be unlawful be-
cause the Great Lakes board of managers did not authorize that con-
duct, the argument fails under Sec. 2(13) of the Act, which provides
that “[i]n determining whether any person is acting as an ‘agent’ . . .
the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually au-
thorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling.” See also
Braun Electric Co., 324 NLRB 1, 2–3 (1997) (company’s president
ever, T. Wiers’ authority regarding the making of management
policy was limited. Pursuant to both the purchase agreement
and the agreement on bonuses, T. Wiers was required to “ad-
here to [the Great Lakes’] business management and other poli-
cies” in the operation of the Great Lakes facilities. T. Wiers’
authority as president of Great Lakes was also limited when it
came to financial matters. He was required to obtain the ap-
proval of the Great Lakes board of managers for any expendi-
ture at the Great Lakes facilities that exceeded $10,000, and
also consulted with the board of managers regarding other sig-
nificant business decisions. In addition, he had to obtain ap-
proval before making adjustments of more than $1000 to
charges for warranty service to vehicles. Once a month,
T. Wiers was required to make a report to the board of manag-
ers in which he summarized activities at the Great Lakes facili-
ties and provided financial information. The record contains
two examples of these reports, and in both T. Wiers discussed
various personnel matters at the Great Lakes facilities, includ-
ing, in general terms, his opposition to the union organizing
campaign at the Elkhart facility. These reports do not make
any mention of the Wiers IT facilities. Auditors for Interna-
tional Truck and Engine and/or Respondent Great Lakes would
visit T. Wiers intermittently in order to verify that he was oper-
ating the Great Lakes facilities in accordance with Great Lakes’
policies.
The record indicates that it was T. Wiers’ ambition to make
the four Great Lakes facilities part of Wiers IT. He testified
that he was moving the four Great Lakes facilities and the three
Wiers IT facilities “towards commonality in terms of several
items.” His plan was to “brand” the Great Lakes facilities with
the Wiers name. Towards that end, he requested, and obtained,
approval from the Great Lakes board of managers to begin
using the Wiers name even when doing business at the Great
Lakes facilities. On March 6, 2006, T. Wiers filed paperwork
with the State of Michigan stating that Respondent Great Lakes
would be transacting business under the assumed name “Wiers
International Trucks.” He filed the same type of paperwork
with the State of Indiana. T. Wiers also began using Wiers IT
signs, stationary, and business cards at the Great Lakes facili-
ties. The record indicates that, for a period of time, the pay-
check stubs for employees at the Great Lakes facilities carried
the names of both Wiers IT and Respondent Great Lakes.
However, the paycheck stubs in the record from the Wiers IT
facilities carry only the name of Wiers IT.
T. Wiers also began to consolidate certain management and
administrative functions. Hettich, who was the director of parts
and service for the three Wiers IT facilities, also oversaw the
four Great Lakes facilities during the relevant time period.6
The managers of the individual Great Lakes locations began
reporting to Hettich, who, in turn, reported to T. Wiers. Hettich
had authority to hire, train, and fire employees, and to recom-
mend wage increases, at the Great Lakes facilities, as well as at
the Wiers IT locations. He was also held responsible for the

acting as agent, despite company’s argument that president’s specific
acts were outside his authority).
6 His title with Respondent Great Lakes was “district parts and ser-
vice manager.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
level of income generated by those facilities.7 The Great Lakes
facilities and the Wiers IT facilities all submitted their payroll
information to the same payroll clerk, who was located at the
Wiers IT facility in Plymouth. That payroll clerk, in turn, sub-
mitted the information to an outside payroll company that actu-
ally issued employees’ paychecks. During the period that the
purchase agreement was in effect, the personnel files for em-
ployees of the Great Lakes facilities and the Wiers IT facilities
were kept at the Wiers IT location in Plymouth. Sales paper-
work from both the Great Lakes facilities and the Wiers IT
facilities was processed by a Great Lakes employee who
worked at the Great Lakes location in South Bend. There were
two or more employees of Respondent Great Lakes who were
stationed at the Wiers IT headquarters in Plymouth.
Despite the push towards “commonality” on “several items,”
the Great Lakes and Wiers TI facilities remained discrete enti-
ties in significant respects. No action was taken to re-
incorporate the two companies as a single entity. Respondent
Great Lakes never owned any portion of Wiers IT or its facili-
ties, or had any authority over how T. Wiers operated the Wiers
IT locations. In the operation of the Great Lakes facilities, on
the other hand, T. Wiers was required by the purchase agree-
ment to “adhere to [Great Lakes’] business management and
other policies.” T. Wiers testified that there was no plan to
generally apply the Wiers IT policies at the Great Lakes facili-
ties. Rather, he stated, “Wiers had some things that were in
place” and “Great Lakes had some things that were in place.”
Over time, Respondent Great Lakes and Wiers IT adopted cer-
tain common policies and procedures that they determined were
“best practices,” but this was, according to T. Wiers, only done
“to some degree.” During much of the time that T. Wiers was
president of both Respondent Great Lakes and Wiers IT, the
Great Lakes facilities (including the Elkhart location) continued
to use the Great Lakes’ personnel handbook, while the Wiers IT
facilities used a different, Wiers IT, handbook. It was not until
April 2007—after the filing of the representation petition—that
the Respondent began to distribute the Wiers IT handbook to
employees at the Elkhart location. Even then, the Respondent
was not shown to have withdrawn the Great Lakes personnel
handbook.
The record shows that a bright line continued to exist be-
tween the finances of Wiers IT and Respondent Great Lakes,
even after T. Wiers began using the Wiers name at the Great

7 In its answer, Respondent Great Lakes denied that Hettich was its
supervisor and agent during the relevant time period, but that conten-
tion is wholly without merit. Given Hettich’s authority at the Great
Lakes facilities as summarized above, he was, without doubt, Respon-
dent Great Lakes’ supervisor with the meaning of Sec. 2(11) and its
agent within the meaning of Sec. 2(13) during the period when he al-
legedly took actions that violated the Act. Moreover, an individual
who engages in interrogations, promises of benefit, or other coercive
activity is an agent of the employer if the individual was placed by
management in a strategic position where employees could reasonably
believe he spoke on its behalf. CDR Mfg., 324 NLRB 786 (1997);
Roskin Bros., Inc., 274 NLRB 413, 421 (1985); Elias Mallouk Realty
Corp., 265 NLRB 1225, 1234–1235 (1982); B-P Custom Building
Products, 251 NLRB 1337, 1338 (1980). Respondent Great Lakes
placed Hettich in such a position.
Lakes facilities. Respondent Great Lakes had a bank account
that was owned by Great Lakes and from which it paid employ-
ees at the four Great Lakes facilities. Wiers IT had a separate
bank account that was owned by Wiers IT and which was used
to pay employees of the three Wiers facilities. When an em-
ployee of a Great Lakes facility did work that benefited a Wiers
IT facility, an invoice was created and Wiers IT reimbursed
Respondent Great Lakes for the time spent by that employee on
Wiers IT business. Likewise, when an employee of a Wiers IT
facility performed work for a Great Lakes facility, Respondent
Great Lakes would reimburse Wiers IT. This reimbursement
procedure was followed with respect to services rendered by
Hettich, as well as to services rendered by the payroll clerk and
the sales processing clerk discussed above. When T. Wiers
made a bulk purchase of new computers to be used at both the
Wiers IT facilities and the Great Lakes facilities, Respondent
Great Lakes paid Wiers IT for the computers that were placed
at the Great Lakes facilities. The W-2 forms provided to indi-
viduals employed at the four Great Lakes facilities identified
the employer as Great Lakes International Trucks even after T.
Wiers began using the Wiers IT name at those facilities. The
W-2 forms issued to employees at the Wiers IT facilities, on the
other hand, listed the employer as Wiers International Trucks.
After Timothy Burelison was moved from a Great Lakes facil-
ity to a Wiers IT facility in May 2007 he received a Great
Lakes W-2 form for the pretransfer period and a Wiers IT W-2
form for the posttransfer period. T. Wiers ran a number of
marketing advertisements in the name of Respondent Great
Lakes, without any mention of Wiers IT.
When T. Wiers became president of Respondent Great Lakes
he did not replace the employees with Wiers IT staff, but rather
retained the Great Lakes employees and continued to pay them
at Great Lakes’ established wage rates. He made annual rec-
ommendations for merit wage increases at the Great Lakes
facilities, but had to obtain approval from the Great Lakes
board before implementing those increases. Employees who
worked at the Great Lakes facilities remained in Respondent
Great Lakes’ health plan, while employees at the Wiers IT fa-
cilities were covered by a separate Wiers IT health plan. Re-
spondent Great Lakes and Wiers IT maintained separate work-
ers’ compensation insurance, and separate business numbers.
The record also showed that after Respondent Great Lake be-
gan using the Wiers name for much of its operation, it contin-
ued using the Great Lakes name for commercial truck leasing.
T. Wiers’ tenure as president of the Great Lakes facilities
was terminated on July 13, 2007. All of the unfair labor prac-
tices described in the complaint are alleged to have occurred
during the period when T. Wiers was president of Respondent
Great Lakes. After July 13, T. Wiers continued to be owner,
president, and chief executive officer of Wiers IT, as he had
been for many years prior to his involvement with Respondent
Great Lakes. Similarly, Hettich continued in his position with
Wiers IT, but no longer had any role at the Great Lakes facili-
ties. After T. Wiers’ tenure as president of Respondent Great
Lakes ended, Respondent Great Lakes continued to employ a
majority of the employees who were already working at the
Great Lakes facilities.
WIERS INTERNATIONAL TRUCKS 5
III. UNION CAMPAIGN
A. Representation Petition
In early 2007, Robert Mohney and William Allison—
mechanics at the Great Lakes facility in Elkhart—contacted a
business agent of the Union about meeting with employees.
Mohney and Allison subsequently informed other employees
that the Union was interested in representing mechanics at the
Elkhart facility. During the relevant time period, the Elkhart
facility employed between five and nine such mechanics—
referred to there as “service technicians.” A number of the
service technicians who Mohney and Allison talked to about
representation signed union authorization cards. The service
technicians also held group union meetings, talked informally
about the Union, and displayed various types of prounion para-
phernalia.
The record shows that the three alleged discriminatees—
Timothy Burelison, John Bussey, and Eric Reamer—
participated in the Union activities. All three signed union
authorization cards and attended group union meetings. Bureli-
son attended five or six of the union meetings, Bussey attended
multiple such meetings, and Reamer attended nearly all of the
meetings. The three alleged discriminatees also talked to other
employees about their support for the Union. Bussey and
Reamer both placed prounion stickers on the toolboxes that
they kept in the facility’s shop—a location where the stickers
could be seen by employees, supervisors, and managers.8 In
addition, Reamer placed a prounion bumper sticker on the ve-
hicle that he drove to work and parked in the facility’s parking
lot. He also wore a keychain bearing a union insignia in such a
way that it could be seen by others. Hettich did not deny that
he observed the public displays of union support by the three
alleged discriminatees, nor did he deny that he was aware that
those employees supported the Union. T. Wiers denied that he
saw any antiunion paraphernalia at the Elkhart facility, but did
not deny that he was aware that the three alleged discriminatees
were among the service technicians who supported the Union.
On April 6, 2007, the Union filed a petition to be certified as
the collective-bargaining representative of a unit comprised of
“All full-time and regular part-time mechanics” at the Elkhart
facility.9 Respondent Great Lakes actively opposed the unit
description in the petition, contending it should be broadened
beyond the group of eight service technicians who the Union
was seeking to represent, so as to include two service advi-
sors/writers (who distribute work assignments to the techni-
cians) and four parts department employees. A hearing was
held regarding these contentions on April 20, 2007. At the
hearing, the Union called two of the alleged discriminatees—

8 Burelison also displayed prounion paraphernalia, but only after he
was informed that he was being transferred.
9 In its brief, Respondent Great Lakes concedes that it was the em-
ployer of all employees at the Elkhart facility from February 24, 2006,
to July 13, 2007. The Union’s representation petition named “Wiers
International Trucks” as the employer, but T. Wiers testified that while
the Elkhart facility was doing business under the Wiers IT name, the
actual owner-employer was always Respondent Great Lakes. I find
that Respondent Great Lakes has been the owner-employer at the Elk-
hart facility during the time period relevant to this litigation.
Timothy Burelison and John Bussey—as witnesses. Hettich
was present when Burelison and Bussey testified. Shortly
thereafter, Hettich approached Burelison at work and said that
he was “surprised” to see him at the hearing. In a decision
issued on May 21, 2007, the Regional Director determined that
the unit description that the Union set forth in its petition—
which was limited to service technicians—was appropriate.
B. Employer’s Opposition to the Union
1. Antiunion campaign
T. Wiers testified that he opposes unionization. The Wiers
IT employee handbook has a section entitled “management
philosophy” that is concerned almost exclusively with opposi-
tion to unionization. That handbook states that “Wiers is a non-
union company,” and that the company “inten[ds] to oppose
unionization by every proper means.” Respondent Great
Lakes began to distribute this handbook at the Elkhart facility
shortly after the Union filed the representation petition.
When he received the representation petition, T. Wiers re-
tained an attorney to help him “fight” the Union, campaign for
a “no” vote, and identify legal “do’s and don’ts.” T. Wiers noti-
fied the Great Lakes board of managers of his intention to op-
pose the union campaign and obtained its approval for his
choice of an attorney to help in the effort. After being retained,
the attorney assisted Respondent Great Lakes in developing the
antiunion campaign and reviewed materials that the Respondent
disseminated to employees. T. Wiers also obtained the assis-
tance of a consultant who had been involved with a successful
antiunion campaign at another company. That consultant, Gary
Mullennix, individually interviewed each person working at the
Elkhart facility in order to identify the employees’ sources of
discontent.10 T. Wiers stated that the proper analogy for Great
Lakes’ antiunion campaign at the Elkhart facility is the legal
defense mounted by a person wrongly accused of committing a
crime.
2. T. Wiers conducts mandatory group meetings
T. Wiers conducted three group meetings with Elkhart em-
ployees regarding the Union. He required the service techni-
cians to attend each of these meetings. Hettich and the Elkhart
service manager, Jon Breitenbucher, were also present. The
first meeting was held on about April 25 or 26, the second on
about May 2, and the third in early or mid-May. According to
T. Wiers, the purpose of these meetings was to “educate,” em-
ployees about unions, not to “sway” them to vote one way or
the other. (Tr. 126.) That characterization, however, is not
credible given the record evidence about his presentations.11

10 Mullennix was soliciting grievances on behalf of Respondent
Great Lakes and I find that he was its agent for purposes of that activ-
ity. The Respondent placed Mullennix in a strategic position where
employees would reasonably believe he was soliciting grievances on its
behalf. See CDR Mfg., supra, Roskin Bros., Inc., supra; Elias Mallouk
Realty Corp., supra; B-P Custom Building Products, supra.
11 Based on his demeanor and testimony, I found T. Wiers a less than
fully credible witness. On several occasions while testifying he became
visibly amused, giving the impression that he did not believe the pro-
ceedings were to be taken seriously. In addition, he showed a willing-
ness to provide testimony that he certainly knew was false, such as the
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
The written documents that T. Wiers used at the meetings, and
the testimonies of attendees and T. Wiers himself, show that
T. Wiers’ purpose was precisely to sway employees to vote
against the Union. Although he briefly discussed the mechan-
ics of the upcoming representation election, he limited his dis-
cussion primarily to impugning the motives of union officials
and highlighting negative aspects and possible adverse conse-
quences of unionization. The written outline that T. Wiers
prepared of his remarks at the April meeting states: “Wiers
does not want a union. Any union is a thorn. It is a thorn in
your side and it is a thorn in our side.” Regarding the Union’s
motivation at the Elkhart facility, T. Wiers stated: “Why are
they here? Money! The Operating Engineers want your money
. . . . to support their expensive habits.” He stated, further, that
the Union’s “sole purpose is to serve the Union’s interests and
not yours.”
A slide that T. Wiers presented to employees at the second of
the mandatory meetings was titled “Union Facts” and stated
that if employees elected to be represented by the Union the
employees “will work for the union—not for Wiers.” The same
slide went on to state that if employees elected the Union they
could “Expect” “No increased health care benefit,” “No wage
benefit,” and “No pension benefit.” T. Wiers stated that wages
would not change and that he did not have to sign a contract,
only negotiate in good faith. Another slide in the presentation
stated that unionization caused “top performers [to] leave.”
The written remarks that T. Wiers prepared for one of the meet-
ings state that “no one would support a union if you did not
believe the union was going to get you something,” and that
“supporting the union is like buying a raffle ticket, the chances
of winning are minimal.” Generally, the only employee who
asked questions during these presentations was alleged dis-
criminatee Burelison, and T. Wiers appeared disturbed by those
questions.
Reamer testified that T. Wiers’ general subject at the meet-
ings was that selecting the Union “would only increase the
hardships [employees] would have to go through.” T. Wiers
showed employees a video presentation which stated that “the
union is only looking out for their best interests and not your
best interests” and did not discuss potential advantages of un-
ionization. Burelison remembered that T. Wiers was “open and

above-mentioned statement that it was not his purpose during the man-
datory group meetings to “sway” employees to vote one way or the
other regarding union representation. That statement is wholly incredi-
ble based not only on the content of the presentations, but also on
T. Wiers’ testimony that the meetings were part of a campaign against
the Union. In other instances he responded to questions in an evasive
manner. For example, during questioning by counsel for the General
Counsel, he first denied that Elkhart employees were not receiving
reimbursement for training/certifications, but when pressed he con-
ceded that the Elkhart employees did not even know that such a benefit
existed and were not being reimbursed. In reaching my conclusion that
T. Wiers was not a particularly credible witness I considered the fact
that he was no longer associated with Respondent Great Lakes and that
the company he continued to be associated with, Wiers IT, had already
settled with the Board. However, based on his demeanor and testi-
mony I was left with the impression that T. Wiers remained inclined to
slant his account in order to cast his actions as president of Respondent
Great Lakes in the most favorable light.
adamant that he was campaigning against the Union and that he
wanted the shop to stay union-free.” According to Bussey’s
testimony, T. Wiers held up the Union’s financial statement at
the meeting and stated that the Union was “just out to collect
the dues” and “weren’t going to give . . . any representation.”
The evidence shows that at one of the Respondent’s manda-
tory group meetings, Burelison complained that employees
were not being reimbursed for training and certifications. Em-
ployees also raised this concern to Mullennix during their one-
on-one interviews, and Mullennix communicated this to Het-
tich. At the second mandatory meeting, T. Wiers presented a
slide stating that, with the Company, employees were reim-
bursed for training and for the costs associated with obtaining
commercial drivers licenses. T. Wiers also apparently outlined
the mechanics of how employees could go about obtaining such
reimbursement.
The alleged discriminatees testified that T. Wiers made a
number of statements about closing the Elkhart facility. Bureli-
son testified that at one of the meetings, T. Wiers “said he
would have to close the facility because with the Union in
there, there’s no way that it would be profitable.” Bussey testi-
fied that at the first of the mandatory meetings, T. Wiers “basi-
cally told us,” that if the Union won the election “he was going
to have to close the shop.” Elsewhere in his testimony, Bussey
recounted T. Wiers stating, “[T]hat if this keeps up, if the union
gets elected, that they’re basically going to close the doors.”
Bussey testified that T. Wiers also touched on this subject dur-
ing the second mandatory meeting, stating that “if it kept going
on that he was going to close the doors to Elkhart.” According
to Bussey, at the third meeting, T. Wiers referenced the money
he had spent on attorneys fees to fight the union, and stated that
he was going to have to close the doors at the Elkhart facility if
he had to keep paying such “exorbitant” attorneys fees.
Reamer testified that, during a one-on-one conversation,
T. Wiers told him, “I don’t know if I can keep the doors open
with all these attorney fees and fighting the union.”
When asked whether he stated that he would close the facil-
ity, T. Wiers responded:
If there was any discussion through the course of this cam-
paign, the discussion would have been that Elkhart was not a
profitable location. I believe I stated that the Union would not
make Elkhart a profitable location and that it was up to us, be-
ing collectively management and employees, to make the
Elkhart profitable and that no business or no location over the
long term that wasn’t profitable would remain in business.
(Tr. 331.) T. Wiers also testified that he told employees having
a union would increase the legal expenses and the administra-
tive expenses for the Company. One of the slides he presented
to employees at the group meetings warns that the cost associ-
ated with the Union “further reduces profitability and viability
of Elkhart location.” T. Wiers told employees that the Com-
pany had the “right to determine viability of the Elkhart loca-
tion.” The same slide states that the Company had spent
$20,000 to defend against the Union at Elkhart and that if em-
ployees voted for union representation there would be further
costs associated with negotiating. T. Wiers also presented a
WIERS INTERNATIONAL TRUCKS 7
slide indicating that employees’ “future” would be uncertain if
they elected the Union.12
I find that the record does not establish that T. Wiers explic-
itly stated that he would close the Elkhart facility rather than
operate it with a union in place or during an ongoing union
campaign. T. Wiers essentially denied making such statements
and although I found him a less than candid witness, see supra
footnote 11, his denial was consistent with the documentary
evidence and was otherwise plausible. To the extent that the
testimonies of Burelison, Bussey, and Reamer indicate that
T. Wiers said that he would close the facility because of un-
ionization or the union drive per se—as opposed to unprofita-
bility that T. Wiers predicted would be exacerbated by unioni-
zation—I find that such testimony does not outweigh the con-
trary evidence. The accounts of T. Wiers’ exact wording that
were given by Burelison, Bussey, and Reamer were not consis-
tent. Indeed, Reamer did not recount T. Wiers making any
statements regarding plant closure during the mandatory group
meetings, but only during an individual meeting between
T. Wiers and himself. Moreover, Bussey qualified his testi-
mony by stating that T. Wiers “basically” made certain state-
ments regarding plant closure, not that he made exactly those
statements. Burelison testified about statements made by
T. Wiers regarding closure of the facility, but was unable to
remember when precisely T. Wiers made those statements. For
these reasons I find only that T. Wiers made those statements
regarding plant closure that he testified to and/or that are me-
morialized in the documentary evidence from his presenta-
tions.13
3. Agents of Employer meet individually
with employees
T. Wiers and Hettich also discussed the Union during un-
scheduled one-on-one meetings with most of the employees at
the Elkhart facility. These individual meetings generally oc-
curred immediately after the mandatory group meetings during

12 This slide is titled “What do you have with Union?” and then lists,
inter alia, “Future?”
13 That being said, it is not surprising to me that Burelison, Bussey,
and Reamer would understand T. Wiers to be saying that they would
lose their jobs at the Elkhart facility if employees elected to be repre-
sented by the Union or continued the union campaign. The evidence
suggests that T. Wiers, who reviewed the information he disseminated
with legal counsel, chose his words carefully to leave employees with
the impression that unionization would result in the closure of the Elk-
hart facility, without actually stating that it was unionization or union
activity, as opposed to the unprofitability that he predicted unionization
would exacerbate, which would lead to closure. As the Supreme Court
has noted, when reviewing such comments one “must take into account
the economic dependence of the employees on their employer, and the
necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick
up intended implications of the latter that might be more readily dis-
missed by a more disinterested ear.” NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395
U.S. 575, 617 (1969); see also American Pine Lodge Nursing, 325
NLRB 98 fn. 1 (1997), enf. granted in part, denied in part 164 F.3d 867
(4th Cir. 1999) (“A trier of fact is not required to accept the entirety of
a witness’ testimony, but may believe some and not all of what a wit-
ness says.”); Excel Containers, Inc., 325 NLRB 17 fn. 1 (1997) (noth-
ing is more common in all kinds of judicial decisions than to believe
some and not all, of a witness’ testimony).
which T. Wiers had campaigned against the Union. During the
individual meetings, T. Wiers and Hettich would typically ask
employees what they thought the Union could do for them.
Hettich would also discuss problems that employees were hav-
ing with payroll, health insurance, job transfers, and the union
campaign—the idea being that Hettich would try to help em-
ployees with those problems.
Burelison described the individual meetings that T. Wiers
and Hettich each conducted with him. T. Wiers conducted his
meeting with Burelison in the employee breakroom, while Het-
tich approached Burelison near his toolbox, which Burelison
described as a “more isolated” location. Both T. Wiers and
Hettich asked Burelison why employees would want to have a
union. Burelison told them that it was because of issues relat-
ing to insurance, pension, and “quality of work life.” During
these meetings, both officials asked Burelison what he thought
the results of the election would be.14 In addition, Hettich
asked Burelison, “[W]ho he thought was in favor and who
wasn’t.”15 During a one-on-one meeting, T. Wiers asked
Bussey how he thought the Union would benefit him. Bussey
answered that the Union provided better benefits—an answer to
which T. Wiers reacted by “kind of frowning.” The exchange
made Bussey uncomfortable and he ended the conversation at
the first opportunity.
Hettich conducted a one-on-one meeting with Reamer in the
Elkhart facility’s parking lot. Hettich told Reamer: “I under-
stand the union people are hitting you guys kind of hard. I just
want you to know that we are the good guys in this.” Then
Hettich asked Reamer whether he was attending the union
meetings. Reamer answered that he had, but probably would
not attend future meetings. Hettich asked Reamer whether he
knew anyone else who was going to the union meetings.
Reamer responded either “no” or “I can’t tell you.” During a
subsequent conversation—this one a few days before Reamer
was transferred—Hettich told Reamer that he had “heard a
vicious rumor.” When Reamer asked what the rumor was,
Hettich responded, “I heard you were for the Union.” Then
Hettich asked, “Are you for the Union or for the company?”
Reamer answered, “I’m for the Union at this time.” Hettich
then warned: “[O]nly . . . three things can happen with the
Union coming in here. One it can get better; two it can stay the
same; or three, it can get worse. It’s not going to get better and
it’s not going to stay the same. It can only get worse.”
After receiving the union petition, Respondent Great Lakes
arranged to have a consultant, Gary Mullennix, assist in the
antiunion campaign. Mullennix conducted individual inter-
views of approximately 30 minutes in length with every em-

14 Burelison credibly testified that both officials asked him what he
thought the result of the election would be. Hettich confirmed that he
had posed this question and T. Wiers stated that he did not recall asking
the question, but did not specifically deny that he had done so.
15 I base the conclusion that Hettich asked Burelison to reveal who
he thought was in favor of the Union on Burelison’s account. Tr. 239.
Hettich stated that “to the best of [his] knowledge” he did not “specifi-
cally” ask employees about their own positions regarding the Union.
Tr. 210. Not only is that denial somewhat half-hearted sounding, but
even if credited it would not rebut Burelison’s testimony that Hettich
asked him to reveal other employees’ union views.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
ployee at the Elkhart facility. Hettich, who scheduled the inter-
views, testified that this activity was motivated by the Union’s
petition and that the purpose was to find out what the employ-
ees’ issues and concerns were so that the employer would be
able to correct them. After Mullennix had finished interview-
ing employees, he met with Hettich to discuss the issues raised
by employees. Hettich then talked to employees on the shop
floor or in break areas to follow up on the issues and concerns
that had been brought to his attention. T. Wiers, in an April 20
report to the Great Lakes board of managers, stated that he was
working with Mullennix and a labor law attorney to “resolve
the issues.”
IV. REIMBURSEMENT FOR OBTAINING CERTIFICATIONS
AND COMMERCIAL DRIVERS LICENSES
When Burelison and Bussey were hired at the Elkhart facility
in December 2006, they understood that the employer would
reimburse them for obtaining Automotive Service Excellence
(ASE) certifications and a Commercial Drivers License (CDL).
According to Burelison, it was “pretty expensive” to obtain the
ASE certifications and a CDL, and the employer’s promise of
reimbursement was one of the reasons he had accepted the
position at the Elkhart facility. Shortly thereafter, Kevin
Fields—who at the time was the service manager at the Elkhart
facility—announced to Bussey and other employees that the
Company could no longer afford to reimburse them and was
discontinuing the benefit. In February 2007, Burelison asked
Fields about the training/certification benefit, and Fields told
him that “we’re not going to follow through with it at this
time.”16
At one of the mandatory antiunion meetings, as well as dur-
ing interviews with Mullennix, employees at the Elkhart facility
complained that they were not being reimbursed for obtaining
ASE certifications and CDLs. At the second group meeting,
T. Wiers presented a slide which stated that the employer was
providing employees with “Paid ASE,” and “Paid CDL.”
T. Wiers discussed how reimbursements worked under that
program. He also responded to employee questions regarding
the program by distributing copies of the Wiers IT handbook.
He testified that the handbook, which employees at the Elkhart
facility had not received until then, explained the benefit.17 Up
until that time, Respondent Great Lakes had not provided Bu-
relison with any training materials, but about 1 week after the
second meeting, Hettich gave Burelison guides and training
videos that were part of the ASE/CDL reimbursement program.
T. Wiers denied that the ASE/CDL reimbursement benefit
was new. However, he made no effort to explain the unrebut-
ted testimony that, shortly before the start of the union cam-
paign, the Elkhart service manager told multiple employees that
the benefit would not be provided to them. Moreover,
T. Wiers’ claim that employees had the benefit before the union

16 Fields did not testify. There was no evidence contradicting
Bussey’s and Burelison’s testimonies that Fields announced discon-
tinuation of the benefits relating to ASE certification and CDLs.
17 In the past, a Great Lakes handbook had been distributed at the
Elkhart facility. The Great Lakes handbook was not introduced as an
exhibit and there was no evidence that it discussed the ASE/CDL reim-
bursement benefit.
campaign is undercut by his statement that the benefit was set
forth in the Wiers IT handbook, since by his own account em-
ployees at the Elkhart facility did not receive that handbook
until after they raised the ASE/CDL reimbursement issue dur-
ing the union campaign. Indeed, T. Wiers and Hettich admitted
that it became clear during the union campaign that employees
at the Elkhart facility had no knowledge that reimbursement for
ASE certification or CDLs was available to them and were not,
in fact, obtaining reimbursement.
V. TRANSFERS AND TERMINATION
In May 2007, T. Wiers made four personnel transfer deci-
sions that involved the Elkhart facility. The first was in early
May when he transferred a service technician named Gary Mor-
ton to the Elkhart facility from the Wiers IT facility in Ply-
mouth.18 In his May report to the Great Lakes board of man-
gers, T. Wiers commented: “[Morton’s] been with me since
1994. Good person and he will help train the current staff.
Important move. Union vote is scheduled for end of May/be-
ginning June. I am cautiously optimistic about the outcome.”
Subsequently, at least two things happened that could be ex-
pected to dampen T. Wiers’ optimism that the Union would be
defeated in the upcoming election. First, on May 21, 2007, the
Regional Director issued a decision rejecting the Employer’s
contention that the unit definition should be altered to include
service writers and employees of the parts department. Sec-
ond, Reamer, under questioning by Hettich, announced that he
was “for the Union.”
On May 25, a few days after the board’s May 21 decision
and Reamer’s declaration, T. Wiers had Hettich inform Bureli-
son, Bussey and Reamer that they were all being transferred
from the Elkhart facility. All three of these service technicians
had been included on the list of eligible voters that Respondent
Great Lakes submitted for the payroll period ending on May 13,
2007. T. Wiers admitted that he transferred these employees
out of the bargaining unit against the advice of the labor attor-
ney who he had specifically retained to advise the Company on
“do’s and don’ts” during the organizing campaign. (Tr. 120,
131–132.) T. Wiers transferred Burelison to the Plymouth
facility—the same location from which he had just recently
transferred Morton to Elkhart. Thus, T. Wiers effectively
traded Burelison—a known union supporter—for Morton—an
individual who T. Wiers had employed since 1994. Morton
was closely enough associated with T. Wiers that when Re-
spondent Great Lakes ended T. Wiers’ tenure as its president,
Morton, unlike other employees, left with T. Wiers and re-
turned to the Plymouth facility. T. Wiers transferred Bussey to
the Great Lakes facility in Kalamazoo, and Reamer to the Great
Lakes facility in South Bend. Burelison and Reamer were re-

18 By using the term “transfer” to refer to the removal of Morton
from the Plymouth facility and his placement at the Elkhart facility, I
do not mean to suggest that those two facilities were part of a single-
integrated business enterprise/single employer or a joint employer. As
discussed below, Plymouth and the other Wiers IT facilities were not
part of such a relationship with the Great Lakes facilities such as the
Elkhart location. However, the fact that T. Wiers was the president of
both Respondent Great Lakes and Wiers IT enabled him to carry out
“transfers” between the two separate companies.
WIERS INTERNATIONAL TRUCKS 9
quired to report to their new duty stations on May 30, and
Bussey on May 31.
T. Wiers testified that he made the decision to transfer three
of the eight service technicians eligible to vote in the upcoming
election at the Elkhart facility because there was not enough
work for the service technicians assigned to that location. He
stated that the reason he chose Burelison, Bussey, and Reamer
as the three service technicians transferred was that they had
previously asked Hettich for transfers and were the three least
senior service technicians.19 When pressed, however, T. Wiers
stated that only Bussey and Reamer had “definitely” requested
transfers. (Tr. 99–100.) After carefully considering the re-
cord, I find that the evidence does not show that any of the
alleged discriminatees requested transfers. In Burelison’s case,
even Hettich, to whom T. Wiers claims the transfer requests
were made, said that Burelison was not among the employees
who had made such a request. Burelison and Bussey both
clearly and confidently testified that they had never requested
transfers (Tr. 266–267, 315), and based on their demeanor and
testimony, and the record as a whole, I credit that testimony.20
In the case of Reamer, while the record shows that months
earlier he had broached the subject of working at the South
Bend location, it supports his testimony that he never asked to
transfer. (Tr. 288.) More specifically, the record shows that
about 3 weeks after starting work at the Elkhart facility in Janu-
ary or February 2007, Reamer asked Hettich, “[W]hat the pos-
sibility would be,” of working at the South Bend facility. Het-
tich responded that it would probably not be possible for
Reamer to work at the South Bend facility because Reamer’s
father was a service advisor/writer at that location. Therefore,
if Reamer worked at the South Bend location his own father
would be assigning work to him. Hettich told Reamer that it
was “against company policy to have family members working
in the same department in the same facility.”21 Reamer credi-

19 Respondent Great Lakes does not claim that employee perform-
ance had anything to do with the decisions to transfer the alleged dis-
criminatees, but T. Wiers implied that Burelison’s skills were somehow
lacking. Tr. 99. The Respondent’s own records for April 2007—the
last full month before the transfer decisions were made—report that
Burelison was the third most productive of the eight service technicians
at the Elkhart facility. GC Exh. 15. Burelison testified that his effi-
ciency rating placed him the top three of the eight service technicians at
the Elkhart facility. Burelison had been working as a service technician
continuously since 1979 and was actively recruited to work at the Elk-
hart facility. During Burelison’s relatively brief period of employment
at the Elkhart facility, Respondent Great Lakes granted him a wage
increase.
20 In addition, I note that Bussey was still working for Respondent
Great Lakes at the time he testified. While my credibility determina-
tion regarding Bussey is made independently of that fact, I nevertheless
note that crediting him is consistent with the Board’s view that the
testimony of a current employee that is adverse to his employer is
“given at considerable risk of economic reprisal, including loss of em-
ployment . . . and for this reason not likely to be false.” Shop-Rite Su-
permarket, 231 NLRB 500, 505 fn. 22 (1977); see also Jewish Home
for the Elderly of Fairfield County, 343 NLRB 1069 fn. 2 (2004), enfd.
174 Fed. Appx. 631 (2d Cir. 2006); and Flexsteel Industries, 316
NLRB 745 (1995), enfd. mem. 83 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 1996).
21 The Wiers IT handbook, which was distributed to some Elkhart
employees shortly before the transfers, includes a policy that disfavors
bly testified that during the approximately 3 months between
the time of this discussion and the time he was forced to trans-
fer from the Elkhart facility to the South Bend facility, he never
again raised the subject with the Respondent. Reamer testified,
further, that he wanted to stay at the Elkhart facility, but that
Hettich told him his only choices were to transfer to the South
Bend facility, or be laid off.
To support the claim that Bussey and Reamer requested
transfers, Respondent Great Lakes relies primarily on the testi-
mony of Hettich. Hettich testified that Bussey, Reamer, and a
third Elkhart service technician named Anthony Hood asked
him if they could transfer after the Union filed its petition to
represent employees. According to Hettich, all three stated that
they wanted to transfer in order to avoid involvement with the
Union. I find Hettich’s testimony on this score less credible
than the denials of Bussey and Reamer. First, it is facially im-
plausible that Bussey and Reamer, both of whom publicly sup-
ported bringing the Union to the Elkhart facility, would seek to
abandon that facility in order to avoid involvement with the
Union. Moreover, Hettich’s testimony on the subject vacil-
lated. At first he testified that Bussey requested a transfer to
Kalamazoo, but then he qualified his testimony to state that all
Bussey “actually” did was “mention[ ] that there was an oppor-
tunity for him to go to work” for a manufacturing company
“that was located in Kalamazoo.” Similarly, after first stating
that Reamer was seeking a transfer to South Bend to avoid
involvement with the Union, Hettich later gave other reasons—
for example, that Reamer wanted to work with his father or felt
he could be mentored more professionally in South Bend.
While T. Wiers repeatedly claimed that he was merely “hon-
oring” the transfer requests purportedly made by the alleged
discriminatees (Tr. 99–101), that characterization is hard to
square with the record evidence. First, as discussed above, the
credible evidence did not show that any of the three alleged
discriminatees asked to transfer. Second, the three individuals
who supposedly requested transfers were Bussey, Reamer, and
Hood—not Burelison. If T. Wiers’ motivation was to satisfy
employees’ transfer requests then I would expect him to con-
sider Hood before choosing to impose a transfer on Burelison—
a union supporter who wanted to remain at the Elkhart facility.
Third, T. Wiers’ claim that the Company was merely honoring
the requests of employees is undercut by the manner in which
the transfers were presented to the employees involved. On
May 25, Hettich did not offer the alleged discriminatees the
opportunity to transfer, but told them they had to transfer if
they wished to continue working. Hettich told Reamer,
“You’re going to South Bend or you can choose to be laid off.”
Hettich told Burelison that he had “no choice but to be trans-
ferred to Plymouth.” (Tr. 267.) Burelison expressed displeas-
ure, pointed out that Morton had just been transferred from
Plymouth to Elkhart, and said that if he had to leave the Elkhart
facility he would prefer to go to the Kalamazoo facility. The
Respondent did not allow Burelison to remain at the Elkhart
facility or move to the Kalamazoo location, but rather “hon-

permitting relatives to work in proximity to each other and that permits
“an employee [to] be directly or indirectly supervised by a relative”
“[o]nly in extraordinary circumstances, with management approval.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
ored” his nonexistent transfer request by sending him to the
Plymouth facility.
Regarding seniority—the record shows that Morton was the
Elkhart service technician who had the least seniority with Re-
spondent Great Lakes and at the Elkhart facility. The Plymouth
location from which Morton had been moved earlier in May
was not a Great Lakes facility, but a Wiers IT facility, and ac-
cording to the Respondent’s own arguments—which, as dis-
cussed below, I accept—the Respondent was not involved with
the Plymouth facility. Thus, there is no reason to assume that
Morton’s seniority at the Wiers IT facility in Plymouth would
be applicable at the Great Lakes facility in Elkhart and Respon-
dent Great Lakes has not shown that it was applicable there.
Moreover, the transfer policy in the Wiers IT employee hand-
book, which Respondent Great Lakes distributed to Elkhart
employees prior to the transfers, does not include seniority as
one of the factors identified as influencing transfer decisions.22
Even assuming that the evidence had shown that Burelison,
Bussey, and Reamer would be legitimate transferees in the
event that there was not enough work for service technicians at
the Elkhart facility, I find that Respondent Great Lakes has
failed to show that such a work shortage existed. T. Wiers
testified that there had not been enough work for the service
technicians at the Elkhart facility since at least March 2007.
However, Burelison and Reamer were both busy at the Elkhart
facility prior to being transferred. The Respondent’s own re-
cords show that Burelison usually worked over 200 hours per
month there, including during the final month before his trans-
fer. The Respondent’s records also show that the monthly
“sales dollars” from the work of service technicians at the Elk-
hart facility had been trending upward. Sales dollars increased
substantially during every month from November 2006
($44,743.12) to February 2007 ($64,348.60), dropped in March
2007 ($36,333.54), but then rebounded in April 2007 to its
second highest level during that period ($57,487.00).23 The

22 The Wiers IT employee handbook, which was distributed to em-
ployees at the Elkhart facility starting in April 2007, includes a transfer
policy. That transfer policy states in its entirety:
At the time of hire, every effort is made to place the em-
ployee in a job where his/her abilities are best utilized. The fol-
lowing reasons, however, are considered for transferring regular
employees between jobs or departments:
- To provide the employee with a better opportunity to utilize
present skills, ability and experience.
- To provide an opportunity for training so the employee may
gain new skills and experience.
- To enable the employee to continue his/her employment
when there are changes or reductions in department work sched-
ules.
- To provide employment when physical limitations prevent
the employee from continuing in the same job.
Transfer of employees from one department to another or
from one location to another for the Company’s convenience may
be made to meet Wiers requirements. A request for transfer
should be made in writing and submitted to the Human Resources
Department. A transfer may be made if management determines
it is in the best interest of the Company and/or associate.
23 April 2007 was the last month for which T. Wiers had figures
when he decided to transfer the alleged discriminatees.
total number of hours worked by Elkhart service technicians
also showed a general upward trend from 756.28 hours in No-
vember 2006 to a high of 1481.00 hours in March 2007, and
reached its second highest level, 1298.20 hours, in April 2007.
Perhaps more tellingly, the evidence showed that T. Wiers
transferred Morton—a service technician trusted by him—to
the Elkhart facility in early May 2007. Respondent Great
Lakes provides no explanation why, if there really was a short-
age of work for service technicians at the Elkhart facility, it
transferred a service technician to that facility shortly before
transferring the three alleged discriminatees away. It is true
that the Company’s productivity figures for service technicians
showed a downward trend—from 89 percent in November
2006 to 76 percent in April 2007. Nevertheless, the prepon-
derance of record evidence clearly fails to support Respondent
Great Lakes’ contention that a work shortage had created an
urgent need to transfer service technicians from the Elkhart
facility during the runup to the scheduled representation elec-
tion.
VI. BURELISON AT PLYMOUTH
Burelison began working at the Plymouth facility on May
30, 2007, having been moved there from the Elkhart facility.
The Plymouth location was the headquarters of Wiers IT and
the service manager there was Matthew Cripe. Shortly after
Burelison was transferred, Cripe overheard Burelison and an-
other employee discussing the Union during a break. When
Burelison returned to his workstation, Cripe followed him and
stated, “We won’t be having any of the union conversations
here.” On June 12—only 2 weeks after Burelison was trans-
ferred to the Plymouth facility—Cripe terminated Burelison’s
employment. Cripe completed paperwork regarding Bureli-
son’s termination in which he stated that the reason for the
action was unacceptable performance.
At trial, Cripe explained his decision to terminate Burelison
as follows: “He had some workmanship issues from when I was
not at work. . . . And there were some issues when I was there
after he had left for the day. . . . So basically what we had was
we had a nondocumented verbal warning, and then we had a
couple of documented written warnings all at once.” Cripes
states that the first incident took place on June 4 and the second
on June 8, but he admits that he did not document either of
those incidents until he terminated Burelison on June 12.
Burelison testified that he was not responsible for the work-
manship problems cited by Cripe. He stated that all the tasks at
issue had been performed by, or assigned to, another service
technician. The record showed that prior to the day of his
termination, Burelison had never been disciplined at either the
Elkhart facility or the Plymouth facility. Cripe informed Bu-
relison about all of the purported performance issues at essen-
tially the same time on June 12, and prepared the disciplinary
paperwork all at once, but completed that paperwork so as to
give the impression that Burelison had been given a chance to
improve. The writeup for the first incident states, “Should Tim
[Burelison] continue to have poor performance we will have no
choice but to terminate him,” and the next writeup, prepared
and issued at the same time, states that Burelison was being
terminated.
WIERS INTERNATIONAL TRUCKS 11
Analysis and Discussion
I. SINGLE-EMPLOYER AND JOINT EMPLOYER STATUS
The complaint alleges that, during the relevant time period,
Respondent Great Lakes and Respondent Wiers IT were a sin-
gle-employer/single-integrated business enterprise, Complaint
paragraph 3(b), and also joint employers, Id. Paragraph 3(f),
and that these related Respondents were responsible for various
unfair labor practices. However, as mentioned above, at the
start of the hearing, counsel for the General Counsel announced
that Respondent Wiers IT had settled with Region 25 and that
the General Counsel “was only proceeding against Great Lakes
and whatever entity that constituted at the time in terms of the
Elkhart facility.” See supra, footnote 1. At the hearing, Wiers
IT did not enter an appearance through an attorney or other
representative. Given that Wiers IT and the Board’s Regional
Office had reached a settlement prior to the hearing, and that
the General Counsel explicitly stated it was proceeding only
against Respondent Great Lakes, it was appropriate for Wiers
IT to understand that it was not involved in the hearing, and I
believe it could run afoul of due process concerns for me to
make any finding that imposes liability on Wiers IT for the
unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint. For this reason,
I do not reach the question of whether Wiers IT was involved
individually, or as part of a single-employer/single-integrated
business enterprise or a joint employer, in any of the unfair
labor practices alleged in the complaint.
Moreover, it is not necessary for me to reach the question of
whether the Elkhart facility was being operated under a single-
employer or joint employer relationship in order to decide
whether the one remaining Respondent—Great Lakes—is li-
able for violations committed at the Elkhart facility. Respon-
dent Great Lakes concedes that it was the employer of the em-
ployees working at the Elkhart facility during the relevant time
period. (R. Br. at 10.) The unlawful behavior that the com-
plaint alleges took place at the Elkhart facility was that of
T. Wiers and Hettich—persons who were acting as agents and
supervisors of Respondent Great Lakes. Therefore, a full rem-
edy may be ordered against Respondent Great Lakes for any of
the alleged violations that occurred at the Elkhart location.
Respondent Great Lakes argues that it should not be held re-
sponsible for unfair labor practices at the Elkhart facility be-
cause the alleged actions were taken by T. Wiers without the
actual knowledge of Respondent Great Lakes or the Great
Lakes board of managers. About the most I can say for this
argument is that I am rather amazed by counsel’s ability to
make it with a straight face. Respondent Great Lakes had
knowledge of the actions taken by T. Wiers at the Great Lakes
facilities (including the Elkhart location) because T. Wiers was
the president of Respondent Great Lakes, and its agent. See
supra, footnote 5. In his capacity as president of Respondent
Great Lakes, T. Wiers had the authority to, inter alia, hire, fire,
and transfer employees at the Elkhart facility—including the
alleged discriminatees. Respondent Great Lakes cites to no
precedent under which a company can be held blameless for
unfair labor practices committed by its own president while
making employment decisions that are within the general scope
of his or her authority. To the extent that it is necessary to de-
termine whether the Great Lakes board of managers had
knowledge of T. Wiers’ actions, it is clear that at least part of
that Board did since T. Wiers was a member of the Great Lakes
board of managers. Moreover, T. Wiers made monthly reports
to other members of the Great Lakes Board in which he advised
them that he was waging an antiunion campaign and set forth
some of his plans in that regard. The Great Lakes board of
managers approved T. Wiers’ selection of a labor attorney to
assist in resisting the Union.
Similarly, the record shows that Hettich, when he allegedly
committed unfair labor practices at the Elkhart facility, was the
district parts and service manager for Respondent Great Lakes
and was acting as its agent and supervisor. Managers at the
Great Lakes locations, including the Elkhart facility, all re-
ported to Hettich, and Hettich had responsibility for the profit-
ability of those locations. Mullennix, for his part, had been
brought in by Respondent Great Lakes to work as an antiunion
consultant and was attempting to identify the sources of em-
ployee discontent so that he could convey that information to
Great Lakes officials and help them fight the Union. When
Mullennix engaged in the allegedly unlawful conversations
with Elkhart employees, he was acting as an agent of the Re-
spondent. See supra, footnote 10.
A different situation is presented with respect to the unfair
labor practices alleged to have taken place at the Plymouth
facility.24 That is one of the Wiers IT dealerships owned solely
by its president and chief executive officer, T. Wiers. As dis-
cussed above, Respondent Great Lakes and its parent company
had no ownership interest at all in the Wiers IT facilities. Since
Wiers IT has settled with the Board’s Regional Office, the alle-
gations involving the Plymouth facility are moot except to the
extent that the remaining Respondent—Great Lakes—may be
held liable for them. Such liability could be imposed in this
case if Respondent Great Lakes and Wiers IT are either a sin-
gle-employer/single-integrated business enterprise or joint em-
ployers at the Plymouth facility.25 Contrary to the contention of
the General Counsel, I conclude that it would not be appropri-
ate to hold Respondent Great Lakes liable for violations at the
Plymouth facility under either theory.
The analysis applicable to questions of “single-employer”
status is described in NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Industries, 691
F.2d 1117, 1122 (3d Cir. 1982):
A “single employer” relationship exists where two
nominally separate entities are actually part of a single in-
tegrated enterprise so that, for all purposes, there is in fact
only a “single employer.” The question in the “single em-
ployer” situation, then, is whether the two nominally inde-

24 Those allegations concern Cripe’s conduct at the Plymouth facility
in prohibiting Burelison from discussing the Union while on break and
in disciplining and terminating Burelison.
25 Although the General Counsel also argues that Respondent Great
Lakes is liable as a successor, that argument is confined to allegations
regarding conduct at the Elkhart location, one of the Great Lakes facili-
ties. The General Counsel does not argue that Respondent Great Lakes
is a successor employer at Wiers IT facilities, such as the Plymouth
location, which it neither owns nor operates.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD12
pendent enterprises, in reality, constitute, only one inte-
grated enterprise.
. . . .
In answering questions of this type, the Board consid-
ers the four factors approved by the Radio Union court.
(380 U.S. at 256, 85 S.Ct. at 877): (1) functional integra-
tion of operations; (2) centralized control of labor rela-
tions; (3) common management; and (4) common owner-
ship. Thus, the “single employer” standard is relevant to
the determination that “separate corporations are not what
they appear to be, that in truth they are but divisions or de-
partments of a single enterprise.” NLRB v. Deena Artware,
Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 402, 80 S.Ct. 441, 443, 4 L.Ed.2d 400
(1960). “Single employer” status ultimately depends on all
the circumstances of the case and is characterized as an
absence of an “arm’s length relationship found among un-
integrated companies.” [Citations Omitted.]
As the Board has noted, none of the four factors is controlling
as single employer status ultimately depends on all the circum-
stances of the case. Richmond Convalescent Hospital, 313
NLRB 1247, 1249–1250 (1994). “However, the Board has
determined that the first three factors are of particular impor-
tance, especially the centralized control of labor relations.” Id.
Considering the record through the prism of these factors, I
conclude that the General Counsel has failed to show that Re-
spondent Great Lakes and Wiers IT were so integrated as to
have lost their discrete business identities and become a “single
employer” at the Plymouth location.26 Regarding the first
factor—“functional integration of operations” —although
T. Wiers was making moves towards what he called “common-
ality” in certain respects, the record shows that at the time in
question a clear demarcation continued to exist between the
operations as concerned the Plymouth location. Respondent
Great Lakes and Wiers IT did not commingle money, person-
nel, or equipment at the Plymouth dealership to any significant
extent. See R. Sabee Co., 351 NLRB No. 100, slip op. at 1 fn.
5 (2007) (reversing finding of “single-employer” status where
there was common ownership but evidence regarding commin-
gling of assets was equivocal) and Richmond Convalescent
Hospital, supra (no single-employer status where there was
common management and ownership, but “no evidence of em-
ployee interchange, commingling of funds, centralized admini-
stration, transfers of equipment or any other financial integra-
tion”). Respondent Great Lakes and Wiers IT each had their
own, separate, bank accounts, out of which they paid they own
employees. Paychecks and W-2 forms issued to Burelison at
the Plymouth facility listed Wiers IT as the employer, without
any reference to Respondent Great Lakes. Although Great
Lakes employees sometimes did work for the benefit of Wiers
IT, employees were not freely or informally exchanged be-
tween the two entities. Rather, Wiers IT was billed, and re-

26 This should not be interpreted as a determination that no such rela-
tionship existed at the Great Lakes facilities—Elkhart, Jackson, Kala-
mazoo, and South Bend. Somewhat different facts exist at those facili-
ties, and for the reasons discussed above, I reach no determination
regarding whether those facilities were operated as part of a single
employer or a joint employer relationship.
quired to reimburse Respondent Great Lakes, for the hours of
work that Great Lakes employees did for Wiers IT. Similarly,
if Wiers IT employees performed work for the benefit of Re-
spondent Great Lakes, Great Lakes was required to reimburse
Wiers IT for the hours of the Wiers IT employees. The record
did not demonstrate significant transfers of equipment between
the two entities. On one occasion, Wiers IT purchased com-
puters in bulk and some of the computers were placed at Great
Lakes facilities. However, that did not compromise the finan-
cial separation, or arms length relationship, between the entities
because Respondent Great Lakes was billed by Wiers IT for the
cost of the computers used at the Great Lakes facilities. I con-
clude that consideration of the first factor—functional integra-
tion of operations—does not support a finding that Wiers IT
and Respondent Great Lakes were operating as a single em-
ployer at the Plymouth location.
Regarding the second and third factors—common manage-
ment and centralized control of labor relations—the strongest
evidence in favor of such integration is the service of T. Wiers,
and his deputy, Hettich, as managers for both Respondent Great
Lakes and Wiers IT. The record indicates that, in practice, this
was not the equivalent of the integration of those functions.
T. Wiers operated the Great Lakes facilities under the oversight
of the Great Lakes board of managers and at its pleasure,
whereas he operated the three Wiers IT facilities as his own
enterprise without involvement by Respondent Great Lakes.
Not only was T. Wiers contractually required to apply the Great
Lakes’ “business management and other policies” at the Great
Lakes facilities, but auditors from Respondent Great Lakes
made visits to confirm that that T. Wiers was doing so. Under
the purchase agreement and bonus contract, Respondent Great
Lakes and/or International Dealcor retained the absolute right
to remove T. Wiers from his position as president of Great
Lakes. At the Wiers IT facilities, on the other hand, T. Wiers
was the final authority on management policies and was under
no obligation to follow Great Lakes policies. Respondent Great
Lakes had no right to audit the Wiers IT facilities, or to remove
T. Wiers from his positions with Wiers IT.
Similarly, in the operation of the Great Lakes facilities, T.
Wiers was required to obtain approval from the Great Lakes
board of managers for expenditures over $10,000, to consult
with the board of managers regarding other significant business
decisions, and to discuss the finances of the Great Lakes facili-
ties in monthly reports to Great Lakes and/or International
Dealcor officials. This is in sharp contrast to the way the Wiers
IT facilities, such as the Plymouth location, were operated. At
those locations T. Wiers was free to make expenditures of any
amount and even the most significant of business decisions
without notifying, much less obtaining the approval of, the
Great Lakes board of managers or International Dealcor.
The record provides numerous examples showing that labor
policies at the Great Lakes facilities and the Wiers IT facilities
were not handled in a unitary fashion. At the time he took over
the Great Lakes facilities, T. Wiers did not conform the wages
there to those in place at the Wiers IT locations, but rather con-
tinued to pay the employees of the Great Lakes facilities the
wages established by Respondent Great Lakes. In addition,
Employees at the Great Lakes facilities remained in the Great
WIERS INTERNATIONAL TRUCKS 13
Lakes health plan and workers’ compensation insurance, while
employees at the Wiers IT facilities were covered by Wiers IT
health insurance and workers’ compensation insurance. At the
time that T. Wiers became president of Respondent Great
Lakes, the Great Lakes facilities continued to use Great Lakes’
own employee handbook, and the Wiers IT facilities used a
different, Wiers IT, handbook. It was not until over a year
later, after the Union filed its representation petition, that
T. Wiers first began to distribute the Wiers IT handbook to
some employees at the Elkhart facility. T. Wiers’ testimony
suggested that this distribution was part of an effort to respond
to employee complaints and questions regarding training/certi-
fication reimbursement benefits. The circulation of the Wiers
IT handbook at the Elkhart facility did not mean that the Wiers
IT policies all became applicable at the Elkhart location or any
of the other Great Lakes facilities. Indeed, T. Wiers testified,
without contradiction, that Wiers IT policies were not generally
applied at the Great Lakes facilities, but rather were adopted
there only “to some degree” with respect to what were identi-
fied as “best practices.” The record does not show that em-
ployees at the Great Lakes facilities surrendered their Great
Lakes handbooks or were told that the existing Great Lakes
policies had been supplanted.
On balance, I conclude that the evidence concerning com-
mon management and centralized labor relations does not sup-
port finding that Respondent Great Lakes and Wiers IT were
operating as a single employer at the Plymouth facility.
The fourth relevant factor is “common ownership.” The re-
cord shows that the Wiers IT facilities, such as the Plymouth
dealership, were owned solely by T. Wiers. Respondent Great
Lakes and International Dealcor never had any ownership in-
terest at all in those facilities. It is true that under the agree-
ment for the purchase of Respondent Great Lakes, T. Wiers
acquired a minority ownership interest in Respondent Great
Lakes. T. Wiers’ ownership interest in the Great Lakes facili-
ties, in my view, goes more to the possibility of a “single-
employer” relationship at the Great Lakes facilities where he
and Respondent Great Lakes shared ownership, and not so
much to the existence of such a relationship at the Wiers IT
facilities, such as Plymouth, of which T. Wiers was the exclu-
sive owner. In any case, T. Wiers’ minority interest in the
Great Lakes facilities was relatively small—it was not shown to
have ever exceeded 6 percent—and is insufficient to establish
meaningful common ownership at the Wiers IT facilities, such
as the Plymouth dealership, where Respondent Great Lakes had
no ownership interest at all. I conclude that consideration of
the fourth factor also weighs against finding that Respondent
Great Lakes and Wiers IT were operating as a single employer
at the Plymouth facility.
For the reasons discussed above, I find that the four factors
articulated by the Board do not support a finding that Respon-
dent Great Lakes was responsible, as part of a “single em-
ployer” with Wiers IT, for unfair labor practices that may have
occurred at the Plymouth facility. As Respondent Great Lakes
argues, the evidence shows that the Plymouth dealership was
owned and operated solely by T. Wiers and his company, Wiers
IT. T. Wiers attempted to purchase Respondent Great Lakes,
but failed. It would be unfair, as well as inconsistent with con-
sideration of the four factors discussed above, to hold Respon-
dent Great Lakes responsible for unfair labor practices that
were committed at the separately owned and operated Wiers IT
facilities, simply because T. Wiers was, at the time, making an
unsuccessful attempt to purchase Respondent Great Lakes.
Much the same considerations also lead me to conclude that
Respondent Great Lakes and Wiers IT were not joint employers
at the Plymouth facility. I note at the outset, that it is not clear
that the General Counsel is contending that they were. In its
brief, the General Counsel argues that Respondent Great Lakes
and Wiers were joint employers at the Elkhart location and
other Great Lakes facilities, but does make any explicit attempt
to extend that argument to Wiers IT facilities such as the Ply-
mouth dealership. Indeed, at the start of hearing, counsel for
the General Counsel came close to conceding that Respondent
was not a joint employer at the Plymouth facility, stating:
[O]ur position is [Respondent Great Lakes and Wiers IT]
were clearly a joint employer, a single-integrated enterprise
relationship there at the Elkhart facility. We’re really open to
the idea that there may not have been such a relationship at
the Plymouth facility, which was owned by Wiers and solely
run by Wiers to some extent. . . . . we were open to the idea
that the Plymouth facility may be found to be its own separate
place that would not have joint liability as a joint employer
with Great Lakes. [Tr. 10–11.]
Assuming that the General Counsel means to suggest that
Respondent Great Lakes was a joint employer at the Plymouth
location, I reject that contention. In determining whether a
joint employer relationship exists, “the Board analyzes whether
putative joint employers share or co-determine those matters
governing essential terms and conditions of employment.”
Airborne Express, 338 NLRB 597 fn. 1 (2002). “The essential
element in this analysis is whether the putative joint employer’s
control over employment matters is direct and immediate.” Id.
I conclude that Respondent Great Lakes did not control matters
governing the terms and conditions of employment at the Ply-
mouth facility. Those matters were within the sole discretion of
T. Wiers acting in his capacity as the owner, president, and
CEO of Wiers IT, of which the Plymouth dealership was part.
The evidence does not show that in making decisions regarding
such matters, T. Wiers sought the approval or involvement of
the Great Lakes Board of Managers, considered the interests of
Respondent Great Lakes, or acted in any capacity other than as
the president, CEO, and owner of Wiers IT. Moreover, the
purchase and bonus agreements that installed T. Wiers as presi-
dent of Respondent Great Lakes limited the scope of his re-
sponsibilities as Great Lakes’ president “100 percent” to the
Great Lakes business.
I find that, as counsel for the General Counsel put it, “the
Plymouth facility” was “its own separate place” that was not a
“joint employer with Great Lakes.”27

27 Given my finding that Respondent Great Lakes would not be li-
able for any violations at Wiers IT’s Plymouth dealership under a “sin-
gle employer” or a “joint employer” theory, and since the General
Counsel was not proceeding against Wiers IT, it is not necessary for me
determine whether the violations alleged to have occurred at the Ply-
mouth dealership were established. Those allegations were that
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD14
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Section 8(a)(1)
1. Interrogations
The complaint alleges that Respondent Great Lakes violated
Section 8(a)(1) when T. Wiers and Hettich interrogated em-
ployees about union activities and membership. The evidence
showed that in April and May 2007, during the pendency of the
representation petition, T. Wiers and Hettich had numerous
one-on-one meetings with employees about union matters.
Both officials asked how employees thought the union election
would turn out, and what employees thought the Union could
do for them. During a number of these meetings, Hettich took
his questioning further. He asked Burelison to reveal who was
“in favor” of the Union and “who wasn’t.” Hettich also asked
Reamer whether he was attending union meetings and whether
he knew anyone else who was attending. Subsequently, Hettich
told Reamer that he had heard a “vicious rumor” that Reamer
was “for the Union,” and then asked, “Are you for the Union or
for the Company?” When Reamer indicated that he supported
the Union, Hettich said that if the Union came in “[i]t can only
get worse.”
An interrogation is unlawful if, in light of the totality of the
circumstances, it reasonably tends to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. Mat-
thews Readymix, Inc., 324 NLRB 1005, 1007 (1997), enfd. in
part 165 F.3d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Emery Worldwide, 309
NLRB 185, 186 (1992); Liquitane Corp., 298 NLRB 292, 292–
293 (1990). Relevant factors include, whether the interrogated
employee was an open or active union supporter, whether
proper assurances were given concerning the questioning, the
background and timing of the interrogation, the nature of the
information sought, the identity of the questioner, and the place
and method of the interrogation. Stoody Co., 320 NLRB 18,
18–19 (1995); Rossmore House Hotel, 269 NLRB 1176, 1177–
1178 (1984), enfd. 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985). The Board
has viewed the fact that an interrogator is a high-level supervi-
sor as one factor supporting a conclusion that questioning was
coercive. See, e.g., Stoody, supra.
Based on the factors articulated by the Board, I conclude that
both T. Wiers and Hettich unlawfully interrogated employees.
Both were high-level managers who oversaw multiple facilities,
not just the Elkhart facility. T. Wiers was the president of the
entire Great Lakes enterprise, not to mention its prospective
owner. In his capacity as president he had authority to hire and
fire employees at all of the Great Lakes facilities. Hettich, too,
had authority to hire and fire employees at all the Great Lakes
facilities and it was to him that the onsite managers at those
facilities reported. These officials initiated one-on-one inter-
views with regular employees in order to question them about
union matters. Neither T. Wiers nor Hettich claimed that they
assured the interviewees that they could answer without fear of

Cripe—the Plymouth service manager—violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act
by prohibiting union discussions at the Plymouth facility and violated
Sec. 8(a)(1) and (3) by discriminatorily disciplining and terminating
Burelison.
reprisals and the witnesses’ accounts of the interrogations make
no mention any of any such assurances being given.
The record shows that T. Wiers and Hettich questioned not
only open supporters of the Union, but nearly all of the Elkhart
employees who would be voting in the upcoming election.
Moreover, although Burelison and Reamer were open union
supporters, the evidence showed that Hettich interrogated them
about the union activities and sentiments of other employees.
Gardner Engineering, 313 NLRB 755 (1994), enfd. in relevant
part 115 F.3d 636 (9th Cir. 1997) (interrogation unlawful be-
cause, inter alia, official asked employee how he thought other
employees would vote in upcoming election); Cumberland
Farms, 307 NLRB 1479 (1992), enfd. 984 F.2d 556 (1st Cir.
1993) (interrogation of open union supporters unlawful where
interviewers asked about the union activities/sentiments of
other employees). In several instances, the officials interro-
gated employees about the Union immediately after T. Wiers
held one of the mandatory group meetings at which he ex-
pressed his vehement opposition to unions and linked unioniza-
tion to closure of the Elkhart facility. During the interrogation
of Reamer, Hettich created a particularly hostile tone. He char-
acterized information that Reamer supported the Union as a
“vicious rumor” and demanded to know whether Reamer was
“for the Union or for the Company.” Thus Hettich made clear
that he viewed support for the Union as an act of disloyalty.
When Reamer nevertheless stated that he supported the Union,
Hettich responded by warning that if employees brought in the
Union, things would not get better or stay the same, but “can
only get worse.” See Hoffman Fuel Co., 309 NLRB 327
(1992) (interrogation unlawful where it took place in context of
hostile conversation and was coupled with veiled threat).
In addition, I conclude that T. Wiers and Hettich violated the
Act by asking employees how they thought the union election
would turn out and what good they thought the Union could do
for them. The Board has found such questioning to be coercive
and violative of the Act. See Brooks Bros., 261 NLRB 876, 884
(1982), enfd. mem. 714 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1982) (violation
where employer asked employee “how he thought the election
would turn out”) and Brookwood Furniture, 258 NLRB 208,
214 (1981), enfd. 701 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1983) (violation where
employer asked employee “how he thought the election would
turn out” and “what good” he thought union would do). Re-
spondent Great Lakes cites to no authority indicating that the
prior precedent on this subject is not controlling here. More-
over, the conclusion that these questions were part of a coercive
interrogation is buttressed by the other factors discussed above,
including the identities of the questioners, the absence of proper
assurances, and the hostile circumstances attending the interro-
gations.
I conclude that in April and May 2007, Respondent Great
Lakes violated Section 8(a)(1) by coercively interrogating em-
ployees about their union sympathies and activities, and the
union sympathies and activities of others.
2. Solicitation of grievances
The complaint alleges that on about April 25, 2007, T. Wiers
and Mullennix solicited employee complaints and grievances
and promised employees increased benefits and improved terms
WIERS INTERNATIONAL TRUCKS 15
and conditions of employment in an effort to discourage em-
ployee support for the Union.28 An employer violates Section
8(a)(1) when it solicits, and promises to remedy, employee
grievances as part of an effort to discourage union activity.
MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc., 342 NLRB 1172, 1173 fn. 5
(2004); Hospital Shared Services, 330 NLRB 317 (1999); Reli-
ance Electric Co., 191 NLRB 44, 46 (1971), enfd. 457 F.2d 503
(6th Cir. 1972). The promise to remedy grievances need not be
explicit to constitute a violation. “There is a compelling infer-
ence that [the employer] is implicitly promising to correct those
inequities he discovers as a result of his inquiries and likewise
urging on his employees that the combined program of inquiry
and correction will make union representation unnecessary.”
Embassy Suites Resort, 309 NLRB 1313, 1316 (1992), enf.
denied on other grounds 32 F.3d 588 (D.C. Cir. 1994), quoting
Reliance Electric, 191 NLRB at 46.; see also Evergreen Amer-
ica Corp., 348 NLRB 178, 210 (2006), enfd. 531 F.3d 321 (4th
Cir. 2008). This is particularly true when the solicitation of
grievances is not a pre-existing practice. Evergreen America,
supra; Reliance, supra.
After receiving the union petition, Respondent Great Lakes
retained Mullennix as a consultant for the antiunion campaign.
Hettich required every employee at the Elkhart facility to meet
with Mullennix in hopes that Mullennix would find out what
the employees’ complaints were and the Respondent could
address those complaints. It is plain that this was a special
effort to solicit complaints, not the Respondent’s preexisting
practice. Indeed, Hettich conceded that the effort was moti-
vated by the union campaign.
I conclude that in April or May 2007 the Respondent,
through Mullennix, violated Section 8(a)(1) by soliciting, and
impliedly promising to remedy grievances, in order to discour-
age employee support for the Union.
As discussed earlier, I conclude that T. Wiers and Hettich
asked employees what they thought the Union could “do” for
them as part of coercive interrogations that violated Section
8(a)(1). The General Counsel also alleges that by asking em-
ployees this question T. Wiers and Hettich were soliciting
grievances in violation of Section 8(a)(1). After considering
the record as a whole, I conclude that T. Wiers and Hettich did
not pose this question to solicit grievances, but rather as part of
the employer’s argument that the Union could not do anything
positive for employees. This was a point that T. Wiers made
repeatedly during his speeches at the mandatory group meet-
ings. He stated that the only reason to support a union was the
hope that the union would “get you something,” but that this
was “like buying a raffle ticket, the chances of winning are
minimal.” He stated that, if the Union prevailed in the election,
employees should not “expect” improvements in wage benefits,
pension benefits, or healthcare benefits.

28 The complaint originally alleged such activity only by T. Wiers.
At trial, I granted the General Counsel’s motion to amend the complaint
to allege that Mullennix also participated in this activity. Tr. 195, 207–
208. During some portion of Hettich’s testimony, he mistakenly used
the name Ted Mullet when meaning to refer to Mullennix. All of the
substantive testimony regarding conduct by Mullet actually refers to
conduct by Mullennix.
I conclude that T. Wiers and Hettich did not unlawfully so-
licit grievances by asking employees what they thought the
Union could do for them.
3. Threats
The complaint alleges that on about April 25, 2007, T. Wiers
violated Section 8(a)(1) by threatening employees at the Elk-
hart facility with plant closure if the employees selected the
Union as their collective-bargaining representative. The record
evidence establishes that at the mandatory group meetings in
April and May 2007, T. Wiers stated, inter alia: that the Elk-
hart facility was not profitable, that bargaining with the Union
would increase costs, that all costs would further reduce the
profitability and viability of the Elkhart facility, that no facility
that was unprofitable would remain in business, and that the
company had the right to determine whether the Elkhart facility
was viable. He stated that the Union would not make the Elk-
hart facility profitable, and that it was up to “us . . . collectively
management and employees” to make the facility profitable.
Respondent Great Lakes denied the alleged threat in its answer
to the complaint, but in its post-hearing brief makes no argu-
ment that T. Wiers’ statements did not constitute an unlawful
threat.
Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co., the question is whether T. Wiers’ statements con-
stituted an unlawful threat of retaliation in response to protected
activity, or a lawful, fact-based prediction of economic conse-
quences beyond the employer’s control. 395 U.S. 575, 618–
619 (1969). In Gissel, the Supreme Court stated that when an
employer predicts dire economic effects stemming from union
organization, such a prediction is lawful only if it is affirma-
tively supported “on the basis of objective fact to convey the
employer’s belief as to demonstrably probable consequences
beyond his control.” Id. at 618. “‘Conveyance of the em-
ployer’s belief, even though sincere, that unionization will or
may result in the closing of the plant is not a statement of fact
unless, which is most improbable, the eventuality of closing is
capable of proof.’” Id. at 618–619, quoting NLRB v. Sinclair
Co., 397 F.2d 157, 160 (1st Cir. 1968).
In the instant case, T. Wiers presented employees with no
objective facts to support his assertion that the Elkhart facility
was unprofitable or his prediction that having a union at the
Elkhart facility would reduce the “profitability and viability” of
that facility. Such unsupported assertions support finding an
unlawful threat. See Massachusetts Coastal Seafoods, 293
NLRB 496, 510, 512 (1989) (statement by company official is
an unlawful threat, not a lawful prediction, when the official
gave no facts or figures to support prediction of economic ef-
fects of unionization). Moreover, T. Wiers did not present
objective facts regarding the likely extent of costs associated
with unionization, compare those costs to the size of the Elkhart
operation’s budget, or otherwise show an objective basis for the
prediction that such costs would be substantial enough to nega-
tively affect the viability of the operation. If anything, T. Wiers
exaggerated the costs likely to be associated with having a un-
ion at the Elkhart facility by including the $20,000 that the
Company had spent on legal fees—giving the impression that
these were costs associated with having a union whereas, in
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD16
fact, they were nonrecurring costs that the Respondent volun-
tarily incurred to orchestrate its antiunion campaign. Nor did
T. Wiers identify any objective facts to support his assertion
that all expenditures reduce a company’s profits and viability.
In fact, businesses often make expenditures for improve-
ments—on equipment, processes, materials, and personnel to
give just some examples—that are more than offset by the re-
sulting increases in revenues. T. Wiers cited no factual support
for his prediction that the costs associated with collective bar-
gaining at the Elkhart facility would not also be offset by result-
ing improvements—for example, in workforce stability, skill,
experience, morale, and productivity. I conclude that Respon-
dent Great Lakes has not shown that T. Wiers’ prediction that
the Elkhart facility would be rendered unviable by unionization
was affirmatively supported “on the basis of objective fact to
convey the employer’s belief as to demonstrably probable con-
sequences beyond his control.” Those statements were not a
lawful, fact-based prediction, but an unlawful threat of retalia-
tion.
I recognize that the threat made by T. Wiers was veiled, but
it was too thinly veiled to escape a finding of violation under
the Act. As the Supreme Court noted in Gissel, the inquiry into
whether an employer’s statement about plant closure is an
unlawful threat “must take into account the economic depend-
ence of the employees on their employer, and the necessary
tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up
intended implications of the latter that might be more readily
dismissed by a more disinterested ear.” 395 U.S. at 617. Thus,
the Board has found that statements similar to those made by
T. Wiers were unlawful threats even if employees had to “pick
up intended implications” in order to perceive the threat. In
Superior Coal Co., the Board held that the president of a coal
company unlawfully threatened plant closure when he told
employees that the coal business was competitive, that anything
that drove the company’s costs up would put the company in a
noncompetitive position, and that if “we could not sell coal at a
profit, we would not sell coal.” 295 NLRB 439, 439 fn. 2 and
460–461 (1989). Similarly, in Dominion Engineered Textiles,
the Board held that an employer made an objectionable threat
when it stated that the creation of a collective bargaining obli-
gation would consume time and energies that could be devoted
to solving the company’s problems and would be “devastating”
to the company. 314 NLRB 571 (1994). In McDonald Land &
Leasing, the Board found that the vice-president of a company
unlawfully threatened employees by making statements imply-
ing that the company was financially on the ropes, that if the
union won the election the company would be unable to meet
the union’s demands, and that disaster would result. 301
NLRB 463, 466 (1991). T. Wiers could easily have made his
views known to employees without adding veiled threats of
facility closure, but decided, as in the cases cited above, to
engage in the type of “brinksmanship” that the Supreme Court
has observed often leads employers to “‘overstep and tumble
(over) the brink.” Gissel, 395 U.S. at 620, quoting Wausau
Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 1967).
For the reasons discussed above, I find that during the pend-
ency of the representation petition, Respondent Great Lakes, by
T. Wiers, violated Section 8(a)(1) by threatening that it would
close the Elkhart facility if employees selected the Union as
their collective-bargaining representative.29
The complaint also alleges that in about late April or early
May 2007, Hettich violated Section 8(a)(1) by threatening em-
ployees at the Elkhart facility with lower wages and benefits if
employees selected the Union as their collective-bargaining
representative. The record shows that, during a conversation in
late May 2007, Hettich told Reamer that he had “heard a vi-
cious rumor” that Reamer was “for the Union.” Hettich then
asked Reamer whether he was “for the Union or for the Com-
pany?” When Reamer responded that he supported the Union,
Reamer said: “[O]nly . . . three things can happen with the
Union coming in here. One it can get better; two it can stay the
same; or three, it can get worse. It’s not going to get better and
it’s not going to stay the same. It can only get worse.” An
employer violates the Act when it makes a prediction to em-
ployees that they would necessarily lose benefits if they select a
union when there is “no lawful explanation based on objective
facts as to why such a loss of benefits would occur.” Poly-
America, Inc., 328 NLRB 667, 669 (1999), enfd. in relevant
part 260 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Dico Tire, Inc., 330
NLRB 1252, 1257 (2000) (employer threatens an employee in
violation of the Act when it predicts that employees will lose
benefits in negotiations if they select a union). The Respondent
here has shown no objective basis for Hettich’s prediction that
things would “only get worse” as a result of collective bargain-
ing, and therefore his statement constitutes a coercive threat,
not a lawful prediction. Hettich’s statement was particularly
threatening when one considers that Hettich made it in response
to Reamer’s declaration of support for the Union and in the
context of Hettich’s coercive interrogation of Reamer.
I conclude that Respondent Great Lakes, by Hettich, violated
Section 8(a)(1) in late May 2007 by threatening employees with
worsened terms and conditions of employment if employees
selected the Union as their collective-bargaining representative.
4. Promise of training and certification reimbursement
The complaint alleges that on or about May 3, 2007,
T. Wiers violated Section 8(a)(1) by promising to reinstitute
training and certification reimbursement benefits in order to
discourage employee support for the Union. The evidence
showed that, during the months immediately preceding the
filing of the Union’s petition, Respondent Great Lakes had not
been reimbursing employees at the Elkhart facility for obtain-
ing ASE training and CDL certification. Indeed, during the
early part of 2007, the service manager at the Elkhart facility
had on more than one occasion told employees that such a

29 The complaint also alleges that in about late April or early May
2007, T. Wiers threatened employees with plant closure if the employ-
ees and the Union continued their organizing efforts. The brief of the
General Counsel does not explain what facts are relied on for this alle-
gation or how it differs from the other allegation of an unlawful threat
of plant closure by T. Wiers. To the extent that it is based on state-
ments that T. Wiers allegedly made to Reamer during a one-on-one
conversation, for the reasons discussed above, I found that the record
did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that T. Wiers
made those statements. Therefore, I recommend that this allegation, to
the extent that it is independent of the other allegation regarding threats
of plant closure, be dismissed.
WIERS INTERNATIONAL TRUCKS 17
benefit was not available. The failure of Respondent Great
Lakes to provide this benefit was an issue of concern to em-
ployees and they brought it up to Mullennix when he unlaw-
fully solicited their grievances and to T. Wiers during one of
the mandatory group meetings regarding the Union. Then,
while campaigning against the Union, T. Wiers announced that
Elkhart employees would be reimbursed for ASE training and
CDL certification.
In NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., the Supreme Court stated
that an employer violates the Act by granting benefits “while a
representation election is pending, for the purpose of inducing
employees to vote against the union.” 375 U.S. 405, 409
(1964). The Court explained that Section 8(a)(1) “prohibits not
only intrusive threats and promises but also conduct immedi-
ately favorable to employees which is undertaken with the ex-
press purpose of impinging upon their freedom of choice for or
against unionization and is reasonably calculated to have that
effect.” Id.; see also Village Thrift Store, 272 NLRB 572
(1983). The “employer’s legal duty in deciding whether to
grant benefits while a representation proceeding is pending is to
decide the question precisely as it would if the union were not
on the scene.” United Airlines Services, Corp., 290 NLRB 954
(1988). To determine whether an employer has met, or failed
to meet, this legal duty, the Board considers whether all the
evidence, including the employer’s explanation for the timing
of the increase, supports “an inference of improper motivation
and interference with employee free choice.” Holly Farms
Corp.¸311 NLRB 273, 274 (1993), enfd. 48 F.3d 1360 (4th Cir.
1995), affd. 517 U.S. 392 (1996). Among the factors that may
be considered to determine whether a preelection grant of bene-
fit is unlawfully motivated are: the size of the benefit conferred
in relation to the stated purpose for granting it; the number of
employees receiving it; how employees reasonably would view
the purpose of the benefit; the timing of the benefit, Perdue
Farms, 323 NLRB 345, 352 (1997), enfd. in relevant part 44
F.3d 830 (D.C. Cir. 1998); the employer’s explanation for the
timing of the benefit; prior statements by the employer indicat-
ing that the benefit would not be granted, Lampi, L.L.C., 322
NLRB 502, 503 and 506 (1996), Holly Farms Corp., 311
NLRB at 274; whether the grant of the benefit was consistent
with the employer’s prior practice, Lampi, L.L.C., 322 NLRB at
502, Marine World USA, 236 NLRB 89, 90 (1978); and the
employer’s knowledge that the benefit involved was an impor-
tant issue in the union organizing effort, Huck Store Fixture
Co., 334 NLRB 119, 123 (2001), enfd. 327 F.3d 528 (7th Cir.
2003).
I conclude that the evidence regarding T. Wiers’ decision to
announce that Elkhart employees would be reimbursed for
training and certification supports “an inference of improper
motivation and interference with employee free choice.” The
service manager at the Elkhart had, on more than one occasion,
told employees that the Respondent would not provide this
benefit to them. The record reveals no reason, other than the
advent of the union campaign, for the Respondent’s change of
heart on the subject. Moreover, the Respondent provides no
explanation for its decision to time the announcement shortly
before the representation election, rather than waiting until after
the vote was held.30 The record shows that the Respondent
knew, based on employee complaints to Mullennix and
T. Wiers, that the failure to provide this benefit had emerged as
a significant issue and source of discontent among employees.
The benefit applied to all employees eligible to vote in the up-
coming election, and such employees would reasonably view
the announcement regarding the benefit as an effort by Respon-
dent Great Lakes to show it was not necessary to elect a Union
in order to obtain improvements in their terms and conditions
of employment.
I conclude that Respondent Great Lakes violated Section
8(a)(1) when, during the pendency of the representation peti-
tion, it attempted to discourage employees at the Elkhart facil-
ity from supporting the Union by announcing that the Respon-
dent would provide training and certification benefits that had
previously been denied.
B. Section 8(a)(3) and (4)
1. Reinstitution of previously denied training and
certification reimbursement benefit
The complaint alleges that, on or about May 3, 2007, Re-
spondent Great Lakes violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act by reinstituting training and certification benefits in order
to discourage union support. As found above, during one of
the mandatory group meetings, T. Wiers announced to employ-
ees that training and certification benefits, which employees at
the Elkhart facility had previously been denied, would be pro-
vided to them. About a week later, Hettich began to distribute
guides and training materials that were associated with this
benefit. As discussed above, I found that, under the standards
set forth by the Supreme Court in Exchange Parts, supra, Re-
spondent Great Lakes violated Section 8(a)(1) by announcing
these benefits for the purpose of inducing employees to vote
against the Union. The same Exchange Parts standard applies
to allegations that an employer unlawfully implemented the
benefit in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3). In Home
Health, Inc., 334 NLRB 281, 284 (2001); Perdue Farms, 323
NLRB at 352–353. Therefore, for the same reasons that I
found the announcement of the training/certification reim-
bursement benefits violated Section 8(a)(1), I find that by be-
ginning to provide those previously denied benefits Respondent
Great Lakes violated Section 8(a)(3).
I conclude that Respondent Great Lakes violated Section
8(a)(1) and (3) when, during the pendency of the representation
petition, T. Wiers began to provide employees with previously
denied training and certification benefits in order to discourage
employee support for the Union.
2. Transfers
The complaint alleges that the transfers of Burelison,
Bussey, and Reamer violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) because
the transfers were based on those employees joining and assist-

30 Even when a benefit has been in the works and its approval shortly
before an election is not itself unlawful, a violation has been found
where the Respondent failed to establish a legitimate reason for timing
the announcement before the election, rather than waiting to make the
announcement afterwards. American Red Cross, 324 NLRB 166, 166
fn. 2 and 170–171 (1997).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD18
ing the Union. With respect to Burelison and Bussey, the com-
plaint further alleges that the transfers violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (4) because the transfers were based on those employees
testifying at a preelection hearing held by the Board. The Re-
spondent counters that the transfers were lawfully motivated by
a lack of work for service technicians at the Elkhart facility and
that Burelison, Bussey, and Reamer were the ones selected
because they had previously sought transfers and were the three
least senior service technicians at the Elkhart facility.
In Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083, 1089 (1980), enfd. 662
F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982),
approved in NLRB v. Transportation Corp., 462 U.S. 393
(1983), the Board set forth the standards for determining
whether an employer has discriminated against an employee on
the basis of union or other protected activity in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) and (3). Under the Wright Line standards, the
General Counsel bears the initial burden of showing that the
Respondent’s actions were motivated, at least in part, by anti-
union considerations. The General Counsel may meet this
burden by showing that: (1) the employee engaged in union or
other protected activity; (2) the employer knew of such activi-
ties; and (3) the employer harbored animosity towards the Un-
ion or union activity. Senior Citizens Coordinating Council,
330 NLRB 1100, 1105 (2000); Regal Recycling, Inc., 329
NLRB 355, 356 (1999). If the General Counsel establishes
discriminatory motive, the burden shifts to the employer to
demonstrate that it would have taken the same action absent the
protected conduct. Senior Citizens, 330 NLRB at 1105.
Similarly, to establish a violation of 8(a)(1) and (4) the Gen-
eral Counsel must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the Respondent’s action was motivated, at least in part, by
the employees’ filing of charges or testifying. Wayne W. Sell
Corp., 281 NLRB 529 (1986). The 8(a)(4) violations turn on
motivation and are analyzed using the Wright Line framework.
Newcor Bay City Division, 351 NLRB No. 54, slip op. at 1 fn. 4
(2007); McKesson Drug Co., 337 NLRB 935, 936 (2002).
Under the standards set forth above, I conclude that the Gen-
eral Counsel has met its initial burden under Section 8(a)(1),
(3), and (4) with respect to Burelison and Bussey, and under
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) with respect to Reamer. Burelison and
Bussey testified as union witnesses at the preelection hearing
held on April 20, 2007. This activity constituted both assis-
tance to a labor organization and testimony under the Act, and
therefore discrimination based on it would violate both Section
8(a)(3) and (4) of the Act. In addition, prior to their transfers,
the alleged discriminatees engaged in a range of other activities
which, under Section 8(a)(3), are unlawful bases for employ-
ment action. Burelison, Bussey, and Reamer all signed union
authorization cards, attended union meetings, and expressed
support for the Union to other employees. Bussey and Reamer
placed prounion stickers on their toolboxes where those stickers
were visible to others in the Elkhart facility’s shop area.
Reamer also placed a prounion bumper sticker on the vehicle
that he used to drive to work and which he parked in the Elk-
hart facility’s parking lot. While being interrogated by officials
of the Respondent, all three alleged discriminatees either ex-
plicitly stated, or implied, that they supported the Union. When
Hettich asked Reamer if he was “for the Union or for the Com-
pany,” Reamer responded “I’m for the Union at this time.”
During an interrogation by T. Wiers, Bussey opined that the
Union could benefit him by providing better benefits. Bureli-
son answered questions posed by T. Wiers and Hettich by stat-
ing that employees wanted a union because of issues relating to
insurance, pension, and quality of work life.
It is clear that Respondent Great Lakes was aware that the al-
leged discriminatees had engaged in protected activities at the
time it transferred them from the Elkhart facility. Hettich was
present at the preelection hearing when Burelison and Bussey
testified on behalf of the Union. Shortly afterwards, Hettich
approached Burelison to express his displeasure, stating that he
was “surprised” to see Burelison at the hearing. Burelison,
Bussey and Reamer made pro-union statements directly to
T. Wiers and Hettich during interrogations. Indeed, neither
T. Wiers nor Hettich denied knowing that all three alleged dis-
criminatees supported bringing the Union to the Elkhart facil-
ity.
The record also shows that Respondent Great Lakes har-
bored animosity towards the Union and union activity. This is
established by the Respondent’s use of unlawful interrogations,
threats, solicitations of grievances, and promises of benefits, in
its effort to defeat the Union. Antiunion animus is also demon-
strated by various statements that T. Wiers made to employees
during the mandatory group meetings—for example, his state-
ment that “[a]ny Union” is “a thorn in our side.” A finding of
employer animosity to employees’ participation in the Board’s
processes is also supported by Hettich’s comment to Burelison
about his appearance as a witness.
Based on this record, I conclude that the antiunion animus
was connected to the Respondent’s decision to transfer Bureli-
son, Bussey and Reamer. I note in particular, the timing of the
transfers. T. Wiers transferred the three union supporters only
three weeks before the scheduled elections and just a few days
after both the rejection of the Respondent’s effort to alter the
unit definition and Reamer’s declaration of support for the Un-
ion. Such timing is an important factor in assessing discrimina-
tory motivation and in this case shows a link between the trans-
fers and the employer’s effort to defeat the Union. See LB&B
Associates, Inc., 346 NLRB 1025, 1026 (2005), enfd. 232 Fed.
Appx. 270 (4th Cir. 2007); Desert Toyota, 346 NLRB 118, 120
(2005); Detroit Paneling Systems, 330 NLRB 1170 (2000),
enfd. sub nom. Carolina Holdings, Inc. v. NLRB, 5 Fed. Appx.
236 (4th Cir. 2001). Even Respondent Great Lakes’ own labor
attorney advised T. Wiers against transferring the three union
supporters while the representation election was approaching.
Given the small number of eligible voters—only eight as of
May 13, 2007—T. Wiers certainly knew that eliminating three
union supporters from the pool of eligible voters would signifi-
cantly improve the Respondent’s chances of defeating the Un-
ion in the upcoming vote. Thus, he decided to go ahead with
the transfers against the advice of counsel and despite the bla-
tancy of the discrimination. I find that the General Counsel has
met the initial burden set forth in Wright Line for purposes of
both Section 8(a)(3) and (4).
Since the General Counsel has met its initial burden, the bur-
den shifts to Respondent Great Lakes to prove that it would
have transferred Burelison, Bussey, and Reamer even in the
WIERS INTERNATIONAL TRUCKS 19
absence of the unlawful motives. Respondent Great Lakes
contends that T. Wiers “decided, based upon the amount of
work available, that he had to transfer or layoff three Techni-
cians” and that the lack of work had warranted such an action
since at least April 2007. (R. Great Lakes Br. at 6.) The Re-
spondent further contends, that T. Wiers lawfully selected Bu-
relison, Bussey, and Reamer for the transfers because: (1) they
had the least seniority with Respondent Great Lakes of any of
the service technicians at the Elkhart facility; and (2) Bussey
and Reamer had requested transfers in the past.
After considering the record evidence, I conclude that the
explanations that Respondent Great Lakes offers for transfer-
ring the three union supporters are pretexts for unlawful dis-
crimination. As discussed above, the Respondent has not estab-
lished that the Elkhart facility was lacking work for the service
technicians. Indeed, its own figures for the Elkhart facility
show a generally upward trend both in sales dollars for the
work of service technicians and the total number of hours
worked by service technicians there. Any lingering doubt con-
cerning this issue is dispelled by consideration of the fact that
Respondent Great Lakes decided to transfer Morton—a service
technician who had been with T. Wiers since 1994—to the
Elkhart facility just a few weeks before it transferred the three
union supporters away from the Elkhart facility. If, since April,
the Respondent lacked sufficient work for Elkhart service tech-
nicians then why did it transfer a service technician to that fa-
cility at the beginning of May? Respondent Great Lakes pro-
vides no explanation. Given the rapidly approaching represen-
tation election, and in light of the small number of employees
who would be voting, the Respondent’s decision to transfer a
trusted employee of T. Wiers to the Elkhart facility at virtually
the same time that it transferred three union supporters away
from that facility leads me to conclude that the transfers were
not the result of a shortage of work at the Elkhart facility, but
rather the product of an effort to manipulate the pool of eligible
voters to engineer a “no” vote.
Even assuming that there was a shortage of work at the Elk-
hart dealership, I conclude that the Respondent has not suc-
ceeded in showing that Burelison, Bussey, and Reamer would
have been the ones selected for transfer had it not been for their
union support and other protected activity. As discussed in the
factual findings above, the evidence does not support the Re-
spondent’s contention that any of the three alleged discrimina-
tees requested transfers from the Elkhart facility and certainly
does not show that T. Wiers and Hettich were motivated by the
belief that any of the three would welcome the transfers. In-
deed, the record shows that all three were transferred against
their wishes and, in Reamer’s case, in contravention of the
policy, previously stated by Hettich, against allowing members
of the same family to work together.
I also conclude that Respondent Great Lakes has failed to
substantiate its contention that Burelison, Bussey, and Reamer
were selected for transfer because they had the least seniority
among the Elkhart service technicians. First, as discussed
above, the Respondent has not established that the alleged dis-
criminatees, in fact, had the least seniority. That is a distinction
the record indicates belonged to Morton, who had begun work-
ing for Respondent Great Lakes after Burelison, Bussey, and
Reamer. Moreover, Respondent Great Lakes did not introduce
evidence showing that it had ever before used seniority as a
factor in transfer decisions or that there was a policy or practice
of doing so.31 Indeed, the Wiers IT employee handbook that
the employer distributed to Elkhart employees in April 2007
includes a policy on transfers, and while that policy sets forth a
number of factors that influence transfer decisions, it does not
include seniority as one of those factors. See footnote 22, su-
pra. Assuming that seniority was a factor that Respondent
Great Lakes considered when deciding whether to honor an
employee’s transfer request, one would expect it to first ac-
commodate employees who had worked with the company the
longest rather than skipping over such loyal employees to re-
ward the most recently hired ones.
For the reasons discussed above, I conclude that in May
2007 the Respondent Great Lakes discriminatorily transferred
Burelison and Bussey from the Elkhart facility because of their
union and other protected activities and their participation in
the Board’s processes, and for the purpose of discouraging such
activities, in violation of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act.
In addition, I find that in May 2007 the Respondent Great
Lakes discriminatorily transferred Reamer from the Elkhart
facility because of his union and other protected activities, and
for the purpose of discouraging such activities, in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.32
III. CHALLENGED BALLOTS
The Employer challenged the ballots cast by Burelison,
Bussey, and Reamer on the grounds that those individuals were
not employed in the bargaining unit on the date of the June 19,
2007 representation election. It is undisputed that all three
were eligible to vote prior to being transferred in late May
2007. As found above, those transfers were unlawfully based
on the employees’ union and other protected activities, and
their participation in board proceedings. The Board consis-
tently overrules challenges to ballots cast by employees who,
but for unlawful discrimination, would have been eligible to
vote in the election. LaGloria Oil & Gas Co., 337 NLRB 1120,
1137 (2002), affd. mem. 71 Fed. Appx. 441 (5th Cir. 2003);
Firmat Mfg. Corp., 255 NLRB 1213, 1225 (1981), enfd.
mem.681 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1982); Gossen Co., 254 NLRB 339,
367 (1981), enf. granted in part, denied in part 719 F.2d 1354
(7th Cir. 1983); and F&M Importing Co., 237 NLRB 628, 632
(1978). Since the challenged ballots were cast by three indi-
viduals who would have been eligible voters if not for the
unlawful discrimination against them, I overrule objections to
their ballots.
For the reasons discussed above, Burelison, Bussey, and
Reamer were eligible to vote in the June 19, 2007 election and
the Employer’s objections to their ballots are overruled.

31 Unwritten policies are a ready means of discrimination and are
suspect. See Planned Bldg. Services, 347 NLRB 670, 716 (2006);
Kentucky General, Inc., 334 NLRB 154, 161 (2001); Sioux City Foun-
dry, 241 NLRB 481, 484 (1979).
32 For the reasons discussed above, I do not reach the question of
whether the discipline and termination of Burelison, which occurred
during his employment by Wiers IT, violated Sec. 8(a)(1), (3), and (4)
of the Act. See supra, fn. 27.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD20
IV. EMPLOYER IDENTITY
The order directing a hearing on the consolidated unfair la-
bor practices and representation cases states that the administra-
tive law judge will “determine the name of the employing en-
tity” relevant to the representation election. In its brief, the
Union asks that I direct the Region to name Respondent Great
Lakes as the Employer on the certification of the election. The
Union states that, at all relevant times, Respondent Great Lakes
has owned the Elkhart facility and that employees there were
working for Respondent Great Lakes. In its brief, Respondent
Great Lakes agrees, stating that it was the employer of all em-
ployees at the Elkhart facility during the time period relevant to
this adjudication. The record evidence supports the shared
understanding of the Union and the Respondent. Moreover, at
the time of the hearing, Respondent Great Lakes continued to
own and operate the Elkhart facility.
I conclude that Respondent Great Lakes has, at all relevant
times, been the employing entity at the Elkhart facility, and I
will direct that the Region identify Respondent Great Lakes as
the Employer on the certification of election.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent Great Lakes is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. During the relevant time period, Respondent Great Lakes
was not the employer, a joint employer, or part of a single-
employer/single integrated business enterprise at the Wiers IT
facility in Plymouth, Indiana.
4. By the following conduct, the Respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4), and Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
5. Respondent Great Lakes interfered with employees’ exer-
cise of their Section 7 rights in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act by: coercively interrogating employees about their un-
ion sympathies and activities, and the union sympathies and
activities of others; soliciting and impliedly promising to rem-
edy grievances in order to discourage employees from support-
ing the Union; threatening employees with facility closure if the
employees selected the Union as their collective-bargaining
representative; threatening employees with worsened terms and
conditions of employment if employees selected the Union as
their collective-bargaining representative; and announcing that
it would provide previously denied benefits for the purpose of
discouraging employees from supporting the Union.
6. Respondent Great Lakes violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
of the Act when, during the pendency of the representation
petition, it began to provide employees with previously denied
benefits for the purpose of discouraging employee support for
the Union.
7. Respondent Great Lakes violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and
(4) of the Act by discriminatorily transferring employees Timo-
thy Burelison and John Bussey because of their union and other
protected activities and their participation in the Board’s proc-
esses, and for the purpose of discouraging such activities.
8. Respondent Great Lakes violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
of the Act by discriminatorily transferring employee Eric
Reamer because of his union and other protected activities, and
for the purpose of discouraging such activities.
9. Timothy Burelison, John Bussey and Eric Reamer were
eligible to vote in the June 19, 2007 representation election and
the Employer’s objections to their ballots are overruled.
10. Respondent Great Lakes has, at all relevant times, been
the employing entity at the Elkhart, Indiana facility.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent Great Lakes has engaged in
certain unfair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to
cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed
to effectuate the purposes of the Act. Respondent Great Lakes,
having discriminatorily transferred Burelison, Bussey, and
Reamer must make the discriminatees whole for any resulting
loss of earnings and other benefits, computed on a quarterly
basis, less any net interim earnings, as prescribed in F. W.
Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as com-
puted in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173
(1987). Since Burelison’s transfer to the Wiers IT facility in
Plymouth, Indiana, meant the end of his employment by Re-
spondent Great Lakes, that transfer should be treated as a dis-
charge for purposes determining backpay and any other make-
whole relief.
The General Counsel urges that the Board’s “current practice
of awarding only simple interest on backpay and other mone-
tary awards should be replaced with the practice of compound-
ing interest.” (GCl Br. at 47.) The Board has considered, and
rejected, this argument for a change in its practice. See Rogers
Corp., 344 NLRB 504 (2005), citing Commercial Erectors,
Inc., 342 NLRB 940 fn. 1 (2004); and Accurate Wire Harness,
335 NLRB 1096 fn. 1 (2001), enfd. 86 Fed. Appx. 815 (6th Cir.
2003). If the General Counsel’s argument in favor of com-
pounding interest has merits, those merits are for the Board to
consider, not me. I am bound to follow Board precedent on the
subject. See Hebert Industrial Insulation Corp., 312 NLRB
602, 608 (1993); Lumber & Mill Employers Assn., 265 NLRB
199 fn. 2 (1982), enfd. 736 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied 469 U.S. 934 (1984); Los Angeles New Hospital, 244
NLRB 960, 962 fn. 4 (1979), enfd. 640 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir.
1981).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended33
ORDER
The Respondent, Great Lakes International Trucks, LLC,
Elkhart and South Bend, Indiana, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Coercively interrogating employees about their union
support or union activities.

33 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
WIERS INTERNATIONAL TRUCKS 21
(b) Coercively interrogating employees about the union sup-
port or union activities of other employees.
(c) Soliciting and impliedly promising to remedy grievances
in order to discourage employees from supporting the Interna-
tional Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, a/w Interna-
tional Union of Operating Engineers, AFL–CIO (the Union).
(d) Threatening employees with facility closure if the em-
ployees select the Union as their collective-bargaining repre-
sentative.
(e) Threatening employees with worsened terms and condi-
tions of employment if employees select the Union as their
collective-bargaining representative.
(f) Announcing that it will provide any previously unavail-
able benefit for the purpose of discouraging employees from
supporting the Union.
(g) Implementing any previously unavailable benefit for the
purpose of discouraging employees from supporting the Union.
(h) Transferring or otherwise discriminating against any em-
ployee for engaging in union or other protected activities.
(i) Transferring or otherwise discriminating against any em-
ployee for testifying in a Board proceeding or otherwise par-
ticipating in the Board’s processes.
(j) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Timothy
Burelison, John Bussey, and Eric Reamer reinstatement to their
former jobs at the Elkhart facility or, if those jobs no longer
exist, to substantially equivalent positions at the Elkhart facil-
ity, without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or
privileges previously enjoyed.
(b) Make Timothy Burelison, John Bussey, and Eric Reamer
whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a
result of the discrimination against them in the manner set forth
in the remedy section of the decision.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from
its files any reference to the unlawful transfers, and within 3
days thereafter notify Timothy Burelison, John Bussey, and
Eric Reamer in writing that this has been done and that the
transfers will not be used against them in any way.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi-
tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause
shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment re-
cords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due under the terms of this Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Elkhart, Indiana, copies of the attached notice marked
“Appendix.”34 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the

34 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
Regional Director for Region 25, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of
business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings,
the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former employ-
ees employed by the Respondent at any time since April 25,
2007.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed inso-
far as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.
DIRECTION
IT IS DIRECTED that the Regional Director for Region 25
shall, within 14 days from the date of this Decision, Order,
and Direction, open and count the ballots of Timothy Bureli-
son, John Bussey, and Eric Reamer in Case 25–RC–10389.
The Regional Director shall then prepare and serve on the
parties a revised tally of ballots and issue the appropriate
certification.
IT IS FUTHER DIRECTED that the Regional Director shall iden-
tify Great Lakes International Trucks, LLC, as the employing
entity on the certification of election.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT coercively question you about your union sup-
port or activities.
WE WILL NOT coercively question you about the union sup-
port or activities of other employees.

ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD22
WE WILL NOT solicit, and impliedly promise to remedy, your
grievances in order to discourage you from supporting the In-
ternational Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, a/w In-
ternational Union of Operating Engineers, AFL–CIO (the Un-
ion).
WE WILL NOT threaten that we will close any facility if em-
ployees select the Union as their collective-bargaining repre-
sentative.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with worsened terms and condi-
tions of employment if employees select the Union as their
collective-bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT announce that we will provide previously un-
available benefits for the purpose of discouraging you from
supporting the Union.
WE WILL NOT implement previously unavailable benefits for
the purpose of discouraging you from supporting the Union.
WE WILL NOT transfer or otherwise discriminate against you
for engaging in union and other protected concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT transfer or otherwise discriminate against you
for testifying in a Board proceeding or otherwise participating
in the Board’s processes.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order,
offer Timothy Burelison, John Bussey, and Eric Reamer full
reinstatement to their former jobs at the Elkhart facility or, if
those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions
at the Elkhart facility, without prejudice to their seniority or any
other rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Timothy Burelison, John Bussey, and Eric
Reamer whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits re-
sulting from the discrimination against them, less any net in-
terim earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order,
remove from our files any reference to the unlawful transfers of
Timothy Burelison, John Bussey and Eric Reamer, and WE
WILL, within 3 days thereafter, notify each of them in writing
that this has been done and that the transfers will not be used
against them in any way.
GREAT LAKES INTERNATIONAL TRUCKS, LLC