Westinghouse Electric Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 24, 1965

153 N.L.R.B. 443 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP., ETC. 443
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that.
WE WILL NOT deal or bargain directly with employees nor institute changes
with respect to terms and conditions of employment of our employees in the
appropriate unit defined below, without bargaining with the Chauffeurs, Team-
sters and Helpers, Local 492, affiliated with International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (Ind.).
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in said Union or in any other labor
organization of our employees, or discourage the filing of charges under the
National Labor Relations Act, by withdrawing wage increases or other benefits
granted to our employees, or in any other manner discriminating in regard to
their hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our
employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form labor
organizations, to join or assist said Union, or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively with representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with Chauffeurs, Teamsters and
Helpeis, Local 492, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (Ind ) as the exclusive
representative of all the employees in the appropriate unit defined below, for
the purposes of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment, and if an
understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
All over-the-road drivers, employed at our Albuquerque, New Mexico,
terminal, excluding salesmen, freight agents, local pickup and delivery
drivers, dock employees, salesmen, guards and watchmen, and supervisors
as defined in the Act.
WE WILL make all over-the-road drivers whole for any loss of pay which they
may have suffered as a result of the withdrawal of wage increases granted in
September 1964.
All our employees are free to become, remain, or refrain from becoming or
remaining, members of any labor organization of their choice.
ALBUQUERQUE PHOENIX EXPRESS,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 1015
Tijeras Avenue, NW., Albuquerque, New Mexico, Telephone No. 243-3536, if they
have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions.
Westinghouse E lectric Corp ., Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory
and United Steelworkers of America , District 15, AFL-CIO.
Case No. 6-CA-2756. June 24,1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On February 25, 1964, Trial Examiner Eugene E. Dixon issued his
Decision in the above -entitled proceeding , finding that the Respondent
had engaged in certain unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint
153 NLRB No 33.
444 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion. Thereafter, the Respondent, the General Counsel, and the Charg-
ing Party filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and briefs
in support thereof.'
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and Brown].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record
in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner only to the extent consistent here-
with.
The Respondent is a large manufacturer of electrical products and
other items, with plants throughout the United States. The only plant
involved herein is an atomic energy laboratory wholly owned by the
United States Government and operated by the Respondent under con-
tract with the Atomic Energy Commission. In 1959, after certifica-
tion of the Union as exclusive representative of the works engineering
department at the plant, the parties entered into a collective-bargain-
ing agreement containing, among others, the following clauses :
Section IV-Management
The Union recognizes that it is the responsibility of the Company
to maintain the efficiency of the LABORATORY and agrees that
Management shall have the freedom of action necessary to dis-
charge its responsibility for the successful operation of the LAB-
ORATORY. This responsibility includes, among other things,
the right to hire, maintain discipline, promote or transfer employ-
ees; the determination of the number and location of its plants;
the selection of those with whom it will do business; the methods
and means by which its operations are to be carried on; and the
units of personnel needed to carry on its operations. This section
does not limit or modify the rights of the parties under any other
provisions of this agreement.
Section XXIV-Modification and Termination
A. This Agreement expresses the understanding of the parties
in respect to all matters deemed by them to be applicable to the
bargaining unit. Therefore, except as herein specifically pro-
' In its brief , the Respondent requested oral argument before the Board As the record
and briefs adequately present the issues and positions of the parties , the request for
oral argument is hereby denied
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP., ETC. 445
vided, the Company and the Union , for the life of this Agreement
each voluntarily and unqualifiedly waives the right, and each
agrees that the other shall not be obligated , to bargain collectively
with respect to any subject or matter referred to or covered by
this agreement , or with respect to any subjects or matters not spe-
cifically referred to or covered by this Agreement which were dis-
cussed during the negotiation of this Agreement.
During negotiations for the 1959-60 contract , the Union objected to
the above-described "Management " clause and proposed a limitation
on subcontracting . Despite discussions of these matters at seven meet-
ings before agreement was concluded , the "Management" clause was
not eliminated and no limitation on subcontracting was agreed to.
The following year, prior to the expiration of this contract, the
parties started negotiations for a new agreement . The Union proposed
that the following provision be included in the new contract.
SECTION V-Sub-Contracting
(Not included in present contract)
The Company and the Union agrees [sic] that outside contractors
shall not be employed to perform work on Company premises
which is normally performed by employees of Bettis Atomic
Power Division , if any employee who normally performs such
work is laid off.
Subsequently, at 11 negotiating meetings concerned with the new
1960 contract , the parties thoroughly discussed the subject of subcon-
tracting . Both sides exhaustively presented the arguments in support
of their positions . The Union insisted on a clause limiting the
Respondent 's right to subcontract ; the Respondent steadfastly refused
its agreement to such a provision . When no agreement could be
reached on this matter , the Union took a strike vote among the employ-
ees. No strike occurred , however. At this point , George Haight, man-
ager of plant service for the Respondent , wrote a letter to the Union.
This letter was not introduced in evidence , but two witnesses testified
concerning its contents , and the Trial Examiner found , in effect, that
the Union understood from this letter that although the Respondent
would not agree in advance to a limitation on subcontracting, it would
give the Union an opportunity to try to change Respondent 's mind or
influence company decisions on a job-to-job basis. Finally , a contract
was signed including once again the "Management " and "Modifica-
tion" provisions described above, but not including the "Subcontract-
ing" clause which had been proposed by the Union . The contract was
to be effective for 3 years , expiring on November 20, 1963.
Between November 8, 1962, and October 11 , 1963, the Respondent
awarded more than 100 subcontracts relating to various kinds of goods
446 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and services. The General Counsel alleges that 15 of these subcon-
tracts, totaling some $44,000 in value and dealing with such mainte-
nance matters as painting, cleaning, repairing, and installing, were
awarded by the Respondent without first bargaining with the Union,
in violation of Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act. The record shows
that unit employees performed some similar work in the past.
The Trial Examiner, relying particularly on the Board Decision in
Town & Country,2 found that the Respondent had an obligation to
bargain with the Union over specific instances of subcontracting and
that the Respondent violated Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act by
not negotiating with the Union concerning some of these subcontracts.
However, the Trial Examiner's Decision was issued prior to our Deci-
sions in such cases as Kenmecott Copper.3 Shell,4 and Westinghouse
Electric Corporation (Mansfield Plant),5 in which we defined the scope
of our Decisions in Town and Country, supra and Fibreboard,6 wherein
we first enunciated the rule requiring an employer to bargain with a
union over subcontracting. In the light of these more recent cases, we
reject the Trial Examiner's conclusions and find merit in the Respond-
ent's contention that, in these circumstances, it did not violate Section
8 (a) (5) by not bargaining with the Union before entering into each
specific subcontract involved in this proceeding.
Our decisions in this area make it clear that Fibreboard was not
intended to lay down a hard and fast rule as to unilateral subcontract-
ing and that even where a subject of mandatory bargaining is involved,
there may be circumstances which the Board would accept as justify-
ing unilateral action.7 Thus, as we have recently pointed out," an
employer's obligation to give prior notice, and an opportunity to bar-
gain concerning particular instances of subcontracting, does not nor-
mally arise unless the subcontracting will effect some change in the
terms and conditions of employment of the employees involved. Con-
sistent with this view, the Board has refused to find a violation of Sec-
tion 8 (a) (5) where the employer's allegedly unlawful unilateral action
resulted in no "sib ificant detriment" to employees in the appropriate
unit.9
In the instant case, the Trial Examiner found, and the parties do
not deny, that there were no layoffs among the employees in the unit
as a result of the subcontracting; nor does the record show that
2 Town & Country Manufacturing Company, Inc., and Town & Country Sales Company,
Inc., 136 NLRB 1022, enfd 316 F. 2d 846 (C A. 5).
3Kennecott Copper Corporation (Chino Mines Division), 148 NLRB 1653.
4 Shell Oil Company, 149 NLRB 283; Shell Chemical Company, a Division of Shell Oil
Company, 149 NLRB 298
6150 NLRB 1574
e Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation., 138 NLRB 550, enfd. 322 F. 2d 411 (C A D.C.),
affd 379 U S. 203
' Allied Chemical Corporation (National Aniline Division), 151 NLRB 718.
'Westinghouse (Mansfield), supra, footnote 5.
n American Oil Company, 151 NLRB 421.
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP., ETC. 447
employees in the unit suffered a reduction in wages or hours as a result
of the subcontracting. The General Counsel and the Union contend,
however, that unit employees suffered a "significant detriment"
because, if the subcontracted work had been kept within the bargain-
ing unit employees who had previously been laid off at least 2 years
before the events under consideration here might have been recalled
and employees who were working might have been assigned overtime
work. However, between 1960 and the time of the hearing, no unit
employees had been laid off; and, although a number of unit employees
were laid off in 1959 and 196,0, there is no showing that when the
Respondent engaged in the allegedly unlawful subcontracting, any
individual employees were entitled to recall under the contract between
the Respondent and the Union,10 or that individual laid-off employees
were available or even interested in returning to Respondent's employ.
Thus, the record fails to establish that if the subcontracts had not
been awarded, Respondent would have either recalled employees in
layoff status or assigned overtime work to employees in the unit.
Unlike our dissenting colleague, in these circumstances, we do not
believe that mere speculation that some employees in layoff status
would conceivably have responded to recall notices constitutes "sig-
nificant detriment" within the meaning of Board Decisions."
10 The contract between the Respondent and the Union provides that laid - off employees
are entitled to recall for a period equal to the number of years worked by the employee
up to a maximum of 4 years
11 See Central Soya Company, Inc, 151 NLRB 1691, Kennecott Copper, supra, where
the Board found no "significant detriment" to unit employees even though they might have
been assigned overtime work if the subcontracting had not taken place In Shell Oil
Co , supra, the Board found no signfieant detriment even though laid-off employees might
have been recalled if there had been no subcontracting
Contrary to our dissenting colleague, we are unwilling to find that Respondent's sub-
contracting had a sufficiently detrimental effect upon the unit to constitute a modification
of terns and conditions of employment In cases where , as here , the employer has demon-
strated a willingness to bargain generally as to the overall subcontracting problem, and
has not embarked , suddenly and in a context of surprise , upon a course of occasional
maintenance subcontracting without opportunity for the Union to bargain on behalf of
unit employees , an alleged change in terms and conditions of employment must, at the
very least, be substantiated by a showing that the subcontracting impaired "reasonably
anticipated work opportunities for those in the bargaining unit " 'Westinghouse ( Mans-
field), supra Our dissenting colleague finds such an impairment in the instant case,
relying upon the possibility that assignment of the disputed work to the unit could have
resulted in recall of employees laid off at least 2 years before the events here in issue
This attempt to establish the requisite detriment ( see American Oil Company , supra)
rests upon sheer speculation as to the impact of subcontracting upon individuals who
had not been on payroll status since 1960, and whose status as unit employees is wholly
conjectural The remoteness of any possible recall is further underscored by the fact
that ( 1) layoffs have not occurred since 1960 , ( 2) there is no showing that furloughed
workers are presently available for employment , and (3 ) any decision by Respondent to
reinstate those on layoff status could , as the dissent observes, necessitate separation of
other employees pursuant to the ceiling of 2,900 placed on the Bettis work force by Re-
spondent ' s contract with the Atomic Energy Commission . We deem it unnecessary to
comment on the suggestion of our dissenting colleague that Respondent should have bar-
gained with the Union concerning the layoff of unrepresented employees outside the unit
in order to recall unit employees laid off 2 years earlier and who may not now even desire
reemployment In the circumstances , it is our opinion that lost work opportunities which
rest upon so remote a chain of possibilities as is present in this rezord cannot , in fairness,
be characterized as "reasonably anticipated ." This case is thus clearly distinguishable
448 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
We also deem it significant that there was never any refusal by the
Respondent to negotiate concerning a specific subcontract when
requested to do so by the Union ; that, in fact, the Respondent did nego-
tiate concerning a number of subcontracts during the contract term
and that, in two instances, the Union persuaded the Respondent to
change its subcontracting practices.12 We note, finally, that the
Respondent's practice of subcontracting work to small business con-
cerns complies with the terms of its contract with the Atomic Energy
Commission.13
Under all the circumstances of this case, including the lack of any
significant detriment to the employees involved, the frequent oppor-
tunities afforded the Union, and the Respondent's indicated willing-
ness to negotiate concerning both the general subject of subcontract-
ing and specific subcontracts, we find that the Respondent did not
violate the Act as alleged, and, accordingly, we shall dismiss the com-
plaint in its entirely.14
[The Board dismissed the complaint.]
CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH, dissenting :
Unlike the majority, I would affirm the Trial Examiner's conclusion
that the Respondent violated Section 8(a) (5) of the Act by failing to
notify the Union and give it an opportunity to request bargaining, and
to bargain before letting individual subcontracts for the performance
of unit work. I do so because I cannot agree with my colleagues' con-
clusion that the complaint should be dismissed on the grounds that
employees in the unit did not suffer a "significant detriment" as a
result of the subcontracting.13
from Puerto Rico Telephone Company, 149 NLRB 950, upon which the dissent relies,
where, unlike the present case, the record there established that as a result of unilateral
subcontracting "employees were laid off either because they were deprived of work formerly
performed in the unit, or work to which they would normally have been assigned but
for Respondent's subcontracting"
12 Kennecott Copper Corporation, supra, footnote 3
13 This contract provides in pertinent part:
1 It is the policy of the Government as declared by the Congress that a fair pro-
portion of the purchases and contracts for supplies and services for the Government
be placed with small business concerns
2 The Contractor agrees to accomplish the maximum amount of subcontracting to
small business concerns that the Contractor finds to be consistent with the efficient
performance of this contract
3. The Contractor agrees that, in the event it fails to comply with its contractual
obligations concerning the small business subcontracting program, this contract may
terminate, in whole or in part, for default.
14In view of our determination herein, we find it unnecessary to consider the other
contentions of the respondent The Respondent also filed a motion to reopen the hearing
for the purpose of introducing evidence concerning events which allegedly occurred sub-
sequent to the hearing The motion is hereby denied
15 The majority does not find, nor does the record show, that there was any significant
past practice by the Respondent of unilaterally subcontracting unit work. Cf Westing-
house (Mansfield), supra, footnote 5. Nor does the majority find that in view of the
negotiations leading up to the 1960 contract and the contract terms, the Union waived its
right to bargain over the subcontracting. Cf. New York; Mirror, Division of the Hearst
Corporation, 151 NLRB 834.
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP., ETC. 449
As to the "significant detriment" issue, the record shows that approx-
imately 65 unit employees were laid off in 1959 and 1960; that since
the end of 1960, the number of employees in the unit has been more or
less constant at approximately 160; and that the applicable collective-
bargaining agreement between the Respondent and the Union protects
the right of a laid-off employee to recall for a period equal to the num-
ber of years worked by the employee up to a maximum of 4 years. I
think it reasonable to conclude on the basis of these facts, and particu-
larly since the Respondent's plant had been operating since approxi-
mately 1949, that in 1962-63, when the disputed subcontracting took
place, at least some of these 65 laid-off employees were still entitled to
recall under the provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement;
and that if the unit work had not been subcontracted, they would in
fact have been recalled to perform the work.'6 It is, of course, well
established that unit employees suffer a "significant detriment" if they
are laid off because of the subcontracting.17 There is a comparable
detriment where, as here, laid-off employees are deprived of work
opportunities because of subcontracting, and as a result lose the enjoy-
ment of their contractual right to recall. Indeed, in Westinghouse
Electric Corporation (Mansfield Plant),18 the Board stated that it
would find an unlawful refusal to bargain where the subcontracting
"resulted in a significant impairment of job tenure, employment secu-
rity, or reasonably anticipated work opportunities for those in the
bargaining unit." [Emphasis supplied.] Consistent with this view,
the Board in Puerto Rico Telephone Company,'° adopted the Trial
Examiner's conclusion that certain subcontracts had a measurable
impact on unit employees since "but for the subcontracting, Respond-
ent would have utilized some of the laid-off employees to perform the
work of the subcontractor's employees." Unlike the majority, there-
fore, I would find that because of the unilateral subcontracting, laid-
off unit employees suffered a "significant detriment" in that they were
deprived of a "reasonably anticipated" right to be recalled to perform
the subcontracted work.
The majority concedes that there is a possibility, described as "spec-
ulative," that at the time of the subcontracting, there were laid-off
employees entitled to recall rights, who were available for work; and
"While the Atomic Energy Commission has required that no more than 2,900 persons
be employed at the entire site, no specific maximum was set for the works engineering
department . There is nothing in the record to indicate that the Respondent could not
exercise its discretion within the 2,900 limitation by increasing the number of employees
in the work engineering department and cutting down in the number of employees else-
where Moreover, the record shows that during the 11-month period, between Novem-
her 1962 and September 1963, this limitation was reached only once, and that at various
times during this period, the Respondent could have recalled between 2 and 25 laid-off
employees without exceeding the 2,900 employee limit.
11 See Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation, supra, footnote 6
18 Supra, footnote 5.
19 Supra, footnote 11.
796-027-66-vol 153-30
450 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
it does not deny that if a laid-off employee, in fact, was denied his
right to recall because of the unilateral subcontracting, this would
constitute a "significant detriment" to that employee. The majority
argues, however, that it is unlikely that any employees laid off 2 years
previously would, if entitled to recall rights, be interested in working
for the Respondent; and therefore that the Respondent did not violate
Section 8(a) (5) by failing to bargain with the Union over the sub-
contracting. I cannot agree. In the first place, it is important to
emphasize that the question before us is not whether the Respondent
was required to recall any laid-off employees. We must decide only
whether the Respondent, before subcontracting the maintenance work
and thus precluding the possibility of laid-off employees being recalled
to do the work, was obligated to inform the Union and negotiate con-
cerning the matter. It seems to me that in view of the real possibility
that there were at least some employees having recall rights who might
have been interested in recall, the interest of laid-off employees in the
work proposed to be subcontracted was great enough and the possible
prejudice to them if such work were unilaterally subcontracted, was
sufficiently substantial to warrant the Respondent submitting the
issues involved in the subcontracting to "the mediatory influences of
collective negotiations." 20
Finally, I find totally irrelevant the terms of the contract between
the Respondent and the Atomic Energy Commission. The contract
merely obligates the Respondent "... to accomplish the maximum
amount of subcontracting to small business concerns that the Contrac-
tor finds to be consistent with the efficient performance of his con-
tract." Surely, it would not be inconsistent with this contractual duty
for the Respondent to fulfill its obligations under the National Labor
Relations Act by bargaining with the Union before engaging in such
subcontracting.
As I believe that unit employees suffered a "significant detriment"
as a result of the Respondent's unilateral subcontracting of unit work,
in disagreement with the majority, I would find that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act.
p Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. N.L.R B., 379 U. S. 203.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding, brought under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act
as amended (61 Stat. 136), herein called the Act, was heard before Trial Examiner
Eugene E. Dixon at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on October 14, 1963. The complaint,
dated September 5, 1963, and based upon charges filed and served on May 8, 1963,
was issued by the Regional Director for Region 6 (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania), on
behalf of the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (herein called
the General Counsel and the Board). It alleged that Respondent had engaged in
and was engaging in unfair labor practices by failing and refusing to bargain with
the Union regarding its decision to subcontract work in violation of Section 8(a) (5)
and (1) of the Act.
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP., ETC. 451
In its duly filed answer, Respondent denied the commission of any unfair labor
practices.
Upon the entire record and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
At all times material herein, Respondent has been a Pennsylvania corporation
maintaining its principal offices in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and is engaged in the
manufacture, sale, and distribution of electrical appliances and products and nuclear
reactors in various States of the United States. During the 12 months preceding the
issuance of the complaint, Respondent manufactured, sold, and shipped directly
from its plants throughout the United States to points outside the State goods valued
in excess of $50,000. Respondent is, and has been at all times material herein, an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
If. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, and its Local Union 5852, are now,
and have been at all times material herein, labor organizations within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory is a facility wholly owned by the Federal Govern-
ment and operated by Westinghouse under a contract with the Atomic Energy Com-
mission . It consists of a nuinbei of buildings and technical installations located in
Allegheny County , Pennsylvania , and another installation at Idaho Falls , Idaho.
The purpose of the laboratory is to design , develop, and construct atomic power
reactors for ship propulsion and central station public utilities to be used in generat-
ing electric power. Under its operation by the Company , the laboratory designed,
developed , and built reactors for various Navy vessels as well as the reactor for the
Shippingport Power Station , one of the first applications of atomic power to gen-
erate electricity for nonmilitary uses. Among other things , the functions of the
laboratory include the design of reactor cores which will produce power more
efficiently and involve many programs including reactor metallurgy , reactor control,
and other technical problems associated with the operation of nuclear power plants.
The laboratory is not, and never has been, a production facility in the ordinary sense
of the word . Its purpose is research , design, and development , and the construction
of reactors and associated equipment when these are not available from other sources.
Respondent 's contract with the Atomic Energy Commission contains the following
provisions , among others.
PURPOSE OF CONTRACT
* * * it is intended by the parties that equipment , components , and services
required for these projects will be procured whenever practicable in a competitive
manner which gives all suppliers equal opportunities to furnish such equipment,
components and services , in accordance with the Commission 's policies. It is
also intended that the Contractor shall comply with current policies of the
Government with respect to procurement of supplies and services from com-
mercial sources, as against performance of work in Government -owned facilities.'
* * * * * * *
ARTICLE XXV-UTILIZATION OF SMALL BUSINESS CONCERNS
1. It is the policy of the Government as declared by the Congress that a fair
proportion of the purchases and contracts for supplies and services for the Gov-
ernment be placed with small business concerns.
'An AEC bulletin provides:
1. The Federal policy currently expressed in BoB 60-2, which is in favor of Gov-
ernment procurement from commercial sources unless a finding Is made that com-
pelling reasons exist for performing work in Government-owned facilities Compel-
ling reasons for exceptions to the general policy include national security, relatively
large and disproportionately higher costs, and clear unfeasibility. In addition, this
Bulletin requires Government agencies to discontinue activities currently performed
in Government-owned facilities If and when commercial facilities are available to do
the job at reasonable cost
452 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. The Contractor agrees to accomplish the maximum amount of subcon-
tracting to small business concerns that the Contractor finds to be consistent
with the efficient performance of this contract.
ARTICLE XXVI-SMALL BUSINESS SUBCONTRACTING PROGRAM
1. The Contractor agrees to establish and conduct a small business subcon-
tracting program which will enable small business concerns to be considered
fairly as subcontractors and suppliers under this contract. In this connection,
the Contractor shall-
a. Designate a liaison officer who will (i) maintain liaison with the
Government on small business matters, (u) supervise compliance with the
Utilization of Small Business Concerns Article, and (iii) administer the
Contractor's `Small Business Subcontracting Program.'
b Provide adequate and timely consideration of the potentialities of
small business concerns in all `make-or-buy' decisions
* * * * * *
3. The Contractor agrees that, in the event it fails to comply with its con-
tractual obligations concerning the small business subcontracting program, this
contract may terminate, in whole or in part, for default.
Under the contract and apparently on the basis of negotiation between the AEC
and the Company, the AEC imposes a ceiling on the number of persons who may
be employed by the Company to work at the laboratory. Pursuant to this pro-
cedure, on December 3, 1959, a limit of 2,900 persons was established for the Bettis
site. This limitation was still effective at the time of the hearing herein. Within
this limitation the Company can rearrange its work force at its discretion, its only
restriction being that the ceiling in numbers is not exceeded. In this connection, the
company policy has been to maintain a stable work force of maintenance employees
rather than to hire additional maintenance men for projects that may last only 2 or 3
months, during which period, in order to comply with the personnel ceiling, it would
be necessary to reduce in force other employees by a corresponding number 2
On or about June 18, 1959, the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, was
certified as the collective-bargaining agent for the Company's employees in the
following appropriate bargaining unit.
All employees of the works engineering department at the Respondent's Bettis
and Clairton sites, excluding all other employees, office, clerical, and technical
employees, professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the
Act.3
After the Union was certified, the Company and the Union entered into negotia-
tions for a collective-bargaining agreement which resulted in a contract on or about
November 6, 1959. This contract contained the following clauses:
SECTION IV-MANAGEMENT
The Union recognizes that it is the responsibility of the Company to maintain
the efficiency of the LABORATORY and agrees that Management shall have
the freedom of action necessary to discharge its responsibility for the success-
ful operation of the LABORATORY. This responsibility includes, among other
things, the right to hire, maintain discipline, promote or transfer employees, the
determination of the number and location of its plants, the selection of those
with whom it will do business; the methods and means by which its operations
are to be carried on; and the units of personnel needed to carry on its operations.
This section does not limit or modify the rights of the parties under any other
provisions of this agreement.
* * * * * *
SECTION XXIV-MODIFICATION AND TERMINATION
A. This Agreement expresses the understanding of the parties in respect to
all matters deemed by them to be applicable to the bargaining unit. Therefore,
2 The Respondent claims that this would require the reduction of its engineers or
scientists. I suppose it conceivably could come to that-one nuclear physicist for
one sheet metal worker. On the other hand, I suspect that there might be some
clerical, stenographic, or other categories from which Respondent might make its sub-
stitutions if necessary
3 The function of the works engineering department is to perform maintenance work on
all the facilities and buildings at the Bettis site, the Clairton site no longer being operated.
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP., ETC. 453
except as herein specifically provided, the Company and the Union, for the life
of this Agreement each voluntarily and unqualifiedly waives the right, and each
agrees that the other shall not be obligated, to bargain collectively with respect
to any subject or matter referred to or covered by this agreement, or with
respect to any subjects or matters not specifically referred to or covered by
this Agreement which were discussed during the negotiation of this Agreement.
In the negotiations, the Union proposed a contract provision that would limit
subcontracting The Union also objected to the above management clause, saying it
gave the Company the right to subcontract the work The Company explained the
reasons it had to retain the right to subcontract, including manpower limitations and
allocations In all, the subject was debated at seven meetings before the contract
was concluded In the final agreement there was no limitation on the Company's
right to subcontract, and no elimination of the management clause.
The 1959 contract by its terms was effective until December 1, 1960. Prior to
its expiration, the parties met to bargain on a new contract. The Union handed the
Company a written proposal which, among other things, would have amended the
management clause, and which contained the following:
SECTION V-SUB-CONTRACTING (not included in
present contract)
The Company and the Union agrees that outside contractors shall not be
employed to perform work on Company premises which is normally performed
by employees of Bettis Atomic Power Division, if an employee who normally
performs such work is laid off.
The subject of subcontracting and manpower limitation was discussed at 11 nego-
tiating meetings leading up to the new 1960 contract. The Union was insistent upon
a clause that would limit subcontracting. Every aspect of the subject was debated
exhaustively. While no specific subcontracts were discussed, the Union used many
specific examples, as did the Company, giving both reasons and arguments in support
of their positions. The Company assured the Union that it would make "a conscious
effort to preserve the bargaining unit and to maintain a stable work force."
Finally, the subcontracting issue was the only one left unresolved. The employees
were advised by letter as to the Company's position and the reasons for it. The
Union took a strike vote on the issue, but did not strike The reason that they did
not strike apparently was because of the Company's letter referred to in the record
as "the George Haight 4 Letter of Intent." Although this letter was not offered in
evidence by anyone, both the General Counsel's and the Respondent's witnesses
testified credibly about it. Thus, Union Representative Ciptak testified:
. we were completely unsuccessful in getting them to accept the sub-contract-
ing clause. But in the place of the sub-contracting clause, received the George
Haight Letter of Intent. This is not what only management, but the local Union
officers sold to the membership to prevent a strike in 1960. We asked at that
particular time during negotiations would Mr. Madsen incorporate the George
Haight's Letter of Intent into the contract Mr. Madsen said, "No, we are
going to have to develop a mutual trust. It is not necessary that we incorporate
it, we will not incorporate it into the contract." But the people bought it, and
there was no strike.
And Howard C. Madsen, one of Respondent's officials, testified:
It was at this meeting that Mr Haight first put up the idea of sitting down
and reviewing with the Union and telling them of their plans for subcontracting;
to discuss the actual jobs that we were planning to put out, and as Mr Hanson
has testified, it has been in these last three years since the 1960 negotiations that
Mr. Hanson has been doing that.5
(Haight) suggested that-in fact, he said that he personally would be review-
ing the subcontracting work, and that he thought it would be a good idea if the
two parties got together to occasionally review the work that is being sub-
contracted so that the Union would be informed. The Union felt, of course,
that they saw no relief from what they considered as being excessive subcon-
tracting on our part
From November 8, 1962, to October 11, 1963, Respondent awarded over 100
contracts or purchase orders for various items, services, maintenance, and construe-
'George Haight was at that time manager of plant service for Respondent
5 C. F Hanson was manager of the work engineering department
454 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tion. Of these, the General Counsel cites 14 totaling $43,998 that, according to him,
were awarded by Respondent without the benefit of collective bargaining, i e , with-
out prior notice either before the work started or before the contract was let, or
with notice but without the opportunity to examine or discuss the matter.G
It also appeals that on two occasions, where the Company had indicated its inten-
tion to subcontract work , the Union was able to persuade it to reverse its decision
and let the unit perform the work. Thus, in a meeting on August 27, 1963, the Com-
pany announced its intention of subcontracting the restoration of a quonset hut roof
because of the backlog of its sheet metal workers. After discussing it "pretty
strongly for about an hour" Hanson agreed to let the unit do the work using plumbers
instead of sheet metal workers. Also, undenied in the record is Ciptak's testimony
that the Company had reversed its position regarding certain smoke detection work
and told the Union it was going to get it
In his testimony, Hanson, work engineering department manager, testified that as
to several of the 14 contracts in question there had been prior discussion with the
Union about subcontracting them 7 But Respondent's evidence also revealed that
seven of the contracts involving $32,836 worth of work had been let without prior
notice to the Union. Hanson also testified that the Union
. wanted to see the schedules so they could show me how the schedules should
be rearranged, what items were unimportant and should be shoved down the
list and forgotten about. I told them nothing doing, that was my job, and they
could not see the schedule.
This came up in about half of their discussions.8 Hanson also told them that the
schedules were "a management tool."
The undenied and credited evidence also shows that up to the time that the charge
was filed herein, the Company paid for all the time during which the union employees
were engaged in the discussion of subcontracts with the Company This was in con-
trast to the procedure followed regarding negotiations and grievance discussions
where, under the contract, the Union and the Company each paid half for the
employees ' time. When Union Representative Ciptak asked Hanson why the
Company was paying for all the time in connection with subcontract discussions,
Hanson replied that "the meeting was merely to inform the Local Union , and .. .
it wouldn't be right for management to charge the local Union for half the amount
spent, because sub-contracting is not a negotiable item " 9
The evidence also shows that the Company has in fact maintained a stable force.
The employees represented by the Union are all salaried , not hourly paid. From
October 1962 , through March 1963, there were 159 men in the unit . Then one man
retired. Since then there have been 158. None have been laid off, nor have they
lost any work or salary.
Contentions and Conclusions
In its defense , Respondent contends ( apparently in the order of importance) that
(1) the Union waived the right to bargain on subcontracting during the term of the
collective -bargaining agreement ; ( 2) in any event , the Company did bargain on sub-
contracting both generally and specifically in full accordance with the requirements
of the Act; ( 3) the General Counsel, in his allegations , is attempting to extend or
6 Two contracts were claimed to be in this latter category These involved prior notice
but refusals to let the Union see the Company's work schedule so as to be able to weigh
the Company 's claim that its schedule required that the work be subcontracted That
there were several more contracts in this category would appear from Hanson's admis-
sion set forth below
7 Of these , there were four on which the discussion had taken place anywhere from
6 to 10 months before the contracts were awarded as follows:
Cleaning Building G (10 months )________________________________ $ 5,800
Toilet facilities ( 7 months )______________________________________ 3,734
Painting lean -to (7 months )____________________________________ 739
Painting cell A3 (7 months)____________________________________ 625
8 Hanson testified credibly that he had had at least 17 meetings with the Union in the
past year and a half in which subcontracting was discussed
9 On another occasion when Ciptak had asked Hanson for leave to have an Interna-
tional representative present at a subcontract discussion , Hanson told him there was no
need to because the meetings were solely for the purpose of giving the Union information
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP., ETC. 455
enlarge upon the principle of Town & Country,'0 which it claims "is both unwar-
ranted and unwise"; (4) the policy of the United States requires subcontracting here
by Respondent; and (5) subcontracting is not a mandatory subject for bargaining.
On his part, the General Counsel, although conceding that Respondent bargained
on the subject of subcontracting "generally," contends that Respondent nevertheless
was obligated to bargain with the Union on the "specific instances" in which it con-
templated subcontracting. As to the limitations or requirements imposed upon
Respondent by its contract with the Atomic Energy Commission vis-a-vis subcon-
tracting, the General Counsel states in his brief,
The theory of the General Counsel is not that Respondent violated the Act by
subcontracting, but that the Respondent violated the Act by failing to notify and
bargain with the Union upon its decision to subcontract If the Union had been
afforded that opportunity then all of the factors that affected the Respondent's
decision could be discussed, including any policies of the AEC.
In contending that the Union waived its right to bargain on subcontracting during
the term of the collective-bargaining agreement, Respondent relies on The Jacobs
Manufacturing Company, 94 NLRB 1214, in which the Board held (by a 3 to 2
majority) that under Section 8(d) of the Act," it was no unfair labor practice to
refuse during the term of a contract to bargain on the subject of insurance, a matter
that had been discussed during the negotiations, but which had not been included
in the contract. In that case, the Board stated that:
And if the parties originally desired to avoid later discussion with respect to
matters not specifically covered in the terms of an executed contract, they need
only so specify in the terms of the contract itself. Nothing in our construction
of Section 8(d) precludes such an agreement, entered into in good faith, from
foreclosing future discussion of matters not contained in the agreement.
Then in a footnote the Board expresses the following dictum:
For an example of a contract in which such a provision was incorporated,
see the contract between United Automobile Workers of America and General
Motors Corporation, set forth in Labor Relations Manual (BNA), Vol. 26, p.
63, 91, which states:
(154) The parties acknowledge that during the negotiations which resulted
in this agreement, each had the unlimited right and opportunity to make
demands and proposals with respect to any subject or matter not removed
by law from the area of collective bargaining, and that the understandings
and agreements arrived at by the paities after the exercise of that right and
opportunity, are set forth in this agreement. Therefore, the Corporation
10 Town & Country Manor factoring Company, Inc ., etc, 136 NLRB 1022, enfd , 316 F. 2d
846 (C.A. 5 ), where the Board held that by contracting out an entire bargaining unit
operation ( trucking ) without first consulting with the Union about it , Section 8(a) (5)
of the Act was violated Here, as I understand it, Respondent attacks the applicability
of Town & Country, on the grounds , inter ilia, that there was no threat to the entire
bargaining unit as such or indeed to any job in it, and that bargaining on subcontracts
affecting a unit piecemeal is not required by Town & Country
In this connection , Respondent discusses two Intermediate Reports of Trial Examiner
Reel, Shell 0sl Company, 149 NLRB 283, and Shell Chemical Company , etc, 149 NLRB
298, involving a similar problem as here In holding that the principle of the Town. &
Country case was applicable to the contracting of specific jobs as well as on an entire
operation he said,
The differences are of degree , and not of kind ; the Union has the same legitimate
interest in protecting the work of the employees from slow erosion that it has in
protecting the work against sudden and total disappearance.
I agree with Mr Reel, notwithstanding Respondent 's contrary position.
11 Section 8(d) of the Act after describing in some detail the duties and obligations of
collective -bargaining states that-
. . . the duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either party to discuss
or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a
fixed period , if such modification is to become effective before such terms and condi-
tions can be reopened under the provisions of the contract
456 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and the Union, for the life of this agreement, each voluntarily and unquali-
fiably waives the right, and each agrees that the other shall not be obligated,
to bargain collectively with respect to any subject or matter not specifically
referred to or covered in this agreement, even though such subjects or
matter may not have been within the knowledge or contemplation of either
or both of the parties at the time that they negotiated or signed this
agreement.12
In comparing the waiver clause involved here with the example cited by the Board
in Jacobs, Respondent points out that there the clause "purports to foreclose bargain-
ing on subjects or matters not even discussed or known to exist when the parties
negotiated", while here the "clause forecloses bargaining on subjects or matters
discussed in negotiations" and thus clearly indicates to the parties the subjects upon
which they were waiving their right to bargain.
There is no question that subcontracting is a mandatory subject for collective
bargaining. Town & Country Manufactaumg Company, Inc., and Town & Country
Sales Company, Inc , 136 NLRB 1022, enfd 316 F 2d 846 (C.A 5), Peerless Drs-
t;ibutmg Company, 144 NLRB 1510, and that the right to bargain on such a
subject may be waived by a union The Jacobs Manufacturing Company, supra. But
it is clear that any such waiver must involve "a conscious relinquishment . . .
clearly intended and expressed " Peikins Machine Company, 141 NLRB 98, and
must be "clear and unequivocal" in its terms. California Portland Cement Company,
supra, The Tmmken Roller Bearing Company, 138 NLRB 15, enfd. 325 F. 2d 746
(C.A. 6).
While there may be some merit in Respondents position, I do not agree that in
the circumstances here the clause relied on by Respondent amounts to the "clear
and unequivocal" waiver required by the cases. It seems to me that when a strike
was averted and the Union prevailed upon to relinquish its demand for a blanket
or advance limitation on Respondent's right to subcontract only after the Company
gave assurances that it would inform the Union of its plans for subcontracting and
"discuss [with it] the actual jobs that [it was] planning to put out," 13 the only
logical conclusion is that the Union was not waiving its right here to "discuss" with
the Company in the collective bargaining sense, subcontracting on a specific job-to-
job basis. Accordingly, I find no merit in Respondent's contention that it was not
required to bargain with the Union on specific subcontracts by reason of any waiver
on the part of the Union in that respect.
I also reject Respondent's contention that notwithstanding its position that it was
not required to bargain on specific subcontracts, it nevertheless did bargain with the
Union in that respect also.
It is clear, of course, that during the negotiations the Company bargained with the
Union on subcontracting in general, or to put it more accurately, about a blanket or
overall limitation on the Company's right to subcontract. It also appears that "dis-
cussion" thereafter took place between the Company and the Union on specific sub-
contracts. Whether this discussion satisfied the requirements of Section 8(a)(5) of
12 Cf. Califorivia Portland Cement Company, 101 NLRB 1436, 1438, where the Board
held the following clause to be no valid waiver
This Labor Agreement and the Pension Agreement together contain all the obliga-
tions of, and restrictions imposed upon, each of the parties during their respective
terms
It is the intent of the parties by these two agreements to have settled all issues
between them and all collective bargaining obligations for the term of the Labor Agree-
ment (and for the term of the Pension Agreement relative to pensions), and that no
change shall be made in either agreement prior to the expiration thereof except by
mutual iNritten consent and except as provided in Section 2 of Article X of the
Pension Agreement
13 It may very well be that what the Company meant to convey to the Union was that
as a matter of courtesy and for its information only, it would from time to time review
what had been done by it in the matter of subcontracting However, it also seems quite
likely and reasonable on the evidence herein that what the Union understood the Com-
pany to be saying was that although it would not agree in advance to a limitation on
subcontracting, it would give the Union the opportunity to try to change its mind or in-
fluence its decisions on a job-to-job basis
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP., ETC. 457
the Act is unnecessary to decide,14 since it appears from Respondent's own admission
that at least eight subcontracts, in the amount of approximately $34,000, were
awarded in which no prior notice was given the Union (six such contracts involved
a total of about $29,000),1( or where notice was given, but requests refused, the
Union to see Respondent's schedules (two such contracts involved about $3,500).
On this conduct, even eliminating the two contracts Respondent claimed were not
bargaining unit work, I find that Respondent failed to bargain within the meaning of
the Act. Respondent's contention that the "2 or 3 minor items" which it had "over-
looked" should not weigh against it, loses considerable force in the light of Respond-
ent's refusal to afford the Union a chance to see its work schedules, its basic attitude
that it was not obligated to bargain, and its position that its discussions on subcon-
tracting with the Union were for information only.
In its brief, Respondent alludes to the practical difficulties the Board will encounter
(and that will aiso overwhelm the parties) if the Town & Country doctrine is
extended as the General Counsel seeks to extend it. In this connection, Respondent
discusses some of Trial Examiner Reel's further conclusions in the Shell cases, supra,
about what are and what are not the types of subcontracts that are bargainable, and
how they might be handled by the parties. I do not know whether the disposition
of these matters would be as simple and as potentially gratifying for an employe(
as Mr Reel conjectures, or whether they would be as frustrating and onerous to
handle as Respondent predicts,'(; but I do know that the two instances here where
fruitful results came from genuine bargaining 17 are concrete examples which tend
to undercut Respondent's argument in this connection. Moreover, it also tends to
belie the straitjacket Respondent claims that its Government contract puts it in on
this matter of subcontracting. Here again, I am sure that Respondents problems are
more difficult than in a venture not involving public policy and funds. But I have
no doubt that Respondent has more flexibility in the matter of subcontracting than
it professes, as was exemplified by the two contracts in question.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connec-
tion with the operations of Respondent as set forth in section 1, above, and the
operations of members of the Association as set forth in section III, above, have a
close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow of commerce.
Having found that Respondent has engaged in specific unfair labor practices pro-
hibited by Section 8(a) (1) and (5) of the Act, I shall recommend that it be ordered
to cease and desist therefrom, and take the usual affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
"In at least two instances it would appear that it did. (1) where the Union was able
to reverse the Company's decision with respect to the quonset hut roof, and (2) the in-
stallation of smoke detection equipment However, in other instances it would seem that
it did not. For instance, in about half of the discussions between the union repiesenta-
tives and the Company, when the Union asked to see the Company's work schedules for
the purpose of being able to check the Company's claim that its schedule requirements
necessitated the subcontracting of certain work, the requests were refused with the ex-
planation, in substance, that subcontracting was a management prerogative This posi-
tion, of course, was consistent with the position taken by Respondent throughout these
discussions, that subcontracting was not a bargainable subject It is also consistent with
Ciptak's credited testimony that Hanson's explanation why an International representa-
tive should not participate in a subcontracting discussion was because it was being held
merely to give the Union information With this hit or miss attitude, depending largely
on the mood of the Company at any given time, it can hardly be said that the Respond-
ent was fulfilling its obligation at all times herein to bargain within the meaning of the
Act on the question of subcontracting
15 Of these six, Respondent claimed that two of them (involving about $3.500) were
items that required special equipment or were of such special nature as not to have been
within the unit's purview or capabilities
10I have no doubt that the requirement that Respondent bargain here on subcontract-
ing will not make the performance of its contract with the Atomic Energy Commission
any easier But that would be no reason to excuse such performance
17 The quonset hut roof and the smoke elimination equipment upon which the Union was
able to persuade Respondent to change its mind
458 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record herein,
I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1 Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
2. United Steelworkers of America, District 15, AFL-CIO, and its Local 5852
are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All employees of the works engineering department at Respondent's Bettis
Atomic Power Laboratory, excluding all other employees, office clerical and technical
employees, professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act,
constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4 At all times material since June 18, 1959, the Union has been the representative
for the purposes of collective bargaining of the employees in the above unit.
5. By failing to bargain with the Union before subletting maintenance work of a
nature which could have been assigned to members of the bargaining unit, Respond-
ent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(5)
and (1), and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon
the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , it is hereby ordered that Respondent , Westinghouse
Electric Corp., Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory, its officers , agents , successors, and
assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Letting contracts for maintenance work at its Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory
without prior notice to, and opportunity for negotiation with, United Steelworkers
of America , District 15, AFL-CIO, and its Local 5852 where such contracts cover
projects of a nature which could have been performed by its employees who are
represented by that Union as the statutory bargaining representative , unless emer-
gency conditions require.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with the efforts of the above-named
Union to bargain collectively with the Company on behalf of the employees in the
bargaining unit.
2 Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies
of the Act:
(a) Upon request , bargain collectively with the above -named Union with respect
to whether particular contracts will be let for maintenance work at the Bettis Atomic
Power Laboratory where such contracts cover projects of a nature which could be
performed by Respondent's employees of whom the Union is the statutory bargain-
ing representative.
(b) Post at its Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory, copies of the attached notice
marked "Appendix ." 18 Copies of said notice , to be furnished by the Regional
Director for Region 6, shall , after being signed by a representative of the Respondent,
be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by
it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notice is not altered , defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 6, in writing , within 20 days from
the date of this Trial Examiner 's Decision and Recommended Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.19
I8 In the event that this Recommended Order Is adopted by the Board, the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced
by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order".
"In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read, "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
WEINACKER BROTHERS, INC. 459
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board , and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act , as amended , we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT, except in emergencies , let any contracts for maintenance work
at our Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory covering projects of a nature which
could be performed by the employees of the works engineering department with-
out giving United Steelworkers of America , District 15, AFL-CIO, and its Local
Union 5852, notice of our intention to let such contracts , and an opportunity
to bargain with us over whether such contracts should be let.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain in good faith with the above-named Union
before letting any such contracts.
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 2107 Clark
Building, 701-17 Liberty Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Telephone No. 471-
2977, if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its
provisions.
Weinacker Brothers, Inc. and Lorenzo Matthews , Harry W.
Wright , Local 458, Retail Clerks International Association,
AFL-CIO, and Elizabeth Ann Boyette , Donald Harris, Jack
Willis Smith and Local 458, Retail Clerks International Asso-
ciation , AFL-CIO. Cases Nos. 15-CA-2486-1, 15-CA-2486-2,
15-CA-2486-3, 15-CA-2486-4, 15-CA-2486-5, 15-CA-2486-6, 15-
CA-2486-8, 15-CA-2486-12, 15-CA-2486-15, 15-CA-2486-17, 15-
CA-2486-18, and 15-CA-2501. June 25, 1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On April 15, 1965, Trial Examiner Stanley Gilbert issued his Deci-
sion in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within
the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and rec-
ommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirma-
tive action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
Thereafter, the General Counsel filed limited exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Decision and a brief in support of the Trial Examiner's
Decision. The Respondent did not file exceptions or a brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the National
Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with
these cases to a three-member panel. [Chairman McCulloch and Mem-
bers Fanning and Jenkins].
153 NLRB No. 40.