W. B. Johnston Grain Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 10, 1965

154 N.L.R.B. 1115 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

W. B. JOHNSTON GRAIN COMPANY, ETC . 1115
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Local 522, International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or in
any other labor organization, by discriminating against employees in regard to
their hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join or
assist Local 522, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America, or any other labor organization, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to
the extent that such right may be affected by the provisos in Section 8 (a) (3)
of the Act.
All of our employees are free to become, remain, or refrain from becoming or
remaining, members of Local 522, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or any other labor organization.
EDWARD N. OLSEN D/B/A TERRACE LUMBER COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
STATEN ISLAND HOME IMPROVEMENT CORPORATION,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its
provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 16 Court
Street, Brooklyn, New York, Telephone No. 596-5386.
W. B. Johnston Grain Company and Johnston Seed Company and
American Federation of Grain Millers, AFL-CIO. Case No. 16-
CA-2149. September 10, 1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On July 21, 1965, Trial Examiner Rosanna A. Blake issued her
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent
has engaged in and is engaging in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Exam-
iner's Decision and a brief in support thereof.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection With this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Brown and Zagoria].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner 's Decision, the Respondent's exceptions and brief, and the
154 NLRB No. 101.
1116 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,
and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, with the following
addition :
We agree with the Trial Examiner's conclusion that, because a rea-
sonable time had not elapsed between the settlement agreement and
the Respondent's refusal to bargain, the Respondent violated Section
8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act.' In addition to the Trial Examiner's reli-
ance on the time lapse of only 6 weeks, we rely also on the facts that
only two bargaining meetings had been held after the settlement agree-
ment, and that the parties were apparently making progress toward
reaching agreement when the Respondent, on the ground that a decer-
tification petition had been filed, terminated the negotiations, and
demanded that the Union reestablish its representative status.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its
Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and orders that
the Respondent, W. B. Johnston Grain Company and Johnston Seed
Company, Enid, Oklahoma, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended
Order .2
' Poole Foundry and Machine Company, 192 F. 2d 740 (C.A. 4), cert. denied 342 U.S.
954, enfg. 95 NLRB 34.
2 The telephone number for Region 16, appearing at the bottom of the Appendix attached
to the Trial Examiner's Decision, is amended to read: 335-2145.
TRIAL EXAMINER 'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge filed on October 5, 1964, by American Federation of Grain Millers,
AFL-CIO, the General Counsel, acting through the Regional Director for Region 16,
issued a complaint on November 5, 1964, in which it was alleged that W. B Johnston
Grain Company and Johnston Seed Company, herein referred to collectively as the
Company or the Respondent, had engaged in conduct which violated Section 8(a) (5)
and (1) of the Act. In its answer, Respondent admitted certain allegations of the
complaint, such as the commerce allegations, but denied the unfair labor practice
allegations.
Thereafter, pursuant to due notice, a hearing was held before Trial Examiner
Rosanna A. Blake at Enid, Oklahoma, on January 18, 1965. All parties were repre-
sented and were given full opportunity to introduce evidence, examine and cross-
examine witnesses, to argue orally, and to file briefs. The parties waived oral argu-
ment. Thereafter, counsel for the General Counsel filed a brief as did counsel for
Respondent.
Upon consideration of the record, the briefs, and upon my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS; THE LABOR
ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
W. B. Johnston Grain Company and Johnston Seed Company, two Oklahoma cor-
porations, are affiliated businesses with common officers, ownership, directors, and
operators and constitute a single integrated business enterprise. The directors and
W. B. JOHNSTON GRAIN COMPANY, ETC. 1117
operators formulate and administer a common labor policy for the two companies
which have their principal offices in Enid, Oklahoma, where they are engaged in the
merchandising and storage of grain and the storage, preparation, and merchandising
of seeds.
During the 12 months prior to the issuance of the complaint, a representative
period, each of the companies purchased, transferred, and delivered to their place
of business in the State of Oklahoma, products and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 which were transported to their places of business directly from suppliers
located in States other than the State of Oklahoma.
Upon the above, undisputed facts, Respondent admits and I find that it is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
American Federation of Grain Millers, AFL-CIO, referred to herein as the
Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
IT. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The settlement agreement
On or about September 17, 1963, a majority of Respondent's employees in an
admittedly appropriate bargaining unit voted to be represented by the Union and
on about September 25, 1963, the Board certified the Union as the employees' exclu-
sive bargaining representative.
Following the certification, 10 bargaining sessions were held. Although agree-
ment was reached on some terms, it is clear that the parties were still far apart on
many issues.
On or about August 20, the Regional Director for Region 16 approved a Settle-
ment Agreement "In the matter of W. B. Johnston Grain Company and Johnston
Seed Company, Case No. 16-CA-2086" which had been signed previously by Joe
Meibergen and L. C. Hill on behalf of the Respondent and by Ralph Cox, Inter-
national Representative, on behalf of the Union.
The agreement provided for the posting of notices and bound Respondent to com-
ply with the terms and provisions of the notice. It also stated that "Contingent upon
compliance with the terms" of the Agreement, "No, further action [would] be taken"
in Case No. 16-CA-2086." Also included was the statement: "It is understood,
however, that this Agreement and Notice shall not be construed as an admission or
determination that the undersigned Employer has in any way violated its bargaining
responsibility."
The notice stated:
WE WILL BARGAIN upon request with the American Federation of Grain
Millers, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bar-
gaining unit described herein with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment
or other conditions of employment, and if an understanding is reached, embody
such understanding in a signed agreement.'
B. The events following the settlement agreement
The Respondent and the Union met for several hours on August 20, 1964, the
day the settlement agreement was approved They discussed "from scratch" each
clause in the proposed contract which the Union had submitted during the pre-
settlement negotiations . The Union asked for a 25-cent-an-hour pay increase and
the Company replied that it could grant only 5 cent-an-hour "on a two year
agreement."
Ralph Cox, the union spokesman , had to leave at 3:30 p m., because of a prior
commitment. He asked the Company to meet on Friday, August 21 but at least one
of its representatives could not meet that day. The next meeting was held on
August 28 and lasted 2 hours. The Union made a "package" offer and reduced its
wage demand to an increase of 10 cents an hour. The Company rejected the Union's
proposal and again offered a 5-cent-an-hour increase to be incorporated into a 2-year
agreement.
The Union asked Respondent's counsel and spokesman, Frank Carter, to draft a
complete contract dealing with the issues previously discussed and Carter agreed to
prepare such a draft. When the Union asked how long it would take counsel to
prepare the draft, he said "about a week or ten days "
There being no dispute about the appropriateness of the bargaining unit, it is un-
necessary to describe it here.
1118 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent's counsel suggested that the parties meet on September 9 but the
union spokesman could not meet that day. On September 15, the union repre-
sentative wrote company counsel requesting a meeting on September 21. In his
reply, counsel stated that he would be unable to meet until after September 23.
On Saturday, September 26, Union Representative Cox met Company Counsel
Carter on the street in Enid and asked about the draft Carter had agreed, on
August 28, to furnish Cox Carter said the draft was in his office but made no reply
when Cox asked him to mail a copy to Cox.
The parties met again on October 2. Company counsel stated that a "decertifica-
tion" petition had been filed and that the Company could not bargain "any further."
Carter asked if Cox would agree to a consent election and Cox refused. When Cox
asked about the draft of the contract, Carter said that he had one but would not
give it to Cox "because in view of the Petition I doubt the Union is representing the
people and we . . . refuse to further negotiate with you."
Thereafter, the Company notified the Regional Director that the Union refused
to execute a consent-election agreement 2
The unfair labor practice charge in the instant case was filed on October 5. That
same day, the Regional Director dismissed the decertification petition.
C. Analysis and conclusions
As indicated, supra, the Company's refusal to bargain with the Union on and
after October 2, 1964, was based solely upon its doubt that the Union continued to
represent a majority of the employees. In support of its position Respondent cited,
inter alia, the decertification petition filed on or about September 28; i.e., a few days
after the end of the Union's certification year.
The basic fallacy in Respondent's contention that it was justified in refusing to
bargain because it doubted that the Union currently represented a majority of the
employees is that it disregards and treats as immaterial the settlement agreement
approved by the Regional Director on August 20. On the contrary, the Board holds,
with court approval, that after a settlement agreement has been executed and
approved, a reasonable period of time must be afforded the parties within which to
negotiate and, if possible, to reach agreement on a contract. Poole Foundry and
Machine Company, 192 F. 2d 740 (C.A. 4), cert denied, 342 U.S. 954, enfg. 95
NLRB 34, 35-36. Cf. Frank Becker Towing Company, etc., 151 NLRB 466.
In Poole, the Union was certified in November 1946 and in April 1947, the parties
executed a 1-year contract. A second contract was also executed and this one
expired in May 1949. Shortly thereafter, the Union filed unfair labor practice
charges which included, inter alia, an allegation that employees had been discrim-
inatorily discharged. Subsequently, the parties entered into a settlement agreement
which was approved by the Regional Director on December 28, 1949. Included
was a provision which required Poole to bargain with the Union and the parties in
fact engaged in collective bargaining thereafter.
On March 10, some 10 months after the last contract expired, 64 of the 66 employ-
ees in the bargaining unit filed a decertification petition, the Regional Director notified
Poole that such a petition had been filed, and Poole thereafter took the position
that it would not bargain with the Union until the latter furnished proof of its
majority. As in the instant case, the decertification petition was subsequently
dismissed
Following Poole's refusal to bargain, a new charge was filed, a complaint was
issued and the Board found that Poole's refusal to bargain with the Union violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. As summarized by the court, the Board con-
cluded that (192 F. 2d at 742) :
Since Poole freely entered into the settlement agreement in return for the with-
drawal of the charges against it, and since Poole in that settlement agreed to
bargain with the Union . . . the bargaining provision of the settlement agree-
ment, like a similar provision in a Board order remedying unfair labor prac-
tices, must be given a reasonable time to operate, irrespective of any possible
or proved loss of Union majority during such reasonable period. The Board
further concluded that the three-and-one-half months which elapsed between
the execution of the settlement agreement and the refusal to bargain was not
such a reasonable period, and that Poole was therefore precluded from ques-
tioning the representative status of the Union.
2 When the decertification petition was filed, the Regional Director sent a copy to Re-
spondent and a "form" letter outlining the consent-election procedure. He also enclosed
a copy of the usual agreement for consent election.
W. B. JOHNSTON GRAIN COMPANY, ETC. 1119
In affirming the Board's conclusions and enforcing its order, the court said (192
F. 2d 742) :
The law appears to be well settled that if the Union's original unfair labor
practice charge had led to a regular Board proceeding culminating in a finding
by the Board that the employer had been guilty of an unfair labor practice and in
a Board order directing the Company to bargain with the Union, the Company's
duty to bargain for a reasonable period would have been unaffected by the .. .
Union's loss of majority.... It is even clearer that ordinarily, in the absence of
an unfair labor practice or of a remedial order, Poole would have been well
within its rights in refusing to bargain with a Union whose majority status
Poole questioned in good faith. The narrow question presented in this case is
what effect, if any, is to be given to the settlement agreement under which Poole
agreed to recognize its bargaining obligation to the Union in return for the
withdrawal of the charge against it. The Board concluded that under the settle-
ment agreement the parties must bargain for a reasonable time irrespective of
fluctuations in the Union's majority, and that such a reasonable time after the
settlement agreement had not elapsed. Poole's contention is that in spite of
the bargaining provision of the settlement agreement, it here had the right
to question the Union's lack of a majority, and that, when 64 out of 66 employ-
ees in the bargaining unit manifested their desire not to be represented by the
Union, Poole could properly refuse to deal with the Union since the Union was
not the majority representative of the employees. [Emphasis supplied.]
After discussing the importance of settlement agreements generally, the court went
on to say (192 F. 2d at 742-744) :
We agree with Poole's contention that a settlement agreement differs from a
finding by the Board that an unfair labor practice has been committed. We
agree, too, with the Board's contention that a settlement agreement must, from
its terms, have definite legal effect and is quite different from a dismissal of
the charges....
We think the settlement agreement clearly manifests an administrative deter-
mination by the Board that some remedial action is necessary to safeguard the
public interests intended to be protected by the National Labor Relations Act.
It is equally clear that the settlement agreement represents an agreement
by Poole to undertake promptly the remedial action set out in the agreement
rather than to be put to the trouble and expense of litigation before a trial exam-
iner, the Board and possibly the courts.
Experience has demonstrated the importance of the settlement agreement
agreement in the effective administration of the Act. There is manifest force in
the Board's assertion that the contention of Poole would seriously undermine
the effectiveness of settlement agreements as a satisfactory means of closing cases
involving charges of unfair labor practices prohibited by the Act. There would
indeed be few of these agreements if Poole, after a solemn promise to bargain
with the Union, could immediately escape this obligation by questioning whether
the Union actually represents a majority of the employees in the bargaining
unit.
If Poole's contention be sound, this would permit an employer to commit an
unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain collectively with the Union, sign a
settlement agreement undertaking to bargain with the Union, then attempt to have
a new union certified when dissatisfaction with the old union arose among the
employees because of the unfair labor practice. Certainly this should neither
be permitted nor encouraged.
We, accordingly, agree with the Board's contention that Poole, by entering
into the settlement agreement, thereby securing a withdrawal of the charges of
unfair labor practices, is bound to bargain in good faith with the Union for a
reasonable period of time after such settlement, without questioning the Union's
lack of a majority. The settlement agreement was signed December 27, 1949.
Poole's refusal to bargain was in early April 1950, less than four months after
the settlement agreement. The Board has found that this was not a reasonable
period. We feel bound by this determination since we cannot say it was
arbitrary. . . .
We are not unmindful of Poole's contention that the Board's order denies to
the employees the right to choose freely their representative in collective bar-
gaining-a right expressly guaranteed by Section 7, 8(a) (5), 9(a) and 9(c) (1)
and (3) of the Act as amended .... These employees are free to file a decerti-
fication petition after the settlement agreement has been in effect a reasonable
length of time.
1120 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
While not an admission of past liability, a settlement agreement does consti-
tute a basis for future liability and the parties recognize a status thereby fixed ....
An entire structure or course of future labor relationships may well be bottomed
upon the binding effect of a status fixed by the terms of a settlement agreement.
If a settlement agreement is to have real force, it would seem that a reasonable
time must be afforded in which a status fixed by the agreement is to operate.
Otherwise, settlement agreements might indeed have little practical effect as an
amicable and judicious means to expeditious disposal of disputes arising under
the terms of the Act. Thus, it follows that Poole, after having solemnly agreed
to bargain with the Union, should not be permitted, within three and one-half
months after the agreement, to refuse so to bargain, even if, as here, the Union
clearly did not represent a majority of the employees. [Emphasis supplied.]
The court's opinion, set forth above, makes it clear that the court considered and
rejected most of the arguments made in Respondent's brief and that the court clearly
held untenable Respondent's fundamental thesis, i e., that its duty to bargain with
the Union on October 2, 1964, and thereafter was precisely the same that it would
have been had no settlement agreement been entered into and approved.
Respondent does make one contention not made in Poole and that is that the charge
which preceded the settlement agreement is not in evidence so that it is impossible to
say that the Respondent was charged with a refusal to bargain or with violating any
section of the Act. I think that it is unreasonable to assume that Respondent, who
was represented throughout by counsel, would not have signed a settlement agreement
if no charge had been filed and would not have signed a settlement agreement the
terms of which were wholly unrelated to the allegations of the charge. Moreover,
the settlement agreement is in the record and it is headed "In the Matter of W. B. John-
ston Grain Company and Johnston Seed Company" and gives the case number; i.e.,
Case No. 16-CA-2086. Under these circumstances, I can and do take official notice
that the charge in that case alleged that Respondent had refused to bargain with the
Union. Cf. Paramount Cap Manufacturing Company, 119 NLRB 785, 786-787,
enfd. 260 F. 2d 109, 112-114 (C.A. 8).
In Poole, the court affirmed the Board's conclusion that the Union had not been
given a reasonable time after the settlement agreement, in which to seek to obtain
a contract. Since the refusal to bargain in -Poole did not occur until 31/2 months
after the agreement whereas the refusal in the instant case came only about 6 weeks
after the agreement , it follows and I find that this Union was not afforded a "reason-
able" time after the agreement within which to bargain with this Respondent. Accord-
ingly, I conclude that the settlement agreement bound Respondent to bargain in
good faith with the Union for a reasonable time thereafter, without questioning the
Union's majority, that the 6 weeks which elapsed between the agreement and the
refusal to bargain did not constitute a reasonable time, and that, therefore, Respond-
ent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to bargain with the
Union on and after October 2, 1964, even assuming that the Union no longer repre-
sented a majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit.
III. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in an unfair labor practice, the
recommended order will direct Respondent to cease and desist therefrom and to take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. American Federation of Grain Millers, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By refusing, on or about October 2, 1964, to bargain collectively with the Ameri-
can Federation of Grain Millers, AFL-CIO, the certified bargaining representative of
its employees in an admittedly appropriate unit, Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of
the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practice is an unfair labor practice affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the entire record, the findings of fact and the conclusions of law,
and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, it is hereby ordered that the Respondent,
W. B. JOHNSTON GRAIN COMPANY, ETC. 1121
W. B. Johnston Grain Company and Johnston Seed Company, their officers, agents,
successors, and assigns shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with American Federation of Grain Millers,
AFL-CIO, the certified bargaining representatives of their employees in an appropri-
ate bargaining unit, with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment, or other terms
and conditions of employment.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with the efforts of American Federa-
tion of Grain Millers, AFL-CIO, to bargain collectively with W. B. Johnston Grain
Company and Johnston Seed Company.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies
of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with American Federation of Grain Millers,-
AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit,
and embody any understanding reached in a signed agreement.
(b) Post at their places of business at Enid, Oklahoma, copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix." 3 Copies of such notice, to be furnished by the Regional
Director for Region 16 shall, after being duly signed by a representative of each
Company, be posted by each Company immediately upon receipt thereof, in conspic-
uous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by each Company to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 16, in writing, within 20 days from
receipt of this Decision and Recommended Order, what steps have been taken to
comply herewith.4
8If this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and
Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner"
In the notice. If the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court
of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an
Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order"
41f this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified
to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this
Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that.
WE WILL bargain, on request, with American Federation of Grain Millers,
AFL-CIO, the certified representative of our employees in the bargaining unit-
set forth below, with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment, and other
conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, we will embody
it in a signed agreement.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with the efforts of the
American Federation of Grain Millers, AFL-CIO, to bargain collectively
with us.
The appropriate bargaining unit is:
INCLUDED: All production and maintenance employees of the
Employer's operations, 511 West Chestnut, including truckdrivers and'
"B" Warehouse.
EXCLUDED: Office clerical employees, professional employees,
guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act and all other employees.
W. B. JOHNSTON GRAIN COMPANY AND JOHNSTON
SEED COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By---------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
Dated------------------- By--------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
206-446-66-vol. 154-72
1122 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its pro-
visions, they may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, Sixth Floor,
Meacham Building , 110 West Fifth Street , Fort Worth, Texas, Telephone No. Edison
5-4211, Extension 2131.
New York Newspaper Printing Pressmen 's Union No. 2, AFL-
CIO and New York Times Company and New York Stereo-
typers' Union No. 1, and Publishers Association of New York
City, Parties in Interest . Case No. 2-CD-288. September 10,
1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On July 2, 1965, Trial Examiner Joseph I. Nachman issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed limited exceptions to the
Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. The Respondent
filed no exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and Jenkins]
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record
in this case,' and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner?
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its
Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, as modified
herein, and orders that the Respondent, New York Newspaper Print-
ing Pressmen's Union No. 2, AFL-CIO, New York, New York, its offi-
cers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the
Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as so modified :
' The parties agreed to incorporate the record in the 10(k) proceeding in the present
case.
2 We find merit in the General Counsel 's limited exceptions and accordingly modify
the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner to conform with our determination of
dispute in the 10 ( k) proceeding.
154 NLRB No. 97.