Verizon North, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 31, 2008

352 N.L.R.B. 1022 (N.L.R.B. 2008)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
352 NLRB No. 120
1022
Verizon North, Inc. and International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local 1637, AFL–CIO,
CLC, as a Constituent Member of the Collec-
tive-Bargaining Representative International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Locals 1451,
1635, and 1637, AFL–CIO, CLC. Case 6–CA–
35379
July 31, 2008
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN SCHAUMBER AND MEMBER LIEBMAN
On July 13, 2007, Administrative Law Judge Ira San-
dron issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Coun-
sel and Charging Party each filed answering briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board1 has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, find-
ings, and conclusions and to adopt the recommended
Order as modified.
We affirm the judge’s finding that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by unilaterally
eliminating a past practice of permitting an employee to
“stack” leave, i.e., to use paid vacation or personal leave
days for an absence that qualifies under the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) without any concurrent re-
duction in the employee’s annual allotment of unpaid
FMLA leave. The Respondent argues, among other
things, that the Union waived its right to bargain over
that change by agreeing to a new provision in the parties’
2005 contract stating that “Any leave of absence pro-
vided for in the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA), whether paid or without pay, that is qualified
under the Family and Medical Leave Act, shall run con-
currently with the Family and Medical Leave of Absence
under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
(FMLA).” In agreement with the judge, we find that this
new contract language does not establish a “clear and
unmistakable waiver” of the Union’s bargaining rights.
See generally Provena St. Joseph Medical Center, 350
NLRB 808 (2007) (reaffirming the clear and unmistak-
able waiver standard).
To begin, the phrase “leave of absence” in the new
provision is reasonably susceptible to two interpretations:

1 Effective midnight December 28, 2007, Members Liebman,
Schaumber, Kirsanow, and Walsh delegated to Members Liebman,
Schaumber, and Kirsanow, as a three-member group, all of the Board’s
powers in anticipation of the expiration of the terms of Members Kir-
sanow and Walsh on December 31, 2007. Pursuant to this delegation,
Chairman Schaumber and Member Liebman constitute a quorum of the
three-member group. As a quorum, they have the authority to issue
decisions and orders in unfair labor practice and representation cases.
See Sec. 3(b) of the Act.
(1) that it is coextensive with the statutory FMLA lan-
guage permitting concurrent deductions of all paid and
unpaid leave for an FMLA-qualified absence, or (2) that,
consistent with the parties’ past practice, it does not ap-
ply to paid vacation and personal leave days. Moreover,
nowhere else does the new contract provision refer to the
FMLA definition or otherwise define the scope of “leave
of absence.” Finally, at the time the Union agreed to the
new provision, the Respondent’s chief negotiator assured
the Union that the new language was merely “a clarifica-
tion of existing practice.” In those circumstances, we
find no merit to the Respondent’s argument that the Un-
ion clearly and unmistakably relinquished its right to
bargain over the elimination of the existing stacking
practice.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Verizon
North, Inc., Erie, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
Order as modified.
Substitute the following for paragraph 2(c).
“(c) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-

2 In making that finding, we do not rely on the judge’s citation of
Bath Iron Works Corp., 345 NLRB 499, 500 (2005), affd. sub nom.
Bath Marine Draftsmen Assn. v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2007).
That case involved a different theory of violation and a different legal
standard. We also find it unnecessary to rely on the judge’s statement
that the Respondent was “estopped” from asserting its waiver defense
by reason of its chief negotiator’s assurance, described above, to the
Union.
Although Chairman Schaumber adheres to the position that the
Board should apply a “contract coverage” test rather than the “clear and
unmistakable waiver” standard, see California Offset Printers, 349
NLRB 732, 737 (2007) (then-Member Schaumber, dissenting), he
acknowledges that Provena St. Joseph Medical Center is extant Board
law and applies it for the purpose of deciding this case. In doing so, he
finds that the plain meaning of the new provision in the new contract
supports the Respondent’s waiver interpretation. However, the plain
meaning of a contractual provision does not always mean the provision
is unambiguous, i.e., not reasonably susceptible to another meaning.
E.g., Southern California Edison Co., 295 NLRB 203, 218 (1989), rev.
denied 927 F.2d 635 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Chairman Schaumber agrees
that the parties’ past practice and the absence of any specific contrac-
tual definition clearly showing that the term “leave of absence” in-
cludes paid vacation and personal leave creates sufficient uncertainty
about the parties’ intent to permit reference to extrinsic evidence. See,
e.g., Doubletree Guest Suites Santa Monica, 347 NLRB 782, 784 fn. 7
(2006), citing Sansla, Inc., 323 NLRB 107, 109 (1997). Accordingly,
the representation by the Respondent’s chief negotiator that the pro-
posed new contract language merely clarified existing practice may be
given weight in finding that the Union did not clearly and unmistakably
waive its right to bargain about the elimination of the existing stacking
practice.
VERIZON NORTH, INC. 1023
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel re-
cords and reports, and all other records, including an
electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic
form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due to
employees, including Stewart, under the terms of this
Order.”
Gerald McKinney, Esq., for the General Counsel.
James Urban, Esq. (Jones Day), for the Respondent.
Marianne Oliver, Esq. (Gilardi Cooper & Lomupo), for the
Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
IRA SANDRON, Administrative Law Judge. The complaint
stems from unfair labor practice (ULP) charges that Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 1637, AFL–
CIO, CLC, as a constituent member of the collective-
bargaining representative International Brotherhood of Electri-
cal Workers, Locals 1451, 1635, and 1637, AFL–CIO, CLC
(the Unions) filed against Verizon North, Inc. (the Company or
Respondent), alleging violations of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the National Labor Relations Act (the Act).
Pursuant to notice, I conducted a trial in Erie, Pennsylvania,
on May 17, 2007, at which the parties had full opportunity to be
heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to intro-
duce evidence. All parties filed helpful posthearing briefs that I
have duly considered.
Issues
(1) In June 2005, Respondent admittedly changed the way it
treated employees who opted to take paid vacation or personal
holiday leave in lieu of unpaid leave under the Family Medical
Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, et seq. Did this violate
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) because Respondent made the change
without first affording the Union notice and an opportunity to
bargain? Or, as Respondent contends, was it privileged to im-
plement the new policy by virtue of statutory language and
because of the parties’ negotiated agreement on the subject?
(2) If it was a violation, did Respondent further violate Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) by admittedly disciplining employee Amy
Stewart in October and November 2006 because she no longer
had available family medical leave (FML) under the new pol-
icy?
I note that the Union has a pending grievance on Stewart’s
discipline. The parties attended a mediation session on May 9,
2007,1 and as of the time of the trial, the Union had not decided
whether to take the grievance to arbitration. However, Respon-
dent did not affirmatively assert either before or during trial
that the allegations pertaining to Stewart should be deferred
pursuant to the Board’s policy in Collyer Insulated Wire, 192
NLRB 837 (1971). Accordingly, deferral is not an issue. See

1 The parties disagreed as to the admissibility of statements that Re-
spondent’s agents allegedly made directly to the Union during the
mediation session, but I need not rely on anything purportedly said
there to decide the allegations before me.
Master Mechanical Insulation, 320 NLRB 1134, 1135 fn. 2
(1996); 15th Avenue Iron Works, 301 NLRB 878, 879 (1991).
Witnesses and Credibility
Witnesses for the General Counsel were Stewart and union
officers/company employees Carl Crone, Donald Klaus, and
Robin Pirrello. Respondent called its admitted agents Kristie
Chorney and Maura West.
This case presents few factual disputes between the parties,
and the testimony of the witnesses for the opposing parties was
generally quite similar. Accordingly, deciding the issues does
not hinge on credibility resolution.
Facts
Based on the entire record, including witness testimony,
documents, and the parties’ stipulations, I find the following
facts.
Respondent, a Wisconsin corporation with a principal place
of business in Fort Wayne, Indiana, has at all times material
maintained an office and place of business in Erie, Pennsyl-
vania, called the “Verizon LiveSource Center” (the facility).
The facility is engaged in the business of providing directory
assistance information to the public. Jurisdiction has been ad-
mitted, and I so find.
For over 50 years, going back to when Respondent’s prede-
cessors operated the facility, the Unions have represented a
bargaining unit consisting of various classifications of the facil-
ity’s nonsupervisory employees, including telephone operators.
These classifications are set out in appendix A of the current
collective-bargaining agreement, effective March 27, 2005,
through February 27, 2010,2 which was negotiated on behalf of
the locals by their “systems council,” an umbrella organization.
The number of unit employees, approximately 75 percent of
whom are telephone operators, fluctuates between 700 and 800
each month.
In 1993, the FMLA was enacted. For purposes of this case,
the statute requires that the Company afford qualifying em-
ployees 12 weeks or 60 days of leave, which may be unpaid, in
a 12-month period, for documented medical conditions of the
employee or his or her immediate family members. Pursuant to
the law, the parties first negotiated an agreement on FML in
1995.
The prior collective-bargaining agreement, effective October
28, 2001, through October 22, 2004, contained a memorandum
of agreement (MOA) on FML.3 Largely tracking the require-
ments of the FMLA, it said nothing about the substitution of
paid vacation or personal holiday leave for unpaid FML. Para-
graph 17 provided that the provisions of the MOA were not
subject to the agreement’s grievance-arbitration procedure.
In 2004 and 2005, the parties negotiated the current contract,
with the provisions of the 2001–2004 agreement continuing
past its expiration until the new agreement was reached.

2 GC Exh. 4. The reference on p. 9 to “Exhibit A” was a clerical er-
ror.
3 GC Exh. 3, pp. 94–96. Local 1944 was also signatory to this
agreement, but the International Union subsequently transferred it to a
different jurisdiction.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1024
There were approximately 28 or 30 or so negotiations ses-
sions. FML came up in the context of how it should be admin-
istered, whether the 12 weeks of leave should be based on a
calendar year or a 12-month period, and the treatment of do-
mestic partners who both worked for the Company.4
The specific topic of substitution of paid vacation or personal
holiday pay for unpaid FML was not raised during these nego-
tiations. However, at the September 20, 2004 session, Kristie
Chorney, the Company’s chief negotiator, presented the Union
with a bargaining proposal that made several changes to the
existing MOA, including addition of the following language to
Paragraph 3: “Any leave of absence provided for in the Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreement (CBA), whether paid or without
pay, that is qualified under the Family and Medical Leave Act,
shall run concurrently with the Family and Medical Leave of
Absence under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
(FMLA).”5 She stated that this proposed change to paragraph 3
was merely a clarification of existing practice.6
The current contract was executed on March 27, 2005, and
made effective from that date through February 27, 2010. Its
FML MOA is identical to that in the prior agreement in all
pertinent respects, except that the above-proposed new lan-
guage in Paragraph 3 was added.7
In May 2006, Respondent notified the Union that it was pro-
posing to make certain changes relating to FMLA administra-
tion, and such changes went into effect on November 6, 2006.8
Substitution of Paid Leave for FML and Stacking
Employees at all times germane have had paid vacation time,
depending on length of service, plus 7 paid personal holidays
(float days).9 In November of each year, employees submit
their requested vacation leave for the following year, in order of
their seniority. After this is done, employees in November and
December submit their requested float days in the same man-
ner.
Prior to June 2005, the following practice was in effect at all
times after Respondent was required to comply with the
FMLA. When an employee called in to resource management
with a request for FML, the latter would sometimes offer the
employee the option of using a paid vacation or float day in lieu
of unpaid FML, provided the Company had a sufficient number
of other employees available. If the employee said yes, and
staffing needs were met, the FML was converted to a vacation
or float day, and the employee was not charged for FML leave
time. This “stacking” of leave meant that the employee who
exercised the option kept all of his or her bank of FML.
Maura West, coach/employee relations at the facility, came
to the conclusion in June 2005 that the above practice gave
employees a benefit to which they were not entitled under the
provisions of the FMLA and the collective-bargaining agree-
ment. Rather, when employees opted to take paid vacation or
float day leave, Respondent could charge them for both FML

4 See GC Exhs. 8–9; R. Exh. 1.
5 GC Exhs. 9 and 14.
6 Consistent testimony of Pirrello (Tr. 151) and Chorney (Tr. 243).
7 GC Exh. 4, pp. 91–93.
8 See GC Exhs. 10–13.
9 See GC Exh. 4, sec. 10, pp. 25, et seq.
and paid leave time. She checked this position with another
labor relations representative and with Chorney, who agreed
with her. West was not a participant in the 2004–2005 negotia-
tions.
Starting in June 2005, Respondent implemented this policy,
admittedly without first notifying the Union or giving it an
opportunity to bargain. In sum, the change resulted in no dif-
ference in the amount of paid leave employees received, or a
reduction in the 12 weeks of FML that they were afforded. The
change was in their total number of days of leave, combined
paid and unpaid. Under the new system, vacation or float day
leave substituted for FML also reduced the FML leave avail-
able to the employee, so that paid leave and unpaid leave time
were simultaneously reduced.
Beginning at around this time, West advised employees of
this new policy on a one-on-one basis, when they wished to use
paid leave (vacation or float day) in lieu of FML.
Of approximately 60 grievances filed annually, about 6 relate
to FML. Some 30 or so employees (who opted for paid leave
instead of unpaid FML) have been affected by the change since
June 2005, but there is nothing in the record to suggest that any
of them complained to the Union about this prior to October
2006. The Union’s swift and strong reaction when Stewart
brought the matter to its attention leads me to believe that Oc-
tober 2006 was when it received actual notice of the change. I
find nothing in the record to suggest that the Union was on
earlier constructive notice. I note that although Respondent’s
answer included a 10(b) defense, its brief does not.
The Discipline of Amy Stewart
It is undisputed that, but for the change in Respondent’s pol-
icy in June 2005, Stewart would not have received discipline in
October and November 2006. Respondent does not contest her
eligibility for FML.
In early October 2006, Kim Graham, coordinator, customer
service, called Stewart and told her that she had exhausted her
FML leave. Stewart responded that she did not think so. She
reviewed her leave records10 with Graham and discovered that
5 vacation or float days she had substituted for FML days ear-
lier in the year had been charged both to her vacation/float days
and to her FML days. She asked Graham when the policy had
been changed, and the latter responded June 2005. She then
asked when employees had been told of this. Graham answered
that West had notified employees on a face-to-face basis.
Subsequently, Stewart received the following, for running
out of authorized leave:11
(1) A “Written Warning—Absence,” for “excessive absence,”
dated October 6, 2006.
(2) A 1-day unpaid suspension on October 26, 2006.
(3) An “Attendance Discipline/Letter in Lieu of Suspen-
sion/FINAL CHANCE,” dated November 22, 2006, stating
that her absenteeism had put her job “in serious jeopardy” and
that this action constituted the equivalent of a 3-day suspen-
sion.

10 GC Exh. 16.
11 GC Exhs. 15(a), (b), and (c).
VERIZON NORTH, INC. 1025
Shortly after receiving the October 6 warning, Stewart noti-
fied the Union, and union officer Donald Klaus met with West
soon thereafter. Klaus stated that it appeared that Steward had
mistakenly been changed to FML on the same days that she had
moved vacation or float days to cover the leave. West re-
sponded that it was no error; an employee who did so was
charged both. Saying that the Company could do this, she pro-
duced “The FMLA Handbook” by Schwartz © 1996.12 Klaus
said he would compare that booklet with the one in the Union’s
possession. West did not allude to any specific provisions in
the FML MOA.
The following day, Klaus again met with West. He brought
the second edition of Schwartz’ Handbook, © 2001.13 He
asked when she had changed the policy, and she said June
2005. He then asked if she had notified the Union, and she
replied no, that she did not feel she had to. Klaus referred to
the provision in the second edition (at p. 37) stating that a em-
ployer is required under the FMLA and the bargaining laws of
most states to give a union prior notice and an opportunity to
bargain before adopting policies that affect workers. He said
she might have committed a violation of the law, and she re-
plied, “I very well may have.”14
Pursuant to the contractual grievance-arbitration procedure,15
the Union filed a grievance over the disciplinary actions Re-
spondent took against Stewart. As I stated earlier, it remains
pending.
Analysis and Conclusions
Change in “Stacking” Practice
Normally, an employer violates Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act when, during the term of a collective-bargaining
agreement, it unilaterally makes material or substantial changes
on subjects of mandatory bargaining; to wit, employees’ wages,
hours, or other terms and conditions of employment. NLRB v.
Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); United Cerebral Palsy of New York
City, 347 NLRB 603, 608 (2006). Respondent does not deny
that in June 2005, it implemented a change in the treatment of
employees who opted to take paid vacation or float day leave
when they were eligible for unpaid FLM leave, without first
affording the Union notice and an opportunity to bargain.
One of Respondent’s defenses is that express language in the
FMLA clearly permitted it to make the change. Respondent
points to the 12-week maximum period provided in the statute,
and the language at 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(2)(A) that “an eligible
employee may elect, or an employer make require the em-
ployee, to substitute any of the accrued paid vacation leave,
personal leave, or family leave of the employee for [FMLA]
leave.” However, I find nothing on the face of these provisions
that specifically goes to the issue of double-charging employees
for paid leave and for FML time. Indeed, until June 2005, Re-

12 GC Exh. 5. On p. 88, it states that employees must be allowed to
use accrued vacation or personal leave during any FMLA absence. On
p. 89, citing a statutory provision, it further states that when an em-
ployee goes on paid leave for a reason which qualifies as FMLA leave,
an employer can designate the absence under FMLA.
13 GC Exh. 6.
14 Klaus’ unrebutted and credited testimony at Tr. 49.
15 GC 4, pp. 47 et seq.
spondent interpreted FMLA to allow employees to take paid
leave in lieu of unpaid FML leave and not be charged for the
latter.
Further, the FLMA specifically provides that nothing it con-
tains “shall be construed to diminish the obligation of an em-
ployer to comply with any collective bargaining agreement or
any employment benefit program or plan that provides greater
family or medical leave rights than the rights established under
this Act. . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 2652(a). See Brotherhood of Main-
tenance Way Employees v. CSX Transportation Inc., 478 F.3d
814, 817 (7th Cir. 2007) (provisions in the FMLA do not allow
employers to violate labor agreements under the Railway Labor
Act). Here, Respondent had for 10 years applied negotiated
contractual language to permit employees to save their FLM
time when they chose instead to use paid leave, and it was not
privileged to unilaterally determine in June 2005 that it no
longer had to abide by this practice because FMLA permitted it
to do otherwise.
Respondent also contends that the Union waived the right to
bargain over the change made in June 2005 by its agreement to
the FML MOA in the current contract, particularly the 12
weeks’ maximum FML, and the added provision in Paragraph 3
that “Any leave of absence provided for in the Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement (CBA), whether paid or without pay, that is
qualified under the Family and Medical Leave Act, shall run
concurrently with the Family and Medical Leave of Absence
under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA).”
An employer asserting waiver bears the high burden of dem-
onstrating that the union has clearly and unequivocally relin-
quished such right. Bath Iron Works Corp., 345 NLRB 499,
502 (2005), enfd. 475 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2007); Intermountain
Rural Electric Assn., 305 NLRB 783, 786 (1991), enfd. 984
F.2d 1562 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[A] union must clearly intend,
express, and manifest a conscious relinquishment”); TCI of
New York, 301 NLRB 822, 824 (1991).
I fail to see how the Union’s agreement to 12 weeks’ maxi-
mum FML constituted a waiver of its objection to the change in
June 2005, particularly when the practice at the time of negotia-
tions in 2004 and 2005 was that employees who opted for paid
leave on days they were eligible for FML were not charged for
both FML and vacation or float day leave.
As to Respondent’s second argument for waiver, the above-
quoted language in paragraph 3 can be read as providing that
employees be double-charged for both paid leave and FML
unpaid leave. However, that is not unequivocally and expressly
stated, and Chorney specifically said at the time she presented
Respondent’s proposal in September 2004, that the proposed
change was merely a clarification of existing practice. Essen-
tially the Union was told that the proposed change would result
in no change in the status quo, which at that time was that em-
ployees were not doubly charged when they opted for paid
leave in lieu of FML unpaid leave time. Nothing in the record
reflects that Respondent’s negotiators ever later said anything
to the contrary. In these circumstances, I cannot conclude that
by agreeing to the language, the Union “clearly and unmistaka-
bly” acquiesced in advance to Respondent’s change in policy in
June 2005.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1026
Respondent’s argument of union waiver at bargaining is un-
dermined by the fact that Respondent did not change the policy
at the time the current contract went into effect, March 27,
2005. In fact, the change had nothing to do with what its nego-
tiators proposed during the course of bargaining sessions. In-
stead, West, who did not attend negotiations, sua sponte deter-
mined approximately 2–3 months after March 27, 2005, that the
existing policy, in effect for about 10 years, was overly gener-
ous to employees. Had Respondent indeed intended in Sep-
tember 2004 to alter the existing policy by its proposed new
language, it is unlikely that Respondent would have taken no
steps to implement such changes when the new contract that
included such language became effective.
Finally, regardless of what Respondent might have intended
during negotiations, Chorney’s assurance that the FMLA
changes Respondent was proposing merely clarified existing
policies would have led the Union to reasonably believe that its
agreement to such changes would have no negative impact on
the employees it represented. I conclude, therefore, that Re-
spondent is estopped in any event from claiming the Union’s
agreement to the proposed changes in Paragraph 3 of the MOA
constituted waiver.
Accordingly, I conclude that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act in June 2005, when, without first
affording the Union notice and an opportunity to bargain, it
began charging employees FML leave time when they opted to
use paid vacation or float day leave.
Discipline of Amy Stewart
Since Stewart’s discipline was the direct result of the above
unilateral change, such discipline ipso facto also violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1), and I so conclude.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By the following conduct, Respondent has engaged in un-
fair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act
(a) In June 2005, unilaterally implemented, without first hav-
ing afforded the Union notice and an opportunity to bargain, a
change in the way it treated employees who opted to take vaca-
tion or float day leave in lieu of FML leave, by charging them
time for both.
(b) In October and November 2006, warned and suspended
employee Amy Stewart because she had run out of FML under
the new policy that Respondent unilaterally implemented in
June 2005.
REMEDY
Because Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, it
must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirma-
tive action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Since Respondent in June 2005 unilaterally began charging
employees both FML and vacation or float day leave when they
opted to take the latter, Respondent shall also be ordered to
rescind this unlawful change and to restore to employees, in-
cluding Stewart, any FML leave time they would have retained
pursuant to the policy that was in effect prior to June 2005.
Respondent shall also rescind any disciplinary actions taken
against employees, including Stewart, as a result of the unlaw-
ful change, and make them whole for any loss of pay they may
have suffered as a result of that discipline, in the manner pre-
scribed in Ogle Protective Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970),
enfd. 444 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1971), plus interest as prescribed
in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended16
ORDER
The Respondent, Verizon North, Inc., Erie, Pennsylvania, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Unilaterally changing employees’ benefits under the
FML provisions in the parties’ 2005–2010 collective-
bargaining agreement, without first affording the Union notice
and an opportunity to bargain.
(b) Disciplining employees because they have run out of
FML leave time as a result of its unilateral change in the treat-
ment of their FML benefits.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights Section
7 of the Act guarantees to them.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Restore the practice of not charging employees for both
paid vacation or float day leave and for FML leave time, when
they opt to receive the former, and make employees, including
Amy Stewart, whole for any loss of pay or other benefits they
have sustained as a result of the unlawful change made in June
2005, in the manner set out in the remedy section of this deci-
sion.
(b) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from
its files any reference to the unlawful warnings and 1-day sus-
pension issued to Stewart in October and November 2006, and
within 3 days thereafter notify her in writing that this has been
done and that the warnings and suspension will not be used
against her in any way.
(c) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Region
for examination and copying, all payroll records, personnel
records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze
the amount of backpay due to Stewart under this order.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cilities in Erie, Pennsylvania, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”17 Copies of the notice, on forms provided

16 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Section 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
17 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
VERIZON NORTH, INC. 1027
by the Regional Director for Region 6, after being signed by
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, Respondent has gone out of
business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings,
Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy
of the notice to all current employees and former employees
employed by Respondent at any time since June 1, 2005.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
Respondent has taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.

ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Locals
1451, 1635, and 1637, AFL–CIO, CLC (the Unions) are collec-
tively the certified bargaining representative of employees de-
scribed in our 2005–2010 collective-bargaining agreement with
the Unions (the agreement).
WE WILL NOT implement changes in your family medical
leave (FML) benefits, as provided in the agreement, without
first giving the Unions notice and an opportunity to bargain.
WE WILL NOT discipline you because you run out of FML
leave because of changes that we have implemented without
first having given the Unions notice and an opportunity to bar-
gain.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of your rights under Sec-
tion 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as set forth at the
top of this notice.
WE WILL restore the practice of not charging employees FML
leave time, in addition to paid holiday or float day leave, when
they opt to take paid leave in lieu of unpaid FML leave, as the
policy existed prior to June 2005, and WE WILL restore to you
any FML leave that you were charged as a result of our unlaw-
ful change in that practice in June 2005.
WE WILL make employees, including Amy Stewart, whole
for any loss of earnings and other benefits they have suffered as
a result of that change, in the manner set forth in the remedy
section of the decision.
WE WILL within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from our files any reference to the unlawful warnings and 1-day
suspension Stewart received, and within 3 days thereafter notify
her in writing that this has been done and that the warnings and
suspension will not be used against her in any way.
VERIZON NORTH, INC.