UNITE HERE LOCAL 5 (Hyatt Regency Waikiki Resort & Spa)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 25, 2016

364 NLRB No. 94 (N.L.R.B. 2016)

364 NLRB No. 94
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
UNITE HERE! Local 5 (Hyatt Corporation d/b/a Hy-
att Regency Waikiki) and Mark Tamosiunas and
Agnes Demarke and Wayne Young and Steven
Taono. Cases 20–CB–127565 and 20–CB–127695
August 25, 2016
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS HIROZAWA
AND MCFERRAN
On September 18, 2015, Administrative Law Judge
John J. McCarrick issued the attached decision. The
Charging Parties filed exceptions and a supporting brief,
the Respondent filed an answering brief, and the Charg-
ing Parties filed a reply brief. The Respondent also filed
cross-exceptions and a supporting brief, the Charging
Parties filed an answering brief, and the Respondent filed
a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order.
We affirm the judge’s conclusion that the Respondent
did not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by mistak-
enly sending its March 31, 2014 letter to the Charging
Parties and other nonmember unit employees seeking to
collect dues for a period when no collective-bargaining
agreement was in effect.1 In Service Employees Local
121RN (Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center), relied
on by the dissent, the Board found that a union violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) by circulating a flyer during a con-
tract hiatus that “reasonably tended to restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights, which
includes the right to refrain from paying union dues or
fees when there is no contractual obligation to do so.”
355 NLRB 234, 235 (2010) (emphasis added), enfd.
mem. 440 Fed. Appx. 524 (9th Cir. 2011). The flyer
there was distributed by the union in response to the em-
ployer’s statement that, because the contract expired,
employees were no longer required to pay dues and fees.
The Board found that the flyer, disputing the employer’s

1 We note that at certain points in the judge’s decision, he referred
to the unfair labor practice issue here as whether the Respondent’s
letter constituted a “threat or coercion” under Sec. 8(b)(1)(A), whereas
the statutory language refers to conduct that “restrain[s] or coerce[s] . . .
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.” The
judge’s use of different terminology did not affect his analysis.
accurate statement, “wrongly” asserted that employees
remained obligated to pay dues and fees under the ex-
pired contract. In the present case, the Respondent’s
March 31 letter, sent more than 7 months after the par-
ties’ successor collective-bargaining agreement took ef-
fect, only sought arrearages for unpaid membership
dues—not unpaid core representational fees—and relied
solely on the Respondent’s own internal membership
rules as the authority for collecting dues arrearages. Un-
like a contractual union-security clause, a union’s inter-
nal rules remain in effect during a contract hiatus and
continue to apply to employees who wish to remain or
become union members in good standing. The letter
further underscored that it applied only to members by
stating that the Respondent’s bylaws required the sus-
pension of any “Member” whose dues arrearages ex-
ceeded 2 months. Accordingly, employees would have
reasonably understood that the Respondent’s March 31
letter was not requiring nonmembers to pay fees under
the lapsed union-security clause in the expired contract.
We also agree with the judge that the March 31 letter
is distinguishable from the unlawful flyer in Pomona
Valley Hospital Medical Center because the flyer in that
case threatened employees that, if they did not continue
to pay dues during the hiatus period, they would have to
pay the arrearages in a lump sum, and suggested that
employees could owe even more in a lump sum payment
than if they had continued periodic payments. Id. at
236–237. Here, by contrast, the Respondent sent the
March 31 letter to numerous employees, including full
union members, notifying them that they owed back dues
and needed to make their accounts current to restore full
membership status. The letter’s sole reference to adverse
consequences of nonpayment was that any member more
than 2 months in arrears would be suspended from the
Union. Because the Charging Parties and similarly situ-
ated employees were, by choice, already not union mem-
bers, they would not have found this, the only cited con-
sequence of nonpayment, to be applicable to them, much
less coercive. Indeed, for almost 2 years preceding this
letter, the Respondent had honored the rights of the
Charging Parties and similarly situated employees to
withdraw from membership and to pay only financial
core fees for the Respondent’s representational activities
during times when a contractual union-security clause
was in effect. Notably, in October 2013, another letter
from the Respondent to these same employees recog-
nized their ongoing requests to pay only representational
fees but encouraged them, in light of a recently executed
collective-bargaining agreement, to consider joining the
Union and thereby enjoy the benefits of full membership.
This letter also explained that they would have to pay
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
accrued dues arrearages in order to do so. Therefore,
upon receiving the March 31 letter, these employees
would have reasonably understood that they were only
required to pay dues arrearages should they decide to
reinstate their membership or join the Union.
Under these circumstances, we find, contrary to the
dissent, that the Charging Parties would not reasonably
view the March 31 letter as an attempt to restrain or co-
erce them in the continued exercise of their statutory
rights. Instead, the only objectively reasonable view of
the letter, in context, was that it was mistakenly directed
to them.2 We agree with the judge that, while the Re-
spondent erred by including nonmembers in its dues col-
lection letter, this conduct, without more, would not rea-
sonably tend to restrain or coerce those employees in
continuing to exercise their statutory rights to refrain
from membership in the Respondent or to pay monies to
it that they were not obligated to pay. 3
ORDER
The recommended Order of the administrative law
judge is adopted and the complaint is dismissed.
Dated, Washington, D.C. August 25, 2016
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Chairman
______________________________________
Kent Y. Hirozawa, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MEMBER MCFERRAN, dissenting.
As the Board’s Pomona Valley decision reaffirmed,
Section 7 of the Act protects employees’ “right to refrain
from paying union dues or fees when there is no contrac-
tual obligation to do so.”1 Section 8(b)(1)(A), in turn,

2 To be clear, we do not rely on the fact that the letter was mistaken-
ly sent to the Charging Parties; rather, we find that employees in their
situation (i.e., nonmembers) would objectively understand that it was
sent by mistake. Inasmuch as we do not find that the March 31 letter
was unlawful, we do not reach the issue of whether the Employer’s
subsequent reimbursement of deducted dues would mitigate any coer-
cive effect of the letter or the issue of whether the Respondent’s May
13 letter to the Charging Parties would constitute an effective repudia-
tion of unlawful conduct.
3 Chairman Pearce dissented in Pomona Valley Hospital Medical
Center and adheres to his dissent for the reasons stated there, but he
agrees that the instant case is distinguishable.
1 Employees Local 121RN (Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Cen-
ter), 355 NLRB 234, 235 (2010), enfd. mem. 440 Fed. Appx. 524 (9th
Cir. 2011). In Pomona Valley, the respondent union distributed a flyer,
makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to “restrain
or coerce . . . employees in their exercise of” Section 7
rights. Here, the Respondent Union, UNITE HERE!,
Local 5, sent the Charging Parties and other employees
who were not members of the Respondent a letter that
told them—wrongly—(1) that they owed dues to the Re-
spondent, (2) that their Employer had been billed for
those dues, and (3) that if the Employer did not deduct
the dues owed from employees’ paychecks, each em-
ployee was responsible for paying the Respondent direct-
ly. The Employer then did make paycheck deductions
for amounts wrongly billed. Only weeks later—after the
Employer refunded the deductions and after an unfair
labor practice charge was filed—did the Respondent at-
tempt to clarify its actions. Given the plain language of
the letter, it is clear that the Respondent violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) by demanding dues from employees who did
not owe them. My colleagues’ attempt to distinguish
Pomona Valley on its facts is unpersuasive, as is their
claim that the “only objectively reasonable view” of the
Respondent’s letter, from the perspective of the employ-
ees who received it, was that the letter was a harmless
mistake.
I.
Charging Parties Agnes Demarke, Mark Tamosiunas,
Steven Taono, and Wayne Young are employees of the
Employer, Hyatt Regency Waikiki. The Charging Par-
ties are nonmember objectors who pay only core finan-
cial dues to the Respondent for representational activi-
ties. On April 21, 2012, during the period when there
was no collective-bargaining agreement in effect,2 the
Charging Parties and other nonmembers sent a letter in-
forming the Respondent that they had authorized the
Employer to stop automatic dues deductions from their
pay until the parties reached a new contract. The Em-
ployer stopped withholding dues from the nonmembers
until a new contract went into effect on August 13,
2013.3
On March 31, 2014, the Respondent sent a letter to ap-
proximately 137 employees, both members who were in
arrears and nonmembers who did not pay full dues, in-

erroneously stating that employees were legally obligated to pay union
dues during a contract hiatus and when no union-security clause was in
effect, or they would risk having to make such dues payments in a lump
sum upon contract ratification. The Board found that the union’s flyer
was coercive in violation of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A).
2 There was no collective-bargaining agreement in effect between
July 1, 2010, and August 12, 2013.
3 The parties’ July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2010 contract, and the current
August 13, 2013 contract, both contain a union-security clause, which
requires that, as a condition of employment, unit employees must pay
union dues or agency fees to the Union.
UNITE HERE LOCAL5 (HYATT CORP.) 3
cluding the Charging Parties. The letter read in pertinent
part:
THIS IS A STATEMENT OF YOUR ACCOUNT AS
OF THE ABOVE DATE. Your dues must be made
current. To facilitate this we have billed your employer
for the balance listed below. A deduction will be re-
flected on an upcoming pay stub. If your employer
doesn’t deduct arrearages, you are responsible for pay-
ing this balance directly to Local 5.
Please be advised that the International Constitution
Rules affirmed by Local Union 5 Bylaws must suspend
any Member whose Dues are more than TWO Months
in arrears.
ATTENTION FOOD SERVERS: Please note that if
there are insufficient funds available in your weekly
paycheck to cover dues deduction then you are respon-
sible for sending your dues directly to Local 5.
PLEASE REMIT THE BALANCE STATED.
At the bottom of the letter, the Respondent listed the
total balance due from each of the Charging Parties,
which ranged in amount from $644.76 to $1,294.49. The
balance was the amount the Charging Parties would have
to pay to become full union members, not arrearage
amounts for core representational fees.
The Respondent emailed the Employer a list of em-
ployees who it said owed dues, including the Charging
Parties, and requested that the Employer deduct the max-
imum allowable amount of dues ($62.50) directly from
the employees’ pay. On April 11, the Employer made
the requested deductions.4
On April 28, the Charging Parties filed the underlying
unfair labor practice charge alleging, inter alia, that the
Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by demanding
dues payments from the Charging Parties when no secu-
rity clause was in effect.5 On May 13, the Respondent
sent a letter only to the Charging Parties, which attempt-
ed to “clarify” the March 31 letter stating, in part, that
“[t]he amount listed in the statement of your account

4 On April 15, the Employer sent a letter to the Charging Parties and
similarly situated employees apologizing for the erroneous deductions
and informing them that they would be credited $62.50, which they
were on April 25. The Employer’s subsequent refund of the improper
deductions does nothing to mitigate the coerciveness of the Respond-
ent’s March 31 letter, interpreted on its face.
5 The allegation that the Respondent violated the Act by requesting
the Employer deduct dues directly from the employees’ pay was dis-
missed before the hearing. The dismissal of this allegation has no
bearing on whether the March 31 letter reasonably tended to coerce
employees into paying union dues in violation of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A).
indicates the amount of dues you need to pay in order to
become a member in good standing with the Union.”6
II.
Under the Board’s Pomona Valley decision, the test for
determining whether the March 31 letter violates Section
8(b)(1)(A) is whether it “reasonably tended to restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7
rights, which includes the right to refrain from paying
union dues or fees when there is no contractual obliga-
tion to do so.” 355 NLRB at 235. See also Longshore-
man ILA Local 333 (ITO Corp.), 267 NLRB 1320, 1321
(1983), and the cases cited therein. What matters is
whether, considering the entirety of the letter’s message,
its “words could reasonably be construed as coercive,
whether or not that is the only reasonable construction.”
Pomona Valley, 355 NLRB at 235. Finally, under Po-
mona Valley, no threat of discharge for failure to pay
dues is required to establish a violation, so long as the
union threatens to collect lump-sum dues that are not
owed. Id. at 237.
Faithfully applying the Pomona Valley standard re-
quires the Board to find a violation here. The Respond-
ent’s March 31 letter told employees who in fact owed
the Respondent nothing that:
“[y]our dues must be made current;”
“we have billed your employer for the balance listed;” a “de-
duction will be reflected on an upcoming paystub;” and
“if your employer doesn’t deduct arrearages, you are respon-
sible for paying the balance directly” to the Union.
For each employee, finally, the letter listed an account bal-
ance, which in one instance totaled over $1200.
The words of the Respondent’s March 31 letter made
plain to employees that, in its view, the employees owed
money to the Respondent and that it would take steps to
collect that money in a lump sum. To be told that you
are delinquent in paying a bill, and that steps to collect
will be taken, obviously has a reasonable tendency to
coerce payment from you—which was precisely the
point of the Respondent’s letter, on its face. And, of

6 The Respondent’s May 13 letter did not effectively repudiate the
violation inherent in its March 31 letter, under the standard of Passa-
vant Memorial Area Hospital, 237 NLRB 138 (1978). The Respondent
sent the May 13 letter only after the Charging Parties filed an unfair
labor practice charge, and then only to the four Charging Parties, not to
any of the other nonmembers. Passavant requires that repudiation of
the unlawful conduct be made to all affected employees. Id. at 139.
Furthermore, the Respondent did not admit to wrongdoing in the May
13 letter, and did not assure employees that it would refrain from simi-
lar action in the future, as Passavant also requires. Id. And while the
Employer promptly corrected the erroneous deduction and apologized
for it in its April 15 letter, the Respondent did not expressly join the
Employer in this communication.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
course, the Respondent did succeed in having money
deducted from employees’ paychecks—a fact that obvi-
ously bears on employees’ reasonable construction of the
letter, even if its language were not already so clear.
My colleagues argue (1) that “the letter’s sole refer-
ence to adverse consequences of nonpayment was that
any member [emphasis in original] more than 2 months
in arrears would be suspended from the union;” and (2)
that nonmembers, like the Charging Parties, would have
recognized that this consequence did not apply to them.
This argument misses the essential point here: that the
collection of the dues—potentially in a lump sum or oth-
er financially burdensome fashion—was an adverse con-
sequence. The Respondent’s letter falsely claimed that
employees owed dues, informing them their employer
had been “billed” and that a “deduction” would be made
from their paychecks, and insisting that (if the employer
did not make the deduction) they were “responsible for
paying.” Perhaps nonmembers understood that they
could not be suspended from the Union. But it is also
clear that they reasonably could construe the letter to say
that they owed dues payments to the Union and that the
Union was taking steps to collect that money. That is
what made the March 31 letter coercive.
My colleagues point out that the March 31 letter was
preceded by an October letter from the Respondent to
employees, encouraging them to join the Union and ex-
plaining that to do so they would have to pay accrued
dues arrearages. In light of the October letter, according
to the majority, “employees would have reasonably un-
derstood that they were only required to pay dues arrear-
ages should they decide to reinstate their membership or
join the union.” But whatever the October letter said, the
March 31 letter was unequivocal in its assertions that
employees owed dues, that money would be deducted
from their paychecks, and that they were financially re-
sponsible to the Union. Even if the October letter some-
how suggests that a noncoercive construction of the
March 31 letter was reasonable, it does not preclude an
alternative, reasonable, and coercive construction—all
that Pomona Valley requires to find a violation.
My colleagues insist that the Respondent’s March 31
letter is distinguishable from the flyer at issue in Pomona
Valley, but the factual distinctions they draw are mean-
ingless under the legal standard the Board applied. In
determining whether the words of the letter could rea-
sonably be construed as coercive, it does not matter that
the letter was sent to employees who did owe the Re-
spondent dues, as well as those who did not; that the let-
ter did not invoke a union-security clause in asserting its
demand on employees; or that the Respondent had previ-
ously complied with the law. These facts—even if we
assume they were known to the Charging Parties and
other nonmembers—at most might support a non-
coercive construction of the letter. But given the clear
language of the letter, that is not the only reasonable con-
struction. And because the letter’s “words could reason-
ably be construed as coercive,” Pomona Valley, 355
NLRB at 235, the violation here is established. Indeed,
the fact that unowed dues were deducted from employ-
ees’ paychecks, just as the Respondent’s letter threat-
ened, confirms that a coercive construction of the letter
was not just reasonable, but demonstrably correct.7
Because the violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) in this case
is straightforward under controlling law and the record
here, I dissent.
Dated, Washington, D.C. August 25, 2016
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Jeff F. Beerman, Esq. and Meredith A. Burns, Esq., for the
General Counsel.
Eric B. Meyers, Esq. (Davis, Cowell & Bowe, LLP), for the
Respondent.
Sarah E. Hartsfield, Esq., for the Charging Parties.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOHN J. MCCARRICK, Administrative Law Judge. This case
has been submitted on a stipulated record, without testimony,
by the parties after a telephonic hearing, agreed to by all parties
on April 27, 2015. The case was tried upon the consolidated
complaint in Cases 20–CB–127565 and 20–CB–127695 on
January 29, 2015, by the Regional Director for Region 20.
The complaint alleges that Unite Here, Local 5 (Respondent)
violated Section (8)(b)(1)(A) of the Act by notifying the Charg-
ing Parties, Agnes Demarke (Demarke), Mark Tamosiunas
(Tamosiunas), Steven Taono (Taono), and Wayne Young
(Young) and other employees who were financial core mem-
bers that they owed Respondent dues for a time period when
there was no collective-bargaining agreement in effect.
Respondent filed a timely answer to the complaint and stated
it had committed no wrongdoing.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Upon the entire record herein, including the briefs from the
Counsel for the General Counsel, Charging Parties and Re-

7 To be clear, finding the violation here in no way depends on the
employer’s actual deduction of dues. The March 31 letter, on its face,
had a reasonable tendency to coerce employees because it could rea-
sonably be construed as threatening employees with dues deductions
when, in fact, they had no financial obligation to the Union.
UNITE HERE LOCAL5 (HYATT CORP.) 5
spondent, I make the following findings of fact.
I. JURISDICTION
The parties stipulated that the Employer herein, Hyatt Corpo-
ration d/b/a Hyatt Regency Waikiki, operates a hotel in Hono-
lulu, Hawaii, and, in conducting operations during the 12-
month period ending December 31, 2014, the Employer derived
gross revenue in excess of $500,000 and purchased and re-
ceived products, goods, and materials valued in excess of
$5000 directly from points outside the State of Hawaii. At all
material times, the Employer has been an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
Respondent admits that it represents workers in the hotel and
hospitality industry in Hawaii and that it is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. Respondent
admitted and I find that, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
The relevant facts herein are set forth in the parties’ joint fac-
tual stipulations and joint exhibits, received as Joint Exhibit 19
(Jt. Exh. 1).
After the hearing closed, on June 3, 2015, counsel for the
General Counsel filed a motion to strike portions of Respond-
ent’s Brief to the administrative law judge. On June 4, Charg-
ing Parties also filed a motion to strike portions of Respond-
ent’s Brief to the administrative law judge. On June 9, 2015,
Respondent filed its opposition. General Counsel and Charging
Parties contend that Respondent's brief to the Administrative
Law Judge made factual and other assertions that were not a
part of the stipulated record. General Counsel and Charging
Parties cite five items that should be stricken from Respond-
ent’s brief:
1. The first four paragraphs of Respondent’s “Intro-
duction” on page 1, where Respondent created a fictitious
tale of Charging Party Steven Taono's initial reading and
response to the Union's demand for payment in “early
April 2014.”1
2. Respondent’s statement, “Pursuant to the terms of
the Charging Parties’ April 21 letters, Hyatt commenced
withholding fees for representational purposes after the
collective bargaining agreement went into effect. See Ex-
hibit 12.”2
3. Respondent’s statement, “It is clear from the letter
that they were auto-generated by a computerized billing
system.”3
4. The entirety of footnote 3 on page 6 of Respond-
ent’s brief. This footnote states: “There are many reasons
why a union member might accrue an arrearage. For ex-

1 R. br. at p. 1, LL. 2–15.
2 Id. at p. 5, LL. 17–19.
3 Id. at p. 6, L. 6.
ample, an employee may be out on leave of absence and
not have wages from which to deduct his or her monthly
membership dues commitment in a given period. Local 5’s
effort to collect dues arrearages from members is not at is-
sue in this proceeding. Stip. note 2.”4
5. Respondent’s statement, “It was sent during a time
of labor peace in an atmosphere entirely free from other
allegations of coercion.”5
Respondent counters the motions to strike by arguing that the
Introduction in its brief is quite obviously rhetorical prose pre-
sented in an effort to persuade the decision maker that an em-
ployee would not reasonably find the March 31, 2014 letter to
be coercive, that the statement, that Hyatt commenced with-
holding fees after the collective-bargaining agreement went into
effect, is supported by inferences that can be drawn from the
extant record, that Local 5’s assertion that it is “clear” that the
March 31 letter was auto-generated by a computerized billing
system is a permissible observation based on a document in the
record, that Local 5’s statement that there are many reasons a
union member might accrue an arrearage is a statement of gen-
eral practice in the field in which the Board has expertise, and
is not objectionable and that Local 5’s assertion that the March
31 letter was sent during a time of labor peace in atmosphere
free of other allegations of coercion is supported by the record
and perfectly appropriate.
As to the first item General Counsel and Charging Parties
seek to strike from Respondent’s brief, I find it is in the nature
of argument not fact and I will not consider it as a matter of
fact. As to item two, I find it is a reasonable inference to be
drawn from extant documents and I will not strike this item.
With respect to the third matter, while the documents seem
similar, there is no way to conclude they were auto generated
and I will grant the motion to strike. I will grant the motion to
strike item four since I find the information irrelevant and a
matter of speculation not encompassed by the record herein.
As to item five, while there may have been reference to “labor
peace” in record documents, this issue was not fully litigated in
this proceeding and I will grant the motion to strike.
The parties’ factual stipulations set forth in Joint Exhibit. 11
reflect the following:
11. Since at least July 1, 2006, Local 5 has been the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative of the following bar-
gaining unit of employees employed by the Employer:
All employees of the Employer described in the most current
collective-bargaining agreement between Respondent and the
Employer, including employees in the Banquet Department,
Beverage Department, Food Preparation Department, Food
Service Department, General Clerical Department, House-
keeping Department, Maintenance Department, Steward De-
partment, Uniform Services Department, Porterage Partici-
pants, and Parking Department.
12. Local 5 and the Employer were parties to a collective
bargaining agreement (the "Collective Bargaining Agreement")

4 In its opposition, Respondent erroneously refers to this as fn. 2.
5 R. br. at p. 7, LL. 2–3.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
between approximately July 1, 2006, and June 30, 2010.
Section 7 of the collective-bargaining agreement stated:
SECTION 7, UNION SECURITY
7.01 Employees who are now members of the Union shall, as
a condition of continued employment, remain members of the
Union. All other employees and all new employees shall, as a
condition of continued employment, become members of the
Union no later than the thirty-first (31 s) day following the ex-
ecution of this Agreement or their date of employment,
whichever is later.
7.02 Five (5) days after receipt of written notice from the Un-
ion that an employee has failed to tender his uniform dues and
initiation fees in accordance with the provisions of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended, Hyatt shall
suspend such employees for seven (7) days pending termina-
tion. If within the seven (7) day period of suspension the Un-
ion notifies Hyatt that the employee has complied with Sec-
tion 7.1, the employee shall be immediately reinstated to work
without back pay. If Hyatt is not so notified by the Union the
employee shall be discharged and shall not have access to the
grievance procedure as provided in Section 18 of this Agree-
ment.
13. From about July 1, 2010, until about August 13, 2013,
the Employer and the Union did not have a collective-
bargaining agreement.
14. At all material times, Charging Parties have been em-
ployees in the Unit.
15. At all material times, Charging Parties have not been
members of Local 5 and have objected to the payment of dues
and fees for nonrepresentational activities.
16. Certain other employees in the Unit are similarly-situated
to the Charging Parties inasmuch as they either were employees
in the Unit, were not members of Local 5 at material times
hereto, objected to the payment of dues and fees for nonrepre-
sentational activities, and were subject to certain conduct de-
scribed below that the General Counsel alleges is unlawful.
Said employees will be referred to herein as “"similarly-
situated employees”
17. The Parties do not presently agree on the number of simi-
larly-situated employees. Local 5 believes that the number of
similarly-situated employees (exclusive of the Charging Par-
ties) is 22; the General Counsel believes that the number may
exceed that. The Parties agree that in the event that the NLRB
orders a remedy that requires identification of similarly-situated
employees by name, the counsel for the General Counsel may
seek to ascertain the names of all similarly-situated employees
as a matter of compliance; provided, however, that Local 5
does not waive arguments concerning the appropriateness of
this remedy before the Administrative Law Judge and the
NLRB.
18. Prior to the events described below, the Charging Parties
and other similarly situated employees authorized the Employer
to deduct fees for representational activities from their
paychecks and to remit such fees to the Union.
19. On or about April 21, 2012, Charging Parties and other
similarly situated employees sent individualized letters to Erie
Gill, Local S's Financial Secretary-Treasurer. The letter stated:
RE: CANCELLATION OF UNION DUBS NO
CONTRACT
HYATT REGENCY WAIKIKI BEACH RESORT & SPA
Dear Mr., Gill,
This letter is to notify you that I have authorized the Hyatt
Regency Waikiki Beach Resort & Spa to stop payment of my
Union dues effectively immediately due to no contract be-
tween Local 5 and the Hyatt, In the future, when Local 5 and
the Hyatt secure a compulsory dues contract, I will allow my
employer to commence deducting the required amount of
dues, my reduced fair share amount for financial core mem-
bers, that is demanded by the Union.
Sincerely,
[NAME AND SIGNATURE].
The letters were identical except that for the name and signa-
ture. A copy of the letters submitted by the Charging Parties is
attached to (Jt. Exh. 1 as exhibit 10(a)-(d)). Local 5 received 34
such letters on or around April 21, 2013. Following receipt of
these letters, the Employer stopped withholding dues and/or
fees from the paychecks of the aforesaid employees.
20. The Employer and the Union reached a successor agree-
ment (the "Successor Collective Bargaining Agreement") that
became effective on or around August 11, 2013. The Successor
Collective Bargaining Agreement contains the identical union
security provision set forth in paragraph 12 above.
21. On or about October 2, 2013, Local 5 delivered effective-
ly identical correspondence to the charging Parties and other
similarly-situated employees. A copy of correspondence that
Local 5 delivered to the Charging Parties is attached to Jt. Exh.
1 as exhibit 11(a)-(d). The letters were identical except for the
name of the recipients and the monetary amount identified in
the letters. The letter signed by Respondent's Organizer Raina
Whiting states:
We understand that you have previously requested to pay, in
lieu of the full dues and initiation fees of UNITE HERE Local
5, the fair share fee — that portion of dues and initiation fees
relevant to Local 5's duties as your collective bargaining rep-
resentative.
Now that we have secured an excellent agreement with the
Hyatt and will embark on this time of labor peace, we hope
that you will want to enjoy the benefits of full union member-
ship and will make arrangements to pay the arrearages you
have accrued. The Local 5 bylaws and the IU constitution re-
quire paying dues as a condition of membership. Once you
make arrangements to pay the arrears you have accrued
([TOTAL AMOUNT OWED]), your full membership will be
reinstated.
Please contact Jessie in Local 5's dues department at 941-
2141 and she will work with you to arrange a payment plan.
22. On March 31, 2014, Local 5 sent correspondence to cer-
tain Unit employees, including the Charging Parties and other
similarly-situated employees. A copy of the letters that Local 5
UNITE HERE LOCAL5 (HYATT CORP.) 7
sent to Charging Parties is attached to Jt. Exh. 1 as exhibit
12(a)-(d). Local 5 sent such correspondence to Local 5 mem-
bers who had dues arrearages, as well as to Charging Parties
and similarly-situated employees. Local 5 avers and the Gen-
eral Counsel has no basis to dispute, that Local 5 sent approxi-
mately 137 letters in total to Local 5 members, to Charging
Parties, and to the similarly-situated employees. The letters
were identical except for the names of the recipients and the
monetary amounts identified in the letters. The letter states:
THIS IS A STATEMENT OF YOUR ACCOUNT AS OF
THE ABOVE DATE. Your dues must be made current. To
facilitate this we have billed your employer for the balance
listed below. A deduction will be reflected on an upcoming
pay stub. If your employer doesn't deduct arrearages, you are
responsible for paying this balance directly to Local 5.
Please be advised that the International Constitution Rules af-
firmed by Local Union 5 Bylaws must suspend any Member
whose Dues are more than TWO Months in arrears.
ATTENTION FOOD SERVERS: Please note that if there are
insufficient funds available in your weekly paycheck to cover
dues deduction, then you are responsible for sending your un-
ion dues directly to Local 5. PLEASE REMIT THE
BALANCE STATED. Your prompt payment is appreciated.
If you are retired or currently not employed, please contact the
dues office. If you are on extended medical or personal LOA,
the dues staff will help determine if you are eligible for a
withdrawal card.
Please contact the dues office at (808) 941-2141 or (800) 585-
4373. (Id.)
The Total Balance Due listed on the March 31 letters for the
Charging Parties is as follows:
Agnes Demarke $674.83 (from June 1, 2012, to September 1,
2013); Mark Tamosiunas $644.76 (from July 1, 2012,, to Sep-
tember 1, 2013); Steven Taono $867.21 (from July 1, 2012 to
September 1, 2013); Wayne Young $1,294.49 (from February
1, 2012, to September 1, 2013).
23. Beginning on or about March 31, 2014, Local 5 commu-
nicated to the Employer, requesting it to deduct arrearages up to
the maximum amount of $62.50 per paycheck from the
paychecks of the approximately 137 persons to whom Local 5
had sent the March 31, 2014 letter. A copy of this communica-
tion email message chain is attached to (Jt. Exh. 1 as exh. 13).
Included with the March 31, 2014 e-message was a billing re-
port. A copy of this billing report is attached to Jt. Exh. 1 as
exhibit 14. The Employer subsequently made deductions from
employee paychecks in an amount of up to $62.50, including
from the paychecks of the Charging Parties and similarly situ-
ated employees. The Employer then refunded the arrearages
deducted from the Charging Parties and similarly-situated em-
ployees in their following paycheck. A copy of the Employer's
payroll records for employees that had Local 5 arrearages de-
ducted and refunded is attached to (Jt. Exh. 1 as exhibit 15(a)-
(nn)). The emails reflect that:
On March 31, Jessie DeCoite (DeCoite) from Respondent's
dues department sent an email to Karen Taira (Taira) from the
Employer's human resources department requesting that the
Employer deduct dues arrearages from Unit employee
paychecks.6 Attached to the March 31 email from DeCoite to
Taira was a billing report including the employee's name, the
dues arrearage balance, and the maximum deduction allowa-
ble per paycheck.7 The maximum amount of dues arrearages
that may be deducted from employee paychecks is $62.50.
The billing report lists dues arrearage information for 137
employees, including the Charging Parties and the similarly-
situated Employees.8 Id. The dues arrearages listed on the bill-
ing report for the Charging Parties is identical to the dues ar-
rearages Respondent listed on the letters it sent to unit em-
ployees on March 31.
On April 1, Taira responded to DeCoite's March 31 email by
asking DeCoite whether Respondent had informed employees
of the dues arrearages amounts and how they were calculated.9
DeCoite sent the following response to Taira's email approxi-
mately 2 hours later:
The letter informs the employees of their dues balance and a
billing report was submitted to their employer for the balance
stated and a deduction will be reflected on an upcoming pay
stub. It also state[s] that if there are no deductions, they are re-
sponsible for paying the balance directly to Local 5.10
On April 11, the Employer deducted the maximum allowable
of $62.50 from the Charging Parties and the similarly-situated
employees' paychecks.11
24. On or around April 15, 2014, the Employer delivered a
letter to the Charging Parties and the similarly-situated employ-
ees regarding the payroll deductions described in paragraph 22.
A copy of the letter delivered to Young is attached to (Jt. Exh.
1, as exhibit 16). The other letters were identical except for the
name of the recipient. The counsel for the General Counsel
does not allege that further arrearages were deducted from em-
ployees' paychecks, or that the Charging Parties or any similar-
ly-situated employee is owed any money arising out of the
allegations set forth in the amended complaint. The letter apol-
ogizes for deducting retroactive union dues in the amount of
$62.50, informing the employees that the deduction was made
in error, and the full $62.50 would be credited in the employ-
ees' April 25 paycheck.12
25. On or around May 13, 2014, Local 5 sent a letter to the
Charging Parties attached to (Jt. Exh. 1 as exhibit 17(a)-(d)).
Local 5 did not send a similar letter to any other employees.
Local 5 does not, however, stipulate that the number of similar-
ly-situated employees is 34 or that every employee who mailed
the April 21, 2012 letter to the Union is a similarly-situated
employee. The letter states:

6 Jt. Exh. 1, p. 8, par. 23; Exh. 13.
7 Jt. Exh. 1, page 8, par. 22; Exh. 14.
8 Jt. Exh. 1, p. 8, par. 23.
9 Jt. Exh.1, Exh. 14.
10 Id. Exh.13.
11Jt. Exh.1, p. 8, par. 23; Exh. 15(a)-(nn).
12 Jt. Exh.1, p. 9, par. 25; Exh. 17(a)-(d).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
This letter is to clarify the March 31, 2014 letter you received
from UNITE HERE Local 5's dues department. The amount
listed in the statement of your account indicates the amount of
dues you need to pay in order to become a member in good
standing with the Union. The letter does not refer to the union
security clause in your collective bargaining agreement or
threaten your continued employment. The International Con-
stitution and the Local 5 bylaws indicate that any member in
good standing who accrues more than two months in arrears
will have their Union membership suspended. (Emphasis in
original.)
The Analysis
General Counsel and Charging Parties contend that Re-
spondent violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by unlawfully
threatening to collect dues arrearages in its March 31, 2014,
letter and by failing to effectively repudiate this conduct. Re-
spondent counters that both the text and the context of the
March 31 letter make clear that it did not restrain or coerce
Beck objectors in their right not to pay dues and fees as a condi-
tion of employment while there was no union-security clause in
effect and that it effectively repudiated the March 31 letter.
All parties cite Service Employees Local 121 RN (Pomona
Valley Hospital Medical Center), 355 NLRB No. 40 slip op. at
2 (2010), in support of their arguments.
The facts in Pomona Valley reflect that the employer hospital
and respondent union were parties to a collective-bargaining
agreement that expired May 27, 2007, but was extended from
month to month by agreement of the parties until the union
gave notice that it was terminating the contract. The expired
agreement contained a union-security clause. Upon termination
of the contract the employer advised bargaining unit employees
they were no longer required to pay union membership dues
and fees under the contract’s union-security clause. In addition,
the employer informed the employees that, if they chose, they
could resign from union membership and/or revoke their dues-
checkoff authorizations. In reply, the respondent union distrib-
uted flyers at the hospital. The flyer stated:
Work with an expired contract . . . What does it mean?
The hospital and their representatives i.e. Managers, directors,
and antiunion nurses have put out misleading and incorrect in-
formation regarding having “NO CONTRACT.”
In, truth the NLRA* requires management (Pomona Valley
Hospital) to maintain contract terms and conditions of em-
ployment while it bargains on a new agreement. Abandoning
or changing a pre-existing condition is an unfair labor practice
(ULP), giving the union a basis for filing an NLRB charge,
calling a ULP strike, or filing a challenge to a lockout.
YOU CONTINUE TO BE COVERED BY THE TERMS
AND CONDITIONS OF YOUR CONTRACT!
An employer (Pomona Valley Hospital) must maintain the
status quo after the expiration of a collective bargaining
agreement until a new collective bargaining agreement has
been negotiated or the parties have bargained to impasse.
When a contract expires, a union can file a unilateral-change
charge to enforce a term on the agreement that had been fol-
lowed by the parties, a past practice independent of the con-
tract, or a past practice that conflicts with the contract. Under
the NLRA*, dues and fees may be collected back to the expi-
ration of the collective bargaining agreement (contract).
Many of you have inquired about the stop dues form being
distributed by the hospital and their representatives. You may
have been mislead [sic] into believing that you are not obli-
gated to pay dues and fees during the period of negotiations.
This is untrue and retroactivity may occur prior or upon ratifi-
cation of the contract. Please ask yourselves why all the anti
leaders are still paying dues. Could it be they don’t want the
possibility of owing more in a lump sum?
DUE [sic] AND FEE [sic] OBLIGATIONS REMAIN
INTACT AND MAYBE [sic] COLLECTED PRIOR OR
UPON RATIFICATION OF THE CONTRACT. WHEN
YOU ARE NOT A MEMBER IN GOOD STANDING,
YOU FORFEIT YOUR VOICE, RIGHTS TO
PARTICIPATE IN UNION EVENTS AND FORFEIT
YOUR VOTING PRIVILEGES.
In Pomona Valley the Board held that a union-security clause
in a collective-bargaining normally does not survive expiration
of the contract.13 Additionally, the Board has held that a union-
security clause may not be applied retroactively, and therefore
that a union cannot demand dues as a condition of employment
for periods before the execution of the agreement, citing Team-
sters Local 492 (United Parcel Service),346 NLRB 360, 364
(2006). The Board further concluded that the test for determin-
ing whether the union’s action violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) was
whether the action reasonably tended to restrain or coerce em-
ployees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights, including the
right to refrain from paying union dues or fees when there is no
contractual obligation to do so. The Board stated that in deter-
mining if a threat has been made the Board must evaluate the
entirety of the union’s message in its overall context.
In reaching its conclusion that the Union’s flyer was coercive
the Board said the flyers:
. . . rhetorical question did not highlight the benefits of volun-
tarily maintaining membership, but instead emphasized that if
employees chose not to do so during the period when no con-
tract was in effect, their continuing obligation to pay dues and
fees would likely be enforced in a more onerous manner later,
i.e., through collection of “a lump sum” which could, the flyer
suggested, be “more” than the sum of periodic payments to be
made during the hiatus.14
Respondent also relies on International Brotherhood of

13 In Lincoln Lutheran of Racine (Service Employees Interna-
tional Union Healthcare Wisconsin SEIU-HCWI), 362 NLRB
No. 188 slip op. at 1(2015), the Board reversed its long standing
holding in Bethlehem Steel, 136 NLRB 1500 (1962), and held that “an
employer’s obligation to check off union dues continues after expira-
tion of a collective-bargaining agreement that establishes such an ar-
rangement.” Since the Board held that its decision in Lincoln Lutheran
would only be applied prospectively, it is not binding in this decision.
14 Service Employees Local 121 RN (Pomona Valley Hospital Med-
ical Center), supra at pp. 3–4.
UNITE HERE LOCAL5 (HYATT CORP.) 9
Teamsters, Local Union No 89 (United Parcel Service, Inc.),
361 NLRB No. 5 (2014), for the proposition that it is not un-
lawful for the union to take action to collect fees other than by
threatening or seeking the employee’s discharge. I find this
case inapposite as there was a valid union-security clause.
In United Parcel the Board, citing Johnson Controls II, held
that Section 8(b)(1)(A) and Section 8(a)(3) of the Act bars the
threatened or actual enforcement of a union-security clause by
threat of discharge. It does not prohibit a union from seeking to
collect fees from an ex-member who has been lawfully expelled
but continues to receive representation. Nor is a union is barred
from seeking ongoing payment in some form from a lawfully
expelled employee by lawful means other than by threatening
or seeking the employee’s discharge.
Here, the record reflects that Respondent and the Employer
were parties to a collective-bargaining agreement that contained
a valid union-security clause between approximately Ju-
ly 1, 2006, and June 30, 2010. The contract expired and from
about July 1, 2010, until about August 13, 2013, the Employer
and the Respondent had no collective-bargaining agreement.
On or about April 21, 2012, Charging Parties and other similar-
ly situated employees sent individualized letters to Ernie Gill,
Respondent’s financial secretary-treasurer stating they had
authorized the Hyatt Regency Waikiki Beach Resort & Spa to
stop payment of union dues effectively immediately since there
was no contract between Local 5 and the Employer. Charging
Parties and similarly situated employees authorized deduction
of dues as financial core members when a new contract was
agreed upon. Following receipt of these letters, the Employer
stopped withholding dues and/or fees from the paychecks of the
aforesaid employees.
The Employer and Respondent reached a successor collec-
tive-bargaining agreement effective on or around August 11,
2013. This agreement contained an identical union-security
provision to the most recently expired contract set forth above.
On or about October 2, 2013, Respondent delivered identical
letters to the Charging Parties and other similarly-situated em-
ployees stating inter alia,
Now that we have secured an excellent agreement with the
Hyatt and will embark on this time of labor peace, we hope
that you will want to enjoy the benefits of full union member-
ship and will make arrangements to pay the arrearages you
have accrued. The Local 5 bylaws and the IU constitution re-
quire paying dues as a condition of membership. Once you
make arrangements to pay the arrears you have accrued
([TOTAL AMOUNT OWED]), your full membership will be
reinstated.
On March 31, 2014, Respondent sent letters to Charging Par-
ties and other similarly-situated employees stating in part:
THIS IS A STATEMENT OF YOUR ACCOUNT AS OF
THE ABOVE DATE. Your dues must be made current. To
facilitate this we have billed your employer for the balance
listed below. A deduction will be reflected on an upcoming
pay stub. If your employer doesn't deduct arrearages, you are
responsible for paying this balance directly to Local 5.
Please be advised that the International Constitution Rules af-
firmed by Local Union 5 Bylaws must suspend any Member
whose Dues are more than TWO Months in arrears.
ATTENTION FOOD SERVERS: Please note that if there are
insufficient funds available in your weekly paycheck to cover
dues deduction, then you are responsible for sending your un-
ion dues directly to Local 5. PLEASE REMIT THE
BALANCE STATED. Your prompt payment is appreciated.
Beginning on or about March 31, 2014, Respondent request-
ed that the Employer deduct arrearages up to the maximum
amount of $62.50 per paycheck from the paychecks of approx-
imately 137 persons to whom Respondent had sent the above
March 31, 2014 letter. The Employer subsequently made de-
ductions from employee paychecks in an amount of up to
$62.50, including from the paychecks of the Charging Parties
and similarly situated employees. The Employer then refunded
the arrearages deducted from the Charging Parties and similar-
ly-situated employees in their following paycheck.
On April 11, the Employer deducted the maximum allowable
of $62.50 from the Charging Parties and the similarly-situated
employees' paychecks.
On or around April 15, 2014, the Employer delivered a letter
to the Charging Parties and the similarly-situated employees
regarding the payroll deductions described above. The letter
apologizes for deducting retroactive union dues in the amount
of $62.50, informing the employees that the deduction was
made in error, and the full $62.50 would be credited in the em-
ployees' April 25 paycheck.
On or around May 13, 2014, Local 5 sent a letter to the
Charging Parties that letter states:
This letter is to clarify the March 31, 2014 letter you received
from UNITE HERE Local 5's dues department. The amount
listed in the statement of your account indicates the amount of
dues you need to pay in order to become a member in good
standing with the Union. The letter does not refer to the union
security clause in your collective bargaining agreement or
threaten your continued employment. The International Con-
stitution and the Local 5 bylaws indicate that any member in
good standing who accrues more than two months in arrears
will have their Union membership suspended.
Here I must determine if Respondent’s March 31, 2014, let-
ter violated Section 8(b)(1(A) of the Act by threatening and
coercing Charging Parties and similarly situated employees by
demanding repayment of dues arrearages under Pomona Valley,
supra.
In Pomona Valley as well as numerous cases15 cited in that

15 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union No 89
(United Parcel Service, Inc.), 361 NLRB No. 5 (2014); (no violation
where was a valid union-security clause); Teamsters Local 492 (United
Parcel Service), 346 NLRB 360, 364 (2006) (violation in union’s threat
of termination for failure to pay dues in the absence of a valid union
security clause.); Bay Cities Metal Trades Council, 306 NLRB 983,
985 (1992), enfd. mem.15 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1993) (case does not
involve recovery of union dues under an expired or nonexistent union
security clause.); Iron Workers Local 455 (Precision Fabricators), 291
NLRB 385, 387 (1988) (Despite expired union security clause, union
sought retroactive dues payments and sought discharge of employees);
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
decision and in the briefs of the parties, there was either some
threat or implied threat to discharge employees for failure to
make dues payments or in the Pomona Valley case there was a
threat to collect dues or more in a lump sum in the absence of a
valid union security clause.
In the instant case, both General Counsel and Charging Par-
ties urge me to find coercion by the Respondent Union in seek-
ing to enforce collection of back dues in the absence of a valid
union-security clause absent a threat of discharge or some other
implied threat. Here, the financial core members were invited
to be reinstated to full membership but there was no threat to
invoke any discipline for failure to do so. While the Charging
Parties and similarly situated employees had their balances due
set forth in the Respondent’s letter, unlike Pomona Valley there
was no threat that the entire amount was due in a lump sum or
that something more might be added. The Board has never
held that the sole act of requesting dues arrearages in the ab-
sence of a valid union-security clause violates Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. In all of the Board cases prior to Pomo-
na Valley where it was found the union violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act in seeking collection of retroactive dues
in the absence of a valid union-security clause, the union took
some action such as the threat of enforcement of the union-
security clause provision requiring termination for nonpayment
of dues or threatening that employees might owe a lump-sum
payment or more of past dues. I find no support in case law for
a finding that demanding payment of retroactive dues, standing

Auto Workers Local 785 (Dayton Forging), 281 NLRB 704, 707 (1986)
(violation by union’s implied threat of discharge by invoking union
security clause for nonpayment of dues during hiatus in contracts.);
UAW Local 376 (Emhart Industries), 278 NLRB 285 (1986) (Union
sought discharge of employees for nonpayment of dues pursuant to
expired union-security clause); Local 32B-32J, SEIU (Star Security
Systems), 266 NLRB 137, 138–139 (1983) (violation where a contract
contained a union shop provision requiring membership in good stand-
ing an implied threat of discharge); Teamsters Local 25 (Tech Weld
Corp.), 220 NLRB 76, 77 (1975) (violation by union’s threat of dis-
charge for non-payment of dues in the absence of a valid union-security
clause.); and Mine Workers District 50 (Ruberoid Co.), 173 NLRB 87,
92–93 (1968) (violation by threat of discharge in invoking union securi-
ty clause for retroactive dues payment when no valid union-security
clause existed.)
alone, in the absence of a valid union-security clause, consti-
tutes a threat or coercion under section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
Here I find Respondent Union made no threat. In its March
31, 2014 letter to Charging Parties and similarly situated em-
ployees Respondent gave each employee an account of alleged
dues arrearages, stating, “Your dues must be made current.” A
total balance due was set forth in the letter to each of Charging
Parties but no demand was made that the full amount be paid in
a lump sum. In fact Respondent requested the employer to
deduct no more than $62.50 from the employees’ paychecks
each pay period. There is nothing in this language that a rea-
sonable person would find to be a threat. I find no implied
threat as in Pomona Valley where the union implied that non-
members or those who resigned their memberships would have
dues collected in a lump sum or “more.” It was this threat of
collecting dues in a lump sum or more that the Board found
coercive and violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
Having found that Respondent did not threaten or coerce
Charging Parties or similarly situated employees, I find that
Respondent did not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act and I
will recommend that the complaint be dismissed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1 The Employer herein, Hyatt Corporation d/b/a Hyatt Re-
gency Waikiki, has been an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Respondent Union has been a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent did not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act
and the complaint is dismissed.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended. 16
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed.
Dated, Washington, D.C. September 18, 2015

16 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections shall be waived for all purposes.