Union Manufacturing Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 7, 1940

28 N.L.R.B. 357 (N.L.R.B. 1940)

In the Matter- of UNION MANUFACFURINO' COMPANY and ',TExT1L,Z
' WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA
Case 'No. C-160,8.-Decided December 7, 1910
Jurisdiction : yarn and hosiery manufacturing industry.
Unfair Labor Practices
Discrimination-Testifying under the Act: discharge because of employee's
activities on behalf of-the union and because he gave testimony under
the Act; alleged acts of insubordination and inefficiency as reason for the
discharge held not convincing.
Remedial Orders : reinstatement and back pay awarded.
Mr. Alexander E. Wilson,-Jr., and Mr. Warren Woods, for the
Board. -
Weekes c Candler, by Mr. John Wesley Weekec and Mr. Murphey
Candler, Jr., of Decatur, Ga., for the respondent.
"Mr. R. H. Brazzell, of Atlanta, Ga., and Mr. David Jaffe, of New
York City, for the Union.
Miss Marcia Hertzmark, of counsel to the Board.
DECISION
AND
ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges duly filed by Textile Workers Union of America,
herein called the Union,' the National Labor Relations Board herein
called, the Board; by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region
(Atlanta, Georgia), issued its complaint dated April 22, 1940, against
Union Manufacturing Company, Union Point, Georgia, herein called
the respondent, alleging that the respondent had engaged in and was
engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce, within the
meaning of Section 8 (1), (3), and (4) and Section 2 (6) and
(7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein called
the Act. The complaint and notice of hearing were duly served
upon the respondent and upon the Union.
1 William J. Frazier, a representative of the American Federation of Hosiery Workers,
testified that the charge was filed by Textile Workers Union of America on behalf of
Branch No. 126 of the American Federation of Hosiery Workers.
28 N. L. R. B., No. 62.
357
l
358 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The complaint alleged, in substance, that on or about March 29,
1940, the respondent discharged and thereafter refused to reinstate
Frank Barker 2 for the reason that he had joined and assisted the
Union- and its affiliate, the American Federation of Hosiery Workers,
herein called the Hosiery Workers, and for the reason that he ap-
peared and gave testimony under the Act at a hearing on March
21 and 22, 1940; and that from on or about March 8, 1940, to the
date of the complaint the respondent restrained, coerced, and intimi-
dated its employees 'in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Sec-
tion 7 of the Act. On April' 30, 1940, the respondent filed its an-
swer, denying the commission of the unfair labor practices alleged
in the complaint.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held at Greensboro, Georgia, on
May 6, 1940, before Herbert Wenzel, the Trial Examiner duly desig-
nated by the Board. The Board,, the respondent, and the Union
were represented by counsel and participated in the hearing. Full
opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses,
and to introduce evidence bearing upon the issues was afforded
all parties. . At the commencement of the hearing, the respondent
moved to dismiss paragraph 7 of the complaint which alleged that
the respondent, through its agents,' had made statements to its em-
ployees derogatory to the Union, had advised employees that it
disapproved their attitude toward the respondent, as indicated by
their membership in the Union,, had advised its employees not to
join or remain affiliated with the Union, and threatened to close
down its plant and discharge its employees if they persisted in
activities on behalf of the Union. The Trial Examiner denied the
motion without prejudice to a later renewal of the motion. He
granted a motion by the respondent to make the allegations of
paragraph 7 of the complaint more specific. At the conclusion of
the Board's case the Zrial Examiner granted a motion by counsel
for•the,Board to dismiss paragraph 7 of the complaint, and a motion
fo incorporate in the record the record and exhibits in a previous
proceeding involving the same parties 3 for consideration where ap-
plicable to the allegations as to Frank Barker. The Trial Examiner
'denied without prejudice a motion'by the respondent to dismiss
the complaint. At the conclusion of the Board's case and at the
conclusion of the hearing the Trial Examiner granted motions of
counsel for the Board to. amend the pleadings to conform to the
proof.
' Referred to in the complaint as W. Frank Barker.
8Matter of Union Manufacturing Company and Temtile Workers Union of America, 27
N L R B 1300.
UNION MANUFACTURING COMPANY 359
Mn June 12, 1940, the Board, acting pursuant to Article II, Sec-
tion 36, of National Labor Relations Board Rules and Regulations-
Series 2, as amended, transferred the proceeding to and continued
it before the Board for action pursuant to Article II, Section 37, of
said Rules and Regulations. The Order directed that no Interme-
diate Report be issued, that Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed
Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Order be issued, that the parties
should have the right, within 20 days from the date of the said
Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed Conclusions of Law, and Pro-
posed Order, to file exceptions thereto and to request oral argument
before the Board, and should have the right, within 30 days from
the date of the Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed Conclusions
of Law, and Proposed Order to file a brief with the Board.
On October 5, 1940, the Board issued Proposed Findings of Fact,
Proposed Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Order in these pro-
ceedings, copies of which were duly served upon all parties. Ex-
ceptions to the Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed Conclusions
of Law, and Proposed Order, and Request for Oral' Argument were
filed by the respondent on October 28, 1940.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before the Board in
Washington, D. C., on November 12, 1940, for the purpose of oral
argument. The respondent and the Union were represented by coun-
sel. The Board has considered the exceptions to the Proposed Find-
ings of Fact, Proposed Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Order,
and the oral argument in support thereof, and, in so far as the
exceptions are inconsistent with the findings, conclusions, and order
set forth below, finds no merit in them.
Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE.RESPONDENT
Union Manufacturing Company, Inc., is a Georgia corporation,
having its plant and principal place of business at Union Point;
Georgia, where,it is engaged in the manufacture and sale of yarns
and men's and boys' hosiery. The yarn and hosiery departments are
operated as one-plant, under a common management and adminis-
tration. The respondent uses the major portion of the yarn it
produces.
The materials used by the respondent in its business include cotton,
rayon, rayon staple, celanese, celanese staple, wool, yarn, dyestuffs,
strawboard, needles, and machinery replacements. The value of
the raw materials used by the respondent annually is approximately
$241,000, of which more than 33 per cent represents the value of
360 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
materials obtained outside the State of Georgia. The respondent
annually sells products valued at approximately $900,000 of which
about 95 per cent are shipped outside the State of Georgia.
H. THE ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
Textile Workers Union of America is a labor organization affili-
ated with the Congress, of Industrial Organizations. It admitted
to membership employees of the respondent until March 30, 1940,
when Branch No. 126 of the American Federation of Hosiery Work-
ers was granted a charter. American Federation of Hosiery
Workers is 'a labor organization affiliated with Textile Workers
Union of America. It admits to membership employees of the
respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The discharge of Frank Barker
Frank Barker was discharged on March 29, 1940. He had been
employed by the respondent for about 12 years, during the last 8
years as a machine fixer: He joined the United Textile Workers,
of America, a predecessor of the Union, in 1934 and went on strike
with that organization for 3' weeks. The following year he held
a minor office in that organization.
In -the spring of 1937, the Textile Workers Organizing Committee,
which succeeded the United Textile Workers of America, conducted
an intensive organizing campaign among employees of the respond-
ent during which Barker personally signed up about 300 members.
During the latter part of that year Barker was made chairman of
the local and of the shop committee in the plant and he retained
both offices after the Textile Workers 'Organizing Committee
changed its name to "Textile Workers Union of America," in the
spring of 1939. As chairman of the shop committee, Barker met
frequently with the respondent throughout 1938 and 1939, and he
was the most active member of the Union in the plant. On the
day before his discharge he and William Frazier, an organizer for
the Hosiery Workers, distributed in front of the respondent's offices,
handbills announcing the fact that a charter would be granted to
Branch-126 on March 30.
On March 29, 1940, Barker failed to receive his weekly pay check
as usual. His foreman, Fletcher Chapman, said he did not have
it and advised Barker to inquire of Owen C. Scott, plant superin-
tendent. Scott handed Barker the check with a typewritten mem-
orandum attached which stated, "By reason of insubordination and
inefficiency the Union Manufacturing Company feel justified in
UNION, MANUFACTURING COMPANY 361
severing their relations with you. To takeeffect today (March 29th)
at end of first shift." The slip was signed by Scott. Barker there-
upon asked Scott what "insubordination" meant and was told to
buy a dictionary and look the word up, that he would "have plenty
of time to" do so. Barker insisted that he would like a reason for
being discharged and suggested that Scott write him the reason.
Scott answered that he had already given Barker ample reason.
Barker thereupon left the plant and, after discussing the matter
with Frazier, went with Joe Wray and Donald Lyle, members of
the shop committee, to see Lamb, president of the respondent.
Barker again requested a definition of the word "insubordination"
and was told, "It could mean several things." Lamb refused to
furnish a specific example of Barker's insubordination or of his
inefficiency and stated that the note-spoke for itself. When Barker
expressed the desire to apply for reinstatement, Lamb agreed to
accept the application but explained, "That doesn't mean that you
will ever work here any more." On April 1 Barker and Frazier
attempted to interview Lamb but were told that Lamb's attorneys
-advised him not to talk to them. No further attempt was made
to secure Barker's reinstatement.
The Union alleges that Barker was discharged because of his
activities in behalf of the Union and because he had given testimony
at a hearing conducted by the Board on March 21 and 22, 1940,
involving the respondent and the Union. In support of its con-
tention that Barker was discharged because of his union activities,
the Board offered the testimony of James Cook, an employee of
the respondent, who testified that in April 1939, when he complained
to Lamb that he was unable to afford certain paving assessments,
Lamb asked, "Well, you know who your enemy is, don't You?"
Cook replied,. "Frank Barker" and Lamb said, "Yes." Cook
thereupon inquired, "Why don't you fire him then?".. and Lamb
informed him, "Well, we have to have a cause, and I am just wait-
ing for the first chance." Cook stated at the hearing that his reason
for naming Barker was that he, had received numerous letters from
the respondent, attached to his pay checks, in which the respondent
stated that it was having to cancel orders "on account of disturb-
ances" and that since Barker was the most active member of the
Union he assumed that Lamb referred to him. Lamb did not
testify and Cook's version of his conversation with Lamb is not
denied.
Scott admitted that the decision to discharge Barker was made
after the hearing on March 21 and 22. He testified, however, that
he had recommended Barker's dismissal several times before but
was unable to secure Lamb's permission to discharge him.
362 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR ' RELATIONS BOARD
The respondent denied thjtt Barker was discharged' for the reasons
alleged by the Union and contended that he was dismissed because
of insubordination and inefficiency. To substantiate its contentions
in part, the respondent offered evidence of insubordination by Barker
in the following events. Scott testified that, at a conference in No-
vember 1939 between the shop committee and representatives of the
respondent, Barker called Scott a liar. As -to this incident, Scott
testified that Lamb had accused Barker' of gathering together a
group of men in the plant and reading a certain letter to them
during working hours, that Barker denied the accusation and stated
that 'whoever reported that he had'done that was.a liar; and that
Barker was looking at him and he assumed that Barker was talking
about him. Scott also testified that at the same meeting Barker told
him, when Scott denied knowledge of the activities of a certain
employee in the plant, "If that is all you know about it, you should
go home." Barker admitted having made these statements.
Scott further recalled two occasions upon which Barker was guilty
of cursing in the plant. One incident occurred 2 years prior to
the hearing and Scott then reprimanded Barker. The second in-
stance was about 60 days before the hearing and was reported to
Scott by Chapman who threatened at that time to resign if Barker
did not become more efficient. Scott did not reprimand Barker at
that time but made a note of the occurrence.
The final example of insubordination related by Scott concerned
a statement made by Barker at an open union meeting about March
16, 1940, in which Barker is alleged to have stated that "Lamb was
a gambler and was broke, and that he joined the Presbyterian Church
and had stopped gambling, but that he [Barker] didn't want a
gambler to handle his money." Barker explained that he had made
a speech at the meeting after a non-union employee had made a
"loyalty speech" in which "she praised Mr. Lamb for taking care
of ' hospital bills and things like that for the workers . ' .. and
the,company loaning money to the workers without charging them
any interest ...." Barker testified' that' he was merely quoting
Lamb as to his former habits, and that he had said that "he [Lamb]
had been taking chances, long chances in dealing with contracts,
dealing with us as 'workers, and that that is a form of gambling
other than gambling with cards . . . ."
In view of the harmless nature of the-events just recited, we
cannot find that Barker's alleged insubordination was a factor in
his discharge. Apparently, none of the incidents were considered
serious enough to warrant action at the time they occurred, although
Scott testified that about 2 years before he had told Barker, "If
there is any cussing to be done around here, let me do it. I will
UNION MANUFACTURING COMPANY 363
certainly run you away from this place if you indulge in any more
vile language." Moreover, the statements of Barker in November
1939 were made during a bargaining conference wherein Barker
was acting as a committee member, rather than as an employee, and
the statement on March 16, 1940, was made in a union meeting.
As above stated, the respondent also alleged that Barker was
inefficient. It introduced in evidence a 51-week record of the num-
ber of stops per week on machines serviced by Barker and 25 other
fixers.
Each fixer is in charge of, and responsible for, the perfect me-
chanical operation of the 25 knitting machines being operated by
one knitter. His duties include, among other things, making re-
pairs, keeping the machines properly adjusted at all times, replacing
broken needles, and seeing that the yarn is correctly set in the
machines. The inspector on each shift stops a machine whenever
she finds it producing imperfect work and these stops are charged
against the fixer. Scott admitted that it was possible that some of
the stops counted against a fixer might be due to the incompetency
of a knitter or inspector.
Barker is shown to have had more stops on his machine than
any other fixer. The records of some 16 additional fixers employed
during this period are not shown, however, and Scott testified that
this apparently indicated a perfect 'record for them. Barker testi-
fied that it was impossible for a fixer to have a perfect record even
for as long as 30 days, and a consideration of the testimony with
reference to the work performed by these employees convinces us that
the exhibit introduced by the respondent does not correctly reflect
the records of all of the fixers in the plant and cannot serve as an
accurate basis of comparison.
Barker explained /his high stoppage record on the ground that
for the past 6 months about 80 per cent of his work had been on
samples and 75 per cent to 85 per cent on plated work, an operation
which requires the use of colored borders on men's socks.4 Scott
admitted that Barker had done more plated than plain work in this
period, that plating was more difficult than plain work, and that
it involved the likelihood of more stops for defective work. He was
unable to name another fixer who was doing plated work during that
period and did not deny that the only 108 needle reverse plating
- machines in the plant were being fixed under Barker for 3 or 4
months before the latter's discharge. The respondent's witness Un-
derwood, the knitter whose machines Barker fixed, stated that 18
of the 25 machines on which he and Barker worked were the 108
needle machines and that, as far as he knew, these were the only
4 It is clear that part of the plated work performed by Barker was on the samples
364 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
machines of that type then running in the plant. Underwood also
testified, as did Ruben Ogletree, a fixer who had been employed by
the respondent for 30 years, that there was difficulty operating the
plating machines because they were equipped with home-made ad-
justments and special parts. Ogletree added that it was harder to do
plating because of the use of elastic yarn which the machines were
not made to handle, and that he believed Barker's work was largely,
on plating. Underwood stated that there had been as many stops
on his machines after Barker's discharge as before. Although Scott
testified that numerous stops on machines tended to reduce a fixer's
production rate, he admitted that Barker's production record "stacks
up pretty well."
Scott was unable to say what percentage of Barker's work since
January 1, 1940, was on samples, but he estimated that it may have
constituted 10 to 50 per cent. As above stated, Barker claimed that
sample work made up about 80 per cent of his total and that such
work is also more difficult and causes more stops than regular pro-
-duction. He was corroborated in this by Ogletree who'testified that
more care must be given to samples, that this work requires constant
adjustment of the machines, and that new cones of yarn which are
used each time a different pattern is put on a machine cause waste
and are at first likely to be faulty and break easily. Scott denied
generally that sample work is more difficult than regular work.
Barker testified also that his excessive stops for the first part of
the 51-week period were due to the fact that, a new and inexperienced
inspector, who was later removed from this position and put to
work on clippers, was then on duty on his shift. The respondent-
did not deny Barker's contention with regard to the inspector.
As further evidence of Barker's inefficiency, the respondent intro-
duced another exhibit which shows that Barker's "sizing" record
from October 1939 to the time of his discharge was poorer than'that
of the, other fixers on his shift. There is no evidence as to Barker's
comparative rating prior to October. 1939, nor does it appear how
his total compared with 15 to 20 other fixers in the plant besides
the 12 shown on the exhibit. Moreover, Barker's record did not
grow worse over the period from October 1939 to the date of his
discharge. In fact, for all that appears in the record before us,
Barker may have had more sizing errors than others, during the
entire 8-year period during which he had been a machine fixer with-
out any action having been taken by the respondent.
The respondent also claimed that Barker frequently left his ma-
chines and that Chapman was forced to reprimand him on numerous
occasions because of this. Chapman testified as to certain notes made
by him, after a discussion with Lamb and Scott, during the month
prior to Barker's discharge, which indicated that Barker left his
UNION MANUFACTURING COMPANY 365
machines on five occasions between March 8 and 19. Chapman
testified, however, that it was a common practice for Barker to
leave his machines and that only because he "just wanted to see
how many times he did leave", did Chapman suddenly start keeping
records on Barker. Barker testified that during the past year or
two Chapman had engaged in constant surveillance of his work
and was continually checking up on him, that often when Barker
was looking around the plant for Chapman he would return to his
machines to find Chapman waiting for him there.
If the respondent discharged Barker on March 29, 1940, because
of his organizational activity and affiliation, it committed an unfair
labor practice. While proof of the presence of proper causes at the
time of discharge may have relevancy, and circumstantial bearing
in explaining what otherwise might appear as a discriminatory
discharge, such proof is not conclusive. The issue is whether such
causes in fact induced the discharge or whether they are but a
justification of it in retrospect. On the other hand, it is equally
true that a failure to show proper causes, indeed any cause, for
the discharge does not necessarily establish an unfair labor practice.5
As we have stated above, Barker was, as the respondent knew, the
outstanding exponent of the Union in the respondent's plant. He
had personally solicited the applications of a great majority of the
Union's members, was the spokesman for the committees which met
with the respondent's representatives, and at the hearing a week
before his discharge had testified at length on behalf of the Union.
The evidence relied upon by the respondent to show that Barker
was discharged because of insubordination and inefficiency is not
convincing. The examples of insubordination recalled by Scott be-
gan with an incident which occurred 2 years before, and none of
them impresses us as serious enough to warrant the discharge of an
employee with 12 years' service. The evidence submitted by the
respondent to show that Barker was discharged because of inefficiency
falls short of achieving its purpose since it fails to present an
accurate or complete picture of Barker's work in relation to that
of others similarly employed. The exhibit showing stoppages does
not disclose Barker's record prior to early 1939 and fails to include
the records of a number of fixers employed during the same period.
Moreover, this exhibit does not -afford an accurate basis for judging
Barker's work since the other fixers listed thereon are not shown
to have done as much of the difficult plated and sample work as
Barker; in fact, it is not shown that any of them did this work.
5 See Matter of The Kelly-Springfield Tire Company and United Rubber Workers of
America, Local No. 26 and James M Reed and Minnie Rank , 6 N. L. R B 325 , consent
decree entered , Kelly -Springfield Tire Company v National Labor-Relations Board, 97 F.
(2d) 1007 (C. C. A. 4).
366 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The exhibit dealing with Barker's sizing record covers an even
shorter period of time and is less complete than the stoppage record.
Barker's habit of leaving his machines was characterised by his
foreman as a "common practice." ,
We are unable to find from the record before use that any of
Barker's alleged shortcomings precipitated the decision to discharge
him. It is uncontradicted that in about April 1939 Lamb stated,
when asked why he did not discharge Barker for being the "enemy"
of the employees, "Well, we have to have a cause, and I am just
waiting for the first chance." Plainly, the respondent did not dis-
charge Barker for the reasons it now assigns. However, on March
21 and 22, 1940, Barker testified on behalf of the Union at a hearing
before the Board. A week later he was discharged. We conclude
that Frank Barker was discharged and refused reinstatement because
of his activities on behalf of the Union and because he gave testi-
mony under the Act.7
We find that the respondent has discriminated in regard to the
hire and tenure of employment of Frank Barker, to discourage
and thereby discouraging membership in the Union, and because
he gave testimony under the Act, and by such action has interfered
with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the respondent set forth in Section III above,
occurring in connection with the operations of the respondent de-
scribed in Section I above, have a close, intimate, and substantial
relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and
tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce
and the free flow of commerce.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices, we shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take
certain affirmative action which we find necessary to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
We have found that the respondent discriminated against Frank
Barker by discharging him on March 29, 1940, and thereafter refus-
ing' to reinstate him. We shall order the respondent to offer him
immediate reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent
We do not find it necessary to consider the record in the prior case between the parties.
° See N. L. R B. V. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co , 301 U. S 58, reversuig National
Labor Relations Board v. Friedman -Harry Masks Clothing Company, 85 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A
2) and enf 'g Matter of Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Company, Inc and Amalgamated
Clothing Workers of America, 1 N. L. R B 411
UNION MANUFACTURING COMPANY 367
position without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privi-
leges, and to make him whole for any loss of pay he may have
suffered by reason of the discrimination against him by payment
to him of a sum of money equal to the amount which he would
normally have earned as wages from March 29, 1940, to the date of the
offer of reinstatement less his net earnings 8 during said period.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the
entire record in the case, the Board makes the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Branch No. 126 of the American Federation of Hosiery Workers
and Textile Workers Union of America are labor organizations,
within the meaning of -Section 2 (5) of the Act. ,
2. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act,
the resondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor prac-
tices, within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act.
3. By discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of employment
of Frank Barker, thereby discouraging membership in a labor organi-
zation, the respondent has engaged in and in engaging in unfair
labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8'(3) of the Act.
4. By discriminating against Frank Barker because he gave testi-
mony under the Act, the respondent has engaged in and is engaging
in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (4) of
the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices
affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7)
of -the Act.
ORDER
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations
Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the
respondent, Union Manufacturing Company, Union Point, Georgia,
and its officers, agents, successors, and assigns; shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in Textile Workers Union of Amer-
ica or American Federation of Hosiery Workers, or any other labor
'By "net earnings" is meant earnings less expenses , such as for transportation, room,
and board , incurred by an employee in connection with obtaining work and working else-
where than for the respondent, which would not have been incurred but for his unlawful
discharge and the consequent necessity of his seeking employment elsewhere See Matter
of Crossett Lumber Company and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of Amer-
ica, Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union, Local 2,590, 8 N L R B. 440. Monies received
for work performed upon federal, state, county, municipal, or other work-relief projects
shall be considered as earnings . See Republic Steel Corporation v N. L R. B., decided
by United States Supreme Court, November 12, 1940.
368 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
organization of its employees, -by discharging or refusing to rein-
state any of its employees or by otherwise discriminating in regard
to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment ;
(b) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against any em-
ployee because he has filed charges or given testimony under the
Act;
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coerc-
ing its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist Textile Workers Union of America, Branch
No. 126 of the American Federation of Hosiery Workers, or any
other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 -of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds
will effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Offer to Frank Barker immediate and full reinstatement to
his former or substantially equivalent position without prejudice
to his seniority or other rights and privileges; and make him whole
for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of the respond-
ent's discrimination against him by payment to him of a sum of,
money equal to that which he normally would have earned as
wages from March 29, 1940, until the date of the offer of reinstate-
ment, less his net earnings 9 during said period;
(b) Post immediately in conspicuous places in its plant and keep
posted for a period of at least sixty (60) consecutive days-from the
date of posting, notices to its employees stating (1) that the respond-
ent will not engage in the conduct from which it is ordered to cease
and desist in paragraphs 1 (a), (b), and (c) of this Order; (2) that the
respondent will take the affirmative action set forth in paragraph 2
(a)- of this Order; and (3) that the respondent's employees are
free to become or remain members of Textile Workers Union of
America and Branch No. 126 of American Federation of Hosiery
Workers and that the respondent will not discriminate against any
employee because of membership or activity in-those organizations;
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region in writing
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order what. steps the
respondent has taken to comply herewith.
CHAIRMAN HARRY A . MILLIs took no part in the consideration of
the above Decision and Order. I
See footnote 8.