Truck Drivers & Helpers Local Union No.728 IBT

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 26, 1963

140 N.L.R.B. 1436 (N.L.R.B. 1963)

1436 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Free-Play Togs, Inc., is an employer engaged in commerce within the mean- ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Joint Board is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Respondent , the Joint Board, has not engaged in and is not engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 2 ( 6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER It is recommended that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety. Truck Drivers & Helpers Local Union No. 728, International Brotherhood of Teamsters , and Southern Conference of Team- sters, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Team- sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America and Brown Transport Corp . and Akers Motor Lines ; Atlanta- Asheville Motor Express ; Atlanta Motor Lines ; Atlanta-New Orleans Motor Freight ; Benton Rapid Express ; Carolina Freight Carriers Corporation ; Central Truck Lines; Jack Cole Company ; Custom Cartage Company ; Dance Freight Lines; Dixie Highway Express, Inc.; Dixie-Ohio Express, Inc.; Gordons Transports , Inc.; Hennis Freight Lines , Inc.; Hoover Motor Express ; Huber & Huber Motor Express ; Johnson Freight Lines Company ; Johnson Motor Lines; Mason & Dixon Lines ; McLean Trucking Company ; Miller Motor Ex- press; Murdock Freight Line ; Northern Freight Lines; Parts Convoy Corporation ; Pike Transfer Company ; Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc.; R . C. Motor Lines ; R.C.A. Truck Lines; Road- way Express, Inc.; Rutherford Freight Lines, Inc.; Ryder Truck Lines , Inc.; Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. of Tennessee; Ter- minal Transport Company; T.I.M.E., Inc.; Transcon Lines, Inc.; Wilson Truck Company , Parties to the Contract. Case No. 70-CE-1. February 26, 1963 DECISION AND ORDER On August 25, 1961, Trial Examiner Arthur E. Reyman issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondents had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Inter- mediate Report. Thereafter, the Respondents, the General Counsel, several parties to the contract, and the Charging Party, filed excep- tions to the Intermediate Report and supporting briefs. On Decem- ber 20, 1961, the Board heard oral argument in Washington, D.C., 140 NLRB No. 137. TRUCK DRIVERS & HELPERS LOCAL UNION 728, IBT 1437 in which all parties were given an opportunity to appear and participate.' The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed . The Board has considered the Intermedi- ate Report , the exceptions and briefs , the oral argument, and the entire record in the case, and finds merit in the exceptions of the General Counsel, the Charging Party, and certain parties to the contract. Accordingly , the Board adopts only those findings , conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner which are consistent with this Decision and Order. On January 24, 1961, the Respondents and the Southeastern Area Motor Carriers Labor Relations Association Negotiating Committee entered into separate memorandums of agreement covering over-the- road employees and local pickup and delivery drivers. On March 9, 1961, these memorandums were adopted by the parties as their final collective-bargaining agreements. The only significant changes for our purposes between the memorandums and the final agreements is that section 4 of article IX of the over-the-road memorandum and section 4 of article X in the local pickup and delivery memorandum were deleted from the final agreements. The effect of these deletions is discussed below. The complaint alleged that the "Protection of Rights" articles of the two agreements, referred to herein for convenience as article IX, constitute a "hot cargo" agreement and that the act of entering into and maintaining this article in effect is itself a violation of Section 8(e). 1. The Trial Examiner found the Respondents guilty of violations of Section 8(e), not because they had entered into or maintained the agreements, but only because article IX had been implemented by certain activities of the Respondents, resulting in a refusal to handle the freight of Brown Transport Corp. after it had, been struck for refusing to sign the memorandum of January 24. Our decision in Mary Feifer, d/b/a American Feed Company, 133 NLRB 214, con- firms the correctness of the General Counsel's exceptions to this find- ing. We held there that the act of entering into, signing , executing, or making a contract, either express or implied, which is prohibited by Section 8(e), is sufficient to establish a violation of that section without regard to whether there are any attempts to implement such contract. 2. Article IX, sections 1 and 2, are, with certain insignificant changes in language, identical with article IX in the companion case, Truck I Because of the similarity of the issues involved , this matter was consolidated for pur- poses of oral argument with Truck Drivers Union Local No 413 et al. (The Patton Ware- house, Inc ), 140 NLRB 1474. 1438 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Drivers Union Local No. 413 (The Patton Warehouse, Inc.), 140 NLRB 1474. The Board found in that case that article IX consti- tuted a hot cargo agreement. It will serve no purpose here to repeat the reasons which prompted our conclusions in Patton Warehouse. We find, for the reasons stated in that case, and to the extent found there, that sections 1 and 2 of article IX in issue here are violative of Section 8 (e). 3. The preliminary memorandum of January 24, 1961, contained as an integral section article IX, section 4, titled "Hazardous Work." The Respondents contend that section 4 is not in issue because it was omitted from the collective-bargaining agreements which were adopted in March 1961. However, since section 4 was part of the memorandums of agreement which the parties considered binding on themselves prior to the execution of the final agreements some 6 weeks later, we find that section 4 constituted for that period an agreement of the parties, and that its validity under Section 8 (e) is therefore in issue here. Section 4, while in effect, read as follows : Section 4. Hazardous Work In the event it should be finally determined, after appeal, if available and taken, by any tribunal of competent jurisdiction that employees covered by this Agreement may be required to make deliveries to, pickups from or enter upon the premises of any person who is involved in a labor dispute, the Employer shall provide the following additional benefits to such employees in view of the additional hazards, difficulties, and hardships of per- forming such duties : 1. An insurance policy which provides life insurance, hospital and medical benefits, and compensation for partial and permanent disabilities, all of which shall be no less than three (3) times similar benefits provided by applicable workmen's compensation laws. Where the Employer is not covered by such Workmen's Compensation Law, he shall voluntarily assume his obligations under the law, and, in addition, provide the above benefits. 2. Wages which are no less than three (3) times the rate of pay or earnings otherwise applicable for all services performed on the day or the entire tour of duty during the course of which the above-stated duties must be performed. 3. The Employer shall also, upon request of the Union or employee involved, provide adequate protection against possible injury to such employee or his family which may result from the performance of such duties. 4. If required to testify before any tribunal with regard to the matters referred to in this Article, the employee shall be reim- bursed for lost wages. TRUCK DRIVERS & HELPERS LOCAL UNION 728, IBT 1439 The import of section 4 is that if a tribunal of competent jurisdic- tion decides that employees may be required to handle goods at prem- ises involved, in a labor dispute, the Employer shall thereafter provide certain additional benefits and protection to its employees. It is a method for making it difficult, expensive, and unlikely for an em- ployer signatory to the agreement to insist that his employees handle "hot cargo" goods or equipment. It is comparable in its effect to sec- tion 2(c) of article IX which requires an employer to continue to do business with a struck employer and to handle his hot cargo, but only by the use of strange and uneconomic means. An employer who is permitted by a "tribunal" to require his employees to handle hot cargo, should be able to do so in his accustomed manner. To saddle him with new obligations if he wishes to comply with the law is to penalize him for his observance. Nor is this device more palatable or persuasive because it seems to be directed toward the protection of employees. Certainly, in those situations when the hot cargo which the employer is obligated to handle is under the ban of these Respondents or of other affiliates of the Teamsters Union, it is they who are creating the unsafe conditions which the employees must endure, and it they, not the em- ployers, who can best assure the safety of the employees. Section 4 is, in our opinion, designed to compel adherence by em- ployers signatory to the agreement to sections 1 and, 2 of article IX without regard to their illegality, through economic coercion. In view of our holding that sections 1 and 2 of article IX exceed the limits of legality imposed by section 8 (e) of the Act, we regard sec- tion 4 as an implementation of the Union's illegal object and, there- fore, is itself illegal. ORDER Upon the entire record in this case and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondents, Truckdrivers and Helpers Local Union No. 728, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and Southern Conference of Teamsters, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse- men and Helpers of America, its officers, agents, representatives, suc- cessors, and assigns, shall : 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Maintaining, giving effect to, or enforcing article IX, sections 1 and 2 of the Over-the-Road Agreement, article XI, sections 1 and 2 of the Local Freight Agreement, article IX, section 4 of the Over-the- Road Memorandum of Agreement, and article X, section 4 of the Local Freight Memorandum of Agreement, to the extent found un- lawful herein. 1440 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (b) Entering into, actively maintaining, giving effect to, or enforc- ing any other contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby any employer within the territorial jurisdiction of the Southern Confer- ence of Teamsters ceases or refrains, or agrees to cease or refrain, from handling, using, selling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or from doing business with any other person. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Post at its business offices and meeting halls, copies of the 'at- tached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies of said notice, to be fur- nished by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by official representatives of the Respondents, be posted by the Respondents immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by them for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to its members are custom- arily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondents to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Furnish to the Regional Director for the Tenth Region signed copies of the aforementioned notice for posting by employers who are party to either the Over-the-Road or the Local Freight Agree- ments, if the employers agree, in places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director, shall, after being signed by Respondents, as in- dicated, be forthwith returned to the Regional Director for disposition by him. (c) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, in writing, within 10 (-lays from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. 2 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL OUR MEMBERS AND TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF EM- PLOYERS WHO ARE PARTIES TO EITHER THE SOUTHERN CONFERENCE LOCAL FREIGHT OR THE SOUTHERN CONFERENCE OVER-THE-ROAD AGREEMENTS Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Art, as amended, we hereby give notice that : IV WILL NOT maintain, give effect to, or enforce article IX, sections 1 and 2 of the Over-the-Road Agreement, article XI, TRUCK DRIVERS & HELPERS LOCAL UNION 728, IBT 1441 sections 1 and 2 of the Local Freight Agreement, article IX, section 4 of the Over-the-Road Memorandum of Agreement, or article X, section 4 of the Local Freight Memorandum of Agree- ment, to the extent found unlawful in the Decision and Order. WE WILL NOT enter into, actively maintain, give effect to, or enforce any other contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby any employer within the territorial jurisdiction of the Southern Conference of Teamsters ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other em- ployer, or from doing business with any other person. TRUCKDRIVERS AND HELPERS LOCAL UNION No. 728, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, Labor Organization. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) SOUTHERN CONFERENCE OF TEAMSTERS , AFFILIATED WITH THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS , CHAUFFEURS , WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, Labor Organization. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board' s Regional Office, 528 Peachtree-Seventh Building, 50 Seventh Street NE., At- lanta 23, Georgia, Telephone No. Trinity 6-3311, Extension 5357, if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions. INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE This is a proceeding under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , 29 U.S .C. 151 , et seq., and concerns primarily an interpretation of Section 8(e) of the Act, as amended (Landrum-Griffith amendments, 73 Stat. 519). On February 9, 1961 , Brown Transport Corp . filed a charge alleging an unfair labor practice under Section 8(e) against Truck Drivers & Helpers Local Union No. 728, International Brotherhood of Teamsters , and the Southern Conference of Teamsters, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, Respondents herein. On February 24, 1961, Brown Transport Corp. filed an amended charge against the above-named labor organizations and included therein some 35 Parties to the Contract mentioned below and "other motor freight common carriers " saying that said labor organizations entered into and maintained in effect with the named carriers , contracts and agree- ments which instigated and caused and under which such employer common carriers "ceased, refrained, and have continued to refuse and refrain," from handling, 1442 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD transporting, and dealing in the freight and products of Brown Transport Corp. in violation of Section 8(e) of the Act. On March 14, 1961, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, through the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, on behalf of the Board, issued a complaint and notice of hearing. Timely answers to the complaint were filed by Local Union No. 728 and the Southern Conference, and on behalf of carriers, named Parties to the Contract, including Akers Motors Lines, Atlanta Motor Lines, Central Truck Lines, Dance Freight Lines, Gordons Transports, Inc., Huber & Huber Motor Express, Johnson Freight Lines Company, Miller Motor Express, Murdock Freight Lines, Northern Freight Lines, Parts Convoy Corporation, Pike Transfer Company, R.C. Motor Lines, Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., of Tennessee, Terminal Transport Company, Transcon Lines, and Wilson Truck Company. This case came on to be heard before Trial Examiner Arthur E. Reyman at Atlanta, Georgia, on May 2, 1961, and was concluded on May 8. Each party named above was represented by counsel, was afforded full opportunity to call witnesses, to examine and cross-examine, to present evidence, to make oral argument, and to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. In question here is a basic interpretation of Section 8(e) as written into the Act by the Landrum-Griffith amendments. Briefs have been filed by counsel for the General Counsel, the Charging Party (herein sometimes called Brown), Akers Motor Lines, Atlanta Motor Lines, Central Truck Lines, Dance Freight Lines, Gordons Transports, Inc., Johnson Motor Lines, Miller Motor Express, Murdock Freight Lines, Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., of Tennessee, and Wilson Truck Company. The Southern Con- ference of Teamsters and Truck Drivers & Helpers Local Union No 728, also briefed the case through counsel. Each brief has been carefully considered. Proposed findings and conclusions have been submitted by several of the above- named parties. On the basis of the whole record herein, and upon consideration of briefs and proposed findings and conclusions as submitted, and after hearing the witnesses, I make the following: 1. FINDINGS OF FACT A. The business of Brown Transport Corp. Brown Transport Corp , the Charging Party herein, during the times material hereto, was engaged in and now is engaged in the transportation and handling of freight received from or to be delivered to consignors or consignees of freight by motor vehicle. B. The business of the Parties to the Contract, as described in the complaint Akers Motor Lines, Atlanta-Asheville Motor Express, Atlanta Motor Lines, Atlanta-New Orleans Motor Freight, Benton Rapid Express, Carolina Freight Carriers Corporation, Central Truck Lines, Jack Cole Company, Custom Cartage Company, Dance Freight Lines, Dixie Highway Express, Inc , Dixie-Ohio Express, Inc., Gordons Transports, Inc., Hennis Freight Lines, Inc., Hoover Motor Express, Huber & Huber Motor Express, Johnson Freight Lines Company, Johnson Motor Lines, Mason & Dixon Lines, McLean Trucking Company, Miller Motor Express, Murdock Freight Line, Northern Freight Lines, Parts Convoy Corporation, Pike Transfer Company, Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., R.C. Motor Lines, R C.A. Truck Lines, Roadway Express, Inc., Rutherford Freight Lines, Inc., Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. of Tennessee, Terminal Transport Company, T.I.M.E., Inc., Transcon Lines, Inc, and Wilson Truck Company (herein called the Employers), are engaged as common carriers by motor vehicle in the interstate transportation of freight. During the past calendar year, which period is representative of all times material herein, each of the Employers received more than $50,000 from the interstate trans- portation of freight. The Employers are, and have been at all times material herein, engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED Respondents, Local Union No 728 and the Southern Conference, are, and have been at all times material herein, labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act TRUCK DRIVERS & HELPERS LOCAL UNION 7 2 8, IBT 1443 III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The facts herein are not greatly in dispute. As noted above, the case revolves around the proper construction of Section 8(e), as applied to these facts. It seems expedient, at the outset, to say that on or about January 24, 1961,1 the Respondent labor organizations and the Employers, through their representative, Southeast Areas Motor Carriers Labor Relations Associations Negotiating Committee, or directly, entered into a written memorandum of agreement, effective as of February 1, 1961, containing the following provisions: ARTICLE IX PROTECTION OF RIGHTS Section 1. Picket Line. It shall not be a violation of this Agreement and it shall not be cause for discharge or disciplinary action in the event an employee refuses to enter upon any property involved in a labor dispute or refuses to go through or work be- hind any picket line, including the picket line of Unions party to this Agreement and including picket lines at the Employer's places of business. Section 2. Struck Goods: Recognizing that many individual employees covered by this contract may have personal convictions against aiding the adversary of other workers, and recognizing the propriety of individual determination by an individual work- man as to whether he shall perform work, labor or service which he deems contrary to his best interest, the parties recognize and agree that: It shall not be a violation of this Agreement and it shall not be a cause for discharge or disciplinary action if any employee refuses to perform any service which, but for the existence of a controversy between a labor union and any other person (whether party to this Agreement or not), would be performed by the employees of such person. Likewise, it shall not be a violation of this Agreement and it shall not be a cause for discharge or disciplinary action if any employee refuses to handle any goods or equipment transported, interchanged, handled or used by any carrier or other person, whether a party to this Agreement or not, at any of whose terminals or places of business there is a controversy between such carrier, or person, cr its employees on the one hand and a labor union on the other hand; and such rights may be exercised where such goods or equipment are being transported, handled or used by the originating, interchanging or succeeding carriers or persons, whether parties to this agreement or not. The Employer agrees that it will not cease or refrain from handling, using, transporting, or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer or cease doing business with any other person, or fail in any obligation imposed by the Motor Carriers' Act or other applicable law, as a result of individual employees exercising their Tights under this Agreement or under law, but the Employer shall, notwithstanding any other provision in this Agreement, when necessary, handle, use, transport or otherwise deal in such products and con- tinue doing such business by use of other employees (including management and representatives), other carriers, or by any other method it deems appropri- ate or proper. Section 3 : Within five (5) working days of filing of grievance claiming violation of this Article IX, the parties to this Agreement shall proceed to the final step (Article VIII, Sections 1(c) and 1(d) of the Grievance Procedure), without taking any intermediate steps, any other provision of this Agreement to the contrary not- withstanding. Section 4. Hazardous Work: In the event it should be finally determined, after appeal, if available and taken, by any tribunal of competent jurisdiction that employees covered by this Agree- ment may be required to make deliveries to, pick-ups from or enter upon the premises of any person who is involved in a labor dispute, the Employer shall provide the following additional benefits to such employees in view of the addi- tional hazards, difficulties, and hardships of performing such duties: 1. An insurance policy which provides life insurance, hospital and medical benefits, and compensation for partial and permanent disabilities, all of which shall be no less than three (3) times similar benefits provided by applicable work- men's compensation laws. Where the Employer is not covered by such Work- Unless otherwise noted all dates hereafter mentioned are for the year 1961. 681-492-63-vol. 140---92 1444 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD men's Compensation Law, he shall voluntarily assume his obligations under the law, and, in addition, provide the above benefits. 2. Wages which are no less than three (3) times the rate of pay or earnings otherwise applicable for all services performed on the day or the entire tour of duty during the course of which the above-stated duties must be performed. 3. The Employer shall also, upon request of the Union of employee involved, provide adequate protection against possible injury to such employee or his family which may result from the performance of such duties. 4. If required to testify before any tribunal with regard to the matters re- ferred to in this Article, the employee shall be reimbursed for lost wages. Section 5. Sympathetic Action: In the event of a labor dispute between any Employer or Union, party to this Agreement, during the course of which such Union engages in lawful economic activities which are not in violation of this Agreement, then any other affiliate of .the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America having an agreement with such Employer shall have the right to engage in lawful economic activity against such Employer in support of the Union which is party to this Agreement notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Agreement between such Employer and such other affiliate. The memorandum agreement of January 24 covered local freight and over-the- road operations of the carriers in their relation to the Respondents. On March 9 the Respondents and the Carriers entered into the Southern Conference Local Freight Forwarding, Pickup and Delivery Agreement and the Southeastern Area Over-The- Road Motor Freight Agreement, in which the "Protection of Rights" clauses in the memorandums of agreement were modified in some respects. The first three sections of the clauses were retained; the fourth section was deleted, and the fifth and last section was transposed to another article. The "protection of rights" clauses in the modified local freight agreement and in the modified over-the-road agreement are contained in articles XI and IX respectively, in the formal exhibits herein. The issue here concerns the "protection of rights" clauses The clauses mentioned above are practically identical as contained in the local freight pickup and over-the-road contracts. Article 9, Southern Conference Over- The-Road Motor Freight Agreement, for the period February 1, 1961, to January 31, 1964, as finally executed, provides under the protection of rights clause, section 1: It shall not be a violation of this agreement and it shall not be cause for discharge or disciplinary action [etc.] . .. . identically as set forth in section 1 of article IX of the memorandum of January 24. Section 2 of this article IX in the over-the-road agreement executed on March 9 is identical to section 2 of the memorandum of January 24 These same clauses appear in article XI in the Southern Conference Local Freight and Forwarding, Pickup and Delivery Agreement for the period covering February 1, 1961, to January 31, 1964. Section 4 of article IX of the memorandum of January 24 is not in issue here, it having been transferred to another section of the last agreement between the parties and, as I understand the situation, from statements made by counsel at hearing and in brief, the only issue here is in connection with article IX as set forth in the January 24 memorandum, repeated in the March 9 contracts. Brown, the Charging Party, was a party to the local freight agreement which expired on January 31. It was requested by the president of Local 728 to execute another contract on or about January 25, which the president of Brown refused to do. At midnight on January 31, picket lines were thrown at Brown's terminal in Atlanta. Brown, a common carrier by motortruck, maintains its principal office and place of business in Waynesboro, Georgia, and operates terminals in Savannah, Macon, Augusta, and Athens, Georgia, and at Knoxville, Tennessee, and, until January 31, at Atlanta. Brown was a party to a collective-bargaining agreement with the Respondent Local Union No 728 covering its local pickup and delivery employees at its Atlanta, Macon, and Savannah, Georgia, terminals and with Local Union 621 of the Teamsters covering its pickup and delivery employees at Knoxville The agreement with Local No. 728, which ran from February 1, 1958, and which was terminated by the refusal of President Brown of Brown to renew or substitute a new agreement therefor, expired on January 31, whereupon Brown closed its Atlanta terminal and contracted out its pickup and delivery work in Atlanta to a private cartage concern, Hudson Hauling Company. The strike against Brown and picketing commenced after midnight on January 31 and continued until approximately Feb- ruary 13, when picketing commenced at the premises of Hudson Hauling Company. Thereafter, as more fully set forth below, Brown experienced difficulty in handling TRUCK DRIVERS & HELPERS LOCAL UNION 728, IBT 1445 goods consigned to or through it and says that the proof here shows that the carriers, parties to the January 24 memorandum of agreement, then began refusing to process, check, transport, or otherwise handle Brown's freight when it appeared at the terminals of these various motor carriers for interchange or interlining. The more essential facts regarding the direct dispute between Local 728 and Brown will be discussed below. It is said on behalf of the Charging Party that the direct result of the refusal of certain of the motor carriers named as Parties to the Contract, through their dock or terminal employees and over-the-road drivers, to handle or transport Brown's freight, was that these several motor carriers with whom Brown normally did busi- ness almost completely ceased to handle or transport Brown's freight. The testimony, practically uncontradicted as discussed below, shows that some carriers did attempt to handle Brown's freight in a different manner than usual and that as a result the customers of Brown did not receive freight from Brown or forward freight to Brown for interchange or interlining. With this contention in mind, and also the provisions of article IX of the memoran- dum of January 24, confirmed in the agreement of March 9, it seems convenient at this point to state the issues as seen by the General Counsel, the Charging Party, the Respondents, and the earners: (a) The General Counsel says that it should be decided at the very beginning whether the determination of an alleged violation of Section 8(e) is made on a per se basis, or whether it is necessady to prove the effects of the contract before a determi- nation can be made. He states that his position is that the determination should be made on the per se basis. He states quite simply that the issue to be resolved is whether the "Protection of Rights" clauses contained in the several contracts entered into between the Respondent labor organizations and the named motor carriers are a violation of Section 8(e). (b) Brown, the Charging Party, says that the mere entering into of the contracts which were agreed upon and executed on January 24 was a violation of the Act per se because those motor carriers, parties to the contract, in agreeing to section IX (which, it says, permits their employees to refuse with immunity to handle the goods, freight, and products of other primary employees) did in effect agree to a provision which would require them (the parties to the contract) to cease doing business with other employees within the meaning of Section 8(e) of the Act. The Charging Party states the issues involved herein to be: (1) Whether or not the Memoranda of Agreement and specifically Articles IX and X respectively thereof, entered into on January 24, 1961, between the Respondent Unions in this case and the various motor carriers named as Parties to the Contract, are, under the provisions of Section 8(e) of the Act, and in the light of the Congressional intent, legislative history, and prior decisional case law involving Section 8(b)(4), in violation of Section 8(e) of the Act without regard to effect or implementation? (2) Whether or not, without regard to the legality of the contract at its in- ception and execution, it was and is unlawful in the light of the evidence demon- strating the effect of the agreement upon certain of the motor carriers who were parties to it? (3) Whether or not there was an actual legal and binding amendment to the contracts as executed on January 24, which occurred on March 9, 1961, and if there was such an amendment, whether or not the contracts as amended are in violation of Section 8(e) of the Act, per se? (4) If the contracts were in fact amended on March 9, 1961, are the amended contracts and the enforcement of same under the evidence adduced at the Hear- ing, a violation of Section 8(e) of the Act? (c) The Respondent labor organizations state the questions involved to be these: 1. Whether Section 8(e), on its Face, and as Applied to the Respondents, Denies Due Process of Law Guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Consti- tution. 11, Whether Respondents have Entered into an Express Contract or Agree- ment Proscribed by Section 8(e) of the Act. Iii. Whether Respondents have Entered into an implied Contract or Agree- ment in Violation of Section 8(e). (d) Counsel for Akers Motor Lines, Atlanta Motor Lines, Central Truck -ines. Dance Freight Lines, Gordons Transports, Inc., Johnson Motor Lines, Miller Motor Express, Murdock Freight Line, Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., Ryder Truck Lines, Inc of Tennessee, and Wilson Truck Company state the issues to be. 1446 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD A. Whether the specified provisions of the said collective bargaining agree- ment (hereinafter set forth) are per se violative of Section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. B. Whether, in view of the evidence in the Record as to the effect of the said provisions of said collective bargaining agreement, the same are violative of Section 8(e) of the Act. (e) Huber & Huber Motor Express, R C. Motor Lines, and Terminal Transport Company by implication in the record and in brief adopt the issues set forth by the other motor carriers in their briefs. Counsel for the General Counsel at the outset of the hearing herein, in response to a question from the Trial Examiner, stated that the General Counsel proposed to stand on the proposition that the mere "entering into" of the memorandum of January 24 and the contract of March 9 constituted a violation on the part of each of the parties thereto of Section 8(e). The Trial Examiner said that he was not quite satisfied, particularly in view of the language of the Supreme Court of the United States in Local 357 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. v. N.L.R.B., 47 LRRM 2906 [365 U.S. 667] (April 17, 1961), and N.L.R.B. v. News Syndicate Company et al., 47 LRRM 2916, 2918 [365 U S. 695] decided that day. See below. The Essential Facts and Effects of the Dispute Between Local Union No. 728 and the Southern Conference on the One Side and Brown on the Other Flowing out of the refusal or failure or choice of Brown not to accept the pro- visions of the January 21 memorandums of agreement, and the picketing of Brown on February 1, after the expiration of the prior agreements between it and the Unions, certain events concerning the breakdown of customary interlining or inter- changing of freight between Brown and other common carriers by motor vehicle occurred. Shortly after the opening of the hearing, I expressed doubt concerning the validity of the position taken by the General Counsel and the Charging Party that only "for any labor organization and an employer to enter into any agreement, express or implied . ." does in itself constitute a per se violation of Section 8(e) Over ob- jection, I received evidence of the following circumstances in connection with the strike against Brown after the expiration or termination of its agreements with the Unions. I received evidence from the General Counsel, from the Charging Party, and from the Respondent Unions going to show the effects of the strike against Brown as it affected the business of each of the Parties to the Contract, as it affected Brown, and as it affected the customers of the named Parties to the Contract and the impact of the strike against Brown as to Brown's customers and the thrust dis- played under article IX of the agreement, to which Brown refused to subscribe. After receiving such testimony I took testimony up to a certain point on behalf of the Respondent Unions going to show that certain of the carriers were in no respect affected as the result of the dispute or disagreement between Brown and the Respondents Consequently, as I write this report, I am in a position where in effect I have told counsel for the General Counsel, at the hearing, that I do not subscribe to his per se theory as stated, have permitted the introduction of evidence going to show the effect of the writing of article IX and at the same time have permitted counsel for the Re- spondents to introduce a limited amount of evidence going to show that some carriers were not affected in the least by the strike against Brown. The affirmative evidence which I admitted showing the effect of the strike against Brown is summarized as follows: 1. Atlanta-New Orleans Motor Freight maintains a terminal in Atlanta. For the first few days after picketing began at Brown on February 1, freight was dispatched to the terminal of Atlanta-New Orleans on several different occasions, none of the freight was unloaded at Atlanta-New Orleans, and was returned to the terminal of Hudson Hauling Company (who had taken over the local pickup and delivery service of Brown). Trailerloads of freight were left on the yard of Atlanta-New Orleans, none of it was moved; a driver for Hudson Hauling eventually was sent to Atlanta- New Orleans to pick it up and return it to the Hudson terminal. Regular dock em- ployees of Atlanta-New Orleans, after freight had been dispatched to its terminal in Atlanta by Brown, was handled in regular course; however, an occasion arose when the Hudson Hauling driver arrived when the regular dock employees refused to check or handle Brown freight, the driver was told that the dock foreman would check his freight; the driver stayed there for several hours and during that time called Hudson Hauling Company, his employer, for instructions and was told each time to wait. Atlanta-New Orleans through its foreman did not either check the freight or allow Hudson Hauling through its driver to unload on the Atlanta-New Orleans TRUCK DRIVERS & HELPERS LOCAL UNION 728, IBT 1447 dock. The driver, upon request of the foreman to move his truck away from the dock, did so-the trailer became detached from the truck and fell on the ground as a result of some unknown person having pulled the pin which attaches the trailer to the tractor After several hours the trailer was picked up, retattached to the tractor, and returned to the terminal of Hudson Hauling Company. The freight on that truck never was unloaded According to Claude Brown, president of Brown, during the first several days after February 1, freight was dispatched to the terminal of Atlanta-New Orleans Motor Freight several times, but none of that freight was unloaded at Atlanta-New Orleans but was returned to the terminal of Hudson Haul- ing Company. Eventually several full trailerlo,ads left on the yard at Atlanta-New Orleans were picked up and returned to the Hudson Hauling Company terminal. According to President Brown, Sid Johnson, president of Atlanta-New Orleans, told him that Atlanta-New Orleans would not accept any Brown freight. On Feb- ruary 7 Brown was notified by telegram from Atlanta-New Orleans and from Atlanta-Asheville Express that the interlining agreements which had been in effect between them were canceled. 2. Mason & Dixon Lines was delivered a load of freight by Brown after a picket line was set up by Local No. 728 at Brown on February 1, and was checked by a member of the Union. There were at least four other union employees and eight supervisors and office employees present who were not asked to handle the freight. That shipment was loaded outbound by supervisors. Thereafter the supervisors handled the freight. On February 15, 1961, two union over-the-road drivers were asked to pull loads of Brown freight and they refused. Upon their refusal, no other over-the-road drivers or personnel of any sort were called to pull the Brown loads. These were the only drivers ever asked to pull Brown freight. Supervisors later moved these loads Because there had been difficulty in handling these two loads, Mason & Dixon im- posed an embargo on all Brown freight. THE MASON AND DIXON LINES, INC. KINGSPORT, TENNESSEE EMBARGO NOTICE No. 92 To All Concerned FEBRUARY 16, 1961. Effectively immediately, an embargo is hereby placed on all traffic moving via or in connection with Brown Transport Corporation. This embargo is made necessary by labor difficulties being experienced. In the Atlanta terminal there were 72 city drivers and checkers, 3 of whom were shown to have refused to handle Brown freight, 15 percent unassigned employees, 5 foremen, 2 dispatcher, 1 warehouse superintendent, an assistant terminal manager, and a terminal manager. There were 12 over-the-road drivers domiciled in Atlanta and 200 in the system. Casual and extra employees were available. The company operates a central dispatch board to send drivers when needed to various terminals in the area served by the company. There was no effort made to hire drivers through central dispatch nor to interrogate over-the-road drivers outside Atlanta as to whether they would handle freight. 3. Ryder Truck Lines employed in Atlanta 12 supervisors, 90 to 100 dockworkers, some 100 city drivers and 137 road drivers domiciled in Atlanta. The company operates an extra board which supplies men for 40 to 50 percent of the over-the- road operations. Casual help customarily was used on pickup and delivery but no effort was made to have them move Brown freight. Only a few of the union men were asked explicitly to handle Brown freight Brown freight came across the Ryder dock daily. After February 1, it was all moved by supervisors. Much of the freight was moved by piggyback (railroad flatcar or boxcar). Railroad piggyback operations are limited to railroad terminal facilities which must necessarily include ramps on which vans can be hauled for loading on the railroad car. On occasion the railroad sent its employees to the Ryder dock to pick up freight by truck. On only one occasion did the carrier fail to move Brown freight That load was destined for Vero Beach, Florida and Miami, Florida Piggyback was available from Atlanta to Jacksonville, Florida. Ryder had the facilities to drive from Jacksonville to Vero Beach and on to Miami but on this occasion did not attempt to do so nor to find out if its Jacksonville drivers would pull the freight. No inquiry was made into the labor situation in Jacksonville. Previous to February 1 the company sometimes refused freight it was not equipped to handle. 4. Wilson Truck Company employed in Atlanta some 154 city drivers, checkers, and dockmen, and some 14 or more over-the-road drivers. There were two foremen 1448 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and a dispatcher on each shift during the period involved. There was a central dispatch office in Nashville; however, the Atlanta terminal did not ask it for drivers from elsewhere in the system. After February 1, some of the regular employees were asked to handle Brown freight. On at least two occasions drivers who refused to pull trucks of Brown freight helped unload them after supervisors drove them to the consignee. At least one driver pulled a Brown load over the road. Wilson moved Brown freight by regular employees, supervisory personnel, piggy- back by railroad, railroad shipments of less-than-carload lots. 5. Hoover Motor Express' Atlanta terminal employed 30 checkers and dockmen, 25 city drivers, and 9 road drivers domiciled in Atlanta. There was 1 supervisor per shift, and 200 road drivers in the system. There is a central dispatch office in Nash- ville, which normally is called upon when extra drivers are needed. The carrier uses casual drivers, usually on Saturday and Sunday, holding no union seniority rights. Only a few regular employees were asked to handle Brown freight. It was handled by supervisors for a week after which one or two loads were handled by an independ- ent contractor. When that independent contractor was unable to take another load, Hoover returned it to Brown and thereafter received no more freight from Brown. Central dispatch was not asked for drivers nor did this carrier attempt to get casuals to handle the Brown freight, nor were unassigned men called upon to handle it The General Counsel's witness admitted that the supervisors could have handled all the Brown freight ready to be moved on the dock. 6 Central Truck Lines in its Atlanta terminal had some 70 checkers and loaders and 35 city drivers. Thirty road drivers were domiciled in Atlanta. Three to five supervisors were on each of the three shifts. There were 200 road drivers in the system. Casual employees were used almost daily. Casuals sometimes come in to the dock looking for work; the company maintained a list of 30 to 40 casual employees available for reaching by telephone. With the exception of the first load delivered after February 1 Central handled all Brown freight tendered it although occasionally Brown trucks left without pulling up to the dock or contacting a foreman. The freight was handled by regular over- the-road drivers for 2 weeks and thereafter was handled by having Brown load a Central truck and having a Central driver pull it. Central also used at least two different independent contractors for over-the-road hauls, using equipment belonging to an independent contractor. Other loads were pulled by loading Central trailers at Hudson Hauling Company and taking them over the road without returning to the Central dock. Central employed casual and extra labor. Central did not use piggyback, though it was available, nor did it ask for drivers through central dispatch. This carrier previously had used both piggyback and spot leases. 7. Gordons Transports, Inc., in Atlanta has 29 city drivers and 3 checkers and hostlers. There are 200 road drivers in the system. Drivers occasionally check freight. Although Gordons does very little business with Brown, during the time in question Gordons refused to accept any Brown freight. Only four men had refused to handle Brown freight. The General Counsel's witness admitted that at least one shipment refused was so small that he could have checked it himself The record here contains testimony concerning the effect of the dispute between the Respondents and Brown as to other carriers 2 Enough has been set forth above, it seems to me, to indicate substantial fact regarding the interference of normal operations of carriers as a result of this dispute. Counsel for the General Counsel has quite carefully set forth the position of his office in his brief, ,and has been joined by counsel for the Charging Party. It is said in brief, that: It should be decided at the outset whether the determination of an alleged violation of Section 8(e) is to be made on a per se basis, that is, on an interpre- tation of the contract alone, or whether it is necessary to prove the effects of the contract before a determination can be made. It is the General Counsel's position that the determination should be made on the per se basis. To do otherwise would be inconsistent with the statutory language and the legislative intent, which will be discussed hereinafter, and would result in an incongruous 2 Pike Transfer Company. Transcon Lines, Inc, Johnson Freight Lines Comnanv, Jack Cole Company. Northern Freight Lines, McLean Trucking Company, Hennis Freight Lines. Inc I refused to receive proof offered by the Respondents that other carriers moved and handled freight to or from Brown through the usual complement of help of such carriers, supervisors, by railroad, spot leases, and other means or methods of operation. TRUCK DRIVERS & HELPERS LOCAL UNION 728, IBT 1449 situation. Section 8(e) is clear and unambiguous; it proscribes the entering into of a certain type of contract. Senator Goldwater, after paraphrasing Section 8(e) in his analysis of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, stated: This means that such contractual clauses are per se illegal. It is unlawful for either party even to execute such an agreement . . . (Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Vol. II, p. 1857, hereinafter cited as "II L.H."). The incongruous situation would arise in relation to Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Act. This section proscribes a labor organization from engaging in certain primary or secondary activity where an object thereof is to force or require an employer "to enter into any agreement which is prohibited by section 8(e)." Thus, it must be determined whether the agreement is prohibited by Section 8(e) before it can be determined whether Section 8(b)(4)(A) has been violated. Since Section 8(b) (4) (A) involves the forcing or requiring of an employer to enter into such an agreement, and not the actual entering into of the agree- ment, there can be no resultant contractual effects. Therefore, a determination of the lawfulness of an agreement under Section 8(e) in an 8(b) (4) (A) proceed- ing must necessarily be made on the per se basis. (Citing] Amalgamated Lithographers of America, et al., 130 NLRB 985; Amalgamated Lithographers of America, et al., 130 NLRB 968; and Highway Truck Drivers and Helpers, Local 107, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Independent (E A. Gallagher & Sons), 131 NLRB 925. It should follow that a determination of an agreement in a Section 8(e) proceed- ing must also be on the same basis. Otherwise, there will be a double standard of proof for two interrelated sections involving the same type agreement. This could very well result in the situation where the same agreement before its execution would be per se violative of Section 8(e) in an 8(b) (4) (A) proceed- ing, but after its execution would not be violative of Section 8(e) without the showing of its effects. Naturally, if there is no labor dispute, there is no need to invoke the agreement, and, consequently, there would be no effects. If this were the situation, and if the effects of an agreement must be proved before there can be a violation of Section 8(e), parties would then be required to await the cessation of business before securing a remedy. This would be in complete contravention of the purpose and policy of the Act as set forth in Section 1 of the Act The purpose of the Act is to promote the flow of com- merce by avoiding industrial strife, and certainly not to await the occurrence of such strife The "per se" method of determination of Section 8(e) proceedings would effectuate this purpose. Reference is made to Genuine Parts Company, 119 NLRB 399, to which this same Local 728 here was a party there. I do not agree for the reasons set forth herein. The positions of the parties as set forth at the hearing and in briefs are equally persuasive. The General Counsel and counsel for the Charging Party view the amend- ment to the Act as set forth in Section 8(e) 3 to mean that the mere "entering into a Section 8(e) reads as follows: It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, trans- porting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent un- enforcible and void: Provided, That nothing in this subsection (e) shall apply to an agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other work Provided further, That for the purposes of this subsection (e) and section 8(b) (4) (R) the terms "any employer", "any person engaged in commerce or an industry affect- ing commerce", and "any person" when used in relation to the terms "any other producer, processor, or manufacturer", "any other employer", or "any other person" shall not include persons in the relation of a jobber, manufacturer, contractor, or subcontractor working on the goods or premises of the jobber or manufacturer or per- forming parts of an integrated process of production in the apparel and clothing industry: Provided further, That nothing in this Act shall prohibit the enforcement of any agreement which is within the foregoing exception. 1450 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of an agreement" between a labor organization and employer, whether "express or implied," itself is in contravention of this part of the Act and (as here) the labor organization as a party thereto, by entering into and signing such an agreement made in writing with the employer, has engaged in an unfair labor practice. The Re- spondent labor organizations take the opposite view. I had occasion to consider the meaning and intent of the Congress, in relation to Section 8(e) in Mary Feifer, d/b/a American Feed Co, 133 NLRB 214, in which I stated my reasons for the discard by me of the per se argument made then, and now here, by the General Counsel. I think there must be something more than an express or an implied agreement between a labor organization and an employer- something to show an actual violation of Section 8(e) before impact occurs. I rely on N.L.R.B. v. News Syndicate Company, Inc., 365 U S. 695, and the two companion cases mentioned there: International Typographical Union etc. v. N.L.R.B., 365 U.S. 705, and Local 357 International Brotherhood of Teamsters etc. v. N.L.R.B., 365 U.S 667. Further, under the doctrine of stare decisis, I think that Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, etc (Sand Door & Plywood Co) v. N.L R B., 357 U.S. 93, as discussed by me in my report in American Feed Co., mentioned above, is here applicable in an effort to determine the true meaning of Section 8(e). Incident to the resolution of the problems, as severally set forth by the parties in their definitions of the issues as seen by them, noted above, are the constitutional questions raised by Local 728 and the Southern Conference. Counsel for these Re- spondents rightly say that neither I nor the Board should review or will attack the validity of Section 8(e). These questions are within the province of a constitutional court Counsel for the Respondent Unions, at hearing and in brief, have clearly stated what they believe to be the proper construction of the language of the Act here to be construed. The terms "contract or agreement" . "express or implied" . . . "ceases or refrains" . "handling [etc.] any of the products of any other em- ployer" . "to cease doing business with any other person" and the distinction between primary and secondary boycotts have surely been brought to my attention by them, and have been considered. The several counsels for the Parties to the Contract have stated their respective positions, I believe, in full As I understand them, they contend, in effect, that they have dealt with the Respondents in all good faith Concluding Findings Having disregarded the per se theory of the General Counsel and the Charging Party. I now go to the question of whether or not Section 8(e), under the circum- stances shown by testimony herein, has been shown to have been, or now is, being violated I specifically find an express (not an implied) contract made between the Re- spondent Unions and the parties, that is the carriers, named as Parties to the Con- tract, and I further find that as a result of the refusal of Brown Transport Corp. to enter into the renewed agreement to be effective February 1, 1961, normal opera- tions of carriers, as to both over-the-road and local pickup operations, were dis- rupted, and that the whole result was through the attempted evasion of Section 8(e) by the Respondent Unions. The General Counsel has suggested that a recommended order be issued herein requiring the Respondent Unions to cease and desist from (1) entering into any contract or agreement, express or implied, with the several motor carriers parties hereto, or with any other employer, whereby such employers agree not to handle the goods or freight of any other employer or to cease doing business with any other person, and (2) maintaining in effect, implementing, or renewing the "Protection of Rights" clauses contained in the two memorandums of agreement entered into on January 24 and in the two modified contracts entered into on March 9, 1961. I cannot go that far. I think here the General Counsel has made out a prima facie case of violation of Section 8(e), in that normal transportation or handling or use of goods in interstate commerce was, by the action of the Respondent Local 728, delayed, or resulted in deviation from the usual flow of commerce between States as customarily and usu- ally performed by motor vehicle (common carriers) to resultant interruption of the free flow of traffic in commerce. I so find. SHAWNEE INDUSTRIES, INC., ETC. 1451 IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent Union Local No. 728 and the Southern Confer- ence, as set forth above,4 occurring in connection with the operation of Brown Trans- port Corp. and the freight carriers in and around and operating in the Atlanta, Georgia, area, who employ members of the Respondent Union Local No. 728, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com- merce and the free flow thereof. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent Unions have violated Section 8(e), as set forth above, I shall recommend an order requiring that they cease and desist from the enforcement by affirmative act of the current agreement or any like agreement or contract as shown by prior conduct, and also recommend that they take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. The wide impact of the Unions' unlawful activities, found herein, make it incumbent upon me to recommend the issue of a broad order so as to enjoin the recurrence, throughout the Atlanta, Georgia, area, of the conduct found to beunlawful as stated by me above. It would be appropriate, I think, to incorporate in an order a provision that the Respondent Unions furnish a copy of the notice attached to this Intermediate Report as an appendix, to each of the offices of the parties named as Parties to the Contract in the complaint in this case, and to the Charging Party, to post at -their respective offices and places of business if they so elect to do. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Truck Drivers & Helpers Local Union No. 728 and Southern Conference of Teamsters, both affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauf- feurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 2. By engaging in and by inducing and encouraging many employees of com- panies engaged in the carrying of freight in the Atlanta , Georgia, area, members of the Respondent Local Union, to engage in a refusal in the course of their em- ployment to handle freight brought to docks of their respective employers from or by Brown Transport Corp., at Brown's Atlanta , Georgia, terminal and the conse- quent interruption of the flow of interstate commerce through the 35 Parties to the Contract with the Teamsters Union named in the complaint, the Respondent Unions, Local 728 and the Southern Conference , have engaged in and are now engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(e) of the Act. 3. The unfair labor practices found above are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and are in con- travention of Section 8(e). [Recommendations omitted from publication.] 4 At hearing motion was made on the part of the Southern Conference of Teamsters to be separated from this case. I now decide that the Southern Conference, as party to the contract, is as much involved here as a party as the Respondent Local Union 728. Shawnee Industries , Inc., subsidiary of Thiokol Chemical Corpo- ration and Lodge 954, International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO . Case No. 16-CA-1628. February 26, 1963 DECISION ANI) ORDER On October 3, 1962, Trial Examiner John P. von Rohr issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take 140 NLRB No. 139.