Trend Mills, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 2, 1965

154 N.L.R.B. 143 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

TREND MILLS, INC. 143
SUPPLEMENTAL CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondents did not violate Section 8 (a)(I) and (5) of the Act as alleged in the
amended complaint.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the
case, I recommend that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety.
Trend Mills, Inc. and Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-
CIO-CLC. Case No. 10-CA-5385. August 2, 1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On November 30, 1964, Trial Examiner Eugene F. Frey issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion. He also found that the Respondent had not engaged in other
unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommended dis-
missal of those allegations. Thereafter, the Respondent, the General
Counsel, and the Charging Party each filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the National
Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Mem-
bers Fanning and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed, except as hereinafter noted. The Board
has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and
briefs, and the entire record in this case and hereby adopts the find-
ings,' conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner with
the following modifications.
In dismissing the allegation that the Respondent refused to bargain
with the Union in violation of Section 8(a) (5), the Trial Examiner
found that the appropriate unit comprised 96 employees on the demand
date and, accordingly, that 49 valid authorizations were necessary to
support the demand. The General Counsel's contention that he should
have been permitted to litigate the supervisory status of 2 of the 96
employees appears to us to be well taken; therefore, for purposes of
I The Trial Examiner's Decision occasionally refers to 1964 as the year in which cer-
tain events of the Union's organizational campaign, and Respondent's subsequent inter-
views with its employees, occurred. Since the campaign and the interviews all took place
in 1963, these inadvertences are hereby corrected
154 NLRB No. 7.
144 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
this Decision, we shall accept his claim that the 2 disputed employees
are supervisory personnel who should be excluded from the bargaining
unit. The unit would then consist of 94 employees, and the number of
employee designations necessary to establish the Union's majority
status is reduced to 48.
Of the 54 cards offered in evidence by the General Counsel, the Trial
Examiner found that only 30 could be considered dependable delega-
tions of bargaining authority. Since this figure falls far short of a
majority of the employees by either of the contended methods for
reckoning the size of the unit, the Trial Examiner thereupon recom-
mended dismissal of the 8 (a) (5) charge. In concluding, as we do, that
dismissal is the proper disposition of the refusal-to-bargain count, we
find it unnecessary to approve all of the factual findings or evidentiary
analyses made by the Trial Examiner. It is only necessary here to
affirm his conclusion that the record raises such grave doubts about the
validity of a sufficient number of the cards submitted by the General
Counsel that the Union's assertion of majority representation at the
critical time cannot be sustained.
It seems clear to us that the authorization cards purportedly signed
by William Fox, Benjamin Coulter, and Willie Cunningham may not
be counted, in view of the testimony by the former two employees that
they had never signed such cards, and the testimony by the latter that,
although he signed a card, he quickly retrieved it, erased his signature,
and threw the card away.2 Employees James Kirby, Charles Johnson,
and Robert Pruitt did not read the cards, and authorized other employ-
ees to sign on their behalf after being told merely that the cards would
be used to secure an election in the plant. The solicitors told Billy
Smith, Leroy Jones, Eugene Autry, and Larry Ray Brown that the
only purpose of the cards which they signed was to authorize the hold-
ing of an election .3 Jack Jones, who is unable to read, had his wife
sign his name to a card upon the same representation.
The circumstances under which these, and perhaps other, cards
rejected by the Trial Examiner were signed lead us to the conclusion
that the General Counsel has not established that at least 48 employees
had selected the Union as their bargaining representative on the
demand date. Accordingly, we affirm the Trial Examiner's dismissal
of the Section 8(a) (5) allegations of the complaint.
2 We disagree with the Trial Examiner's ruling that the General Counsel could not in-
troduce, through these witnesses, samples of their genuine signatures, for the purpose of
contradicting their testimony that they did not sign the union cards which bore their
names. Rather than an impeachment of the witnesses, the offer appears to have been
an attempt by General Counsel to prove his case by the use of other, independent evidence,
with the witnesses merely being required to authenticate the samples Cf. 3 Wigmore,
Evidence § 907 (3d ed 1940). Our examination of the rejected samples, however, does
not persuade us that the witnesses' testimony that the signatures on the cards were not
theirs should be discredited.
Member Jenkins would accept the cards signed by Smith, Jones, and Autry, but
would exclude Brown's card for the reason that he was apparently unable to read and
had been misinformed as to the meaning of the card.
TREND MILLS, INC. 145
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its
Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and orders that
Respondent, Trend Mills, Inc., Plainville, Georgia, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial
Examiner's Recommended Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The issues in this case are whether Respondent, Trend Mills, Inc., during an
organizing campaign of Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, herein
called the Union, at its Plainville, Georgia, plant, (1) interrogated employees about
their union affiliation and desires, promised them benefits and threatened them with
various reprisals to dissuade them from joining or assisting said Union, and per-
suaded them not to obey subpenas issued by the Board for their attendance at the
hearings herein, in violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 151, et seq., herein called the Act, and (2) refused to
bargain collectively in good faith with said Union as the exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative of employees in an appropriate unit, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act. The issues arise on a complaint issued August 6, 1963 (as amended at the
hearing),1 by the General Counsel of the Board through the Regional Director for
Region 10, and the answer of Respondent, amended at the hearing, which admits
jurisdiction but denies the commission of of any unfair labor practices.
On due notice, a hearing on the issues was held before Trial Examiner Eugene F.
Frey on 12 days between October 8, 1963, and June 26, 1964, in which all parties
participated fully through counsel. During the hearing I reserved decision on admis-
sion of various union authorization cards offered in evidence by General Counsel,
and on Respondent's motion at the close of testimony to dismiss the complaint on
the merits. My decision on the offers and the motion will appear in the appropriate
findings and conclusions in this Decision. The parties waived oral argument, but
I have received a written brief from Respondent, a telegram from counsel for Gen-
eral Counsel summarizing arguments he made during the hearing on various issues,
and a short statement of position from counsel for the Intervenors, all of which
have been carefully considered by me, together with oral arguments of all counsel
during the hearing, in making this Decision.
Upon the entire record in the case, including my observation of the witnesses on
the stand, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent is a Georgia corporation which at all material times herein has main-
tained offices and plants at Plainville, Rome, and Dalton, Georgia, in which it has
been engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of carpets and rugs. In the
12 months preceding the issuance of the original complaint Respondent in the course
of its business sold and shipped products valued in excess of $50,000 directly from
its Plainville plant to point outside the State of Georgia. I find that Respondent is
and at all times material herein has been engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is, and at all material times herein has been, a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
1 The complaint Issued after Board Investigation of charges filed by the U uvn on
June 27 and July 29, 1963.
206-446-66-vol. 154-11
146 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Ill. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Union campaign and request for bargaining, the representation proceeding
In March 1963 the Union began an organizing campaign at Respondent's Plain-
ville plant, during which it distributed white propaganda leaflets, with white union
authorization cards as part thereof, to employees at the plant gates on several occa-
sions, and also solicited employees through employee committees to sign both white
and blue authorization cards. It also distributed other propaganda and held meet-
ings for employees, which will be discussed below. On April 10, the Union formally
notified Respondent, by letter to the Plainville plant, that it represented "the majority
of your employees," and requested a meeting for contract negotiation. On April 11
the Union filed its petition with the Board in Case No. 10-RC-5551, seeking cer-
tification as bargaining representative of employees in a unit consisting of "all pro-
duction and maintenance employees including plant clerical employees at the Com-
pany plant in Plainville, Georgia, excluding all office clerical employees, professional
employees, truckdriver, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act." The peti-
tion estimated 84 employees in this unit. Respondent received the Union's letter, as
well as notice of the petition and its contents, on Friday, April 12, and replied to the
Union's request by letter of April 16, stating its disbelief that a "majority of our
employees in an appropriate unit consisting of our three inter-related plants in Floyd,
Gordon and Whitfield Counties" had chosen the Union as their bargaining agent,
declined to meet with the Union, noted the filing of the petition seeking an election
"limited to a portion of one of our plants," and suggested that since the matter was
before the Board, it could best proceed through the Board machinery. The Union
wrote back on the 19th that it claimed bargaining rights for employees at the Plain-
ville plant only, and stated it was prepared to submit signed membership cards as
evidence of its majority status at Plainville for check by a neutral party against the
plant payroll. Respondent received this letter on the 22d, and answered on the
24th that it could not agree that the Plainville plant was the appropriate unit, and
rejected the membership cards as evidence of free choice of representative by the
employees because it did not know the circumstances under which the cards were
procured, and assumed that these questions would be resolved in orderly fashion by
the Board in the pending hearing (which the Board had already set for May 8).
After the hearing, at which evidence was adduced on the appropriate unit, the
Regional Director on June 7 issued his Decision and Direction of Election, finding
that the employees at Plainville alone were an appropriate unit.2 On June 12 and
28 Respondent moved the Regional Director to reconsider the unit finding solely on
the basis that actual removal of employees and operations from the Plainville to the
Rome plants was underway, in accordance with a prior decision and schedule for
merger of the two plants. The Regional Director denied the motions on June 21 and
July 1, and Respondent appealed to the Board on the latter date for review of his
decisions. The Board denied the appeal on July 23. The Union on August 2 with-
drew its petition in the representation case, hence no election has been held.
1. Sufficiency of the demand
Respondent attacks the letters of April 10 and 19 as legally insufficient requests for
bargaining, because the Union did not clearly specify in either the scope of the
appropriate unit, as required by the Board Decisions in The C. L. Bailey Grocery
Company, 100 NLRB 576, 579, and Sportswear Industries, Inc, 147 NLRB 758.
General Counsel admitted at the hearing that these letters fall short of specifying the
unit with the particularity required by these decisions, but claims that the deficiency
is supplied by the petition which limited the unit to production and maintenance
employees at Plainville, with specified exclusions noted therein. I agree with this
contention. Though Respondent was in doubt from the April 10 letter as to the
exact scope of the unit (whether one plant or more), that doubt was clarified by the
Union at its request in the letter of April 19, but even before that by specific relinea-
tion of the composition of the unit, and its limitation to one plant, in the petition.
2 He found the exact unit as "all production and maintenance employees of Trend
Mills, Inc., and of Trend Latex & Chemical Company at their Plainville, Georgia, plant,
including the tufting machine fixer, serger fixers, plant clerical employees, shipping de-
partment employees, and the local truckdriver, but excluding over-tbe-road truckdrivers,
office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, Bryon Reeves, Pat Tortosa, John
L. Wooten, Ralph White, the dispatcher , the plant manager, and all other supervisors as
defined In the Act."
TREND MILLS, INC. 147
After receipt of these documents, Respondent raised no question about its composi-
tion when it wrote the Union on the 24th, claiming only that a three-plant unit was
the only appropriate one. Although the Union's letter of the 19th had not specifically
included or excluded truckdrivers, Respondent recognized, as it now admits, that
the Union was thereby claiming all employees at Plainville, except those excluded
by the terms of the Act. The letter did not allude to truckdrivers or the petition
description, hence Respondent had no reason to believe that the Union was thereby
changing or withdrawing the composition of the unit as stated in the petition, which
was significant as the formal unit designation required by law. Considering the
three documents together, I conclude that Respondent on April 12 (when it got the
formal petition) had no reasonable doubt as to the scope or composition of the
unit sought, hence I find that the Union made a proper demand for bargaining April 12,
1964,3 for employees at Plainville only in the unit set forth in the petition.
2. The appropriate unit
On the unit issue, Respondent claims that at the time of the Union's request to
bargain, it had a bona fide doubt as to the appropriateness of the single-plant unit
claimed by the Union, and that it is not required to bargain as to that unit because
in fact a multiplant unit covering Plainville, Dalton, and Rome (or in the alterna-
tive, Rome and Plainville) is the only appropriate unit . It is well settled that an
employer's good-faith doubt as to the appropriateness of the unit is a good defense
to a charge of unlawful refusal to bargain. See N.L.R.B. v. Dan River Mills, Incor-
porated, Alabama Division, 274 F. 2d 381, 386-389 (C.A. 5). But his doubt about
this or the Union's majority status may not be considered bona fide if it appears that
he has in fact denied recognition by using that excuse as a subterfuge to delay rec-
ognition or to gain time in which to take action to undermine the Union or to dis-
sipate its majority. N.L.R.B. v. Irving Taitel, et al., d/b/a 1. Taitel and Son, 261 F.
2d 1, 5 (C.A. 7), cert. denied 359 U.S. 944. General Counsel's main contention is
that Respondent had engaged in a pattern of unlawful coercion of employees through-
out the campaign of such kind and extent as to demonstrate that it never entertained
a bona fide doubt of the Union's majority, but was trying from the beginning to
avoid recognition by dissipating the Union's majority status by unlawful means, so
that its defenses based on the lack of appropriate unit and majority status of the
Union are untenable under the principle of Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB 1263, enfd.
as modified 185 F. 2d 732 (C.A.D.C.), cited in Cameo Lingerie, Inc., 148 NLRB 535.
Since this contention rests upon alleged unlawful conduct of Respondent starting
before the Union requested bargaining and Respondent posed the unit issue, it over-
rides that technical issue and requires analysis of Respondent's overall conduct before
we consider the unit question in itself. That approach is also required by General
Counsel's argument that alleged coercive conduct of Respondent requires that only
limited rules of evidence be applied in determining whether union authorization cards
offered by him are reliable proof of the Union's majority status, However, the
Board has held that resolution of a Joy Silk Mills issue alone requires a considera-
tion of all relevant circumstances, and cannot be solved by any mere mechanical
approach .4
3. The nature and scope of the Union's campaign, and Respondent's reaction to it
The Union began its campaign on March 21, 1964, when it distributed white union
leaflets containing a white union authorization card to employees at the Plainville
plant gates. It distributed six other leaflets to employees through May 24, and held
meetings with groups of employees on March 23 or 24 and 31 and April 7, 1964.
Respondent learned about the campaign as soon as the leaflet distribution began,
was also aware that employees at Plainville thereafter openly discussed it among
themselves and with supervisors in the plant, and kept abreast of the progress of the
campaign both from talks with and rumors among the employees and perusal of
various union leaflets as they came out. After discussions among top management,
8Jaek Gordon, et al., d/b /a Ivy Hill Lithograph Company, and Record Packaging Cor-
poration, 121 NLRB 831, 835, footnote 13. I have carefully considered other cases cited
by Respondent on this point, but find them inapposite on the facts.
' In Cameo Lingerie, Inc., 148 NLRB 535, the Board held that "the question whether an
employer who commits violations of Section 8(a) (1) also intends to undermine the Union's
majority or otherwise defeat the employees ' unionization may not be answered mechani-
cally ; it must turn upon a consideration of all relevant circumstances."
148 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Production Manager Harry Haines, who was responsible for production in the three
plants, early gave plant managers and foremen orders to report to him anything they
heard about the campaign, as well as employee complaints of any kind. When
Respondent learned from these sources that the Union was making "serious inroads"
among the workers (as stated by Vice President Lipson), it determined to have
supervisors talk to employees, to ascertain their complaints, to acquaint them with
existing company benefits and "sell them on the company," discuss with them the
advantages and disadvantages of unionization, and explain its own reasons why it
preferred no union at Plainville. In preparation for this, Plainville Plant Manager
Jack A. Tolbert and Production Planning Manager John L. Wooten were briefed by
Haines and company counsel on the procedure that supervisors could follow under
the Act, including the advice that they could not interrogate employees about sign-
ing cards or their union activities or sentiments, nor could they make any promises
or threats to them to persuade them to abstain from joining or voting for the Union.5
Starting shortly after the filing of the petition, Tolbert began to have talks with
employees on Company time, some at their work stations but most in the office, in
the presence of Production Planning Manager John L. Wooten. He had several talks
with many of the employees on the subject. In five or six of the earliest office dis-
cussions Vice President Nathan Lipson was present. In this manner, management
contacted most of the work force of about 85 within 3 weeks after April 11.6
In the discussions at which he was present, Lipson did most of the talking, with
Tolbert and Wooten adding some comments. He asked the employees at the outset
if they had any problems about which they were unhappy, and said they always had
the right to talk directly to management about them. He and Tolbert also asked
employees one of these questions: how, or if, they felt a union in the plant could
better their position or get them more than they already had; what they thought or
knew about unions in general and the purpose and operation of a union; and what
they thought or knew about this Union.
In answer to the questions, employee Wyman Autry told the officials that the
employees needed a union because he felt some employees had not been treated
fairly, and cited an instance where some had failed to receive requested transfers
from second to first shift after a talk with former General Manager Hines in 1962
and 1963 before the campaign started. However, he also said that he did not know
if the Union could help the Plainville plant. This led to discussion about the effect
of unions in big and small plants, and Tolbert and Wooten stated their opinion that
a union was good in large plants like the nearby Celanese mill, but the Plainville
plant was too small for it to do much good. Wooten also cited his experience with
a union in another local textile plant, saying 30 or 40 people had lost their jobs there
during a strike. During the talk, Autry mentioned that he had been to a union meet-
ing where the union agent and organizers had told the employee about the benefits
the union could get them. Tolbert replied that the employees should go to these
meetings to hear what the Union had to say. Lipson added that he felt the Union
could not help the employees at Plainville in any way and, to prove it, he would be
glad to debate the pros and cons of union benefits with the union men and try to
prove they were liars. In closing, Lipson and Tolbert told Autry that it was a free
country, that he had to make up his own mind how he would vote, and they would
be very happy if he voted against the Union, but it was his own decision to do as he
wanted.
In answering the questions, employee Edward E. Chastain said he did not know
how a union would benefit the workers, but complained that he did not like to work
12 hours a day, for 6 or 7 days a week, and wanted Sunday off. On query by Lipson,
he said his complaint to former Manager Hines about the Sunday work had produced
no result. Lipson then said that Chastain should see Tolbert about it, and they would
arrange it so that he would not have to work any Sundays in the future.
Lipson presented in all these talks the advantages of the Company by explaining
how the Company was growing, its plans for the future, that it was always trying to
do its best for the workers by paying the best wages and giving the best benefits it
could afford, that an employer often can pay employees only what it can afford, and
that a union can only get them certain benefits but not some things which the
employer could not afford.
5 Tolbert already knew of these limitations from his past experiences with the same
union while a supervisor at another local textile mill
e The above facts are found on credited testimony of Lipson , Tolbert, Wooten, Haines,
and James O'Shea.
TREND MILLS, INC. 149
Employee Lumis B. McCormick answered Lipson's questions by asserting that he
thought the workers would benefit by a union "if it was run right." Lipson asked
him if he had ever belonged to a union or worked in a union plant and McCormick
said he had in California. He also complained about a "raw deal" he had received
in his transfer to another job after a carpet had been damaged in a machine be was
operating; he felt he had been unfairly charged with the damage, but got nowhere
in complaining to former Manager Hines. Lipson did not attempt to settle this
problem for him, but made the same statements and arguments about Company
benefits that he made to others.? He also told McCormick that the Company would
not "take this lying down." 8
About May 1 Production Manager Haines called McCormick to his office for a
discussion of his complaint. McCormick again recited the complaint and his inability
to get redress. He also said other employees had problems on which they could not
get help from Hines since he had transferred to Plainville. Haines said workers
always had the right to see him (Haines) about such problems. He then asked
McCormick what he thought a union could do for workers at Plainville, and McCor-
mick said he really did not know, but felt it could do something about the problems
he had mentioned, saying he had worked in a union plant in California and felt a
union was a good thing for workers if run properly. McCormick also complained
about his general lack of progress in the plant, and Haines explained to him the
Company policy of promotion on merit plus other factors as job vacancies appeared,
and said McCormick would be considered for such openings as they came up in
accordance with the policy.°
Later in May, Haines had a similar talk with employee Edward E. Chastain in which
he asked similar questions and expressed some of the Company antiunion views pre-
viously stated by Lipson and Tolbert. On an occasion about the middle of June,
Wooten asked Chastain at his machine what he thought about the Union, and
Chastain replied he did not think it would come into the plant.io
Tolbert's remarks to most employees followed the same general pattern as Lipson's
remarks. He began by asking the worker how he was getting along, how he liked his
job, and if he had any complaints. If the worker stated a grievance, or indicated that
he had been unable to have it settled, Tolbert would discuss it, find out what attempts
the employee had made to obtain redress from his foreman, state the Company posi-
tion on the matter, and try to satisfy the worker's complaint if possible. At the same
time he would remind the worker that if he had any other complaints, he could always
come to Tolbert who would be ready to discuss it with him and try to straighten it out.
He then said he knew there was a union campaign going on, and he wanted to know
how the worker felt "that the Union would help you and other workers, and in what
way"; at times he phrased the question substantially thus- "What do you feel the
Union can give you and other workers that the Company is not already giving"; he
also asked some, "What do you know about this union" or "this union business," and
others, "What do you know about Unions." Some workers replied that they knew
little or nothing about this Union; others said they thought it would be a good thing
for the workers if it was run properly, and that it was needed to get better conditions
and wages or correct instances of unfair treatment of employees. In answer to both
groups, particularly those who stated positive views and complaints, Tolbert explained
in detail the advantages and benefits Respondent was already giving employees,
explaining that it was paying them the best wages and benefits it could afford, that the
Company was treating them right, and he did not think that the Union could get any-
thing for them that they could not get for themselves; and that this was a small, new
plant, and there was a limit to what the Company could afford to pay them and give
them in benefits, if it did not have money to give them more. He also said that if
the Union came into the plant and forced the Company to pay higher wages and give
In a talk with Tolbert shortly before, McCormick had made the same complaint, and
Tolbert had replied that he was not in charge of the plant when that happened, but that
he did not think McCormick would do a thing like that, that he had more confidence in
McCormick's ability to do any job he was given.
8 The findings on the Lipson talks are made on credited testimony of the employees
involved, and corroborating testimony of Lipson, Tolbert, and Wooten. Testimony of
any of these witnesses at variance with the findings is not credited.
e This discussion is found on credited testimony of McCormick and Haines
io These talks are found on credited testimony of Chastain. Testimony of Haines and
Wooten In conflict therewith is not credited, in view of the Company policy and campaign
of widespread talks with and interrogation of employees found above. However, for rea-
sons stated below and in the face of Wooten's categorical denial, I do not credit Chastain's
testimony of a query by Haines about signing a card.
150 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
benefits it could not afford, it might force the Company to shut down if it could not
make a profit , and might put it out of business . He also told some workers that if the
Union came into the plant , while it might get them a raise in wages by negotiation
with the Company , the workers would also have to pay union dues, and , since the
carpet industry was very competitive ( with very small profits for the employers) if the
Union compelled the Company to pay higher wages, it would have to make changes
to cut costs in order to remain competitive with other concerns to stay in business-
one change would probably involve cutting down on overtime work and putting
on a third shift. He also stated that in his opinion the Union would not work well in
a small plant , and that the workers would be better off without it. He explained to
each worker that he was only trying to give him Tolbert's and the Company 's views
about why a union was not advisable in the plant , but was not trying to tell the
worker how to vote in the election or what to do about the Union, as that was the
worker 's own business , he was free to make up his own mind about it, to decide
whether he was for or against the Union, that there would be a secret ballot election
in which he could vote as he pleased, but Tolbert wanted him to think seriously before
he made up his mind how to vote , and hoped that after considering the Company
benefits, the workers would vote against the Union.11
In Tolbert's talk with Eddie Stanley , the latter asked if he would get a 5-cent raise,
reminding Tolbert that workers in the Rome and Dalton plants had recently received
one. Tolbert replied that Respondent had given those raises recently, in line with
similar raises given throughout the industry , but that, on advice of its counsel,
Respondent could not give raises at Plainville while the Union 's campaign and an
election were pending, but when that was "settled" the Company would be free to do
what it wanted about raises , except that if the Union got into the plant, any raise would
be negotiated with it 12
On an unidentified date in mid-April , Tolbert called employee Emmett J. Brown in
for the usual talk. That morning Brown had notified Tolbert that he was quitting;
nevertheless, Tolbert called him in later that day and he and Lipson asked Brown the
basic question found above , after first advising that they were calling all employees to
the office to explain Respondent's position about the Union Brown replied that he
did not think the Union would help the workers a bit. Tolbert said that if he felt so
positive about that, he might go out and tell the other workers how he felt Brown
replied that he did not want any workers mad at him. Brown asked Tolbert about a
raise for the workers, and Tolbert gave the same reply as he had made to Stanley as
found above.13
71 These findings are based on credited testimony of numerous witnesses of General
Counsel , and admissions of Tolbert and Wooten
However, I make no finding that supervisors in these talks asked any witnesses if they
signed union cards or went to union meetings, for employees who testified to this, such
as Robert T. Bailey, Willie F. Drain, Roy Max Tomlinson , Marvin E Jackson , Barbara
J. Gravitt , and Eddie Stanley , placed such questions in short talks which consisted for
the most part of nothing but the question from Tolbert, at times with a short answer
from the employee , other times not ; some were vague about the dates and details of these
talks ; others contradicted themselves on the point ; and their general credibility was fur-
ther weakened by the fact that they very reluctantly admitted other remarks by Tolbert
which indicated that there was far more to each discussion along the lines stated by
other witnesses and the supervisors as found above . I therefore credit denials of Tolbert,
Wooten, and Lipson of any questions about signing of cards or attendance at union
meetings ( except as noted hereafter ), particularly since their other admitted questions
were well calculated to, and did in some cases, lead employees to disclose their union
sentiments , as Tolbert admits
za I find this talk on credible testimony of Tolbert and partial corroboration from
admissions of Stanley . I do not credit other testimony of Stanley to the effect that
Tolbert suggested he tell other employees the Union was not good for workers and not
needed in the plant , for, even if I credited Stanley 's testimony about queries about the
union card and attendance at union meetings , his answers were noncommittal and not
the type of positive answer indicating an antiunion bias consistent with the Company
views, which might lead Tolbert to suggest that he express his feelings to other workers
and thus support the Company position.
Is This talk is found on clear and credible testimony of Tolbert , as corroborated in
Part by testimony of Brown , whose memory of the occasion was very vague , particularly
on the exact terms and sequence of the talk about raises In view of his unimpressive
testimony on this, I do not credit other testimony of his at variance with the findings,
particularly in the face of Tolbert ' s categorical denials.
TREND MILLS, INC. 151
When some employees were questioned about their union views, they replied that
they felt a union would be good in the plant, based on their experiences in other
plants, and others said they were not sure if it would work in Plainville. In response
to such answers, Tolbert and Wooten repeatedly referred to workers' experiences
with the same Union in the nearby Dixie Bell textile plant.'4 Thus, when William
Holbert told Tolbert that he thought the Union would be a good thing in a big mill,
but not in a small place like Trend, he explained that he had seen how workers at
Dixie Bell had lost worktinie. Tolbert then told him, "If you feel that strongly" about
it, "you might tell the other workers how you feel, and find out how they feel." When
Dixie Bell entered the discussion, Tolbert also reminded employees that workers there
were on "short time" (which was a seasonal condition in the industry and at Plainville
at the time) and that when orders for products dropped off during the slow season,
so that workers were on "short time" or laid off, the Union could do nothing about it,
because the Union could not get orders for Respondent. Employee Eugene T. Autry
answered the usual questions by Tolbert by saying that he did not know too much
about the Union, and they then reverted to the Dixie Bell situation, where both knew
that the workers had been talking about a strike during the contract negotiations, and
Tolbert asked Autry what would happen if the Union organized Trend Mills and
called a strike at Plainville. Autry asked what he meant, and Tolbert asked him if he
had not just finished building a new home. Autry said, "Yes,"and Tolbert asked
what would happen if Autry was out of work 3 or 4 months during a strike. Autry
replied that he did not know, but he guessed "that the First Federal [holding the
mortgage on his home] would probably take over the house."
In response to the usual queries, Barbara J. Gravitt told Tolbert she had heard
about the Union, but did not know anything about it, and her "nerves had stood about
all they could," mentioning that she had relatives and friends working at the Dixie
Bell plant, that they were on "short time," talking about a strike, having arguments
about the Union, and a "rough time," and that there had been some fighting reported
there during the labor trouble. Gravitt told Tolbert her nerves were so torn up that
she wanted to take her hat and quit her job. Tolbert talked her out of quitting, saying
that what she did or how she voted about the Union was entirely her own business,
that he did not want to talk to her about that.
In the discussion with employee Mills H. Lemons, Tolbert said that Lemons could
say anything he wanted to about the Union, it would have no effect on his job. He
asked where Lemons' father worked. Lemons said, "At Dixie Bell," and added that
he knew about the labor situation there and it was not good, his father was on slack
time, and the workers there had been promised many things by the Union but it had
gotten them nothing. Tolbert said he had heard talk of a strike there, and asked
Lemons if he and his father were the only ones working in his family. Lemons
replied they were. Tolbert commented that if his father lost his job at Dixie Bell, then
Lemons would be the sole support of the family, to which Lemons agreed. He also
said that if the Union came into Plainville, and "if we start having labor and strike
problems, our customers would take their business elsewhere where they can get their
orders filled, and that could cause the Company to lose some customers and also
cause slack time." Tolbert also said that whatever Lemons wanted to do, or had
done, about the Union was his own business, that he could do as he pleased, that if
he had signed a card it would not affect his job, but that he should think it over care-
fully before he did anything, as he had a responsibility toward his family. Lemons
then admitted that he had signed a card. Tolbert asked him if he had been to a union
meeting. Lemons said he had. Tolbert replied that be had a right to go to union
meetings, and told him to get the facts on both sides and then make up his mind, but
assured him that his job would not be affected by whatever he did.'5
Tolbert and Wooten talked to brothers Loyad E. and Jerry Carter together in the
office. As will appear hereafter, both boys were active in soliciting employees to sign
union cards. After Tolbert asked the basic question about the benefits of the Union
"The record shows that in November 1962 there had been a Board-conducted election
at the Dixie Bell plant, about 10 miles from Plainville, which the Union won, and there-
after it conducted protracted negotiations for a contract with the employer, but although
it had promised the employees many things, no contract had been signed at the time the
Union began its campaign at Plainville. Many of the Plainville employees had relatives
and friends working at Dixie Bell, who had told Plainville workers about the Dixie Bell
situation, and it was freely discussed by workers at the Plainville plant. The Union
victory and negotiations at Dixie Bell were also discussed in various union leaflets dis-
tributed at Plainville.
"The Lemons talk is found on the basis of credited testimony of Lemons and admis-
sions of Tolbert. Testimony of either witness at variance with the findings is not credited.
152 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in this plant, the boys replied that they thought it would benefit them by getting more
wages and better working conditions if it was run right, mentioning that their father
worked at the local Celanese plant where the Union had represented the workers for
years and had done a good job. Tolbert agreed that the Union would probably do a
good job in a place as large as Celanese, but he did not think it would help workers
in a place as small as the Plainville plant. He also said that President Munchak had
always taken a personal interest in his workers and done everything he could for
them, and that any benefits they got would come from the Company, and the Union
could not get them anything which the Company could not give. Tolbert also out-
lined the present company benefits, and said the Company was paying the best wages
it could afford to pay. Tolbert also added that if the boys had any complaints about
wages, jobs, or working conditions, they should come to Tolbert who would always
try to straighten it out if he could. Tolbert also mentioned the Dixie Bell plant, and
that employees there were on slack time. Wooten said that employees there had been
driving new cars before they tried to get the Union in, but that when they went on
"short time," they were losing their cars and "riding bicycles." In closing, Tolbert
told the boys he was not trying to tell them how to vote, because they could make up
their own minds and do whatever they wanted, but he was only explaining the situa-
tion and why he and the Company felt the Union would not help the workers in this
small plant, and that they did not need it there.1e
In separate talks with some workers who approached him for his views about the
Union, Wooten asked them the same questions as Tolbert asked, expressed similar
opinions about wages and other advantages at Plainville, compared their wages and
working conditions with those at the Dixie Bell plant, expressed the opinion that the
Union would not "work out" in a small plant like Plainville, indicating to some that
he had once lost a good job in another plant because of a union, and concluded with
the same reminders that the final decision as to whether they wished to vote for or
against the Union would be theirs in an election.17
Respondent argues strongly that the questions put to employees were not unlawful
because they came incidentally in the course of frank and legitimate exchanges of
views and opinions about unionization between employer and employees. It is clear
that much of each discussion involved such lawful expressions of views by both sides,
and that most of the Employer's statements on the disadvantages of unionization,
illustrated by references to happenings in other unionized plants, were legitimate
expressions of opinion on some possible consequences of unionization to the employees
in their job security and aspects of their personal life,18 but Respondent also admits
that questions about union sentiments and knowledge of unions, both in general and
with respect to this Union, in fact caused many employees to disclose their prounion
or antiunion sentiments. This was not a mere happenstance during lawful exchange
of views, for Lipson admitted that the interviews were designed to learn employees'
grievances, and that during the campaign and these discussions Respondent made an
analysis of the work force to show which workers were against the Union. from
information "volunteered" by the employees or others, and that Lipson and Tolbert
thereby learned most workers' views on the subject I am satisfied that much of this
information was "volunteered" in response to Respondent's questions Hence, I find
that the systematic and all-inclusive interrogation of workers during these talks about
their union sentiments were not incidental or casual queries, but deliberate inquiries
designed to find out the extent of the Union's "inroads" into the work force, were
well calculated to coerce and restrain employees' exercise of their right of free choice
of representative protected by the Act (even though Respondent took pains to tell
each one that the way he voted was his own decision), and that Respondent thereby
violated Section 8 (a)( 1) of the Act.
I also find that Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (1) by:
(1) Lipson's, Tolbert's, and Haines' suggestions to employees that they could
always bring their grievances direct to management for settlement. Lipson's direct
settlement of the grievance of Chastain about Sunday work, and Tolbert's similar
consideration of grievances and attempts to settle them on the spot. By this conduct,
Respondent made it clear both by word and action to employees that they did not
need a union but could bargain and settle their own grievances directly with manage-
16 These findings are based on credited and mutually corroborative testimony of Tolbert,
Wooten, and the two Carters
17 These findings are based on credited testimony of Wooten, Mincey, C. W. Wilson, and
Robert F. Payne.
1s See Mayfair Midwest, Inc., 148 NLRB 1602.
TREND MILLS, INC. 153
ment, and this amounted to a promise (and in Chastain's case a grant ) of benefit well
calculated to coerce employees in the exercise of their free choice of bargaining
representative.la
(2) Tolbert's suggestions to Emmett J. Brown and William Holbert that they tell
other employees the antiunion views they had expressed to him.20
This unlawful conduct is the type which under well-settled Board law would be
well calculated to undermine a union's position with the employees and dissipate its
majority status, and would normally justify a rejection of the defense of lack of
majority status or good-faith doubt of such status on a refusal-to-bargain issue, under
the Joy Silk Mills doctrine. However, the record clearly shows that all this conduct
occurred after the Union on April 11 announced publicly to employees that it had
signed up 71 percent of the Plainville workers and had filed a petition with the Board
for an election. The record shows that all of 54 cards offered as proof of its majority
status are dated prior to April 11, the date the petition was filed and the cards were
formally received by the Board's Regional Office as evidence supporting the petition.
The complaint alleges that the Union achieved majority status on or about April 8.
Hence, it is fundamental to the position of General Counsel on the basic refusal-to-
bargain issue and the application of the Joy Silk Mills doctrine that the majority status
as of April 8 or I1 be established. Respondent argues that no bona fide majority in
fact existed on the latter date, hence an essential element of General Counsel's case
is lacking, and it cannot be said that Respondent's actions were taken, or designed, to
dissipate the majority status. This requires examination of the authorization cards
offered on this point.
B. The alleged refusal to bargain
1. The appropriate unit
As found above, the Union began its campaign at the Plainville plant only and its
petition in the representation case claimed a unit of production and maintenance
employees confined to that plant, with the usual exclusions. Respondent does not
here contest the specific inclusions or exclusions. There is no proof that the Union
extended the campaign at any time material herein to the Rome or Dalton plants.
Respondent contended in the representation proceeding that the only appropriate unit
comprised the three plants, or in the alternative, Rome and Plainville, on the theory
that prior to and during the campaign Respondent had been preparing to effect a
merger of operations of the three plants, on the basis of an economic decision reached
long before, and that the solidation had not been completed before the campaign
solely because of the illness of its president, Theodore M. Munchak. This issue was
litigated in the representation case, in which the Regional Director found that the
Plainville plant unit was appropriate, and rejected the proof indicating the projected
merger and its effect as largely speculative. Respondent adduced evidence here
tending to show that certain steps of the merger pending at the time of the R-case
hearing (May 8, 1963) had since been taken, to the extent of transfer of some Rome
operations to Plainville, involving expansion of that plant. However, when the
hearing herein began, the consolidation was not complete, all three plants were still
operating, and it appeared that even after the changes are completed, the three plants
will still be operating, though the exact fate of the Rome plant has not been decided.
Munchak also admitted that in October 1963, the operations at the three plants were
still entirely separate and subject to different marketing conditions, which would not
mutually affect operations at the three plants. On these facts, I must find that, while
there is indication of a growing interrelation between the three plants which might
increase as and when Respondent's merger and expansion plans are completed, as of
the time when Munchak testified there was still enough disparity between the opera-
tions of the three plants to indicate that a unit limited to Plainville was not inappro-
priate. Hence, as the Union had confined its organization campaign to that plant, I
Cincinnati Cordage and Paper Company, 141 NLRB 72 ; American Manufacturing
Company of Texas, 139 NLRB 815, 816; The Triple AAA Water Co., 142 NLRB 803, 807.
'Reeves Broadcasting & Development Corporation (WHTN-TV), 140 NLRB 466, 467;
Brennan's, Inc., 147 NLRB 1545
I find no violations of the Act in Tolbert's or Wooten's statements indicating that (1)
forced shutdown of the plant, layoffs, or loss of overtime might be an action forced on
Respondent If the Union compelled it to pay wages or give benefits it could not afford,
(2) if a strike were caused by the Union, loss of work occasioned thereby might have an
adverse effect on workers with debts , etc., (3 ) Respondent 's legal inability to consider or
give raises while the union campaign and an election were pending , or (4) Respondent
would consider employees for promotions or job vacancies in accordance with its normal
policies as vacancies appeared.
154 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
find on all the facts that all production and maintenance employees of Respondent
at its Plainville, Georgia, plant, including the tufting machine fixer, serger fixers, plant
clerical employees, shipping department employees, and the local truckdriver, but
excluding over-the-road truckdrivers, office clerical employees, professional employ-
ees, guards, Byron Reeves, Pat Tortosa, John L. Wooten, Ralph White, the dispatcher,
the plant manager, and all other supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit
appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b)
of the Act 21
2. The alleged majority status
The record shows that in the period April 10 through 19, 1964, Respondent
employed 96 people in the appropriate unit found above. The minimum number of
cards to establish a majority is 49. General Counsel offered 54 cards in evidence,
which will be discussed in groups where possible for sake of brevity.22
a. Cards not signed by employees 23
I conclude that the following cards are not reliable evidence of majority status:
William A. Fox did not sign the card containing his name nor authorize anyone to,
fill it out or sign it for him. His repudiation of the name written on the card is cor-
roborated by the obvious difference between that writing and his actual signature
which he placed on the back of the card under a written repudiation of the signature
on the face, when interviewed later and privately by a Board agent. Benjamin H.
Coulter received a white card as part of a union paper, like that issued by the Union
on March 20, 1964, as noted hereafter, but denied that he signed the proffered card
containing his name or anything similar to it.24
2i This is the unit found appropriate by the Regional Director after full litigation of
the issue In reaching this decision I have considered carefully the testimony adduced by
Respondent in the representation case, and the extent to which testimony of Munchak
shows changes in the overall operating picture of the three plants.
It is well settled that , even where a single-plant unit and multiplant units are ap-
propriate, the Board will often find that the smaller unit is appropriate, particularly
where the union confines its campaign and majority claim only to that unit. See
Liebmenn Breweries, Inc. of New Jersey, 142 NLRB 121, 124, 125
22 Most witnesses called to prove cards ( except those repudiating cards ) gave credible
testimony that they signed, or authorized execution of, cards on or about the dates set
forth thereon, but all before April 11 Where some witnesses' memories failed them on
the date, as in the cases of James E. Shelley, Jerry M McClure, and John Smith, I
conclude that their cards were signed or execution authorized sometime before April 11,
on the basis of credited testimony of O'Shea that he received them all by the 9th, and
deposited them with the Board on the 11th with the petition filed that day I also have
noted that all cards offered bear a date stamp of April 11 , showing their receipt on that
date at the office of Region 10.
23 The ensuing findings on each card are based on credible and uncontradicted testimony
of the person named on the card , except where otherwise noted
24 Knowing beforehand that Fox and Coulter would repudiate their alleged signatures,
General Counsel tried to impeach them as his own witnesses by offering genuine samples
of their signatures made the day they testified , claiming they were "necessary" witnesses
whose testimony could be impeached by the party calling them, by proof of a genuine
signature, on the theory that if mere comparison of the two writings in each case in-
dicated they were the same, this would clearly prove that both were falsifying, and
entitle me to find that they in fact signed the cards. General Counsel did not show that
either witness was hostile; nor did he prove how the cards got into the hands of the
Union, whether by mail or messenger ; and the mailer or messenger , if any, was not iden-
tified . While I rejected the offer of recent signature by Fox as an improper attempt to
impeach his own witness , without any proof that he was hostile (he was no longer em-
ployed by Respondent when he testified ), comparison of this signature with Fox's signa-
ture on the back of the card shows clearly that the same hand wrote both, and that a
different writer signed the name on the face of the card Even though the questioned
and proven writings in Coulter ' s case appear on inspection to have similarities in forma-
tion of some letters, I find no rule of law or evidence under which the signer of a piece
of paper, which is not required by specific statute to be signed or witnessed , can fall in
the category of a "necessary" witness as to the paper , so as to permit his impeachment
in this manner and acceptance of other acts by him to prove the contrary of his sworn
testimony. Even if both witnesses' adoption under oath of recent signatures be treated
as a sworn statement or affidavit as to that signature, it is well settled under the rules
of evidence applicable in the Federal Courts that prior ( and perhaps contemporaneous)
TREND MILLS, INC. 155
Sometime before April 11, Willie Cunningham signed a blue authorization card
like the one offered by General Counsel (General Counsel's Exhibit No. 60), but
wrote nothing on it but his name, and gave it back in that condition to employee Jesse
Carver who had solicited him to sign. Carver had told him only that it was "for
more money"; Cunningham did not iead it before he signed, and knew nothing about
its contents or purpose except what Carver told him, from which he gathered that it
would be used by Respondent to get him more pay. After talking to another employee
who advised him not to sign, Cunningham got the card back from Carver in order to
mutilate his name. Carver said he could not use it unsigned, so Cunningham threw
it into a trash can, still blank except for his signature, and never saw it again until a
Board agent showed it to him in July in a private interview, at which time he printed
his name on the back with the notation "I did not sign no card." He rejected the
proffered card as the one he signed, saying the one he signed and discarded had his
fingerprints marked in glue from his fingers in the upper corner; the proffered card
has no such soil marks; however, he admits the signature on the card looks like his 25
The other information now appearing on the card, while correct, is in another hand-
writing, as is the name "Jesse Carver" in the space for signature by the solicitor or
recipient of the card. Although Jesse Carver was called by General Counsel after
Cunningham and testified at length about the signing of his own card, he gave no
testimony about the Cunningham card, hence Cunningham's testimony on it stands
uncontradicted, and from this and the card itself I find that Cunningham signed the
card, gave it otherwise blank to Carver, then retrieved it and threw it away, still
blank except for signature, and that in some unexplained fashion it was filled in later
by another person 26 and sent to the Union. On these facts I conclude that Cunning-
ham first signed the card and gave it to Carver with the implied authority to fill it in
and give it to the Union, but then retracted that action and authority by getting it
back and throwing it away. Hence, the card is not reliable evidence counting toward
majority status.27
Some time before April 8, 1964, James H. Kirby and J. R. Bennett got blue
authorization cards with union leaflets at the plant gate, and were thereafter solicited
to sign them by employee William Holbert, an employee solicitor for the Union.
Holbert told each that the cards were needed to get an election, and that there would
be an election if 70 percent or more workers signed them. Kirby replied that if that
was all it was, Holbert should go ahead and sign a card for him and send it in. Kirby
wrote his name and address on a slip of paper and gave it to Holbert, and at the same
time Bennett gave Holbert his name, address, and telephone number on another slip.
Both employees told Holbert to fill out and sign the cards and send them in. Bennett
had read the blue card that he got beforehand, and on the basis of the wording on it,
various union leaflets he had read before, and other remarks of Holbert, he under-
stood that the card would be sent to the Board to get an election , at which he could
vote as he pleased, and that after the Union won the election, he could join it or not
as he pleased Kirby never read the card he got at the gate, or the one sent in for him.
Neither employee gave anyone other than Holbert authority to use the information
they gave Holbert or to send in cards for them. Holbert later told Bennett that he
had not filled out or sent in the card for Bennett, but had some other unidentified
person do it. He never told Kirby anything about his disposition of the Kirby slip,
although the latter heard that some other worker had sent in a card for him. Holbert
corroborated both men on the stated "election" purpose for which the cards would
be used, and admitted he did not state any other purpose, and that he also told them
the cards would be kept confidential, that no one but the Union would know who had
signed them. He made these statements to them on the basis of similar statements
self-contradictory statements under oath cannot be treated as having any substantive or
independent testimonial value ; at most they can be used to discredit sworn testimony of
a witness, and, if they do that, there is then nothing of record (absent other, independent
credible proof) on which the trier of the facts can make a finding. Cf. N.L.R.B. V. Quest-
Shon Mark Brassiere Co, Inc., 185 F. 2d 285, 289 (C.A. 2), cert. denied 342 U.S. 812;
G & H Construction Company, 130 NLRB 923, 930.
as The signature on it strongly resembles a genuine signature of Cunningham on General
Counsel's Exhibit No 61
21 The "Jesse Carver" at the bottom of the card appears very much like the proven
signature of Carver on his own card, and the fact that he did not testify to contradict
Cunningham warrants the inference that he could not truthfully deny Cunningham's
story. However, though a strong suspicion arises that Carver retrieved the card from
the trash can and sent it in without authority from Cunningham, I find it unnecessary to
make any finding to this effect.
On these findings, I admit the card, General Counsel's Exhibit No. 60, and proven
signature , General Counsel's Exhibit No. 61, in evidence
156 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
made to him by employee Winford (Junior) Tomlinson, Jr., who had solicited him to
sign a similar card, and by Union Business Agent James O'Shea. The cards offered
as the documents of Kirby and Bennett were in fact filled out by employee Jerry
McClure on April 8 at the request of Holbert who gave him the slips of paper which
Kirby and Bennett had filled out, and were given to the Union by McClure.
McClure's testimony, and inspection of the cards, shows that he stapled these slips of
paper to their respective cards before he sent them in, but those slips were not on the
cards when offered, and there is no proof as to what happened to them. I reject these
cards on two grounds: lack of general or specific authority from Kirby and Bennett
to anyone other than Holbert to complete and send them in, and, even if that basic
defect were cured, the clear proof from all witnesses concerned that the only purpose
made evident to both employees was that the cards would be used only for an election
and no other purpose.28 I had reserved decision on the admissibility of the alleged
Kirby and Bennett cards, and now reject them as not proven to be actual or authorized
acts of either employee.
Charles R. Johnson received a blue card sometime before April 8 from an unidenti-
fied employee who told him it would be used to get an election. He did not read the
card, but gave another employee, whose name he did not know but described as a
young, sandy-haired man working on a beamer, the card and a slip of paper with his
name and address, telling him to put them on the card and send it in. The man said
he would do it. McClure testified that when he came to work the night of April 8,
Holbert gave him a piece of paper with Johnson's name on it, and asked him to put it
on a union card, which he did at the same time he filled out cards for Bennett and
Kirby, He attached the Johnson data slip to the card itself, but the slip is not now
attached to the card offered, though it bears a staple mark showing something had
once been fastened to it; the whereabouts or disposition of the slip is not shown in the
record. On these facts I must reject this card as evidence of majority status because
of the lack of substantial and credible proof that it was made out by McClure upon
either specific or general authority from Johnson. I therefore reject this card, General
Counsel's Exhibit No. 26, on the offer of which I had reserved decision.
Respondent claims numerous employees who either signed cards, or had others
sign for them, did so solely upon the representation that they would be used only to
get an election. Before considering the reliability of their cards, the contemporaneous
remarks of the Union to employees about the cards must be outlined, as there is no
proof that Respondent discussed the purpose or effect of the cards with them. The
record shows that the first release of the Union was a white leaflet distributed by its
agents at the plant gate on March 20, 1964. The four-page document listed benefits
received by carpet workers who were members of this Union in other plants, suggested
that Plainville workers could get the same benefits and a better standard of living
through a union contract at their plant by filling out the "pledge card printed below,"
and urged them to join the Union and "win a union contract for your plant." A
union authorization card was printed as an integral part of the leaflet, with dotted
lines indicating it could be cut out. Addressed to the Union at its Dalton, Georgia,
office, the card stated:
(DATE) ---------------------------- 1963
I hereby accept membership in the Textile Workers Union of America, affiliate
of the AFL-CIO-CLC, and of my own free will hereby authorize the Textile
Workers Union of America, its agents or representatives to act for me as a
collective bargaining agency in all matters pertaining to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment with my employer,
-----------------------------------
NAME OF COMPANY
It had blanks to be filled in with the signer's name, his address and phone number,
his employer, and other facts about his job. Prominent at the top was the word
"Confidential"; at the bottom the card also stated "no initiation fee" and "no dues
until you have a signed contract." These cards will be called "white cards" to dis-
tinguish them from blue authorization cards distributed later in the campaign which
do not contain the three words and phrases last quoted above, and which state in
the body:
(DATE)---------------------------- 196-
28 Englewood Lumber Company, 130 NLRB 394; Morris & Associates, Inc., 138 NLRB
1160, 1164. As will appear below, this limited purpose of the cards comprised the whole
thrust of the Union 's representations to employees , employee solicitors , and, through them,
to other employees.
TREND MILLS, INC. 157
I hereby accept membership in the Textile Workers Union of America of my
own free will and do hereby designate said Textile Workers Union of America
as my representative for the purpose of collective bargaining in respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment or other conditions of employment.
The Union became interested in the plant when employee John Pope conferred with
Business Agent James O'Shea on March 12, 1964, about dissatisfaction of workers
with working conditions at Plainville. After its first distribution of leaflet with card
on March 21, O'Shea on March 23 or 24 conferred with employees Pope, Lumis B.
McCormick, and Jerry M. McClure, explaining the Union's organization and opera-
tion, and instructing them how to solicit other workers to sign authorization cards. In
describing the Union's procedure, he said that: Under the law the Union needed only
a majority of employees signed up to be recognized as bargaining agent, but it had
a policy of getting about 65 to 70 percent signed up before he asked the employer
to bargain with it. If the employer denied recognition, the Union petitioned the
Board for an election, giving the signed cards to the Board. He emphasized that the
cards would be kept secret and never shown to the public, and that only the signer,
the Union, and the Board would know who had signed cards. He explained the
bargaining procedure if the Union was recognized or won the election, pointing out
that no dues were payable by employees until the Union got a signed contract from
the employer. He gave the three employees blue cards for solicitation of other
workers.
At a second meeting on March 31, attended by about 11 employees, O'Shea
reported on the number of cards procured, and said they needed about 65 to 70 per-
cent of the workers signed up before the Union could ask for an election. He
emphasized the confidential nature of the cards, telling employees they could vote
as they pleased, for or against the Union, in the election, that if the Union won and
came into the plant, the employees could still join or not join the Union as they
pleased, and that if they signed the card they did not have to pay any union dues
until a contract was negotiated and signed. He also told them that under Georgia
law, although they signed cards, they still did not have to belong to the Union. He
never told them that by signing the cards they became members of, or joined, the
Union, or that they were presently "authorizing the Union to represent them"; the
most he said on this point was that after signing they "had the protection of the
Union" if the employer discharged or otherwise discriminated against them. As the
Union did not have a card majority at this meeting, O'Shea urged those present to
get more cards signed, and appointed several worker committees to solicit for that
purpose. In soliciting workers thereafter, the committee members told workers sub-
stantially what O'Shea had said about the election purpose. Thus, Winfred (Junior)
Tomlinson told workers (including his brother Roy Max Tomlinson) the only reason
for signing the card was to get an election, that it was "for a vote"; when some workers
asked him if they would be making more money if they signed the card, he replied,
"No, we will be just like we are, we have not had an election." However, the record
does not show that any of the employee solicitors told employees that the card would
presently put them under the "protection of the Union" for any purpose 29 At a
final meeting on April 7 or 8, attended by about 22 workers, O'Shea announced that
21 That the election Purpose was impressed on the solicitors by O'Shea to the exclusion
of all else, and that they in turn emphasized only this purpose in their solicitations, is
highlighted by the fact that two solicitors, Winfred Tomlinson, Jr., and Jesse Carver,
knew from reading the white leaflet that they were signing the attached white card partly
to enable the Union to get more benefits for them, which indicated "representation for
collective bargaining"; yet they did not state this purpose to workers. Other facts in-
dicating the overriding emphasis on the election purpose are: (1) the Union's filing of the
petition on April 11 without giving Respondent a chance to respond to its April 10 re-
quest for bargaining , which Respondent received April 12; and (2) the Union's distribution
of a leaflet at the Dalton plant on April 18 or 19 advising workers there about the
campaign and filing of the petition at Plainville, and urging that they could have their
own union by 65 percent or more of them signing TWUA cards, sending them to the
Union , and representing that the cards would be "confidential. The Company never sees
them. They are used to show the Government to get an election in your plant " Al-
though O'Shea professed no knowledge of this leaflet, he did not deny that it was Issued
by the Union, and its composition including the same name , address, and telephone num-
ber at the bottom as the Union used in the Plainville campaign , convinces me that it was
an official union propaganda leaflet, and a cogent Indication of the Union's intent to
secure cards at Plainville only for an election.
15S DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
enough signed cards had been procured to make a majority and win the election, that
he would notify Respondent of that fact, and if Respondent refused recognition
(which O'Shea says he expected), the Union would petition the Board for an elec-
tion 30 It is clear from the above facts that the only actual and announced purpose
of procurement of the cards was to secure an election, in which employees who
signed were not bound to vote for the Union, nor even to join it later if the Union
won. The Union's whole conduct was thus clearly calculated to point out to employ-
ees only this limited purpose of the cards, and to impress on them that the card did
not obligate employees in any way.
Respondent claims cards bearing the names of 12 employees who did not sign
cards,31 but authorized others to sign and fill them in, must be rejected because these
employees gave that authority only on the representation that the cards would be
used only for an election I consider these seriatim:
Robert L. Mincey received a white card, read it over, had his wife fill it out, signed
it personally, and mailed it to the Union on March 24. No one talked to him nor
did he read any literature about it before he signed it, but he testified that he under-
stood the card was "for us to have a union out there," and " to get a union," that no
one talked to him about an election , and he did not know how the Union would get
into the plant, although he "figured it would come to an election ," and if it came
to that he would vote "yes." He admitted that he heard "everybody" talk about "our
union election" and he "took for granted the union was for an election, you have got
to have an election to have a union,' and "we were betting on our election." It is
clear from this testimony that, although he had read the card and presumably could
understand the wording on it, Mincey realized he was signing a document designed
to get a union in the plant, and that, while he was not sure about the exact proce-
dure, he understood that an election was necessary before the Union could get in.
However, since he clearly wanted the Union in, I must conclude that he signed the
card with the understanding from it that it amounted to a voluntary adherence to
the Union even before an election , and despite the prevalent talk about the election.
I consider the card reliable evidence toward majority status 32
Loyad E. Carter on March 21 had his wife sign the white card he cut out of the
leaflet distributed on the 20th. He read the card before she signed, and knew that
it was an authority to the Union to represent him, which he understood both from
reading it and what he had been told about such cards by his father who had been
a union member 17 or 18 years. He says he signed it to get the Union in the plant
to help the workers get more pay and benefits. He also admitted that before the
Union came in, and could get benefits, an election was necessary, and that he learned
from talk with other workers that there would be an election if enough of them signed
cards, that the card did not bind him to vote either way at the election, and that he
could join the Union if it came into the plant. While he knew that an election would
have to be held before the Union could get benefits for him, I find he signed the card
to enable the Union to represent him for that purpose, hence the card is reliable
evidence toward majority status.
On some date shortly before April 1, John Pope authorized McCormick to fill in,
sign, and send in a blue card for Pope. McCormick did it on or about March 26.
Pope was the employee who had first contacted O'Shea about bringing the Union into
Plainville and, when he asked McCormick to send in the card, he explained to
McCormick that he had talked to O'Shea, the card was "to organize the Union," and
the Union needed a certain percentage signed by employees in order to get an election.
Pope had been in the past a member of the United Furniture Workers Union in a
nearby furniture factory, and he had seen similar union authorization cards there and
knew their basic purpose.33 From these facts I find that Pope authorized McCormick
11 The above facts are found from credited admissions of O'Shea and numerous witnesses
of General Counsel. Testimony of O'Shea at variance therewith is not credited.
n Robert L. Mincey, Loyad E Carter, Clifford W Wilson, Winfred Hobgood, Jr, Robert
T. Bailey, Robert L. Pruitt, Willie F Drain, Hollis V. Bailey, Jack H Jones, Eddie
Stanley, Benny Stanley, and John Pope
12 See Cumberland Shoe Corporation, 144 NLRB 1268
33 These findings are based mainly on credible testimony of McCormick and O'Shea, as
corroborated in part by testimony of Pope. While testifying, Pope was laboring under
the handicap of knowing that he had an incurable bone and blood disease ; he was ob-
viously sick when testifying, which accounts in large part for his vague and self-
contradictory testimony. However, he admits various talks with O'Shea both at the
union hall and elsewhere, and admits he might have authorized McCormick to send in a
card for him, but cannot recall the incident. I therefore have credited his admissions to
the extent that they are consistent with the clear testimony of McCormick and O'Shea.
TREND MILLS, INC. 159
to send in the blue card for him with knowledge that he was thereby designating the
Union to represent him for collective bargaining, and conclude that the card should
be counted toward majority status.
Clifford W. Wilson had received the union leaflet and white card passed out on
March 20, and understood from it that the white card was to join the Union in order
to get more benefits in the plant. On or about April 8, William Holbert solicited him
to sign the card to "join the Union," Wilson said he was agreeable, and authorized
Holbert to get a card, fill it out, sign it for Wilson, and send it in. Holbert did so on
April 8 and reported this to Wilson on the 9th. Wilson had talked about the blue
card with Holbert just before giving the authority, and knew from reading the leaflet
and from Holbert's remarks that he was thereby "signing up for" the Union for his
own benefit, whether or not it got into the plant. He also knew that the card would
be used to procure an election, that he could vote either way in the election, and join
the Union either when he signed the card or later on; at another point he stated he
was signing the card "to go ahead and join up if they won at that time." It is clear
from this testimony that he knew the card would presently affiliate him with the
Union for his benefit, regardless of an election. I conclude that this card should be
counted toward majority status.
After Winfred Hobgood, Jr., got the white card with leaflet, he had his wife read
both to him, had her fill out and sign the card, and he mailed it to the Union on
March 23. While he did not understand the big words on the card, he understood
that the cards were "for better pay and to be under a union." Lumis McCormick
had told him beforehand that the card would be used for an election, so he also under-
stood it was "to have an election" in which he could vote as he pleased, and that if
the Union won the election he could join it; he did not consider the card as forcing
him to vote for the Union at anytime. He understood that if he signed the card
"things would get better on the job if they won the election," "that the cards would
be used to get a vote, and if the Union won, it would bring better things." This clearly
indicated that he signed with the idea that the Union would act for him to get better
wages and working conditions, though possibly after an election. I conclude the
Hobgood card should be counted toward majority status.
Robert T. Bailey received and read over the white card with leaflet on March 20.
About the same time he was told by Lumis McCormick and others that he should
sign it because they needed a certain percentage of employees signed to show that
they "wanted a union," and if a majority wanted it, they would hold an election to
see if it would come into the plant. He was told by his brother, a union mem-
ber, that in such an election the employees had a chance to decide if they wanted
a union or not, that they did not have to join but could if they wanted to. From all
this he gathered that by signing the card he was joining the Union and accepting
membership in it "if it was going to come in." After hearing these explanations, he
filled out the card (except for the date), signed it, and mailed it to the Union some-
time before April 11.34 While it appears that most of the information Bailey got
about the card clearly emphasized that it would be used to get an election after
enough workers had signed the cards, and he says he signed it largely to "go along"
with the other workers who, as he was told, were also signing, and that he could vote
as he pleased in the election, he also gathered from the card itself that he was in effect
presently accepting membership in the Union, conditioned only upon its winning
the election. On this basis, I conclude and find that the card is reliable evidence
toward majority status.
Sometime in March 1964, employee J. B. Drain, with whom Robert L. Pruitt rode
to work, solicited him twice to sign a blue card, saying it was to get an election, and
that about 70 percent of the workers had to sign cards before they could get an elec-
tion. At first Pruitt refused to sign, but the second time said he would not sign but
Drain could sign one for him and send it in if he wanted, it did not make any differ-
34 This witness contradicted himself seriously by saying on direct examination that he
filled out, executed, and mailed the card entirely himself, and on cross-examination
admitted he lied, saying he had his sister do it all for him. He also repudiated his
earlier statement to the Board which is consistent with his direct testimony. I have
decided that his direct testimony is more likely the truth, after having compared his
admitted initials put on the back of the card at the request of a Board agent isith the
written signature on the face, which comparison indicates that he probably signed the
face The card has a date of April 5 written in pencil, which is not explained in any
way, but I find from the Board date stamp on the back that it was received by the Board
from the Union on April 11 (with the petition) so that the Union must have received it
that day or earlier
160 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ence to Pruitt. Pruitt did not see or read the blue card offered in evidence before it
was filled out by someone , nor was it ever read to him. J. B. Drain was not called
to testify about this, but the card is filled out and dated March 30, 1964, all in one
handwriting, which appears far different from the rather crude initials which Pruitt
put on the back of the card in July for a Board agent. On these facts I must conclude
that Pruitt authorized the signature of a blue card on his behalf only on the repre-
sentation that it would be used for an election, and find that it is not reliable evidence
of majority status.35
Willie F. Drain received the white card with leaflet on March 20, but never read
the document. Shortly after he heard some employees say that the cards should be
signed to see if a majority of the employees wanted an election. He then had his
wife fill out and sign the card for him and mail it to the Union on March 25.36 He
testified that he had her send the card in to "find out what they had to offer, what
there was about it, to get more information." He indicated steadfastly that he did
not know that the card was an "authorization" for the Union to "represent him for
purposes of collective bargaining," and does not know the meaning of the words in
quotes; his understanding at the time was only that there would be an election, but
he was "not obligated for nothing"; 37 at another point he stated his understanding
of the card was "to see who wanted it and who did not, to find out if it was worth
running an election for it or not, and to explain to some of the people what they
would be getting, and what they would not be getting," he did not understand that
he was thereby "lining up on one side or the other" ; the card was "to bring us in and
let us know what would happen and what there was about it." On the basis of this
uncontradicted testimony , I find that Drain sent the card in only to secure more infor-
mation about the Union , and understood it would be used only to find out if there
should be an election, and that by signing it he was not obligated in any way.38
I conclude that the Drain card cannot be counted as reliable evidence toward major-
ity status.
Hollis V. Bailey received the usual white card and leaflet at the gate, and had his
wife fill it out for him and mail it in to the Union on March 28. He glanced at the
card before she did this, but did not understand what it said because he reads only
poorly. Before she filled it out, he heard from employees that there would be an
election if enough employees signed cards and sent them in, and on that understand-
ing he told his wife to send it in . There is no proof that he tried to, or could, read
the leaflet that came with the card. I hereby admit the white card (General Coun-
sel's Exhibit No. 39 ) in evidence as sufficiently authenticated , but I find that Bailey
had the card sent in only because he understood it would be used for an election, and
that it is therefore not reliable evidence toward majority status.39
I find from credible testimony of Jack H. Jones and Jesse Carver that Carver asked
Jones to sign a blue card shortly before April 3, telling him that if enough employees
signed the cards they would have an election, and that a certain number had to sign
ae There is no proof that Pruitt talked to other workers or to O'Shea , or read the card
or any union literature , which might warrant any inference that he might also have
understood that he was joining the Union or making it his bargaining agent. Hence, the
ruling in the Cumberland Shoe case , supra, Is Inapposite . The situation here is far more
like that In Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 149 NLRB 161 (re the White card).
"Drain could not remember the date this was done, and his wife did not testify, but
the card is dated March 25, 1964, in the same handwriting as the remainder of the writ-
ing on It which he said was his wife's.
87 He told these things to two different Board agents who took statements from him
privately on July 5 and October 16 , 1963, but the agent preparing the first statement
apparently did not put this down , but wrote the contrary of It, to the effect that he was
authorizing the Union to represent him for collective bargaining . The second statement
does, however , contain the gist of his testimony on this point.
80 In reaching these findings , I have also considered both statements given by Drain
to Board agents, but have placed no reliance on the first, insofar as It tends to contradict
his sworn testimony on the stand , for it Is clear that on this point It contains a statement
directly opposite to what he told the agent at the time, and I am convinced he did not
realize this when he signed that statement . However, he adopted much of the pertinent
parts of the second sworn statement , consistent with his sworn testimony.
80 See footnote 35, above. General Counsel offered a second blue card (General Coun-
sel's Exhibit No. 40 ) which Bailey admitted was apparently prepared by his wife, but
denied he authorized her to send It in at any time. I reject the offer of this card.
TREND MILLS, INC. 161
to get an election 40 He also advised him the card would be used only to get art
election. Jones cannot read, so he took the card home to his wife who filled it out
and signed it for him in his presence and at his request, but without reading it to him.
He then took it back to Carver who signed it in the lower left corner, put the date
April 3, 1963, on it, and sent it to the Union 41 I admit Jones' card (General Coun-
sel's Exhibit No. 45) in evidence as sufficiently proved, but I find that Jones author-
ized its execution and transmission on the representation that it would be used only
to get an election, and conclude that it is not reliable evidence of majority status.
Jas. H. Matthews & Co., supra.
Business Agent O'Shea gave Eddie Stanley the usual white card in a leaflet on
March 20, without saying anything to him about it. Stanley cannot read or write,
so he took it home to his uncle, William Barnett, who read the whole document to,
him and then, at his direction, filled out and signed the card for him, and Stanley
then mailed it to the Union. In reading the leaflet to him, Barnett told him the card
was "to vote to get a Union in there," and that he could vote any way he wanted;
he did not state any other purpose for the card, such as joining the Union, but he did'
tell Eddie that if the Union won the election, he could either join or not join the
Union as he pleased. While his uncle told him the card "could be used for an elec-
tion," he did not say that was the only purpose. Examination of the card (General
Counsel's Exhibit No. 79) shows that Stanley cut it out of the white leaflet previously
described, which clearly does not say anything about an election. Hence, although
Stanley testified without contradiction to the remarks about an election by his uncle,
I do not credit his further testimony that his uncle read them out of that leaflet, and
can only infer that they were not prompted by anything in that paper. On the con-
trary, it is inferrable that if Barnett read aloud all that was in the leaflet, Stanley
could only have understood therefrom that signing of the card would help to get him
the benefits which the Union described in it, and that this was one of the things which
the card would enable the Union to get for him. This is not inconsistent with Bar-
nett's remarks that the card "would be used for an election." Thus I find that, before
Stanley had the card executed for him, he was apprised of both purposes for which
the card would be usable, and as the first is in effect a designation of the Union to
get benefits for him, I find that the card is reliable evidence of majority status. See
Cumberland Shoe Company, supra.
Jack B. (Benny) Stanley received a blue card from employee Loyad E. Carter at
the plant sometime before April 1. At the time, Carter told him the employees had
to sign them to get an election "in the Union," and that a certain number had to be
signed for that purpose. Carter did not otherwise explain the card or state any other
purpose of it. Before that, Stanley had attended a union meeting (apparently
March 31) at which he heard the statements of O'Shea found above. Stanley took
the card home, read it over, and then had his wife fill it out and sign it in his pres-
ence on April 1. The next day he took it back to Carter. Stanley testified that from
his reading of the card before his wife filled it out, he understood it to mean that
"we would sign the cards, get them to represent us, to vote on it and let the Union
come in, that we could vote either one way or the other." However, I am satisfied
and find from the card and his whole testimony that he understood from the card
wording alone that the Union would "represent" the workers for some undefined
purpose, but that he also knew from the union announcements and remarks of Carter
that they would also be used to get an election. Hence, on his understanding of the
first purpose, I find that the card is reliable evidence of majority status.
In summary, I find that eight cards in this group should be counted toward major-
ity status, while four should not.
B. Cards signed by employees
Winfred Hobgood, Jr., was active in soliciting employees to sign blue cards, telling
Dale Young, Anderson D, Chastain, and Barbara Joe Gravitt, among others, that
the cards were being signed by employees to get an election, and that they should'
"go along and sign" so that they all could have an election, that they needed about
w Carver 's testimony indicates that he was telling Jones, as he told other employees,
the gist of what O ' Shea had told him and others about the election purpose of the cards,
and need for more, apparently at the meeting of March 31, as outlined above.
a Carver did not testify about this, but the proven signature on his own card (Gen-
eral Counsel's Exhibit No . 69) is apparently the same writing as his name on the
Jones' card.
206-446-66-vol. 154-12
162 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
70 percent of the workers signed up to get the election, and that at the election they
could vote either way they pleased. Hobgood did not state any other purpose for
the card. Young testified that he read his card before he signed it and turned it in,
but insisted that his understanding of the words then and now was that he was
authorizing the Union to ask for an election, and to "represent us in an election."
This appears credible in light of what Hobgood told him, hence I conclude that
Young signed the card only for that limited purpose, and that it is not reliable evi-
dence of majority status. Although Hobgood, Lumis McCormick, and William
Smith solicited Chastain to sign a blue card and all told him the same story about
its election purpose, he read and understood the wording on it before he signed and
turned it in and understood therefrom that he was presently "joining the Union,"
whether or not it came into the plant with an election. In addition, McCormick or
Smith told him the card was "for a union and to get a vote." Clearly, Chastain was
made cognizant of two purposes for the card, one being acceptance of membership
in the Union and designation of it as his bargaining agent. I find Chastain's card
reliable evidence of majority status.
In addition to the election purpose stated by Hobgood to Gravitt, he also told her
that if she did not sign the card, and the Union won the election, she would lose her
job. Gravitt refused to sign the card then, but took it with another blank card to the
home of her friend, employee Alice Louise Bowling, on April 6 to discuss the mat-
ter. Gravitt's brother, employee Clifford Ray, was also present. Gravitt told Bowling
what Hobgood had said to her, including the fact that 70 percent of the workers had
already signed, the Union was "coming in," and if the two did not sign they would
lose their jobs. She also urged Bowling to sign because "they would get more
money." Bowling read the card and at first refused to sign it, but after Gravitt's
remarks about losing their jobs, and Ray's added comment that the Union would know
from the signed cards who had signed for the Union and who had not, Bowling filled
in and signed her card. Gravitt then did the same with hers.42 Although this evi-
dence shows that one probable reason for Bowling's execution of the card was the
possibility that they might get more money thereby, it appears that Gravitt and
Bowling took very seriously the threat of loss of job stated by Hobgood, whom Grav-
itt had known for some years, and that this threat of possible reprisal from the
Union, which was enhanced by Ray's remarks about the Union's knowledge of who
favored the Union and who did not, was well calculated to obliterate any other
reason stated to the two girls as the inducement to sign the card. While there is no
proof that the Union authorized or can be charged with this threat, nevertheless it
was the most prominent factor in their signing of the cards and, by analogy with the
Board's rulings that threatening and coercive remarks by an employer, or even inde-
pendently by outsiders, may affect the employees' freedom of choice in an election
and thus vitiate it, even though they thereafter have the protection of the secrecy of
the voting booth, I must conclude that the clear threat of reprisal by the Union
(which would be sure to know if they did not sign cards), initiated by Hobgood, an
active employee solicitor for the Union, was enough to vitiate the signing of these
cards, even though both girls read them before signing and may also have had some
idea that they could be used to get better working conditions. Obviously, a clear
threat of job loss is far more potent in coercive effect than a vague possibility of
monetary benefit accruing from signing the card 43 I therefore find that the Gravitt
and Bowling cards are not reliable evidence of majority status
Leroy Jones signed a blue card on April 8, after reading it over and understanding
from the words that it involved acceptance of membership in the Union. He signed
only after repeated solicitations both at the plant and at home by various workers,
who told him the card was merely for an election. On one occasion the union
adherents told him that if he did not sign they would "take me up before the boys,"
42 The talk at Bowling's house is based on credited testimony of both women. Ray
did not testify on this point.
43 There is no proof that either woman had received or read the first white leaflet
reciting union benefits. It is also significant that, although Ray (who had signed a
white card March 25) testified that he read that leaflet and knew its contents, he did not
recite them to Gravitt or Bowling in trying to induce them to sign up, but merely
enhanced the coercion in Hobgood's threat, as relayed by Gravitt, by emphasizing that the
Union would be well aware if they did not sign up.
The overriding consideration must always be whether the employee was given an un-
trammeled freedom of choice, and whether that was interfered with by employer, union,
or some outside source. See N.L.R.B. v. Dadourian Export Corporation, 138 F. 2d 691,
892, 893 (C.A. 2).
TREND MILLS, INC. 163
-which meant to him that they would "mob me." He still refused to sign, saying he
wanted to do as he desired. Finally, after further solicitation at his home, he signed
the card "so I could have a little peace" and on the understanding that it was intended
to be used only to get an election without "signing my rights away." This uncon-
tradicted and credible testimony indicates that he signed the card unwillingly, for a
limited purpose, and in order to avoid further solicitation and threats to hale him
"before the boys." I find that it not reliable evidence toward majority status, even
though he was aware of the meaning of the words on the card.44
Respondent claims that at least 13 other cards signed by employees must be
rejected because the signers did not or could not read or understand them, but
relied only on the representation of other employee solicitors that they would be
used only to secure an election. I find from credible testimony of Ray Bunch, Larry
R. Brown, Marvin E. Jackson, Jerry A. Penney, Donald C. Skeen, Millard E. Weaver,
Roy M. Tomlinson, Russell Edwards, Wm. N. Smith, and William Holbert, that
each was told by the employee or agent who solicited him that the card was needed
(or would be used) in order to get enough signed cards to hold an election, that the
card would be held confidential, and that no other purpose or use of the card was
stated or indicated to him. In addition, Brown had been solicited by workers four
or five times, but always refused to sign; however, when Wyman Autry again solic-
ited him with the above explanation, asking him to "go along with the other boys,
to help them get an election," emphasizing the confidential nature of the card and
the fact that Brown could still vote as he pleased in the election, Brown gave in and
signed on April 8, both because of the last statements and to stop employees from
pestering him further. Substantially the same representation was made to Jerry A.
Penney by Agent O'Shea just before he signed his card 45 Since it is clear from
the repeated and emphatic remarks of O'Shea to workers about the election pur-
pose, and the arguments stemming from that purpose which he and employee solici-
tors used to get them signed during the intensive drive for signatures at and after
the second union meeting, all of which the solicitors passed on to unsigned employees
at the plant thereafter, I am convinced and find that the above workers had impressed
on them and were led clearly to understand that the cards were needed, and would
be used, only to get an election and that they were not bound thereby in any manner,
and that this purpose was impressed on their minds to the effective exclusion of any
other purpose stated on the cards or expressed otherwise in union literature. Hence, I
must reject these cards as reliable majority proof4e
I also find from credible testimony of Wyman Autry, Mills H. Lemon, John Smith,
Emmett J. Brown, and Warner Roden,47 that, while each of these witnesses at or
" See case cited in previous footnote.
45 Penney testified vaguely and with much self-contradiction from a sickbed, long after
the event, and as his recollection was obviously very hazy, due to his condition, counsel
agreed that his two statements to the Board, dated July 18 and October 16, 1963, should
be considered for all purposes, in connection with his sickbed testimony, to determine the
truth. The July 16 statement merely shows he signed a card for O'Shea at a meeting.
The October statement clearly sets forth statements by O'Shea indicating the election
purpose like those found above, and indicates that they were probably made at the
March 23-24 meeting In it Penney also denies any knowledge at the time that the
Union was being made his "representative" Penney's personal testimony in large part
jibes with the latter statement, hence I have concluded that the only representations
made to him were those found above, and that although be says in his October statement
that he read the card before signing, he did not gather from its wording any other pur-
poses than that stated by O'Shea.
161 consider the ruling in Cumberland Shoe Company, supra, inapposite on the facts,
mainly because of the intensive and narrow thrust of the Union's arguments and efforts
toward an election.
4'i Brown could not read well enough to understand the "big words" on the white
card, but got the meaning when his wife read it to him, as well as the leaflet He re-
ceived no information from any other source. Roden signed and mailed in a white card
about March 20, after reading both card and leaflet. It was apparently lost, and when
employee solicitors told him his name was not listed at the union hall as a signer, he
signed a blue card for Lumis McCormick about April 1, after McCormick had emphasized
the great need for it to get an election. However, I must assume he knew, as he testified,
that the first card would authorize the Union to represent him presently, at least to get
an election, and that the same purpose was in mind when he signed the substitute blue
card which is in evidence, for he thought that the blue card had the same wording as
the white. Hence, I conclude he clearly understood that the latter would authorize the
Union to represent him generally if it won the election
164 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
before signing cards heard the representations from solicitors for the Union which
have been found in the preceding paragraph, they were also told at the same time
some of the benefits which the Union might get them in the plant, or that signing
of the card would enable the Union to help workers get such benefits, or that the
card would appoint the Union to act for the employees in the plant if it won the
election. Hence cards of these witnesses should be counted toward majority status.
I also find that cards of the following employees should be counted because their
credible testimony indicates that all of them read the card and understood its wording
and meaning, as well as wording of the white leaflet issued with the white cards, or
other literature, although most of them were told and had impressed on them in one
form or another, and understood, the election purpose in substantially the terms
stated by O'Shea and his employee solicitors as found above: Clifford Ray, Newton
F. Rogers, Jr., Jesse Carver, James E. Shelley, Winfred Tomlinson, Jr., Jerry W.
Carter, Jerry M. McClure, Ronald K. Nix, William H. Barnes, Edward E. Chastain,
Eugene T. Autry, James L. Causby, Robert F. Payne, Lumis B. McCormick, and
Charles F. Keown48
3. Conclusion on majority status and the refusal-to-bargain issue
Summarizing the above analyses, I find that prior to April 11, 1963, the Union
received only 30 cards which were executed or authorized under circumstances indi-
cating they were reliable evidence of majority status,49 and as this falls far below
48 Testimony of Autry, Causby, Payne, and McCormick indicates that their understand-
ing from these sources was that they were presently selecting the Union as their repre-
sentative to function as such if it won the election. I consider this a present designation,
subject to cancellation upon a condition subsequent; ie., loss of the election. Substan-
tially the same conclusion can be drawn as to the understanding of Loyad E. Carter,
C. W. Wilson, Hobgood, R. T. Bailey, Roden, E. J. Brown, John Smith, W. Autry, and
Lemons, whose card signings have been analyzed above.
Keown read only the white card, but is not sure about the leaflet. He says he turned
in the card to "learn more about it, and if I still liked it and if it was as good as they
said it was, I was going to go ahead and vote for it" ; before he signed, workers solicited
him almost daily, stating only the election purpose as outlined above. However, from all
his testimony I conclude that he was in effect appointing the Union as his representative,
but subject to cancellation of the authority after be learned whether the Union would get
him all the things it promised ; I think he must have learned these union representations
from the white leaflet.
+e Throughout the hearing General Counsel argued that, in view of the coercion to which
employees were subjected by Respondent, the Board should apply the strict rule of parole
evidence to each card, deciding its validity only on the fact of signing. This argument
is without merit for several reasons. At the outset, the unfair labor practices of Re-
spondent occurred after employees had signed or authorized execution of cards and the
Union had completed its solicitation, and I find no theory by which later coercion can
be extended backward so as to rule out all testimony as to what outside influences from
parties other than Respondent created the understanding on which employees executed
cards. Second , this argument cannot, of course, apply to cards which certain employees
lever saw, signed, or which were sent in without their knowledge or authorization.
Third, under the principles stated in Englewood Lumber Company, 130 NLRB 394, and
Cameo Lingerie, Inc., 148 NLRB 535, all the circumstances of the signings must be con-
sidered to determine not only what was said to employees, but also whether there was in
fact contemporaneous coercion or duress exerted by parties other than Respondent. In
fact, the salutary need for careful examination of all circumstances of the signing of
cards is demonstrated in this case by O'Shea's admission that the Union as a matter of
policy never relies on procurement of a mere 51 percent of signed cards in a unit before
seeking an election, but always procures from 65 to 70 percent, because it recognizes
the ever-present possibility of forged cards, some not signed under actual authorization,
and that in other instances signers may change their minds after signing. The instances
of cards signed without authorization, the use of one after it had been repudiated, and
procurement of others by coercive remarks, as found herein, show that the union policy
was realistic.
Nor can General Counsel's argument be supported by the fact that many witnesses
called by him had refused to honor subpenas , but retained special counsel to fight en-
forcement proceedings by the Board in the U.S district court. The fact that they took
these steps but were unsuccessful and finally testified under order of that court does not
automatically make them hostile witnesses or serve to affect their credibility. Quo
Enterprises, Inc., 140 NLRB 1001, 1003.
TREND MILLS, INC. 165
the 49 minimum required, I find that the Union did not represent a majority of
.employees in the appropriate unit aforesaid on or prior to April 11, 1963. Lacking
-such status before April 11, and in the absence of proof that Respondent's unfair
labor practices found above began, or could have had any effect on that status, before
April 11, when the Union ended its solicitation campaign with the petition for an
-election, I am unable to conclude that those unfair labor practices can be considered
on any theory as evidence of a bad-faith doubt of a majority status (which did not
exist) or of an attempt to undermine any status of the Union, within the principle
of Joy Silk Mills, supra.50 Hence, Respondent was not required to bargain with the
Union on and after April 11, 1963, in response to its demand of April 10. I there-
fore grant Respondent's motion to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as it
-charges Respondent with an unlawful failure and refusal to bargain 51
C. The alleged interference with Board process
Late in September 1963, General Counsel subpenaed numerous employees of
Respondent to testify at the initial hearing of this case at Rome on October 8. Shortly
after getting their subpenas by mail, many of the employees brought their subpenas,
with an accompanying letter from counsel for General Counsel,52 to Wooten and
Tolbert, asking what they were, what they should do with them, and whether they
had to appear at the hearing in response to the subpena or appear at the union hall
as requested in the letter. Most of these employees indicated plainly that they did
not know anything about court, and did not want to appear because they would lose
time from work. Some said that they did not want to come to court to be ques-
tioned about the union card, because they felt the cards they signed were confiden-
tial, that no one was supposed to see them. A few indicated reluctance to appear
because of personal reasons, such as medical treatment. When William N. Smith
asked Wooten if he had to go to court, and if the paper was legal, Wooten said he
did not think so, but "if it was a court order, you would have to go." Smith replied
that if he did not have to go, he would not. When employees asked Tolbert about it
at first, most of them asked what "they" would do to them, or what would happen
to them, if they did not go to court. Tolbert read the subpena shown him by the
first few employees and told them that, as far as he could see, there was no penalty
stated on it for not going to court, and he did not think there would be any penalty
if the worker did not appear,53 but it was apparently a legal subpena from the Board,
and the worker could go or not, as he or she decided Referring to the letter, Tolbert
said he did not think the worker had to comply with the letter, that nothing could
be done to him if he did not. When other workers continued to ask Wooten ques-
tions about the subpenas, he asked Tolbert what he should tell them. Tolbert called
Respondent's counsel who advised him that under the Act, when persons did not
honor subpenas, the Board could procure an order of the Federal court directing
50 See N L .R B. v Harold W. Koehler, et al , Partners, d/b/a Koehler's Wholesale
Restaurant Supply, 328 F. 2d 777 (C.A. 7), and cf Flomatic Corporation, 147 NLRB
1304 . In this connection , there is a signicant lack of substantial proof that Respond-
ent took any unlawful specific retaliatory steps, such as discharge or other actual dis-
crimination , against any employees whose union affiliation or sentiments it had procured
by its interrogations and promises Neither General Counsel nor the Union have cited
any cases which would indicate that subsequent unfair labor practices of the type found
above by an employer are sufficient to deny its defense of a good-faith doubt of majority
status to a refusal-to-bargain claim, or to establish a majority status for the Union which
never existed beforehand.
"This conclusion makes it unnecessary to analyze the circumstances surrounding
Respondent 's letters of April 16 and 24, and its later conduct , for purposes of determin-
ing the validity of Respondent 's claim of bona fide doubt of majority status. See cases
In preceding footnote.
ea The letter , after referring to the enclosed subpena and requesting attendance of the
employee a half-hour early on October 8, also requested the employee to meet with
counsel for General Counsel on the 7th at the union hall in Rome " in order to review
with you in advance the testimony which you will give at the hearing "
0 Tolbert was correct in his appraisal of the subpena , because the yellow subpena issued
by the Board contains no statement of any violation of law or penalty for not obeying
its direction . The only intimation of that lies in the single word at the top "Subpena"
which , while it is a modern contraction of the earlier Latin form "subpoena ," which
means "under penalty," does not convey the idea of any penalty or punishment to the
ordinary reader; nor did the form letter sent with the subpena by counsel for General
Counsel indicate that consequence in any way.
166 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
their appearance , which could be served on them by a U.S. marshal , and if they did'
not appear in response to the order , they could be fined or sent to jail . The attorney
said that probably, as a practical matter, the Board might have subpenas served by
a U.S. marshal , and not go to the extent of getting a court order . 54 Tolbert told
this procedure to Wooten , and also in substance to the workers who queried him
about it thereafter , telling them that they had to decide personally whether to go,
and, if they did, they need only tell him and Respondent would let them off from
work. When some employees did not appear at the hearing of October 8, and Gen-
eral Counsel charged in the presence of Tolbert that there had been interference with
Board process by Respondent , Tolbert prepared a notice that afternoon which he
read to employees at the 4 p.m . change of shifts, and also posted over his name on
the plant bulletin board. The notice read:
We are still getting questions from employees about the Labor Board hearing
that is being held and whether employees who have received subpoenas have
to go and testify.
We want to make our position clear. Whether an employee goes to the Labor
Board hearing or not is his own decision . We have not told anyone to go. We
have not told anyone not to go. What you do is up to you . I want to say
that the Company does not object and holds nothing against any employee who
does go to the hearing and testifies.
I also want to say that the subpoenas you have received from the Labor
Board are lawful and the Labor Board can obtain a court order requiring you
to go to the hearing and testify.55
When Loyad E. Carter asked Wooten on October 7 if an employee had to appear
under the subpena if he did not want to , Wooten replied that he did not have to go
if he did not want to, but if he did the Company would let him go, that the decision
was up to him. When Carter asked what would happen if he did not go, Wooten
said that a "court order " might be served on him, and he would have to go, and if
he did not, a deputy marshal would lock him up . The morning of the 8th , Carter
told Wooten he had to go to the hearing that day. Wooten asked if he had a "court
order." Carter said it was. Wooten replied that then he had to appear Later in
the day, Carter told Wooten it was not a court order, and Wooten then said it was
up to him to decide what he wanted to do, he was not going to tell him what to do,
but if he wanted to go to the hearing, he would be given time off from work to go.
Carter then asked for time off , got it, and went to the hearing.56 Wooten also told
some workers in Carter's hearing that they were not required to appear at the union
hall in response to the letter from General Counsel.57
On the afternoon of October 9, before the start of the second shift, Tolbert saw
second-shift worker Dale Young talking to first-shift employees at work, causing
them to stop work while he talked. At this time , one worker reported to Tolbert
that Young was telling workers they would be fined several hundred dollars if they
did not appear at the hearing . As Young was about to start work, Tolbert asked
him if he had been going around trying to get workers to go to the hearing. Young
cs It Is apparent from various colloquys between counsel about the subpenas at the
hearing, that Respondent's counsel was speaking from personal experience as a former
member of the staff of the General Counsel of the Board and from extensive experience
In trial work in cases under the Act.
55 The above findings are based on credible and mutually corroborative testimony of
Tolbert and Wooten, and documentary evidence, as corroborated In substantial part by
admissions of Gravitt, Bowling, and William N. Smith Testimony of other employee
witnesses In conflict therewith is not credited.
sa Carter lied about having a court order, explaining In testimony that he used this
as an "excuse" to get permission to attend the hearing This is not credible in face of
Wooten's remarks the day before which plainly indicated that such permission would be
given if requested There is a strong suspicion that the second talk with Wooten was
deliberately staged by Carter for an ulterior motive, for be says he went back to check
with Wooten after hearing other workers say that both supervisors had told them the
same thing Wooten told Carter on the 7th, and after conferring with counsel for Gen-
eral Counsel and Business Agent O'Shea the night of the 7th about his talk with
Wooten that day Carter actually testified on the 9th
s7 These facts are found from credited testimony of Wooten, corroborated in part by
admissions of Carter. In view of Carter's vacillation In his testimony on this point,
I do not credit any of his testimony at variance with the findings.
TREND MILLS, INC. 167
denied it. Tolbert told him this was not Young's concern, whether they went to the
hearing, that he should leave them alone and not bother them while at work, that it
was none of his business whether they went to court or not, and that if workers did
not want to go the hearing of their "own free will," that was their business, not his.
Immediately after this incident, and after consultation with Respondent's attorney,
Tolbert read to the assembled employees and also posted on the bulletin board a
notice stating:
The Labor Board hearing is still going on. We have heard it said that some
employees are afraid that if they go to the hearing and testify they will be dis-
charged or mistreated by the Company. This is not true.
Any employee who desires to go to the hearing to testify is free to do so. I
want to assure you that no employee will be discharged or mistreated in any
way for going to the hearing and testifying.
If any employee wants to go to the hearing and testify, he should notify his
supervisor and the Company will make arrangements to let him off and to pro-
vide transportation if needed.58
The record shows that workers had long been accustomed to seek out supervisors,
particularly Tolbert, for advice on personal and other problems, and that he always
freely gave them the best advice he could. I find that workers voluntarily approached
Tolbert and Wooten in like manner for advice about the subpenas served on them
by mail, and that when employees indicated their reluctance to appear in court for
various reasons, Tolbert indicated truthfully that the subpenas on their face did not
carry any penalty for failure to appear, hence in his opinion nothing would happen
to them at that time if they did not appear, but that thereafter court proceedings
could be taken to enforce their appearance, and that the decision about honoring the
subpena was their own decision, and the Company would give them time off if they
decided to go to the hearing. I find nothing in this advice which tended to encourage
employees to disobey the subpenas, or which interfered with Board process in any
other manner.59 Nor do I find any violation of the Act in Tolbert's warning to
Young to stop trying on company time to induce workers to attend the pending hear-
ing. It is clear that such conduct interfered with employees while at work, and
Tolbert had a right to prevent any interference with their work by others during
working time. I therefore grant Respondent's motion to dismiss the amended com-
plaint insofar as it charges Respondent with illegal conduct in the opinions and
advice it stated to employees about the subpenas and their enforcement and shall
recommend that the complaint be dismissed in that respect.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connec-
tion with the operations of Respondent described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several
States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices violating
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. In
view of the limited nature of the unfair labor practices found herein, I shall recom-
mend only that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from any like or related
conduct.
18 These facts are found on clear, credible testimony of Tolbert, as corroborated in part
by testimony of Young. I do not credit Young's testimony at variance therewith, be-
cause of his vague and vacillating testimony on the talk , It is notable that in response
to one question of the Union's counsel, Young said his impression of Tolbert's remarks
was that he was accusing him of trying to prevent employees from attending the hearing
59 If such encouragement could be implied on any theory, the implication was promptly
canceled by Respondent's oral and printed announcements of the 8th and 9th which
made it clear that it was standing neutral, leaving the employees to decide whether to
attend the hearing, and offering time off and transportation if they obeyed the subpenas
Considering all the facts in context, Respondent's conduct falls far short of the type of
employer conduct found illegal by the Board in Certain-Teed Products Corporation, 147
NLRB 1517.
168 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record in the case, I
make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of See-
lion 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and the Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. By interrogating employees regarding their union sentiments, promising and
granting them benefits and suggesting direct negotiation of grievances with Respond-
ent, and actual settlement of such grievances with employees, to dissuade them from
choice of or adherence to said Union as their bargaining agent, and suggesting that
they express antiunion views to other employees, thereby interfering with, restrain-
ing, and coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7
•of the Act, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) and 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
3. All production and maintenance employees at Respondent's Plainville, Georgia,
plant, including the tufting machine fixer, serger fixers, plant clerical employees, ship-
ping department employees, and the local truckdriver, but excluding over-the-road
truckdrivers, office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, Byron Reeves,
Pat Tortosa, John L. Wooten, Ralph White, the dispatcher, plant manager, and all
other supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. The Union was not at any time mentioned in the amended complaint the
freely chosen collective-bargaining representative of a majority of Respondent's
employees in the above unit, and was not the exclusive representative of employees
in such unit within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. Respondent has not at any time mentioned in the amended complaint failed or
refused to bargain with said Union in violation of the Act, or engaged in any coercive
conduct toward its employees except as found above.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire
record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, I recommend that the Respondent, Trend Mills, Inc., its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from interrogating employees regarding their union senti-
ments, promising and granting them benefits and suggesting direct negotiations of
grievances with Respondent, and actual settlement of such grievances with employ-
ees, to dissuade them from choice of or adherence to said Union as their bargaining
agent, or suggesting that they express antiunion views to other employees, or in any
like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing their employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is designed to effectuate the policies
of the Act:
(a) Post at its Plainville, Georgia, plant, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix." 60 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for
Region 10, shall, after being duly signed by its authorized representative, be posted
by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for a
period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
to insure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in writing, within 20 days from
receipt of this Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.61
w In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order be en-
forced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United
States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a
Decision and Order."
81 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in writing, within
10 days from the date of receipt of this Order , what steps the Respondent has taken
to comply herewith."
INT'L BROTHERHOOD ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL 903 169"
It is further recommended that the amended complaint be dismissed insofar as it
charges Respondent with an unlawful refusal to bargain or with any coercive con-
duct other than that found in this Decision.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board , and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela -
tions Act, as amended , we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees regarding their union sentiments,.
promise or grant them benefits, or suggest direct negotiation of grievances with
us, or make actual settlement of grievances with them, in order to dissuade
them from the choice of or adherence to Textile Workers Union of America,
AFL-CIO-CLC, or any other labor organization of our employees , as their
collective-bargaining agent, or suggest that they express antiunion views to
other employees , or in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce our employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7
of the Act.
All our employees are free to become or remain , or to refrain from becoming or
remaining , members of the above Union or any other labor organization.
TREND MILLS, INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, 528 Peach-
tree-Seventh Building, 50 Seventh Street, NE., Atlanta, Georgia, Telephone No. 876
3311 , Extension 5357, if they have any questions concerning this notice or compli -
ance with its provisions.
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union
No. 903 and Gulf Coast Building and Construction Trades
Council and Pass Development , Inc. Cases Nos. 15-CC-235 and
15-CP-38. August 2,1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On June 1, 1965, Trial Examiner George J. Bott issued his Decision.
in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondents had
engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor practices within
the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and
recommending that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondents had not
engaged in certain other unfair labor practices and recommended that
the complaint be dismissed with respect to such allegations. There-
after, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Decision and a sup-
porting brief.
154 NLRB No. 10.