TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 14, 1965

152 N.L.R.B. 1495 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

TDIT TRAILER FERRY, INC. 1495
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office 1015 Tijeras
Avenue NW, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Telephone No. 247-2520, if they have
any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions.
APPENDIX D
To ALL EMPLOYEES OF VALLEY GOLD DAIRIES, INC.
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, I hereby notify you that:
I WILL NOT interrogate employees of Valley Gold Dairies, Inc. regarding their
union membership or activities in a manner constituting interference, restraint,
or coercion within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
I WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees ,of Valley Gold Dairies, Inc. in the exercise of the right to self-
organization, to form or assist labor organizations, to join Chauffeurs, Team-
sters and Helpers Local Union No. 492, affiliated with the International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or any
other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed in Section
7 of the Act, and to refrain from any and all such activities.
JOHN EDWARD PRICE,
Respondent.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Attorney for Valley Gold Daisies, Inc )
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office 1015 Tijeras
Avenue, NW., Albuquerque, New Mexico, Telephone No. 247-2520, if they have
any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions.
TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. and Associated Maritime Workers Local
No. 8, affiliated with the International Organization of Masters,
Mates & Pilots, AFL-CIO. Case No. 12-CA-9960. June 14,
196.5
DECISION AND ORDER
On February 16, 1965, Trial Examiner William Seagle issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had
not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint, and
recommending that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Gen-
eral Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision together
with a supporting brief, and the Respondent filed limited exceptions to
the Decision, and an answering brief to the General Counsel's
exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and Jenkins].
152 NLRB No. 147.
1496 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIO NS BOARD
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record
in this case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner except as noted below.
We agree with the Trial Examiner that there were 41 full-time and
regular part-time employees in the appropriate unit, and that the
Union represented less than a majority of that number on April 15,
1964, when its request for recognition Was received by the Respondent.
We see no adequate reason for adopting a different standard than that
used by the Regional Director in his Decision and Direction of Election
dated May 21, 1964, for determining Which of the lashing crew Were
regular part-time employees to be counted as part of the Respondent's
complement of employees. As only those lashing crew- employees who
had worked a minimum of 100 hours in the 12-month period preceding
the eligibility date would have been eligible to vote if an election had
been conducted, we find without merit the General Counsel's argument
in his brief that a different standard should now be adopted under
which 10 employees who satisfied this standard in 1963 but who had not
worked in 1964 would be excluded, while Solomon and Simmons who
had worked in 1964 but had not yet Worked 100 hours would be
included. Thus, disregarding the cards signed by Solomon and Sim-
mons, the Union had obtained by April 15 cards signed by 22 employ-
ees of the 41 in the unit. However, 2 of these 22 cards, those signed
by Peacock and Sharpe, were, in our opinion, no longer valid as of the
critical April 15 date, because these employees had revoked the authori-
zation previously granted to the Union to represent them by seeking to
retrieve their cards from the employee who had solicited their slgna-
tures.2 As the Union did not in fact represent a majority of Respond-
ent's employees on or after April 15, We find, Without considering other
reasons advanced by the Trial Examiner for his dismissal of the 8(a)
(5) allegations of the complaint, that Respondent was not obligated to
recognize the Union.
'The General Counsel 's exceptions correctly point out that the decision to extend
medical insurance coverage to the lashing crew was not made by the end of March 1964,
and that the Trial Examiner was in error as to this date However, Garner 's deposition
clearly indicates that Respondent decided to extend this coverage to the lashing crew
sometime during the first 2 weeks of April, which would still antedate the Union ' s orga-
nizational activities We agree with the Trial Examiner that the implementation of
this decision, the distribution to the lashing crew of applications for Blue Cross-Blue
Shield coverage in May 1964 was not intended to persuade the employees to reject the
Union in the forthcoming election . True Teinper Corporation, 127 NLRB 839 , at 842-844
2 Cf Abrasive Saliage Company , Inc, 127 NLRB 381, 392, where the employees ' revoca-
tion of their authorization cards on the date the Union's demand for recognition was
made was ineffective because it had been induced by the Employer 's unlawful interroga-
tion and threats, whereas here, Peacock and Sharpe ievoked their authorization cards on
their own initiative without any prompting of interference by the Respondent
TMT TRAILER FERRY, INC. 1497
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its
Order the Order recommended by the Trial Examiner, and orders that
the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case was heard before Trial Examiner William Seagle at Jacksonville , Florida,
on October 12, 13, and 14, 1964, upon charges filed on June 15 , 1964, and a com-
plaint issued on July 31, 1964 , alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1) and ( 5) of the
Act
Upon the evidence and proceedings at the hearing, the posthearing brief filed by
counsel for the respondent , and my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses,
as well as my knowledge of their personalities ,' I hereby make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent, TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., hereinafter referred to as TMT, is a
Delaware corporation engaged at Jacksonville, Florida, as well as at other locations
not involved in the present proceeding, in the transportation and forwarding of
freight from points within and without the State of Florida and the Continental
United States. It receives annually in excess of $ 50,000 as an instrument of commerce.
The home office of TMT appears to be in Miami, Florida. TMT is at present in
bankruptcy and its affairs are being administered by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida, Division 8, located at Miami, Florida.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Associated Maritime Workers, Local 8, affiliated with the International Organiza-
tion of Masters, Mates & Pilots, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as Local 8 or
simply as the Union , is a labor organization that has sought to organize the warehouse-
men and stevedores or longshoremen 2 who are employed by the Respondent.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
The bargaining history of TMT shows that it had a collective- bargaining agree-
ment with Seafarers' International Union for a period of 1 year that ran approx-
imately from the middle of 1959 to the middle of 1960 The S.I.U was certified as
bargaining representative of the stevedores employed by TMT on March 30, 1961,3
and attempted, but without success, to negotiate a contract with the employer.
Despite this failure, a number of the stevedores or longshoremen currently employed
by TMT are still, apparently, members of the S.I.U.
The situation remained unchanged, apparently, until April 1964 when Local 8
appeared upon the scene. The circumstances under which this occurred are extremely
obscure. All that is certain is that on Sunday, April 12, 1964, Junior Jacob Hicks,
who works as a dockhand at the Florida Towing Company, and who is secretary-
treasurer of Local 8, accompanied by Robert L. Hunter and Stewart ("Stoy") Lester
Thomas, two of the mechanics who worked for TMT, visited the homes of a consid-
I This is not applicable to the testimony of Thelma Garner, whose testimony was taken
by deposition prior to the hearing
2 These are sometimes referred to as the lashing ciew
a In Case No 12-RII-30
'These are Kermit C Green, Sr, William L. 'Morris, Frank Norman Simmons, Gordon
A Simmons, and Clarence Harmon, whose name appears erroneously in the transcript as
Clarence Ormond
1498 DECISION'S OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
erable number of the stevedores or longshoremen who worked for TMT, and secured
their signatures to Local 8 authorization cards. The efforts of the campaigners were
facilitated by the fact that the longshoremen all lived on the lower end of the New
Berlin Road which ran down to the St. Johns River about 10 miles northeast of
Jacksonville.
On April 13, which was, of course, the very next day after the activity on the New
Berlin Road, Hicks on behalf of Local 8 sent a registered letter to TMT in which the
Union stated that a majority of the TMT employees at the Jacksonville, Florida,
terminal (excluding clerical and professional employees, guards, and supervisors)
had designated the Union as their bargaining representative, and that representatives
of the Union wished to meet with representatives of TMT at the Seminole Hotel on
April 17, at 10 a.m., in order to discuss recognition and a contract. It was also
disclosed in the letter that the Union would be prepared at this meeting "to demon-
strate to any impartial party proof of its designation
On April 13, Local 8 also filed a petition for an election although it had not yet
received, of course, a reply to its letter. Doubtless, it was because this petition had
been filed that on April 14 William A. Stringer, who is the Respondent's yardmaster
in charge of its Jacksonville, Florida, operations, received a telephone call from
Mel Stadler, one of the field examiners in the Tampa Regional Office of the Board.
In this telephone conversation, Stadler asked Stringer whether he had received
Local 8's letter, and what he planned to do. Stringer informed Stadler that he would
have to take this problem up with the Respondent's office in Miami.
Before the Respondent could reply to Hicks' letter of April 13, it received from
him on April 20 another letter dated April 17. In this letter, Hicks reiterated the
claim of representation and the offer of proof of representation made in his letter of
April 13 but concluded: "If for any reason you are unwilling to grant representa-
tion to this Organization as the representative of the foregoing employees without an
election conducted by the National Labor Relations Board, please let me know
whether you will agree to the holding by that agency of a consent election "
Stringer had no knowledge of Local 8's organizing activities until he received the
telephone call from Stadler. Upon receiving Hicks' letter of April 13, he contacted
B. D. Thouvenelle, the general manager of TMT in Miami, who instructed him to
contact Ray C. Muller, the Respondent's attorney, and after further consultation
between Thouvenelle, Stringer, and Muller, a letter dated April 21 was prepared for
Thouvenelle's signature and sent to Hicks. This letter was as follows
Mr. William Stringer, our Jacksonville manager, has forwarded your letter of
April 13, 1964, to me. Also, Mr. Stringer has been advised by the National
Labor Relations [Board] that your union has filed a petition for an election.
Under the circumstances, we feel that the best method for handling the
matter is to let the N.L.R.B conduct an election so that both the union and
the company have the benefit of the government's certification. We believe
your organization would prefer certification and our company would prefer
to deal with a certified union.
I understand that the local Jacksonville office of the N L R B. will now begin
to process your petition and, thus, we must await the results of an election before
commencing contract negotiations.
Due to inability to agree on what would constitute an appropriate unit of the
Respondent's employees, apparently, it did not prove possible to arrange a consent
election. A hearing was held, therefore, on Local 8's petition of April 13. The
hearing was held on May 4, and the S.I.U. intervened in the proceeding. On May 21,
1964, the Regional Director issued his Decision and Direction of Election. An
election was scheduled for June 17 but before the election could be held Local 8
withdrew its petition and filed the unfair labor practice charges leading to the
present proceeding.
B. The alleged violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
1. Stringer's speeches
Most of the alleged violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act are based on state-
ments made by Stringer in two speeches which he delivered to the employees. The
first of these speeches was delivered a few days after the hearing on the Union's
election petition on May 4. The second of the speeches was delivered a few days
before the scheduled election of June 17. Both speeches were delivered in the ware-
house to both the warehouse employees and to the stevedores or longshoremen.
TMT TRAILER FERRY, INC. 1499
In both instances Stringer read from a prepared text. In the posthearing speech,
which does not cover more than two pages in double space, he informed the employ-
ees that he had heard from Local 8 "about two months ago," and that now there
were two unions, Local 8 and the S I.U., who seemed to be anxious to take care of
them. The reason for their interest in the employees, he declared, was that the
unions were after their money in the form of dues but, he also told them, they had
a perfect right to tell the Unions' organizers to go away. In two short paragraphs
of the speech, Stringer then referred to the role of the hiring hall in providing jobs
for the employees. These two paragraphs were as follows:
Fellows, I think you've got pretty good jobs here. I know this you don't
have to pay a union dues to go through some hiring hall.
And let's look at the hiring hall a minute. I know for a fact that one of their
unions has got only about fifty jobs to give out, but they already have 150 men
waiting. Where does that leave you? You know the answer as well as I do.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Stringer's preelection speech was even briefer than his posthearing speech. After
referring to and explaining the mechanics of voting in the scheduled election, he
continued as follows:
Over the past couple of weeks, I know one of the unions has been buying a
lot of beer-and I guess one of the union organizers has been drinking a lot of
beer, too. Let me say this about these beer parties: drink all the union beer
you want, but when you get in that voting booth, vote what is best for you.
If you think you owe someone your vote for a couple of beers, you're not as
smart as I think you are. My guess is that just one month's dues from you all
would be about 1/10 the cost of a beer party.
Fellows, let's face the facts- the unions only want your money. They want
your dues and what they can squeeze out in assessments.
With all this, I know there are going to be some votes for the unions. Some
fellows never learn. I want to tell you a little story. When I was a kid I lived
on a farm. I had a real pretty black horse that was kept in the best pasture
near the house. Well, that horse wanted to get in the next pasture, full of
rocks, and would keep cutting his throat on the barbed wire just trying. He
would never learn. Some people are like that horse. They never learn, but
they cut their own throats trying.
When you come down to it, the unions can't give you anything and they
can't guarantee you anything. All they can do is take your money.
Fellows, you don't need them. Tell them so with a big neither vote.
I perceive nothing in the text of either the first or the second speech that transcends
the privilege of Section 8(c) of the Act, despite the effort to represent everything
that Stringer said on either occasion as extremely insidious. Even his statement that
he had heard from Local 8 about 2 months previously is attacked, since in fact it was
less than a month before the meeting at which the first speech was delivered. A good
deal is also attempted to be made of Stringer's remarks about the hiring hall, which
are represented as a threat that the lashing crew would lose their jobs, and which
are denounced as false. Moreover, in fact, Local 8 did not have 150 men on the
bench waiting for only 50 jobs Surely, this is hyperbolic. In commenting on the
possible result of recruiting the lashing crews, whose work was irregular, through a
union hiring hall, Stringer was referring to a situation which had existed at TMT in
the not very distant past. When the contract with the S.I.U. had been in force, the
lashing crews had been obtained through the union, but this system had been aban-
doned, and for some time before Stringer's speech, they had been obtained directly
through Gordon "Dump" Simmons, one of the stevedores who lived on the New
Berlin Road and who was the only one of them who boasted a telephone. Stringer
was merely arguing that the "Dump" system was more advantageous to the lashing
crew than a union hiring hall could be. Since he was not stating what he or the
company would do but what would result from the operation of a system over
which neither he nor the company had had any control, he was engaged in making
an argument rather than in uttering a threat. Finally, if it is legitimate at all to
judge Stringer's remark on the number of men who were on the bench by the effect
of the remark on his audience, it is not without significance that not a single one
of the witnesses who testified concerning what Stringer said about hiring halls had
any recollection whatsoever that he had cited any specific figures. As for the alleged
falsity of Stringer's figures, while it is true that Hicks, the secretary-treasurer of
1500 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Local 8, did testify that during the first few months of 1964 the Local never had
more than half a dozen of its members unemployed at any one time, and that it did
not have as many as 150 members, applicants for employment who were not mem-
bers of the Local could have been using its hiring hall . Stringer never identified,
moreover , the Union to which he was referring . In his comment on the hiring hall,
he was simply repeating what Carl Lawrence , a representative of another union, the
NMU, had told him. There is nothing to show, furthermore , that Stringer did not
believe in good faith what Lawrence had told him.
The objections to the text of Stringer 's preelection speech seem to be no more
valid than those to the posthearing speech. Stringer 's comments on the Unions' beer
parties are not attacked as having no foundation in fact, and do not otherwise con-
stitute impermissible argument . Stringer's picturesque parable about the horse was
not rendered more insidious by its context , which was an appeal to the employees
to vote against the unions , nor by the remark which followed it to the effect that
unions could not guarantee to get the employees anything This was not equivalent
to a threat that Stringer would do anything to render futile any efforts which they
might make.
I credit Stringer 's testimony that he did not vary from the texts in delivering either
his first or his second speech. But , after each of his speeches , he did ask whether
there were any questions , and during each of these question periods he did make a
few additional remarks. Just what these remarks were and exactly what questions
occasioned them is, however , veiled in the greatest obscurity . Once the texts of the
speeches are put aside , the rest is terra incognita . Counsel for the General Counsel
called five witnesses who attempted to testify concerning what Stringer had said either
in his speeches or in the question periods following the speeches . Not all of the
witnesses had been present on both occasions but even those who were had , for the
most part, only the vaguest recollections of Stringer 's remarks Although per-
sistently questioned , two of the witnesses kept repeating that they really could not
remember very much.5 Two other witnesses remembered , apparently , too much, for
they testified concerning what Stringer said at a meeting which they did not attend.ii
As for the Respondent 's sole witness , who was, of course, Stringer , he was just as hope-
less as the General Counsel's witnesses when it came to testifying as to anything he
said that was not in one of his speeches. For example , Manning had testified that
Stringer had said in his first speech that in the event of a strike the strikers could be
replaced. Although Stringer had not included any such statement either in his first or
in his second speech , as the texts of these speeches clearly shows , he nevertheless
testified both that he had made such a statement in one of his speeches , although he
was not sure whether it was in his first or in his second speech, and that he made such
a statement in response to a question after one of his speeches . In any event, it is
clear that , whenever Stringer may have made the statement about strikers being sub-
ject to replacement , he was doing no more than stating a prerogative undoubtedly
possessed by employers who have not committed any unfair labor practices
A particularly strenuous attempt was made by counsel for the General Counsel to
establish that Stringer during the first meeting with the employees had asked them
during the question period whether they had any complaints or gripes . But this
attempt produced only the usual confusion and uncertainty . Of the three witnesses
who testified on this subject , Hodges, Simmons , and Manning , the first two were the
most hopeless of the General Counsel's witnesses . Simmons positively denied that
Stringer had asked whether there were any complaints or gripes . In response to
repeated leading questions , Hodges and Manning were finally induced to say that they
thought Stringer had asked about gripes or complaints but the context of their testi-
mony shows that what Stringer probably asked was whether they had any questions.
Stringer himself , when pressed on cross-examination to state whether he had asked
the employees during his first speech whether they had any complaints or gripes,
replied : "I asked them if they had any complaints in so many wands I don 't remem-
ber exactly what the words were." [Emphasis supplied ] This is so obviously non-
'These two witnesses were Lester Hodges , Jr, and Gordon "Dump" Simmons Hodges
could not remember , even approximately , when each of the speeches was delivered,
or which speech came first Simmons , who seemed similarly at sea , disclosed that his
memory was not refreshed even after he had been shown his own statement and he had
read it
6 Thus, John Manning testified as to what Stringer had said in each of his speeches,
although the prehearing statement given by him indicates that he heard only one of
Stringer 's speeches Robert Hunter testified that he heard Stringer ' s remarks about the
hiring hall , although admittedly , he had not been present when Stringer delivered the
posthearing speech
TMT TRAILER FERRY, INC. 1501
sensical that it is apparent that Stringer's answer was incorrectly reported.? Actually,
the record as a whole shows that Stringer sedulously avoided answering any question
that might lead to the inference that he was either withholding or promising benefits.8
Thus, when a question was put to him about raises he declined to answer it, pleading
what amounts to the Fifth Amendment in labor cases In these circumstances, he
would hardly be inviting not only questions but complaints about working conditions.
2. The liberalization of the Blue Cross-Blue Shield benefits
The most fully authenticated question put to Stringer at either of the meetings
addressed by him was one relating to the Respondent's Blue Cross-Blue Shield pro-
gram, which had been inaugurated in 1955 but which covered only regular full-time
employees. When at the conclusion of his posthearing speech, Stringer asked for
questions, "Dump" Simmons, who was a longshoreman, and who, therefore, worked
only part time or irregularly, spoke up and asked, apparently, about hospitalization
benefits for the lashing crew, and Stringer simply replied that he would look into it.
Apparently, the Respondent's Blue Cross-Blue Shield program was on an annual
basis, and the policy had to be renewed each spring. In January 1964, when the
Respondent was making up its budget, Thouvenelle and Stringer had a discussion
about insurance benefits in which they considered whether to extend the health pro-
gram or provide life insurance for the employees. They decided that the coverage of
the Blue Cross-Blue Shield program should be extended but they left working out the
details to the Respondent's auditor, Thelma Garner, who had been very much in
favor of covering the regular part-time employees. In her discussion with a Blue
Cross-Blue Shield representative it was finally decided that not only should the pro-
tection afforded to regular full-time employees be liberalized but also that the lashing
crew should be covered. This decision was definitely reached by the end of March
1964, and it is apparent, therefore, that the decision to cover the lashing crew preceded
the appearance of the Union on the scene. The implementation of the program,
which required filling out new applications by all the employees, was carried out
later, of course. The part-time employees made applications in May 1964 and were
covered as of July 1, 1964. Although Stringer knew the answer to "Dump" Simmons'
question when it was put to him, he refrained from giving it because of the general
instruction that he had received not to make any announcement that might be con-
strued as a promise of benefits In fact no announcement was made about the
liberalization of the Blue Cross-Blue Shield program at any time-not even after the
lashing crew had already filed their applications for coverage.
It is charged in the complaint, apparently, that the liberalization of the Blue Cross-
Blue Shield program constituted a violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. This must
be upon the theory that it constituted the conferment of benefit, or the promise of a
benefit. Certainly, this was the theory upon which the issue was litigated. There is,
however, no convincing evidence that it was motivated, either in its conception or
implementation, by a desire to persuade the employees to reject the Union.
3 The supposed interrogations of Manning and Hunter
It was not alleged in the complaint in the present case that the Respondent had
caused any of its employees to be interrogated. But after Manning had testified about
his Blue Cross policy, he was asked by counsel for the General Counsel- "After his
speech that Mr. Stringer gave you-this refers to his post-hearing speech-that you
just testified to, did you have a conversation personally with Mr. Stringer later that
day9" Manning's answer to this question was- "Later that day, he came over and he
talked to me in a joking way." Asked what Stringer had said, Manning testified-
He said, what are you trying to do, John, f-k me up? "So we both smiled
at him. I told him, "No, what do you mean9 I don't get it." He said "You
know about this union." I said, "This is the first I heard of it. You know, I
wouldn't do anything like that to you Mr. Stringer." So he laughed and got in
his car.
'The record is replete with such instances Subsequent to the hearing counsel for the
General Counsel made a motion to correct the record in many respects but the motion
does not begin to exhaust the number of errors that manifestly were made . Counsel, as
well as the Trial Examiner , are not infrequently reduced to incoherence . This is not in
itself very important , since the statements of counsel and the Trial Examiner are not
evidence . But the occasional misreporting of the testimony of the witnesses is far more
unfortunate.
s This was, apparently, the result of instructions that he had received.
1 502 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATION'S BOARD
It is apparent that this was mere banter on Stringer 's part, and that Manning was
well aware that Stringer was only joking . I find no violation , therefore , in their inter-
change of remarks.
When issued , the complaint in this case also failed to allege that Hunter had been
interrogated by Muller, the Respondent 's attorney , but this allegation was added at
the hearing before the taking of testimony had commenced . After Local 8 had with-
drawn from the election , and the complaint had been issued in the present case,
Muller, in preparation for the expected hearing, interviewed Thomas and Hunter
with the object of securing statements from them. Although Thomas was called as a
witness to testify on behalf of the General Counsel , and testified adversely to the
Respondent , he was not even questioned about his interview with Muller . It is fair
to assume from this that Muller said and did nothing unlawful or even improper.
However, Hunter did testify that in the interview with him Muller asked him what
he thought about the Union, and that he at once informed Muller that he could be
fired if he talked to him about the Union . In deference to the canon of professional
ethics that discourages testimony by attorneys , Muller did not take the stand to deny
Hunter's testimony but I do not credit it anyway . I regard Hunter as so untrust-
worthy a witness that I do not credit any of his testimony unless corroborated I
certainly agree with the statement made by Hunter himself in testifying about his
interview with Muller: "I am not too good at remembering things ...." I find noth-
ing unlawful in Muller's interview with either Thomas or Hunter.
4. The encounter between Hunter and Stringer at the hearing
Hunter, who had been the prime mover in getting the Respondent 's employees to
sign Local 8 authorization cards , was no longer employed by the Respondent at the
time of the hearing. He had left the Respondent's employ as of Labor Day 1964 in
order to start a business of his own . Before doing so, however , he had paid a visit
to Stringer at the latter's home to discuss his plans. He asked Stringer whether, if his
business venture did not work out , he could come back to work for TMT, and
Stringer told him that he would take him back if he had anything for him to do.
On Monday morning, October 12, 1964, which was the day the present hearing
opened, Hunter, who had been subpenaed as a witness, encountered Stringer in the
hallway of the floor of the building where the hearing was being held. They shook
hands, and , according to Hunter 's testimony on direct examination , the following
conversation between him and Stringer occurred:
. he [Stringer] asked me how I was and I said, "Fine ." And he said I wished
that it was all over because I was losing time and money and in turn he said,
"I hope nothing comes of this for your sake ." I said I was not concerned about
it. [Emphasis supplied.]
On cross-examination , Hunter gave a slightly different version of the conversation, as
follows:
Q. You both stopped?
A. Stopped and shook hands. He said, "How you doing Bob?" I said, "Fine."
Q. Go ahead , what else did he say?
A. He in turn said, "How is everything going?" I said , "I need to be there.
I wish this thing would get over with . I am losing time and money ." He said,
"I do too, I hope nothing ever comes of it for your benefit."
Q. Anything else that was said?
A. I said , "I do too. I need to get back there."
Q. Did Mr. Stringer say anything else?
A About that time Mr. Westheimer (counsel for the General Counsel)
came around through past us in the passageway and we broke it up and I
in turn came and walked in here with Mr. Stringer.
Q. You didn 't tell Mr. Westheimer about this conversation until today?
A. That is right , sir. [Emphasis supplied].
Stringer himself testified as follows with respect to his conversation with Hunter
during their encounter:
Q. Just tell us what was said in the conversation yesterday.
A. I said to him, "This here is kind of a bad time for you ," or "This hearing
is a bad time for you." And he said , "I'm not worrying about that ." I said,
"It is costing you money ." And he tells me he has 11 men working down there.
Mr. MULLER : Just tell us what he said.
TMT TRAILER FERRY, INC. 1503
The WITNESS: "11 men sitting down there doing nothing and it is costing
him money" that is as near as I can remember of the conversation. And I
said, "Bob, if I can do anything for you I will do it." And he said, I will be
around in January. I want some of your business.
Q. [By Mr. MULLER] Did you say anything about this hearing that it had
better come out right for you for his sake?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Did you say anything like, "It's bad for you to be involved in a hearing
like this?"
A. I did.
Q. What were your comments concerning that?
A I said, "It is unfortunate because when something like this gets around
when you start in business people might not think well of it." That was my
comment. [Emphasis supplied.]
I credit Stringer's candid version of the conversation between him and Hunter
on this occasion but it is evident even from Hunter's testimony that it was he
rather than Stringer who initiated the conversation by bemoaning the fact that his
attendance at the hearing was interfering with the conduct of his business. Such a
remark by Hunter was under the circumstances virtually an open invitation to
Stringer to speculate on the possible effect on his business prospects of Hunter's
appearance at the hearing as a witness not for management but for a labor union.
Such a remark by Stringer was not menacing, since it did not imply that he would
take any action to see to it that Hunter was penalized, and, since in fact he actually
offered to help Hunter in his business. This offer may well explain the rather curious
fact that, although Hunter encountered counsel for the General Counsel immediately
after his conversation with Stringer he failed to mention it, and waited until the
next day to unburden himself. Apparently, Hunter needed time for reflection before
coming to the conclusion that he had been "threatened."
On the basis of Hunter's testimony, counsel for the General Counsel moved to
amend the complaint to allege that Stringer had threatened Hunter in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The evidence is inadequate to support this allegation
but even if it were it is very much to be doubted that Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
had been violated. Hunter was no longer employed by the Respondent at the time
of the hearing. The alleged threat was not even made in the presence of any of the
Respondent's employees, and the testimony concerning the alleged threat was not
even given in the presence of any of the Respondent's employees who were present
at the hearing, for they had been excluded from the hearing room long before
Hunter's testimony concerning his encounter with Stringer had been given. In
these circumstances, the alleged threat would not have had the necessary effect of
interfering with the exercise of the Section 7 rights of any of the present employees.9
5. The alleged curtailment of telephone privileges
There is also no allegation in the complaint in which the Respondent is charged
with curtailing the telephone privileges of the employees after the hearing on the
election petition. But counsel for the General Counsel sought to litigate this issue
at the hearing, and counsel for the Respondent did not object that he was going
beyond the scope of the complaint. The issue may, therefore, be considered.
Unfortunately, the evidence relating to this issue is rather obscure. Only three
of the witnesses for the General Counsel-Thomas, Manning, and Hunter-testified
with respect to difficulties which they had in trying to make or receiving telephone
calls but it is not easy to tell from their testimony what telephone they had in mind,
or whether it was padlocked or taped up. Thomas testified with respect to the
padlocking of a dock telephone that went through the office switchboard. Manning
testified about a dock telephone that was taped up. Hunter testified that he found
a lock on the telephone when he attempted to make a telephone call. From
Stringer's testimony it finally emerged that there were, apparently, two telephones
that had been used by employees. One was on the dock area near the river, and it
was installed several years ago as a direct line. It was found, however, that prac-
tically everybody on the river was using it, and it was finally padlocked. It seems,
moreover, that the padlock was repeatedly broken, and that it had to be repadlocked
again and again. The other telephone, which is on the dock where the freight is
loaded into the trailers-this would be, apparently, near the warehouse-went through
9 See, for instance. Local 150, International Union of Operating Engineers, et at.
(Frisch Contracting Service Company, Inc ), 149 NLRB 29
1504 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the office switchboard, and it was this telephone which seems to have been taped up
either in April or May 1964. It is perfectly clear that the union situation had
absolutely nothing to do with the padlocked telephone on the dock down by the
river. As for the telephone that was taped up, Manning, the only witness who
seems to have testified clearly about this telephone, admitted that he had previously
been personally warned against using this telephone.lo Stringer testified that action
was taken to tape up the telephone because its use was being abused, and there is
no good reason for doubting his testimony. The telephone may have been taped
up, moreover, even before the Union asked for recognition.
I do not find that the Respondent committed any independent violations of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act There is a complete absence in the present case of those other
means which are commonly used by antiunion employers to defeat union campaigns,
such as private and systematic interrogations of employees, and coercive activities
by the whole supervisory staff. Indeed, such means could not have been employed
in the present case because the union campaign was over almost before it began:
it was an example of instant unionism. The only planned activity in the present
case, consisting of Stringer's two speeches, was undertaken weeks after all the author-
ization cards were signed This activity was, moreover, wholly overt. I have taken
this circumstance into consideration in concluding that Stringer's remarks could not
have had a coercive effect upon those employees who heard his speeches. For the
rest, the General Counsel's case seems to consist of bits and pieces that were formed
into a patchwork quilt as the hearing proceeded. I can find in this patchwork, how-
ever, no meaningful pattern of unfair labor practices. Even if I were to conclude
that one or two questionable incidents occurred, I should have to consider them
as haphazard and isolated.
C. The alleged violations of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act
The Respondent interposes two defenses to these allegations: (1) that it had a
good-faith doubt that Local 8 represented a majority of its employees, and (2) that
Local 8 did not in fact represent a majority of its employees when it requested
recognition.
The Respondent's contention that it had a good-faith doubt concerning Local 8's
representative status is based on several factors. These are: (1) In view of its
past relations with the S.I.U., which have already been described, and still continuing
contacts with William "Red" Morris, the S.I.U. representative, it had reason to
believe that many of its employees still belonged to the S.I.U.; (2) the unit claimed
as appropriate by Local 8 differed from the unit previously certified by the Board
in 1961; and (3) although the union was requesting recognition on the basis of a
card check, it had simultaneously filed a petition for an election.
Each of the reasons that are advanced as justification for the existence of a good-
faith doubt on the part of the Respondent has a certain degree of plausibility. Inso-
far as the doubt was based on the past bargaining history of TMT, Stringer and
Thouvenelle had some reason for assuming that many of their employees were still
members of the S.I.U. But changes in union affiliation, even in the course of a few
years, can hardly be said to be an unfamiliar phenomenon. Whether such a change
had in fact occurred, and to what extent, is precisely what would be revealed by the
card check which the Union suggested. To be sure, dual unionism is not unknown,
but an examination of Local 8's authorization cards would also have revealed that
the employees who signed them had expressly revoked the authority of any other
union to represent them. Insofar as the Respondent's doubt was based on the
appropriateness of the unit, it is true that the S.I.U. had represented only the steve-
dores, or longshoremen. But, prior to the certification of the S.I.U., the Board had
shown a willingness to include also the warehouse employees if they should vote for
inclusion as a group. It was only when the warehouse employees voted against
inclusion in the bargaining unit that they were excluded. As for the Respondent's
third and last ground for doubt, namely the filing of a petition for an election on
the same day as the demand for recognition, this has perhaps the greatest degree of
plausibility, for it might well be argued that this in itself showed that Local 8 was
not very sure of its ground. I am aware that the Board held in Dan River Mills, Incor-
porated, Alabama Division, 121 NLRB 645, that the almost simultaneous filing of
an election petition with the making of a demand for recognition was insufficient to
establish the existence of a good-faith doubt, and that the Board seems to have
ID Although Thomas testified about a padlocked telephone, he may have been referring
to the taped-up telephone, since he spoke of its going through the switchboard in the office.
TMT TRAILER FERRY, INC. 1505
adhered to the rationale of this decision in Rea Construction Company, 137 NLRB"
1769, despite the denial of judicial enforcement to the Dan River Mills decision 11
However, there are distinguishing features between the present case and the earlier
decisions, since the filing of the petition in the present case was not only strictly
simultaneous with the making of the demand for recognition but the Union also
followed up the filing of the petition within a few days by addressing another letter
to the Respondent in which, while reiterating its claim to recognition, it nevertheless
also inquired whether the Respondent would consent to an election.12 In the earlier
decisions, moreover, the respondents were found guilty of the commission of serious
unfair labor practices which in themselves were sufficient to negative the existence
of good-faith doubt.
I see no need to decide in the present case, however, whether the Respondent in
fact entertained a good-faith doubt that Local 8 represented a majority of its
employees, since I find no satisfactory evidence that the Union did represent a
majority of the Respondent's employees who were subsequently found by the
Regional Director to constitute the appropriate bargaining unit. The failure of
such proof is itself sufficient to prevent a finding of violation of Section 8(a)(5)
of the Act.13
In his Decision and Direction of Election the Regional Director found the appro-
priate unit of the Respondent's employees to be as follows:
All employees of the Employer at its Jacksonville, Florida, operation, includ-
ing warehouse employees, and stevedores; but excluding office clerical employ-
ees, professional employees, watchmen, guards, and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
As the stevedores worked irregularly, it was necessary to adopt a standard of
eligibility for these part-time employees, and the Regional Director adopted the
standard approved by the Board in Case No. 12-RM-30, which was based upon a
minimum of 100 hours worked during the year preceding the eligibility date. In
view of the existence of a dispute concerning the eligibility of four of the employees,
namely E. Hutto, Eldon Stewart, Francis Stringer, and Winfield Lamb, the Regional
Director also specifically held that the first three named were not supervisory employ-
ees and so eligible to vote, but that Lamb was an office clerical employee, and so not
eligible to vote. The respondent failed to appeal from the Regional Director's deci-
cision, which therefore, became final.
At the opening of the hearing, counsel for the General Counsel offered in evidence
three documents as his Exhibits Nos. 5(a), 5(b), and 5(c). Exhibit No. 5(b) is a
four-page document showing all the hours worked by stevedores for the period from
April 1, 1963, through March 31, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the lashing-crew
list). Exhibit No. 5(c) is a one-page list of employees who were on the payroll
of the Respondent for the payroll period ending May 20, 1964 (hereinafter referred
to as the bargaining-unit list). Exhibit No. 5(a) is a covering memorandum dated
June 16, 1964, from Muller, the Respondent's attorney, to Stadler, the field examiner
in the Jacksonville office of the Board, explaining the nature of the lashing-crew list,
and the bargaining-unit list. It is stated in this memorandum that there have been
no changes in eligibility between the terminal date of the lashing-crew list and the
date of the Union's demand for recognition, or between the date of the Union's
demand for recognition and the date of the bargaining-unit list. It is also stated
in the memorandum that the names of the employees on the bargaining-unit list
that are underlined represent "permanent" employees. What this actually means is
that these were the regular, full-time employees as distinguished from the lashing
crew.
It is apparent that the lashing-crew list is only a subsidiary list. It is the bargaining
unit list that must be used for determining the number of employees in the bargaining
unit. The bargaining-unit list contains the names of 41 employees, of whom 13
were regular full-time employees, and 28 were members of the lashing crew. It is
a rather anomalous aspect of the present case, however, that counsel for the General
Counsel attempted to impeach the accuracy of the bargaining-unit list despite the
fact that he had himself offered it in evidence shortly after the opening of the hearing,
"See 274 F 2d 381, 386-389 (CA 5).
12 Compare S. Frederick Sansone, d/b/a S. Frederick Sansone Co , 127 NLRB 1301,
1314-1315, and Cactus Petroleum, Inc, 134 NLRB 1254.
18 See Gulf Bottlers , Inc, 127 NLRB 850, 875.
789-730-66-vol. 152-96
1506 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
without any reservations or qualifications , apparently . He later contended, how-
ever , that at least 10 of the lashing crew 14 whose names appear on the bargaining-
unit list should not have been included. This contention was based on two grounds,
the first being , apparently , that they did not work in 1964. This was true 15 but it is
quite immaterial , since they would be nonetheless eligible if they had worked 100
hours in the latter part of 1963. The second ground on which the accuracy of the
bargaining -unit list is attacked is that the same 10 members of the lashing crew were
not covered when in May 1964 the Blue Cross -Blue Shield coverage was extended.
Again it is true that these employees were not then covered but there is nothing to
show that the basis of coverage was eligibility for inclusion in the bargaining unit
Coverage was extended to regular full-time employees hired since the last effective
coverage date and to all part-time employees-not just stevedores-who under Blue
Cross-Blue Shield regulations were eligible. All those whom counsel for the Gen-
eral Counsel would exclude did not work at all in 1964, although they had worked
the requisite number of hours in 1963, and they may well have been excluded from
Blue Cross -Blue Shield coverage because of their failure to work in 1964. More-
over , the transmitted lists for coverage'(; sent by the Respondent to Blue Cross-Blue
Shield were mailed on May 11 and 15, 1964 , and changes in employment could have
occurred since the lashing-crew list had been prepared . For example , counsel for
the General Counsel contends that two employees whose names appear on both the
earlier transmittal list, and the lashing-crew list, namely John Solomon and Jessie
Clay Simmons , should be added to the bargaining unit. The lashing crew list shows
that Simmons worked 14 hours in 1964, and that Solomon worked 341/2 hours in
1964. although neither had worked in 1963. Since they clearly had not worked the
requisite 100 hours , they were not eligible for inclusion in the bargaining unit but
they may well have been eligible for insurance coverage either because their jobs
had changed or for other reasons. I know of no legal maxim like "once a stevedore
always a stevedore ." The speculations and surmises of counsel are not evidence.
Counsel for the General Counsel also contended that Clifford Williams, whose
name appears on the bargaining -unit list 17 should be excluded as a supervisor but
the evidence does not support this contention. Williams appears to be no more than
a pusher of the crews handling freight in the warehouse, and who works along with
them. His status is the same as that of Eldon Stewart , who performs the same
function in the yard , and who has been specifically found by the Regional Director
to be a nonsupervisory employee.
I find, therefore , that the bargaining unit consists of the 41 employees on the
bargaining-unit list. To establish that on April 15 Is it represented a majority of
the Respondent 's employees , Local 8 must show that it then had authorization cards
from 22 of the 41 employees in the bargaining unit . There are in evidence 24 such
authorization cards, which are dated April 12 or 13, 1964.19 However, the author-
ization cards of John Solomon and Jessie Clay Simmons, who may not properly be
included in the bargaining unit, must be disregarded . This leaves Local 8 with 22
authorization cards but 2 of these cards, those of Thomas Allen Peacock and
William G. Sharpe ,20 were obtained under such circumstances that these cards must
also be disregarded.
"These 10 are Larry Boardman, Kermit C. Green, Sr., Clarence Harmon, Lester
Hodges, Sr., Phillip J. Lowery, William L. Morris, John D. Piver, Leslie R. Smith, Walter
E. Smith, and Dewey C. Spalding
15 Counsel for the General Counsel spent a good deal of time questioning one of his
witnesses , Stoy Thomas , as to whether he had ever seen any of the 10 at work in 1964
He elicited from Thomas testimony that he had not seen the following at work at any
time in 1964: Larry Boardman, Kermit C. Green, Sr , Lester Hodges, Sr , and Dewey
C. Spalding. But this inactivity, as well as the inactivity of others of the 10, was already
shown by the lashing crew list
ie They are in evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit Nos 2(a) and 2(b)
"His name is erroneously given on this list as "Cris" Williams.
18 The date as of when a Union 's majority is to be determined is the date of the receipt
of its request for bargaining rather than the date when its request was sent See Rea
Construction Company, 137 NLRB 1769, 1770, and earlier authorities there cited
19 All the cards in evidence are dated April 12, except the cards of Stewart Lester
Thomas, Williams G Sharpe, Isaac Roberts, and Thomas Allen Peacock. These four
cards are dated April 13
"Both Peacock and Sharpe were regular, full-time employees, working as checkers
The two were also brothers-in-law
TMT TRAILER FERRY, INC. 1507
On Monday morning,21 when they arrived to go to work, they found Robert
Hunter waiting for them as they got out of their car. They were in a hurry to
punch in but they were approached by Hunter, who asked them to sign union cards.
Hunter told them that everybody else had already signed union cards, and that if
they would sign, it would be a hundred percent. So Peacock and Sharpe signed
the cards. But later in the day they talked it over, and decided that they did not
really know what they had signed, or what they were getting into. They kept talking
about it all day Tuesday and finally decided that Sharpe should ask Hunter to return
their cards. Sharpe spoke to Hunter on Wednesday, and asked the latter to return
his card and Peacock's. Hunter told Sharpe that he and Peacock could have their
cards back but he never actually returned them. I credit the testimony of Peacock
and Sharpe.
Considering that less than a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit had
signed union authorization cards, what Hunter told Peacock and Sharpe, in order to
induce them to sign such cards, seems to me to have constituted a gross misrepre-
sentation. Bandwagon psychology is always an important factor in inducing hesitant
employees to sign union authorization cards. By falsely creating this bandwagon
psychology, Hunter was engaged in deceiving the two employees.
I am aware that it has been held in a number of earlier cases that when union
solicitors told employees that a majority of the other employees had already signed
authorization cards they were only engaged in sales talk, and that what was said was
not a material misrepresentation.22 But the conclusions in these cases were but-
tressed by such props as that the evidence did not show affirmatively that the repre-
sentation made had been untrue, or that the employer had engaged in so many other
unfair labor practices than a refusal to bargain that he could not be heard seriously
to complain that the Union did not represent a majority of his employees. In any
event, these cases date from the period when the Board seemed to subscribe to the
doctrine that virtually nothing that a union solicitor told an employee could affect
the validity of his act in signing a union authorization card. This rationale is incon-
sistent, however, with the reasoning in the more recent decision of Englewood
Lumber Company, 130 NLRB 394, a leading case, which seems to espouse the doc-
trine that what employees are actually told to induce them to sign union authorization
cards does matter. In view of the rationale of Englewood, and the patent falsity
of the representation in the present case that all the other employees had already
signed union authorization cards, I do not believe that I am bound to follow the
decisions in the earlier cases. It is significant that in the still more recent case of
Ottenheimer and Company, Inc., 144 NLRB 38, the Board avoided, moreover, the
necessity of deciding the effect upon the validity of authorization cards of a repre-
sentation to the signers that a majority of the other employees had signed such
cards 23
The authorization cards of Peacock and Sharpe must also be disregarded, more-
over, because they were revoked on or before April 15, the very day that the Respond-
ent received Local 8's letter requesting recognition. It is well settled that union
authorization cards may be revoked 24 and, certainly, where, as here, the revocation
has been communicated to the Union's agent (namely, Hunter), the revocation is,
clearly, effective.25
As the authorization cards of Peacock and Sharpe may not be counted, Local 8
fell short at least by two of having a majority in the bargaining unit. While this is
In his cross-examination of Peacock and Sharpe, counsel for the General Counsel
assumed that it had been established that the Monday morning during which they signed
their cards was April 13 Actually, it is evident from their testimony that neither of
them had any personal recollection of the date.
22 See E. H. Sai gent and Co , a corporation, 99 NLRB 1318, 1322-1323 ; Hari y Epstein
at at, d/b/a Top Mode Manufacturing Co., 97 NLRB 1273, 1296 ; H Rohtstein & Co ,
120 NLRB 1556, enfg. in part and denying in part 266 F. 2d 407, 409-410 (CA 1).
' Two members of the panel who decided the Ottcnheimer case took the position that
it was unnecessary to determine this, since there was no evidence that the representation
was in fact false The third member of the panel took the position, however, that the
cards of the signers who had been told that a majority of the employees had already
signed authorization cards should not be counted. He relied, apparently, at least in part
upon the reversal of the Board's decision in the Rohtstein case
2i See N.L.R.B. v. West Ohio Gas Company, 172 F. 2d 685 (C.A 6) ; N.L R B. v. Reeder
Motor Co., 202 F. 2d 802, 803 (C A. 6) ; N.L.R.B. v. Abrasive Salvage Company, Inc ,
285 F 2d 552, 555 (C.A. 7).
25 Compare Tinley Park Dairy Co., d/b/a Country Lane Food Store, 142 NLRB 683, 686
1508 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sufficient to dispose of its claim of majority representation, there are actually some
other reasons for doubting it. The principal doubt must arise from the unsatisfactory
nature of the evidence as to when all the authorization cards were actually signed.
Only eight of the employees who signed union authorization cards testified concerning
them at the hearing, and most of them were not even asked whether their cards were
correctly dated. One of them, Manning, was asked whether he had filled in the
date on his card and replied in the negative. Nevertheless, it may be inferred from
the circumstantial evidence relating to the signing of the cards that Manning, as well
as the other employees, who were witnesses and identified their cards, probably
signed them either on April 12 or 13. All the other cards were introduced into
evidence through Hunter, however, and the dates they bear are somewhat suspect.
Hunter himself admitted that he had filled in the date on Leroy Mayer's card, and
an examination of the handwriting on the cards themselves indicates that he also
dated at least a dozen others. When he was asked about the dating of the cards, his
answer was not very positive. Thus, he testified:
Q. They [the union authorization cards] were all signed on the dates that
they bear?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are you sure about that?
A. To the best of my knowledge, that's correct. [Emphasis supplied.]
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., is an employer engaged in com-
merce, or in an industry affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union, Associated Maritime Workers Local No. 8, affiliated with the
International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, AFL-CIO, is a labor orga-
nization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All the employees of the Respondent at its Jacksonville, Florida, operation,
including warehouse employees and stevedores but excluding office clerical employees,
watchmen, guards, and supervisors, as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appro-
priate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b)
of the Act. (The term "stevedores," as used herein, refers only to those stevedores
who worked a minimum of 100 hours, preceding April 15, 1964.) .
4. Associated Maritime Workers Local No. 8 did not on April 15, 1964, represent
a majority of the Respondent's employees in the bargaining unit found to be appro-
priate, and the Respondent by refusing to recognize the Union and to enter into
collective bargaining with it did not commit any unfair labor practice affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
5. By extending Blue Cross-Blue Shield coverage to its part-time employees with-
out consultation with or bargaining with the Union concerning the same, the
Respondent also did not commit any unfair labor practices affecting commerce within
the meaning of Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act.
6. The Respondent has not interfered with, restrained, or coerced its employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and has not, therefore,
committed any unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
In view of my findings of fact and conclusions of law, I recommend that an order
be entered dismissing the complaint.
Tech-Craft, Inc. and Lynn R. Harbin . Case No. 19-CA-2852.
June 14,1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On August 13, 1964, Trial Examiner Wallace E. Royster issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent
152 NLRB No. 152.