The Shelby Manufacturing Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 1, 1965

155 N.L.R.B. 464 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

464 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
If members have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its pro-
visions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 1700 Bank-
ers Securities Building, Walnut and Juniper Streets , Philadelphia , Pennsylvania,
Telephone No. 735-2612.
The Shelby Manufacturing Company and International Union,
United Automobile , Aerospace , and Agricultural Implement
`Yorkers of America, AFL-CIO .
The Shelby Manufacturing Company and International Union,
United Automobile , Aerospace , and Agricultural Implement
`Yorkers of America, AFL-CIO, Petitioner. Cases Nos. 8-CA-
3466, 8-CA-3550, and 8-RC-54992. November 1, 1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On May 14, 1965, Trial. Examiner Eugene E. Dixon issued his Deci-
sion in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take cer-
tain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's
Decision. He also found that the Respondent had not engaged in cer-
tain other -unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recom-
mending dismissal as to them. The Trial Examiner further found
merit in the objections by the Union to the election conducted on
May 12, 1964, and recommended that the election be set aside and that
a new election be held. Thereafter, the Respondent, the Charging
Party, and the General. Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examin-
er's Decision and supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in. connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman McCulloch and 'Mem'bers Brown and Zagoria].
The I3oarcl has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The I3oarcl has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record
in these cases, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner with the following additions and
modifications.'
1. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the Respondent
violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act by promulgating and enforcing
unlawful no-solicitation and no-distribution rules; by interrogating
1 We hereby correct the Trial Examiner 's apparently inadvertent error by substituting
the word "suspending" for "discharging" in the section of the Trial Examiner ' s Decision
entitled "The Remedy," and by substituting May 12 for May 14 as the date of the election.
155 NLRB No. 39.
THE SHELBY MANUFACTURING COMPANY 465
employees about their attendance at union meetings and about their
having signed union cards; by threatening employees with discharge,
shutdown of the plant, and loss of benefits if they engaged in union
activity; by promising employees benefits if they rejected the Union;
by granting employees a wage increase and other benefits because they
voted against the Union; and by forbidding the wearing of union
insignia in the plant. We also agree that the Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a) (3) of the Act by suspending employees for wearing union
insignia in the plant .2
2. In disagreement with the Trial Examiner, we find that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act by refusing
to bargain with the Union.
As described more fully in the Trial Examiner's Decision, the Union
wrote to the Respondent, on February 27, 1964, requesting recognition
as bargaining representative of its production and maintenance em-
ployees. At the time, the Union had obtained cards from 40 of the
Respondent's 73 employees. On March 5 the Respondent wrote to the
Union, refusing to grant it recognition on the ground that it did not
believe that the Union represented a majority of the employees in the
unit, and suggesting that the Union prove its claim by petitioning the
Board for an election. In the meantime, on March 2, 1964, the Union
filed a petition for an election. The Union lost the election held on
May 12 and filed timely objections to conduct affecting the results of
the election. On October 16, based on charges filed by the Union on
March 31, May 4, and June 24, the General Counsel issued a consoli-
dated complaint alleging that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)
(1), (3), and (5) of the Act. In his Decision, issued on May 14, 1965,
the Trial Examiner found merit in the Union's objections to the elec-
tion and recommended that the election be set aside. He found, how-
ever, that the Union did not represent a majority of employees when it
sought recognition, and he therefore recommended that the Section
8 (a) (5) allegations of the complaint be dismissed. In finding that the
cards did not constitute valid designations of the Union as bargaining
agent of the employees, the Trial Examiner relied on the facts that the
cards contained a statement on the back that they "will be filed with the
National Labor Relations Board to secure a secret ballot election ..."
and that "at least six" of the employees signing cards testified that they
were told the purpose of the cards was "to get an election."
The front of the card is printed in heavy black print "AUTHORI-
ZATION TO UAW". Beneath this is a space for the date, and then
the words "I ... authorize UAW to represent me in collective bargain-
ing." This is followed by blanks for additional information and for
2 In the absence of exceptions thereto by the General Counsel or the Union , we adopt
pro forma the Trial Examiner ' s finding that the third suspension of employee Strunk, on
the occasion that he "covered himself " with union insignia , was not discriminatory.
466 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the signature of the employee. At the bottom of the card, and in the
same size type is the following : "This card is for use in support of the
demand of UAW-AFL-CIO for recognition, or for an NLRB elec-
tion." Thus, the card on its face is a "dual-purpose" type of card,
which the Board, with court approval, has held constitutes a valid
designation of the union as bargaining representatives of the employ-
ees involved .3 The Trial Examiner found that the cards here differed
from such "dual purpose" cards because of the statement on the back
of the card, quoted above, that the card would be used to secure a Board
election. We disagree. This statement on the back of the card merely
reaffirms one of the alternative purposes of the card stated on its front.
It does not nullify the effect of the front of the card which clearly
authorizes the Union to represent the employee involved and thus con-
stitutes a valid designation of the Union.
We also disagree with the Trial Examiner's view that the cards were
not valid because some of the employees were told that the purpose of
the cards was to get an election. The Board has held on a number of
occasions that authorization cards are reliable evidence of majority
status where the solicitor of the cards did not represent that they were
to be used only to secure an election. Here, while several of the employ-
ees may have been told that the cards were to be used to secure an elec-
tion, the Trial Examiner did not find that there was any credible evi-
dence to establish that any employee who signed a card had been told
by the Union that the only purpose for the cards was to obtain an elec-
tion. We find, accordingly, that none of the cards in issue are invali-
dated because of representations with respect to a possible election.4
As noted, the Union had secured 40 cards in a unit comprising 73
employees. Of these 40 cards, we shall exclude the card of Homer
Ragon, which was unsigned. We shall, however, include the cards of
Charles White, a leading union adherent, whose signed and duly
authenticated card, although introduced at the hearing for identifica-
tion purposes, inadvertently was not introduced into evidence, and the
card of Forest King. Relying on King's testimony at the hearing, the
Respondent contends that King was coerced into signing a card. We
have carefully examined this testimony, and find it to be confused,
internally inconsistent, and at variance with his pretrial statement.
3 Aero Corporation, 149 NLRB 1283; Lenz Company, 153 NLRB 1399; International
ipnion of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO (S . N C. Manufacturing Co,
Inc.), 147 NLRB 809, enfd. 352 F. 2d 361 ( C.A.D.C. ) ; Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. and Winn-
Dixie Louisville, Inc., 143 NLRB 848, enfd. 341 F. 2d 750 ( C.A. 6), cert. denied 382
U.S. 830.
4 Cumberland Shoe Corporation, 144 NLRB 1268 ; Bernard S . Happach d/b/a 14th Street
Market, 151 NLRB 560 ; Jas. H. Matthews it Co, 149 NLRB 161; see also Trend Mills,
Inc., 154 NLRB 143, Cf N L R .B. v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc ., 341 F. 2d 750 , 754-755
(C A. 6), cert. denied 382 U.S. 830'
Member Brown concurs in this finding because of his opinion that signed designation
cards are the best evidence of the signatories ' intent, absent a showing of fraud or
coercion.
THE SHELBY MANUFACTURING COMPANY 467
Accordingly, we conclude that King is not a credible witness, and we
shall therefore not exclude King's signed card on the basis of such tes-
timony. Accordingly, we find that the Union had obtained 39 valid
authorization cards in a unit of 73 employees. We find, therefore, in
disagreement with the Trial Examiner, that on February 27, 1964, a
majority of the employees in an appropriate unit 5 had designated the
Union as bargaining agent by the execution of valid authorization
cards, and that the Union was the majority representative in said unit
when it demanded that the Respondent recognize and bargain with it.
Here, we have already found that the Respondent engaged in fla-
grant unfair labor practices, violative of Section (a) (1) and (3).
These unfair labor practices began shortly after the Union commenced
its organizing campaign and they continued until after the election
took place. As already noted, the Trial Examiner found that because
of these unfair labor practices, it was impossible for employees in the
bargaining unit freely to express their choice of bargaining represent-
ative in the Board election. In these circumstances, we find that the
Respondent's overall conduct establishes that it refused to recognize
the Union not because of a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority,
but in order to gain time in which to destroy its majority status.6
Accordingly, and as we have already found that the Union repre-
sented a majority of the Respondent's employees, we find that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a) (5) by refusing to bargain with the
Union.
We agree with the Trial Examiner's finding that during the critical
preelection period the Respondent engaged in a course of conduct
which interfered with the employees' freedom of choice in the selection
of a bargaining representative, and his recommendation based thereon
that the election of May 12, 1964, be set aside. However, in view of our
holding that the Respondent violated Section 8(a) (5) and our order
requiring the Respondent to bargain with the Union,7 we do not adopt
the Trial Examiner's further recommendation that a new election be
directed. Instead, as no current question concerning representation
exists, we shall dismiss the petition in Case No. 8-RC-5492 and vacate
all proceedings held in connection therewith.8
5 The parties stipulated at the hearing that the appropriate unit is: All production and
maintenance employees at the Respondent 's No. 1, No. 2, and No. 3 plants in Sidney,
Ohio, but excluding office clerical employees and all professional employees , guards, and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
0Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB 1263, enfd. 185 F. 2d 732 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied 341
U.S. 914; N.L.R.B. v. Stow Manufacturing Co., 217 F. 2d 900, 904-905 (C.A. 2), cert.
denied 348 U.S. 904; N.L.R.B. v. Southeastern Rubber Mfg. Co., Inc., 213 F. 2d 11, 14-15
(C.A. 5) ; N.L,R.B. v. Model Mill Company, Inc., 210 F. 2d 829 (C A. 6) ; N.L.R B. V.
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., supra ; N.L.R.B. v. Howell Chevrolet Company, 204 F. 2d 79
(C.A. 9).
7 Bernel Foam Products Co., Inc., 146 NLRB 1277. See cases cited in footnote 6, supra.
8 S.N.C. Manufacturing Co., Inc., supra.
212-809-66-vol. 155-31
468 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its
Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, as modified
herein, and orders that the Respondent, The Shelby Manufacturing
Company, Sidney, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended
Order, except as modified herein.
1. Add the following paragraph as paragraph 1(a) to the Trial
Examiner's Recommended Order, the present paragraph 1(a) and
those subsequent thereto being consecutively relettered :
"(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with International Union,
United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of its employ-
ees in the appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, and other terms and conditions of employment. The
appropriate unit is:
All production and maintenance employees including regular part-
time employees employed at the Respondent's No. 1, No. 2, and No. 3,
plants in Sidney, Ohio, but excluding office clerical employees and all
professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
2. Add the following as paragraph 2(a) to the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order, the present paragraph 2 (a) and those subsequent
thereto being consecutively relettered :
"(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with International Union,
United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of employees
at Respondent's plants in Sidney, Ohio, in the unit found appropriate
above, and embody any understanding reached in a signed contract."
3. Add the following paragraph as the first indented paragraph on
page ii of the Appendix attached to the Trial Examiner's Decision :
WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Imple-
nlent Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining
representative of all our employees in the appropriate unit
described below with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of em-
ployment, and other terms and conditions of employment and, if
an agreement is reached, embody such understanding in a signed
contract. The appropriate unit is :
All production and maintenance employees including regular
part-time employees employed at the Respondent's No. 1, No. 2,
and No. 3 plants in Sidney, Ohio, but excluding office clerical
employees and all professional employees, guards, and supervisors
as defined in the Act.
THE SHELBY MANUFACTURING COMPANY 469
Jr is FURTHER ORDERED that the petition in Case No. 8-RC-5492 be,
and it hereby is, dismissed, and all proceedings held in connection there-
with be, and they hereby are, vacated.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding, brought under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136), herein called the Act, was heard before Trial Exam-
iner Eugene E. Dixon at Sidney, Ohio, on November 4 to 6, 1964, pursuant to due
notice with all parties represented by counsel. The consolidated and amended com-
plaint I issued on June 24, 1964, by the Regional Director of Region 8, Cleveland,
Ohio, on behalf of the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board,
herein called the General Counsel and the Board and based upon charges duly filed
and served on March 31, May 4, and June 26, 1964, alleged that Respondent had
engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of
the Act. The substance of the allegations was that Respondent had interfered with,
restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section
7 of the Act by various specified conduct, had discriminated against its employees in
regard to the hire or tenure of their employment by the suspension of various
employees because of their union membership, activities, or sympathies thereby
discouraging membership in the Union, and refused to bargain with the Union as
the representative of a majority of Respondent's employees in an appropriate unit.
In its duly filed answer Respondent denied any violation of the Act.
Upon the entire record and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS
At all times material herein Respondent has been a corporation duly organized
under and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Ohio, with its offices, and
principal place of business located in Sidney, Ohio, where it has been engaged in
the manufacture and distribution of grain elevator machinery. In the course and
conduct of its business Respondent annually ships products valued in excess of
$50,000 directly to points outside the State of Ohio. Respondent is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Issues
About the middle of February 1964, the Union began a campaign to organize
Respondent's employees. Thereafter the Union's claim that it represented a majority
of the employees in an appropriate unit and its request for recognition were not
honored by Respondent. After that the Union also lost a Board-conducted election
for representative status in connection with which it filed timely objections. The
objections for the most part involved conduct which is the subject of the complaint
herein and, as noted, have been consolidated in this one proceeding. The case
presents these basic issues to be determined:
1. Whether Charles Linder, Jack Ike, and James Rogers were supervisors as
contended by the General Counsel or were merely rank-and-file employees with the
title of leadman as contended by Respondent.2
3Besides the unfair labor practice matter, a hearing was ordered on the question of
whether or not Respondent had interfered with the freedom of choice of the employees at
the collective-bargaining election conducted by the Board on May 12, 1964.
2In this connection It should be noted that after a hearing on the matter , the Regional
Director in his decision and direction of election dated April 10, 1964, made detailed
findings of fact as to the status of these Individuals and concluded that they were super-
visors within the meaning of the Act.
470 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. Whether Respondent committed various acts of interference, restraint, and
coercion in violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
3. Whether the suspension of various employees for wearing union stickers or
insigna was discriminatory within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
4. Whether the membership authorizations obtained by the Union were secured
by means of coercion or fraud thus negating any obligation on the part of Respond-
ent to recognize and bargain with the Union.
The Supervisory Status of Linder, Rogers, and Ike
Since the complaint attributes much of the alleged 8(a)(1) conduct to the three
above-named alleged supervisors I shall first examine their status. In so doing, I
have considered the testimony in the transcript of the representation hearing (which
was made part of the record herein by stipulation of the parties) and hereby adopt
by reference the factual findings of the Regional Director in connection therewith
as accurately reflecting that testimony. In addition, I make the following findings
from the testimony adduced before me:
1. According to the General Counsel's witnesses, both Rogers and Linder were
introduced to them as foremen. Superintendent Wise denied introducing the two as
foremen and with the aid of a leading question testified that he told new men that
they would be taking orders from group leaders "under the supervision from the
foremen and [himself]." 3 This seems to me to be a bit too formal and legalistic to
believe. I credit the General Counsel's version.
2. On or about March 23, Wayne Lloyd was wearing a union sticker on the back
of his shirt. Linder came by and seeing the sticker on Lloyd's back reached down
and tore it off. Lloyd immediately "jumped up" and protested that the shirt
belonged to him and was not company property. Linder told him to go into his
office, that he would get Superintendent Wise and that the three of them would dis-
cuss it. In the office Linder told Wise that he thought that someone had put the sticker
on Lloyd's back without his realizing it. Lloyd pointed out that such was not the
case; that he had the sticker put on his back and that the shirt was not company
property, and that Linder had "no business tearing it off " Wise agreed with Lloyd
but went on to say to him, "You shouldn't do this, Wayne. This is showing disloyalty
to the Company and to Chuck Linder. He is the man that got you the job, and you
are showing disloyalty "
3. According to Linder's own testimony, prior to the election Lloyd and another
employee, Holt, had taken their tools home (employees were required to furnish
their own handtools) and Linder had requested that they bring them back. "They
both got rather cute about it." Linder got angry and told them that they were
always ribbing him about being a group leader and not a foreman so he was now
telling them "as a boss" to bring in their tools by Monday.4
The following Monday morning Linder asked Lloyd if he had brought in his
tools. Lloyd said he had not done so and Linder said "let's go." He looked around
and seeing Holt said, "You can go, too, if you didn't bring them." They then went
to Wise's office where Wise asked if they had brought their tools. Lloyd said, "I
did not. I never need them. You told me to get them out of here. I did what
you told me." Wise said, "Well, did Linder tell you to bring them back?" Lloyd
replied, "Linder did but you didn't." Wise said, "That is all. You can go home"
and added that the same went for Holt also. According to the testimony of Wise,
he never gave Linder instructions to tell the two employees to bring back their tools.
4. According to Rogers' testimony, about the beginning of the union organizing
campaign he was called into a conference of "mostly group leaders" by Wise in
which they were told or instructed "to watch and see ... any effects" and to "watch
everything in general" regarding the union campaign. According to Rogers both
Ike and Linder were at this meeting According to Linder's testimony he did not
attend the meeting. I credit Rogers. It further appears from the testimony of Ike
that in addition to himself, Linder, and Rogers, Foremen Labig, Olshawsky, and
May were also present at this meeting.
5. Linder testified that on a couple of occasions in mid-February when Holt and
Lloyd were out of work on the can line he sent them to Olshawsky to work and
that it was either do that or he "would have to send them home."
8 Linder testified that he was introduced to new employees by name as their "group
leader."
*According to Lloyd 's testimony Linder gave them until Monday morning to bring in
their tools saying that "it would either be them by Monday morning or else."
THE SHELBY MANUFACTURING COMPANY 471
Like the Regional Director, I find that the three men in question are supervisors
within the meaning of the Act. The indicia in Linder's case are paiticularly per-
suasive. His office, his introduction as foreman, and his direction of the employees
strongly suggest a supervisor. Any doubts about his status are disspel]ed, I believe,
by the disciplinary authority he exercised as is amply demonstrated in the record.
As for the other two, the clincher with respect to them, it seems to me, is their
attendance at a meeting with supervisors (including Linder) in which the entire
group was directed by Respondent to keep tabs on the union activity of the employees
N.L.R.B. v. Schill Steel Products, Inc., 340 F. 2d 568 (C A. 5) enfg. 144 NLRB 69.
Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
On March 23, 1964, Respondent promulgated c and posted the following regulation:
NOTICE
ON
RULES ON SOLICITATION AND DISTRIBUTION
(1) THERE SHALL BE NO DISTRIBUTION
OF LITERATURE ON COMPANY PROPERTY;
(2) THERE SHALL BE NO SOLICITATION
DURING WORKING HOURS.
SHELBY MFG CO.
MANAGEMENT
While it is within Respondent's authority to ban solicitation or distribution of
literature during working time, it is clearly not within its authority to enact the kind
of blanket ban on the distribution of literature on company property which Respond-
ent attempted to do. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Company, 139 NLRB 849;
Stoddard-Quark Manufacturing Co., 138 NLRB 615, Walton M.aaufactiaing Com-
pany, 126 NLRB 697, enfd 289 F. 2d 177 (C.A. 5).
The complaint alleged that pursuant to the above no-solicitation rule Respondent
"attempted to prevent his employees from distributing union literature in nonwork-
ing areas and on nonworking time." At the hearing, Respondent admitted this
allegation.
On or about February 19, Group Leader Linder (whom I have found to have been
a supervisor within the meaning of the Act) called the men of the punch-press
department into his office one at a time to discuss the incipient organizing campaign.
According to the testimony of Arthur Holt, prior to being called into the office by
Linder the latter had asked Holt if he "went to the union meeting that night." In
Linder's office later, Linder asked Holt if he had signed a union card, telling Holt
that one of his men had signed a union card and that if he found out which
employee it was he would "run his ass out of the door." He further asked Holt
what he knew about the Union in the shop.
Wayne Lloyd testified that when he was called by Linder into the office he was
told that "they were having a little union trouble" and that Linder "knew he had
one man . that signed a card" but did not know who it was. Linder further
stated that "he was going to find out and when he found out who had signed the
card, he was going to make sure to get rid of him."
In his testimony Linder, although admitting that he called the employees into the
office and spoke to them about the union campaign, denied any of the interrogation
or making any of the threats attributed to him. On cross-examination when he was
asked if he had interrogated Holt in the office regarding hearing anything about the
Union he answered, "not that I recall. It has been quite a while ago." However,
after seeing his statement he then testified that he had asked Holt ` if he had heard
the rumor of the Union...." Based upon Linder's equivocation and inconsistency
in his testimony and considering the conflict between his testimony and that of
Rogers as to their attendance at the meeting in which Wise instructed them to look
out for things in connection with the union campaign, I am convinced and find that
the General Counsel's version here is mote worthy of credence than is that of the
Respondent's.
About the time of Linder's interrogation of and threats to the punch-press employ-
ees can line Foreman Olshawsky conducted a meeting of his employees in which
the Union was discussed. Thus Bob Wilson testified that on February 17, the
employees were assembled in Olshawsky's office about 7.30 in the morning where
5 Rogers' testimony , which would lend the impression that the notice in question merely
codified "verbal rules" long in effect in the plant , was in direct conflict with Superin-
tendent Wise's testimony that there had never been any regulations regarding distribution
or solicitation because none had ever been needed before.
472 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Olshawsky told them that "he got it from the horse's mouth, and he was talking
about Warner Burns (Respondent's vice president and general manager ) that he
would put a padlock on the front door and all of (the employees) would be out of
a job." Strunk testified that Olshawsky said, "If you get a union in here Warner
is likely to put a padlock on the door. I know it for a fact." He also said that
"There is a good chance for advancement in here. There is a lot of you guys that I
would like to make group leaders." Sherry testified that Olshawsky had said, "there
will be a lot of you walking the streets if the Union gets in " He also said, "there
are a few of you here that could stand to be out of work, but the majority of you,
I know for certain you can't be out of work." The meeting ended with Olshawsky's
admonition to "get back to work and take a deep thought on it."
While admitting that he had called the meeting in question and talked to the
employees about the Union, Oishawsky was very definite in his denial of the fore-
going testimony. Yet in his statement to the Board agent he had said he could not
remember whether he had made any statement to the employees at this meeting to
the effect that the Company "could put a padlock on the doors and close the plant
down if the Union got in." He also admitted on cross-examination that he had told
the employees he had had experience in a union having worked in one for 10 years.
He also admitted that he had told them that if the Union came in "it could cause
confusion and that might cause the Company to close the plant." Again I feel and
find that the General Counsel's version here more accurately reflects what was said
at this meeting.
James Strunk testified that sometime in March Group Leader Rogers had told
him, "We know you are a hard pusher for the Union. We are going to push you out
the door." A couple of weeks later when Rogers started across the street to plant
No. 1, Strunk gave him a quarter to bring back a package of cigarettes from the
cigarette machine. Rogers took the quarter and said, "You know, if you guys get a
union in there, you won't be able to do that. They will take the pop machine, coke
machine, and cigarette machine out of here." Strunk also testified that prior to his
leaving the employment of Respondent on April 13, 1964, Rogers told him, "You
guys will never be satisfied unless you get that damn union in here and get this
work taken out." In the same conversation Rogers also said, "If the union goes in,
Copeland would take all the work out of here . and the machines, equipment and
stuff." According to Bob Wilson's testimony Rogers told him that he had been
talking to a Copeland truckdriver who had told him that if Respondent was shut
down for 1 day because of the Union "Copeland would take over, take all the
machinery.. " 6 Rogers went on to say that "this is just hearsay . . . just some-
thing I heard, so it is just a rumor."
Denny Wilson testified that on May 8, 1964, some Copeland officials including
the president were looking over the equipment together with Warner Burns, Respond-
ent's vice president and general manager. Later that day Foreman Olshawsky said
to Wilson, "Did you see those wheels out in the shop?" Wilson said, "Yes." Olshaw-
sky said, "They are going to take this stuff out of here, if the Union gets in."
Both Rogers and Olshawsky denied telling employees that Copeland would take
their work or machinery out if the Union won the election. However Rogers testi-
fied that during the union campaign five or six Copeland officials had come to the
plant and made a plantwide inspection. According to Rogers they had "come in to
see what (Respondent) was doing to get the rust out." On cross-examination when
Rogers was asked if he had discussed with the employees the reason for the Cope-
land officials being in the plant on this occasion he testified that he "might have
said that they was in on the rust." He was then asked if he had heard any rumors
that they were in the plant for the purpose of determining what to do with their
work in the event the Union won the election. Rogers answered , "No." On further
cross-examination, however, he admitted that he had heard such a rumor and
explained that his source was a Copeland truckdriver and that he had told Bob
Wilson about it! Again I credit the General Counsel's version here. Rogers' testi-
mony was too inconsistent to be convincing.
In December 1963, according to Bob Wilson' s undenied and credited testimony,
he had made a request to management on behalf of the entire can line for a wage
increase . At this time it was pointed out to him that the Company did not "give
raises like that, they give it on the merit system, individually... " After some dis-
cussion the Company agreed to grant raises to about 10 of the can line employees.
The next morning Wilson and Warner Burns had further discussion about the matter
in the presence of Foreman Olshawsky. At this time Burns expounded further on
6 The majority of the can line work was done for Copeland by Respondent with
machinery owned by Copeland.
THE SHELBY MANUFACTURING COMPANY 473
the matter, telling Wilson that it was against company policy to give general increases;
that some of the employees "didn't deserve a raise ... and some needed more and
some didn 't, so that is why they should do it individually."
Notwithstanding this stated policy of the Company's, on June 1, while objections
to the results of the election which had been held on May 12, were still pending,
Respondent granted its employees a general wage increase. At the same time
Respondent also announced that it was assuming the entire cost of the employees'
insurance plan which up to then had apparently been on a contributory basis. The
General Counsel contends that these benefits were given by Respondent as a reward
to the employees for having rejected the Union and as a further inducement to vote
against the Union should the opportunity arise. In the circumstances of this
,case, I agree with the General Counsel. Paramount Textile Machinery Co , 97
NLRB 691, 693; Northwest Engineering Company, 148 NLRB 1136.
The foregoing evidence clearly shows that Respondent repeatedly interfered with,
restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them in
the Act. Of the foregoing conduct I specifically find that by the following Respond-
ent violated Section 8 (a)( I) of the Act:
1. Its promulgation and enforcement of the no-solicitation and no-distribution
rule.
2. Linden's interrogation of Holt about attending a union meeting and about
signing a union card.
3. Linder's threat to the employees to discharge the card signer.
4. Olshawsky's threats that if the Union came in Respondent would padlock the
door and the employees would be out of a job or "walking the streets."
5. I also find that in the same comments above, Olshawsky's statement that there
were a lot of the employees that he "would like to make group leaders" was, in the
context made, a thinly veiled promise of promotion as a reward for rejecting
the Union.
6. Rogers' threats to Strunk of discharge, loss of work and loss of vending
machines if the Union came in.
7. Rogers' threats to Strunk and Bob Wilson that if the Union came in Copeland
would take out its machines and work.
8. Olshawsky's threats to Denny Wilson that Copeland would take its "stuff"
away from Respondent if the Union came in.
9. Respondent's granting of a general wage increase as found above and its
assumption of the total costs of the employees' insurance program.
In addition to the foregoing, there was introduced in evidence several documents
involving campaign communications from Respondent to the employees. The Gen-
eral Counsel contends that these contain several promises of benefit and threats of
reprisals designed to influence the employees in their union activities and sympathies
which not only interfered with the election but also violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. Since this evidence would only be cumulative and would add nothing to the
proposed remedy and recommended order herein I see no reason to dispose of it.
Discrimination
Beginning about March 23, several of the union supporters were given 3-day
layoffs for wearing union insignia in the plant . For the most part these insignia
were stickers 31/2 inches in diameter's bearing the inscription:
FOR PROTECTION
AND SECURITY
JOIN AND VOTE UAW
The individual circumstances of these disciplinary actions were essentially the
same. The employees were told to either take off the stickers or punchout. At no
time were they given any explanation for the action other than that the wearing of
stickers was prohibited.8 Most of them received letters from the Company explain-
7 All except Bob Wilson , Robert Ervin and James Strunk wore a single sticker . Strunk
wore at least a dozen on one occasion and Wilson and Ervin on one occasion wore
automobile bumper stickers pasted across their shoulders.
s In this connection the following notice dated March 30, 1964, was posted by the
Company:
NOTICE
NO EMPLOYEE WILL BE ALLOWED TO DISPLAY, ON HIS PERSON
OUTSIDE ADVERTISING MATERIAL OF ANY KIND.
SHELBY MFG. CO.
MANAGEMENT
474 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ing only that their suspensions were "for insubordination and violation of company
rules."
Respondent's evidence regarding the union stickers was that the stickers had been
pasted "on the coke machine, candy machine, timeclock, tow motor, Chuck Linder's
office window, restroom, and the back door, and on some of the parts [Respondent]
was running"; that they took quite a while to tear down, were gummy, fell on the
floor and presented a housekeeping problem. As for the wearing of the stickers,,
it presented a safety hazard in that men running presses "kept turning around to see
what was happening" and gave rise to "horseplay" in that some employees would
stick them on others.
Except for the occasion when Strunk apparently wore as many stickers as his
clothing would accommodate I reject Respondent's evidence as supplying a valid
defense to the suspension in question.`) The right of employees to wear union insigna
on the job has been approved by the Supreme Court Republic Aviation Corporation
v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 793, at 803. As pointed out by the Trial Examiner in Standard
Fittings Co., et al., 133 NLRB 928, 941:
Absent special circumstances, the Board and the courts have long recognized
the right of employees to wear union insignia or other insignia related to con-
certed activities while at work.0
Here, except for vague generalities, Respondent has made no showing of any
special circumstances that would warrant the curtailment of the employees' right to
wear union insigna at work. No incidents of horseplay were shown, nor does it
appear that production was adversely affected. Indeed, it was admitted that despite
the alleged inconvenience the stickers caused, Respondent "still got out (its) produc-
tion. " Moreover, as pointed out by the General Counsel, neither "did Respond-
ent consider this to be of sufficient importance" to warrant explaining to the em-
ployees the reason "why it was ordering to give up a protected right." Mayrath
Company, 132 NLRB 1628.
Accordingly, I find that all of the suspensions except the one given to Strunk on
the occasion that he had covered himself with stickers were discriminatory within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act Thus Respondent is liable for one 3-day
suspension of Gary Campbell, Harry F. Clark, Arthur Holt, Leonard M. Sherry,
Wayne Lloyd, Jr., Charles E. White and Denny L Wilson; and is further liable for
two 3-day suspensions of James D Strunk, Robert J Ervin and Bob G Wilson.10
In this connection I also find that in the circumstances herein, Respondent's notice
of March 30 forbidding the display of any advertising material of any kind on his
person is illegal on its face and violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The Alleged Refusal to Bargain
By letter dated February 27, 1964, the Union wrote to Respondent claiming to
represent "a majority of the production and maintenance employees" of Respondent
and requesting recognition and the institution of collective-bargaining negotiations.
At this time there were 73 employees in the baigaining unit 11 from v hom the
Union had secured 40 authorization cards.
By letter dated March 5, 1964, Respondent replied to the Union's request in part
as follows:
It is our opinion that your union does not represent a majority of the employ-
ees within the bargaining unit described in your letter, and consequently we
must refuse to recognize your union based on the mere claim of majority
status as set forth in your letter.
It is my suggestion that you prove your claim by filing a petition with the
National Labor Relations Board in order that they can determine what is an
appropriate bargaining unit and whether or not your union in fact does repre-
sent a majority of our employees in an appropriate bargaining unit. Be assured
that I will be glad to cooperate with the National Labor Relations Board in the
processing of any petition that you might file with them.
e Conceivably Strunk's exhibitionism may have caused machine operators to look around
at him and thus endanger their operations.
to The fact that Bob Wilson and Ervin wore bumper stickers on their back on one
occasion does not militate against this finding since the right to wear union insignia
is not affected by the nature of the insignia . Fabri-Tek Incorporated, 148 NLRB 1623.
uThe appropriate unit is (as stipulated at the hearing) "All production and main-
tenance employees including regular part-time employees employed at the Employer's
No. 1, No. 2, and No. 3 plants in Sidney , Ohio, but excluding office clerical employees and
all professional employees , guards and supervisors as defined in the Act."
THE SHELBY MANUFACTURING COMPANY 475
In defending its position in not recognizing the Union , Respondent's main con-
tention is that the Union's majority at the time of its request had been obtained by
fraud, coercion , and misrepresentation and that as a matter of law was not a valid
or uncoerced majority within the contemplation of the Act. In this connection,
Respondent first attacks the form of the authorization card used by the Union. The
pertinent aspects of the card are as follows: On one side the card in heavy block
print on top is entitled:
AUTHORIZATION TO UAW
Then the card shows a blank space for the applicant's name with the wording in
lower case lettering:
I.... authorize the UAW to represent me in collective bargaining
,On the bottom of the card it is stated in lower case lettering that:
This card is for use in support of the demand of UAW-AFL-CIO for recognition,
or for an NLRB election
On the opposite side of the card in the center at the top in heavy block lettering
the same size as was used in the wording "authorization to UAW" on the other side
of the card are the words:
SECRET BALLOT ELECTION
Directly underneath this in the same lower case lettering as appears on the opposite
side of the card it reads:
This card will be filed with the National Labor Relations Board to secure a
secret ballot election conducted by representatives of the United States
Government.
Underneath this in the same heavy block lettering as described above the card states:
THIS CARD IS CONFIDENTIAL
Thereunder, in block lettering somewhat smaller than the foregoing, appears the
following :
You have the support of one of the world's largest and strongest unions .. .
UAW-AFL-CIO.
At least six of those who signed cards 12 testified without the suggestion of leading
questions that when they were solicited to sign they were told that the purpose of
the cards was to get an election. Charles White, who solicited about half of the
total authorizations, testified that he told some of those he solicited that their purpose
.,was to get a secret election." In connection with this admission, however, he
insisted that he also told all of those he solicited that the purpose of the cards "was
for union representation." Bob Wilson, who was responsible for most of the other
authorizations secured by the Union, testified almost uniformly that what he told
those he was soliciting was, "to read this card, sign it if he wanted to, because we
were going to try and get a union in......
Several witnesses testified that the talk all over the plant during the campaign was
about having an election. This was confirmed in White's testimony when he testified
that "The boys all knew what it was for. It was ... to have an election." White was
then asked, "So, your testimony is that all the boys knew there would have to be a
secret election before there could be representation by the Union?" He replied,
"They knew it. It was on the card." In view of the foregoing evidence and con-
sidering that the cards unequivocally stated that
This card will be filed with the National Labor Relations Board to secure a
secret ballot election conducted by representatives of the United States Govern-
ment. [Emphasis supplied.]
I find that in the circumstances here it cannot be said that a majority of the employees
had selected the Union to represent them as their bargaining agent. The cases
relied upon by the General Counsel are all distinguishable on the facts including
Aero Corporation, 149 NLRB 1283 which the General Counsel represents as involv-
ing a card identical to the one here in issue. The cards are substantially identical
,on the face or signature sides. But on the reverse side the Aero card, so far as the
record shows, contained no commitment that it was to be filed for the purpose of
"The six were Forrest King, August Hosack, Gary Baker, Charles E. Hall , Edward L.
Harmon , and Thomas Ike.
476 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
obtaining a Board -conducted election . Moreover, it is this commitment ( lacking in
all the other cases relied on by the General Counsel) which distinguishes this case
from the cases cited by him and which makes them inapposite.
The General Counsel points to the fact that several card signers who testified that
they were told that the purpose of the cards was to get an election, attended union
meetings after they had signed the cards. This, he contends, shows that it was their
intention to join the Union when they signed and that their authorizations should
be relied upon in determining the question of majority. It is conceivable, however,
that these people attended the union meetings to find out more about the Union 13
so as to know how to vote in the election promised by the union solicitors and the
union card itself.
In a similar vein the General Counsel also points to evidence showing that one
or two of the foregoing people conducted themselves in a manner appearing to be
inconsistent with their testimony. Thus it appears that Forrest King, when he
signed a card at his house in the evening at the request of Bob Wilson (who was
accompanied by James Strunk at the time) thereafter accompanied Wilson and
Strunk in their union calls on other employees that evening. According to Wilson's
testimony King asked them if he could join them. According to King's testimony,
they asked him to accompany them and while he had no desire to do so he was
afraid to refuse them. Accordingly he made an excuse that he was unable to go
just then. They indicated that they would return for him which they did. Based upon
my observation of the witnesses involved here, I have no hesitation in crediting
King.14
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The unfair labor practices of the Respondent set forth above, occurring in con-
nection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several
States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices violative
of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, I shall recommend below that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies
of the Act.
Having found that Respondent discriminated against various employees by dis-
charging them, I will recommend that the Respondent be ordered to make each whole
for any loss of earnings he may have suffered because of the discrimination against
him by payment to him of a sum of money equal to the amount of wages he would
have earned from the date of the discrimination to the date of the offer of reinstate-
ment together with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum, and that
the loss of pay and interest be computed in accordance with the formula and
method prescribed by the Board in F W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and
Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716, to which the parties hereto are
expressly referred.
The unfair labor practices committed by Respondent strike at the heart of the
rights guaranteed employees by Section 7 of the Act 15 The inference is warranted
that Respondent maintains an attitude of opposition to the purpose of the Act with
respect to the protection of employee rights in general. It will, accordingly, be
recommended that Respondent cease and desist from infringing in any manner upon
the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.16
19 At least one so testified.
14 In this connection I want to set forth my impression of Wilson. He was a husky
well-built young man, 26 years old, 6 feet 2 inches tall, weighing 190 pounds. He demon-
strated a self-assurance almost bordering on arrogance and was the type who by personal-
ity, demeanor, and physical stature could be expected to dominate the average person.
It Is clear that he was looked upon as a leader In the union campaign ( and otherwise)
among his fellow employees and I do not doubt that this gave rise to some obsequiousness
on their part toward him and explains for me their protestations on the stand that he was
their friend.
16 N.L.R.B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F. 2d 532 (C.A. 4).
1e May Department Stores d/b/a Famous-Barr Company v. N L R .B., 326 U.S. 376;
Bethlehem Steel Company v. N.L.R.B., 120 F. 2d 641.
TIDE SHELBY MANUFACTURING COMPANY 477
Having found that Respondent committed various acts of interference, restraint;
and coercion which involved objections raised by the Union to the election which
was conducted on May 14, 1964, I shall further recommend that the results of that
election be set aside and a new election ordered.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in this
proceeding, I make the following conclusions of law
1. The Shelby Manufacturing Company, is, and has been at all material times,
an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act
2. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is and has been at all material times, a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act
3 By discriminating against its employees as found above, the Respondent has
engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
4. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act, as found above, Respondent has
engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are untair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and upon
the entire record in this proceeding, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, I recommend that the Respondent, its agents,
successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership of any of its employees in International Union,
United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America,
AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organization of its employees by discharging, or
in any other manner discriminating against any individual in regard to his hire, tenure
of employment, of any term or condition of employment, except as authorized in
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
(b) Threatening loss of work, employment, economic benefits, or any other
reprisals because of their employees' union activities or sympathies.
(c) Promulgating or enforcing illegal rules against the weaiing of union insignia,
the distribution of union literature, or the making of solicitations on behalf of a
union.
(d) Granting or promising its employees any benefits for the purpose of influencing
them in their exercise of rights guaranteed them in the Act.
(e) Interrogating employees concerning their union membership, activities, or
sympathies, in a manner constituting interference, restraint, or coercion within the
meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
(f) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them in Section 7 of the Act, except to
the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in
a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor-Management Report-
ing and Disclosure Act of 1959.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies
of the Act:
(a) Make the employees listed on the Appendix hereof whole for any loss of
pay they may have suffered by reason of Respondent's discrimination against them,
together with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum, in the manner set forth
in the section entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board and its agents, for
examination and copying all payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary or useful to
determine the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Recommended Order.
(c) Post at its plants in Sidney, Ohio, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix." 17 Copies of said notice , to be furnished by the Regional Director for
17 If this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board , the words "a Decision and
Order" shall be substituted for the words " the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner"
In the notice . In the further event that the Board ' s Order be enforced by a decree of a
United States Court of Appeals , the words "a Decree of the United States Court of
Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order "
478 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Region 8, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted
by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for a
period of 60 consecutive days thereof, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(d) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date
of the receipt of this Decision and Recommended Order what steps the Respondent
has taken to comply herewith.18
I also recommend that the election herein be set aside and a new election ordered.
I further recommend that the complaint be dismissed as to the 8(a) (5) allegations.
18 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in or activities on behalf of Interna-
tional Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Work-
ers of America, AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organization of our employees
by discriminatorily discharging or in any other manner discriminating against
any individual in regard to his hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment, except as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT threaten loss of work, employment, economic benefits or any
other reprisals because of our employees' union activities or sympathies.
WE WILL NOT promulgate or enforce illegal rules against the wearing of
union insignia, the distribution of union literature, or the making of solicitations
on behalf of a union.
WE WILL NOT grant or promise our employees any benefits for the purpose of
influencing them in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in the Act.
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees concerning their union membership,
activities, or sympathies, in a manner constituting interference, restraint, or
coercion within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our
employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form labor
organizations, to join or assist the above-named or any other labor organization
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, or to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities
except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized
in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.
WE WILL make whole Gary Campbell, Harry F. Clark, Arthur Holt, Leonard
M. Sherry, Wayne Lloyd, Jr., Charles E. White, Denny Wilson, James D. Strunk,
Robert Ervin, and Bob G. Wilson, for any loss of earnings they may have suf-
fered as a result of our discrimination against them.
All our employees are free to become or remain, or refrain from becoming or
remaining, members of the above-named or any other labor organization.
THE SHELBY MANUFACTURING COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provi-
sions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 720 Bulkley
Building, 1501 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio, Telephone No. Main 1-4465.