The George G. Glenner Alzheimer's Family Center, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 24, 1999

No. 74321461 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 24, 1999)

Paper No. 12
RFC
THIS DISPOSITION IS NOT
CITABLE AS PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB AUG. 24, 99
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re The George G. Glenner Alzheimer’s Family Center, Inc.
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Serial No. 74/321,461
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Terrace A. Meador of Baker, Maxham, Jester & Meador for The
George G. Glenner Alzheimer’s Family Center, Inc.
Darlene D. Bullock, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law
Office 101 (Chris Wells, Managing Attorney).
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Before Simms, Cissel and Hairston, Administrative Trademark
Judges.
Opinion by Cissel, Administrative Trademark Judge:
On October 8, 1992, applicant, The George G. Glenner
Alzheimer’s Family Center, Inc., applied to register the
mark "ALZHEIMER’S FAMILY CENTER" for "videotapes regarding
the treatment and care of persons with organic brain
disorders." The application was based on a claim of use in
interstate commerce since December of 1987.
Ser No. 74/321,461
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This case is before the Trademark Trial Appeal Board
on appeal from the Examining Attorney’s final refusal to
register the mark under Section 2(e)(1) of the Act, on the
ground that the mark is merely descriptive of applicant’s
videotapes regarding the treatment and care of people with
organic brain disorders.
Both applicant and the Examining Attorney have filed
briefs in connection with the appeal, but applicant did not
request an oral hearing, so we have resolved this matter
based on the written record and arguments before us.
A mark is merely descriptive, and hence unregistrable
under Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act, if it describes
an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature,
purpose or use of the goods specified in the application.
In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 3 USPQ 2d 1009 (Fed. Cir.
1987); In re Bright-Crest, Ltd., 204 USPQ 591 (TTAB 1979).
It is not necessary that a term describe all the purposes,
functions, characteristics, or features of the goods in
order for it to be held merely descriptive. It is
sufficient if a term describes a single attribute of the
goods. In re MBAssociates, 180 USPQ 338 (TTAB 1973). The
issue of descriptiveness is not decided in the abstract,
but rather must be determined in relation to the specific
Ser No. 74/321,461
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goods identified in the application. In re Abcor
Development Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 200 USPQ 215 (CCPA 1978).
The Examining Attorney contends that the mark sought
to be registered is merely descriptive of applicant’s
videotapes regarding the treatment and care of people with
organic brain disorders because applicant, which is
identified on the specimens of record as "Alzheimer’s
Family Center, Inc.," is a family center for people
involved with the treatment and care of victims of
Alzheimer’s disease, and the video tapes sold under the
mark deal with this subject. She takes the position that
the term sought to be registered provides information
concerning the subject of the tapes and the business
establishment from which they emanate. The Examining
Attorney argues that a prospective purchaser would not have
to exercise any particular thought or imagination in order
to understand this from consideration of the mark in
connection with the goods.
The record includes a dictionary definition of
"Alzheimer’s disease." The definition establishes that
Alzheimer’s disease is an organic brain disorder. There is
no question that the term "ALZHEIMER’S" is merely
descriptive of video tapes whose subject is this disorder.
Ser No. 74/321,461
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The Examining Attorney also contends that the term
"FAMILY CENTER," as used in applicant’s mark, has
descriptive significance because the words would be
perceived by the purchasers of applicant’s goods as an
indication of the entity that produces the tapes, in the
same sense as the words "store," "shop," and "Co." would
be.
The Examining Attorney made of record a dictionary
definition showing that the word "center" is used in
reference to "a place where a particular activity or
services is concentrated: a medical center…" Also
submitted were copies of excerpts from a number of articles
retrieved from the Nexis database wherein "family center"
is used in descriptive senses to indicate particular
businesses or other entities. Included in these excerpts
are references to the "Family Center for Disorders of
Childhood and Adolescence," in Tempe, Arizona; to the
"Claremont Baptist Church Child Development and & Family
Center," in Atlanta; to the "Odyssey House Family Center,"
in Louisiana; to the "Richstone Family Center," a child
abuse treatment program in California; and to "family
centers" in reference to day-care centers in a number of
locations. From this evidence, family centers appear to be
organizations which are involved in various aspects of
Ser No. 74/321,461
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family life, such as child care, health care, religion,
recreation, drug abuse treatment and prevention, and other
social services.
The Examining Attorney argues that combining the
descriptive terms "ALZHEIMER’S" and "FAMILY CENTER" results
in a mark which is merely descriptive of the goods
specified in the application.
Applicant submits that if its mark were "ALZHEIMER’S
FAMILY VIDEO TAPE CENTER," a refusal based on
descriptiveness might be appropriate, but argues that the
mark for which it seeks registration is a combination of
components which, although they may be descriptive
individually, when juxtaposed, "evoke a unique commercial
impression." Applicant contends that the mark combining
all three words does not immediately convey a readily
understood meaning to the average purchaser of its
videotapes.
Based on the record before us in this case, we hold
that the term sought to be registered is merely descriptive
within the meaning of Section 2(e)(1) of the Act. The
record shows that applicant is a family center in San
Diego, California, and that the subject matter of the
videotapes on which it uses the mark is Alzheimer’s
disease. We agree with the Examining Attorney that the
Ser No. 74/321,461
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mark immediately conveys this information, without the
necessity for any imagination, speculation or conjecture.
The mark indicates that the subject of the tapes is
Alzheimer’s disease and that the tapes emanate from a
family center concerning the disease. Thus, the test for
mere descriptiveness under the Lanham Act is satisfied.
Applicant concedes that the individual words which
make up its mark "may be descriptive." There is no
evidence in this record in support of applicant’s argument
that when these words are combined in the manner shown,
they somehow lose their descriptive significance and "evoke
a unique commercial impression" (brief, p. 2). There does
not appear to be anything unusual or incongruent about this
combination of readily understood descriptive words that
would lead us to conclude that the combination would not
itself be merely descriptive of the goods set forth in the
application.
Because the record establishes that the mark sought to
be registered immediately and forthwith conveys information
about the nature or character of the goods with which is
used, the mark is merely descriptive of them. Accordingly,
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the refusal to register under Section 2(e)(1) of the Act is
affirmed.
R. L. Simms
R. F. Cissel
P. T. Hairston
Administrative Trademark Judges,
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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