The Chamberlain Group, Inc.v.Lynx Industries, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

May 14, 2012

No. 91174249 (T.T.A.B. May. 14, 2012)

Mailed: May 14, 2012

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
______

Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559

The Chamberlain Group, Inc.

v.

Lynx Industries, Inc.

_____

Joseph T. Nabor and Alisa C. Simmons of Fitch, Even, Tabin &
Flannery for The Chamberlain Group, Inc.

A. Blair Hughes and James M. McCarthy of McDonnell Boehnen
Hulbert & Berghoff LLP for Lynx Industries, Inc.

______

Before Quinn, Zervas, and Wolfson, Administrative Trademark
Judges.

Opinion by Wolfson, Administrative Trademark Judge:

This is a consolidated opposition proceeding involving
three trademark applications filed by Lynx Industries, Inc.,
as depicted below.
THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE T.T.A.B.
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
2
1.) LYNXMASTER (in standard character form) for various
items of “metal garage door hardware,” listed in the
following footnote, in International Class 6;1
2.) for the same various items
of “metal garage door hardware” as in the standard
character application, in International Class 6;2 and
3.) for “electric door openers,
electric garage door openers and remote controls for

1 Trademark application Serial No. 78619040 for the mark
LYNXMASTER; filed April 28, 2005 on the basis of applicant’s bona
fide intent to use the mark in commerce for “metal garage door
hardware, namely hinges, rollers, brackets, top brackets, quick
closing brackets, bottom brackets, locks, handles, bearing
plates, latches, striker plates, inside swivels, lock bar guides,
lock bar discs, night latches, step plates, fasteners, namely
nuts, bolts, screws and rivets, adjustable reinforcing brackets,
pusher springs, leaf bumper springs, exhaust ports, namely vents
for garage doors, horizontal tracks, vertical tracks, struts,
angles, vertical angles, horizontal angles, perforated angles,
slotted angles, flange angles, flag brackets, jamb brackets,
splice plates, junction plates, clips, track clips, sheave
plates, head plates, springs, extension springs, torsion springs,
lift drums, cones, universal cones, cast iron cones, cable wire,
cable fittings, cable clips, pulleys, center supports, center
plates, solid shafts, keyed shafts, tubed shafts, couplings,
chain guards, chains, sashes, bearings, insert bearings, bearing
retainer plates, flat bearings, football bearings and key
blanks.”
2 Trademark application Serial No. 78625795 for the mark
LYNXMASTER and design; filed May 9, 2005 on the basis of
applicant’s bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce. The
identification of goods is identical to the identification of
goods in Serial No. 78619040.
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
3
electric garage door openers” in International Class
9.3
The Chamberlain Group, Inc. opposed registration of
applicant’s marks pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark
Act. Opposer alleges prior use and registration of the
marks LIFTMASTER4 and LIFT-MASTER5 in connection with
“overhead door operating systems,”6 and that applicant’s
marks, when applied to applicant’s goods, so resemble
opposer’s marks as to be likely to cause confusion.7

3 Trademark application Serial No. 77356941 for the mark
LYNXMASTER and design; filed December 20, 2007 on the basis of
applicant’s bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce.
4 Reg. No. 863447 for the mark LIFTMASTER for “residential
electrical garage door controllers”; registered January 14, 1969;
renewed.
Reg. No. 2724638 for the mark LIFTMASTER for “electric motors
for doors, gates and shutters; tubular electric motors for doors,
gates and shutters; remote control systems and components
thereof-namely radio controls for garage and warehouse entrance
doors or gates, automatic garage door openers, lights, motors,
antennas, transmitters, receivers and controllers responding
thereto and used in such systems; electrical safety equipment;
namely, an electric eye for sensing obstructions and controlling
doors; electronic security devices, namely, electronic controls
for granting access and egress through doors or gates; radio
receiver units, radio transmitter units, keypads and card
readers; a centralized automated system comprising a programmable
controller, power line carrier modules, and one or more control
modules or control receptacles, for controlling audio equipment,
lighting, and other appliances in a residence; providing
technical advice and information in the maintenance and repair in
the field of garage door opener installation, remote control
systems, electrical safety equipment electronic security systems
centralized automation systems and central vacuum systems”;
registered June 10, 2003; partial Sections 8 and 15 combined
declaration has been accepted and acknowledged.
5 Reg. No. 1781236 for the mark LIFT-MASTER for “electric door
openers and structural parts thereof”; renewed.
6 Notice of opposition, para. 2.
7 In Opp. Nos. 91175332 and 91185559, opposer also alleges
ownership of several foreign trademark registrations for the
marks LIFT MASTER, LIFTMASTER, and LIFT-MASTER for garage door
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
4
Opposer also has alleged under Trademark Act § 43(c) that
its mark LIFTMASTER became famous prior to the filing dates
of applicant’s applications, and that registration of
applicant’s marks will impair, diminish and dilute opposer’s
goodwill and rights in its LIFTMASTER mark.
Applicant has denied the salient allegations of the
notices of opposition.8 However, applicant admits that
opposer “has spent millions of dollars advertising and
promoting garage door operators bearing the LIFTMASTER
trademark”9 and “has sold at least a million dollars [sic]
of garage door operators bearing the LIFTMASTER mark.”10
Applicant admits it “had knowledge of [opposer’s] use of the
LIFTMASTER mark on garage door operators at the time
[applicant] filed”11 its applications; and admits that
applicant “is a competitor of [opposer] with respect to the
sale of garage door operator goods and accessories,” but not
“in the sale of garage door hardware.”12 Both attend the

openers and related goods. These registrations are irrelevant,
as discussed more fully infra.
8 Footnotes 8-12 identify paragraphs from Opp. No. 91174249.
These same admissions have been made at different numbered
paragraphs in the answers filed in Opp. Nos. 91175332 and
91185559.
9 Applicant’s Answer, para. 9.
10 Applicant’s Answer, para. 27.
11 Applicant’s Answer, para. 10.
12 Applicant’s Answer, para. 14.
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
5
same two major national trade shows and advertise in many of
the same trade journals.13
The Record
By rule, the record includes applicant’s application
files and the pleadings from each opposition. Trademark
Rule 2.122(b), 37 CFR §2.122(b).
In addition, both parties have filed testimony and
evidence under notices of reliance, and stipulated to the
introduction of a certified copy of a decision from the
Federal Court of Canada in a trademark action between the
parties involving applicant’s marks.14
Opposer’s Record
Opposer filed the following testimony during its
testimony period:
1. Testimonial deposition taken of Sarah Anderson,
opposer’s vice president of marketing
communications and customer advocacy, on July 27,
2010 (and continued on October 21, 2010 and
December 2, 2010), with accompanying exhibits.

2. Testimonial deposition taken of Donald Ewasiuk,
owner of AAA Crosstown Garage Door Service Inc.,
on July 30, 2010 (and continued on December 14,
2010), with accompanying exhibits.

3. Testimonial deposition taken of Bradley Watkins,
opposer’s District 2 sales manager, on August 2,
2010, with accompanying exhibits.

13 Answer in Opp. No. 91174249, paras. 16, 17. These admissions
have also been made in the other two oppositions.
14 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Lynx Industries Inc., 2010 FC
1287, Federal Court of Canada (December 20, 2010).
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
6
Opposer further filed a notice of reliance to introduce
the following evidence into the record during its testimony
period:
4. Certified copies showing the current status and
title of opposer’s U.S. trademark registrations:

a. Reg. No. 863447 for the mark LIFTMASTER;
b. Reg. No. 1781236 for the mark LIFT-MASTER;
c. Reg. No. 2724638 for the mark LIFTMASTER;
d. Reg. No. 1401035 for the mark GARAGE
MASTER (electric garage door openers);
e. Reg. No. 3201915 for the mark GARAGE
MASTER (remote controls);
f. Reg. No. 2034080 for the mark
ACCESSMASTER15

5. Copies of 31 foreign registration certificates
for opposer’s marks LIFT MASTER, LIFT-MASTER,
LIFTMASTER, CHAMBERLAIN LIFT MASTER, and
CHAMBERLAIN LIFTMASTER; four foreign
registrations for the mark GARAGE MASTER; and
one foreign registration for the mark
ACCESSMASTER.

6. Copy of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
final decision in Opposition No. 91160673, dated
December 14, 2007.

7. Copy of Requests for Admission and Responses in
“Applicant’s Response to Opposer’s First Set of
Requests for Admission.”

8. Copies of nine active and two cancelled U.S.
trademark registrations owned by third parties
purporting to show similarity of the parties’
goods.

9. Copies of excerpts from nine “yellow page”
telephone directories purporting to show use of
opposer’s mark LIFTMASTER.

15 Opposer did not plead ownership of the marks GARAGE MASTER and
ACCESSMASTER or argue the issues of likelihood of confusion or of
dilution with respect to these marks in its brief. Thus, we have
not considered either mark in determining whether applicant’s
marks are likely to cause confusion with or dilution of opposer’s
marks.
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
7

10. Copies of three Good Housekeeping magazine
advertisements purporting to show use of
opposer’s mark LIFTMASTER.

11. Copies of Interrogatories and Responses in
“Applicant’s Response to Opposer’s First Set of
Interrogatories” and in “Applicant’s First
Supplemental Responses to Opposer’s First Set of
Interrogatories” (Nos. 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 22,
33).

12. Portions of the discovery deposition taken of
Mark Schram, applicant’s vice president and
general manager, on January 21, 2010, with
accompanying exhibits.

13. Testimonial deposition taken of Sarah Anderson
on December 6, 2005, in Opp. No. 91160673, with
accompanying exhibits.16

14. Testimonial deposition taken of Mark Tone,
opposer’s executive vice president of
administration, on April 13, 2006, in Opp. No.
91160673, with accompanying exhibits.

15. Copy of the April 16, 2010 Preliminary Amendment
filed by Master Lock Company in Opp. No.
91174589, The Chamberlain Group, Inc., v. Master
Lock Company.

16. Copy of cancelled Reg. No. 2427098 for the mark
DOORMASTER owned by a third party.

Applicant’s Record

Applicant filed the following testimony during its
testimony period:
1. Testimonial depositions of Mark Schram taken
July 13, 2010 and October 27, 2010, with
accompanying exhibits.

16 The parties stipulated that testimony and evidence submitted in
Opp. No. 91160673 between the parties could be submitted and
relied upon as evidence in these consolidated proceedings. Their
stipulation is treated as a joint motion to accept the testimony,
which is hereby granted. Trademark Rule 2.122(f).
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
8

Applicant also filed notices of reliance to introduce
the following evidence into the record during its testimony
period:
2. Testimonial depositions of Mark Schram taken
December 2, 2005 and February 2, 2006, in Opp.
No. 91160673, each with accompanying exhibits.17

3. Discovery deposition of Sarah Anderson taken
January 27, 2010, with accompanying exhibits.

4. Discovery deposition of Sarah Anderson taken
March 17, 2005, in Opp. No. 91160673, with
accompanying exhibits.18

5. Discovery deposition of Mark Tone taken January
29, 2010, with accompanying exhibits.

6. Discovery deposition of Mark Tone taken March
17, 2005, in Opp. No. 91160673, with
accompanying exhibits.19

7. Copies of 22 third-party registrations for the
marks DOORMASTER, TORQUEMASTER, HURRICANE
MASTER, WIND MASTER, and SPEED-MASTER.

8. Certified copies showing status and title of
Reg. Nos. 314792920 and 316516821 owned by
applicant.

17 Entered by stipulation. See fn. 16.
18 Trademark Rule 2.122(f), 37 CFR §2.122(f) permits testimony
taken in another proceeding to be used in a proceeding between
the same parties (so far as the testimony is relevant and
material), but the rule does not permit the introduction of a
discovery deposition taken in the prior proceeding or information
contained in an exhibit thereto. Accordingly, we have not
considered this evidence.
19 This evidence has not been considered. See fn. 18.
20 Reg. No. 3147929 for the mark LYNX for “metal garage door
hardware, namely hinges, rollers, brackets, top brackets, quick
closing brackets, bottom brackets, locks, handles, bearing
plates, latches, striker plates, inside swivels, lock bar guides,
lock bar discs, night latches, step plates, fasteners, namely
nuts, bolts, screws and rivets, adjustable reinforcing brackets,
pusher springs, leaf bumper springs, exhaust ports, namely vents
for garage doors, horizontal tracks, vertical tracks, struts,
angles, vertical angles, horizontal angles, perforated angles,
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
9

9. Copies of TTABVUE printouts and portions of the
file histories in seven prior oppositions
between opposer and unrelated third-party
applicants for marks containing the term
“master.”

10. Copies of two Canadian Intellectual Property
Office decisions dated October 23, 2009, in the
Canadian opposition between the parties.22

11. Copies of Interrogatories and Responses in
“Opposer’s Response to Applicant’s First Set of
Interrogatories to Opposer.”

12. Copies of three confidential settlement
agreements entered into by opposer and a third
party, filed under notice of reliance dated
October 29, 2010.23

Evidentiary Objections

Objections by Opposer
In an appendix to its brief on the case, opposer
objects to the admission of certain deposition testimony and

slotted angles, flange angles, flag brackets jamb brackets,
splice plates, junction plates, clips, track clips, sheave
plates, head plates, springs, extension springs, torsion springs,
lift drums, cones, universal cones, cast iron cones, cable wire,
cable fittings, cable clips, pulleys, center supports, center
plates, solid shafts, keyed shafts, tubed shafts, couplings,
chain guards, chains, sashes, bearings, insert bearings, bearing
retainer plates, flat bearings, football bearings and key
blanks”; registered September 26, 2006.
21 Reg. No. 3165168 for the mark for goods identical to those
listed in Reg. No. 3147929; registered October 31, 2006.
22 The Canadian Intellectual Property Office issued two companion
decisions on October 23, 2009, one pertaining to each mark.
23 The three settlement agreements (designated as confidential) do
not qualify as official records or printed publications, and were
not identified during oral testimony. Therefore, they are not
appropriate for submission by notice of reliance. Trademark Rule
2.122(e). We note that the confidential settlement agreements
attached as exhibits to the January 29, 2010 discovery deposition
of Mark Tone have been considered as Mr. Tone identified them.

Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
10
documentary evidence proffered by applicant. Specifically,
opposer objects to (i) the introduction of testimony and
exhibits from the October 27, 2010 and February 2, 2006,
testimony depositions of Mark Schram; (ii) the October 19,
2009 Canadian Intellectual Property Office decisions
regarding the opposition brought by opposer against
applicant’s Canadian trademark applications for the marks
LYNXMASTER and ; (iii) copies of the third-party
registrations applicant submitted under notice of reliance;
and (iv) the copies of the oppositions, cancellations and
settlement agreements involving opposer that applicant
submitted under notice of reliance.
Schram Testimony - October 27, 2010
Opposer objects to the introduction of Mr. Schram’s
October 27, 2010 testimony deposition and Exhibit Nos. 5-21.
Opposer contends that Mr. Schram did not prepare the
documents and lacks personal knowledge as to the matters
stated therein and hence is not qualified to testify
thereto.
Exhibits 5-12 and No. 21 are copies of third-party
brochures or website printouts. Exhibit Nos. 13-20 are
copies of trademark registrations owned by Master Lock
Company. While Mr. Schram did not prepare these documents,
they are admissible on his recognition and stated
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
11
familiarity with the documents, the companies, and their
products.24 Moreover, the dates and URLs at which the web
pages were accessed have been printed on the website
printouts. Cf. Safer Inc. v. OMS Investments Inc., 94
USPQ2d 1031, 1039 (TTAB 2010). The documents have not been
considered for the truth of any matters asserted therein,
but only for what they show on their face. Life Zone Inc.
v. Middleman Group, Inc., 87 USPQ2d 1953, 1959 (TTAB 2008);
cf. Sports Auth. Mich. Inc. v. PC Auth. Inc., 63 USPQ2d
1782, 1798 (TTAB 2001); TBMP § 704.08(b)(3d. ed.
2011)(“documents obtained through the Internet may not be
used to demonstrate the truth of what has been printed.”).
Opposer further objects to Exhibit Nos. 26 and 27 on
the grounds that these brochures are not distributed in the
United States. Mr. Schram’s testimony is that the product
identified in Exhibit No. 26, and one of the two products
identified in Exhibit No. 27, are not sold in the United
States, but that some of the hardware shown in the brochure
is sold in the United States. We agree that information
regarding sales of products overseas is irrelevant, and have
considered the exhibits only to the extent they show product
that is available in the United States. See Fruit of the

24 Schram 10/27/10 Dep., p. 20 (Exs. 5, 6); p. 30 (Ex. 7); p. 32
(Ex. 8); p. 35 (Ex. 9); p. 36 (Ex. 10); pp. 37-38 (Ex. 11); p. 40
(Ex. 12); p. 43 (Exs. 13-20); pp. 48-49 (Ex. 21).

Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
12
Loom Inc. v. Fruit of the Earth Inc., 3 USPQ2d 1531, 1534
(TTAB 1987)(“Trademark activity outside the United States is
ineffective to create rights in this country.”).
Schram Testimony - February 2, 2006, Opp. No. 91160673
In its response to opposer’s objection to Exhibits 14,
15 and 16 and related testimony of Mr. Schram in connection
with his deposition of February 2, 2006, applicant states
that it will not rely thereon. Accordingly, we have not
considered these exhibits and related testimony.
Canadian Court Decisions
Opposer objects to the introduction of the October 23,
2009 decisions from the Canadian Intellectual Property
Office on the ground that they have been overturned.
Applicant agrees the decisions should be disregarded. We
have not considered them.
Third-Party Registrations
The third-party registrations and applications made of
record through applicant’s notice of reliance are relevant
to the likelihood of confusion issue pertaining to the
number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.
They have been considered for whatever probative value they
may have.
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
13
Oppositions, Cancellations and Agreements Involving Opposer
and Unrelated Third Parties

Opposer objects to the introduction of information
pertaining to previous oppositions, cancellations and
settlement agreements involving opposer and unrelated third
parties as irrelevant to the present action. We have
previously noted that the settlement agreements are not
admissible as they were submitted under notice of reliance;
such evidence may only be submitted as an exhibit to a
testimony deposition or by stipulation. On the other hand,
information pertaining to prior oppositions and
cancellations that is contained in the TTABVUE printouts or
file histories thereof is relevant to the issue of the
strength of opposer’s mark, as it serves to show opposer’s
enforcement efforts. The information has been properly
submitted under Trademark Rule 2.122(e) and has been
considered for this purpose, but not as an admission by
opposer that applicant’s use of its marks is not likely to
cause confusion. See DC Comics Pan American Grain Mfg. Co.
Inc., 77 USPQ2d 1220, 1227 (TTAB 2005)(Board “cannot
extrapolate” from opposer’s decision to enter into an
agreement with one company that there can be no likelihood
of confusion with respect to a different company’s use of
its mark).
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
14
Objections by Applicant
Applicant objects to the introduction of the testimony
of opposer’s third-party witness Mr. Ewasiuk; the testimony
of Sarah Anderson regarding a purported settlement agreement
concerning a patent dispute between the parties; opposer’s
foreign trademark registrations; and the Canadian Appellate
Decision in the Canadian opposition between the parties.
Ewasiuk Testimony
Applicant objects to that portion of Mr. Ewasiuk’s
testimony that sets forth his opinion as to whether there is
a likelihood of confusion between the parties’ marks, on the
grounds that such testimony lacks proper foundation, is
speculative, and is biased.
Specifically, applicant contends that Mr. Ewasiuk’s
testimony lacks foundation and is speculative because he is
an installer and not a customer of garage door operators25
and because he was asked about the “wrong mark” in
conjunction with garage door operators (i.e., applicant’s
word mark alone and not the applied-for mark that includes
the cat head design).26 Applicant contends that Mr. Ewasiuk
is a biased witness inasmuch as he expressed brand loyalty
to opposer, stated he would not purchase garage door openers

25 Mr. Ewasiuk testified that the primary business of his company
is servicing existing residential garage doors and garage door
openers. The rest of the business is installation of new garage
doors and openers. Ewasiuk 7/30/10 Dep., p. 7.
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
15
from any other source, and has been installing opposer’s
LIFTMASTER garage door openers virtually exclusively for the
past 36 years.27
We do not find Mr. Ewasiuk’s testimony to be unduly
prejudicial despite his apparent bias in favor of opposer.
“[T]he Board does not strike properly taken and filed
testimony” and will measure “the probative weight to be
afforded the testimony … against the obvious bias of the
witness….” Marshall Field & Co. v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 25
USPQ2d 1321, 1326 (TTAB 1992). Similarly, applicant’s
objections on the grounds of speculation and lack of
foundation have been taken into consideration in our
determination of the probative value of this testimony.
Nonetheless, Mr. Ewasiuk’s opinion as to the potential
for confusion carries very little weight. First, Mr.
Ewasiuk was not qualified during his deposition as an expert
witness able to provide opinion testimony. Secondly,
“[o]pinion evidence of this type is not binding on the
Board, which must independently evaluate the facts in any
given case and arrive at its own conclusion.” Freedom Fed.
S&L Ass’n v. Heritage Federal S&L Ass’n, 210 USPQ 227, 230
n.1 (TTAB 1981).

26 See, e.g., Ewasiuk 7/30/10 Dep., p. 25.
27 Id. at pp. 25-26.
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
16
Anderson Testimony - December 2, 2010
Applicant objects to the introduction of Ms. Anderson’s
testimony regarding a settlement agreement between the
parties involving a patent dispute. Ms. Anderson was not
familiar with the settlement agreement and could not
authenticate it.28 Opposer argues that Mr. Schram,
applicant’s vice-president and general manager, testified
that he was involved in the settlement of that lawsuit and
that if applicant doubted the accuracy of Ms. Anderson’s
testimony, it could have produced its own copy of the
settlement agreement or recalled Mr. Schram for
clarification. However, Mr. Schram’s testimony did not
authenticate the settlement agreement and further, he
testified that there were no trademark issues in that
proceeding.29 Accordingly, Ms. Anderson’s testimony and the
unauthenticated settlement agreement have been disregarded.
Opposer’s Foreign Trademark Registrations
Opposer’s alleged ownership of foreign trademark
registrations is irrelevant to the issues of likelihood of
confusion and dilution herein. See, e.g., Bureau National
Interprofessionnel Du Cognac v. International Better Drinks
Corp., 6 USPQ2d 1610, 1618 (TTAB 1988) (“an applicant’s
ownership of a foreign registration of its mark is

28 Anderson 12/2/10 Dep., pp. 363, 403-404.
29 Schram 7/13/10 Dep., p. 62.
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
17
immaterial to applicant’s right to register the mark in the
United States; similarly, an opposer’s right to object to
the registration of a mark in the United States is
independent of whatever foreign trademark rights the parties
may have”). Accordingly, the Board excludes the foreign
trademark registrations from consideration.
Canadian Appellate Decision
In light of the parties’ January 21, 2011 stipulation
that the December 20, 2010 Federal Court of Canada decision
be entered as part of the evidentiary record in this
proceeding, we admit the evidence. This Board will make its
determination based on all the facts in evidence in this
case. Otokoyama Co. v. Wine of Japan Import Inc., 50 USPQ2d
1626, 1631 (2d Cir. 1999)(“fact that a litigant has been
awarded or denied rights over a mark in a foreign country
ordinarily does not determine its entitlement to the mark in
the United States”).
We turn now to consider opposer’s standing and the
merits of its likelihood of confusion claim.
Standing
Because opposer has properly made its pleaded
registrations of record, opposer has established its
standing to bring this opposition. Cunningham v. Laser Golf
Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1844 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
18
Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d
1024, 213 USPQ 185, 189 (CCPA 1982).
Priority
Because opposer’s pleaded registrations are of record,
Section 2(d) priority is not an issue in this case as to the
marks and the goods recited in the registrations. King
Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182
USPQ 108, 110 (CCPA 1974).
Likelihood of Confusion
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an
analysis of all of the probative facts in evidence that are
relevant to the factors bearing on the issue of likelihood
of confusion. In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476
F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973). See also, Palm
Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee
En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In
re Majestic Distilling Company, Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 65
USPQ2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In any likelihood of
confusion analysis, two key considerations are the
similarities between the marks and the similarities between
the goods. See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper
Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976) (“The
fundamental inquiry mandated by §2(d) goes to the cumulative
effect of differences in the essential characteristics of
the goods and differences in the marks”).
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
19
A. The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods
described in the applications and registrations at
issue; the similarity or dissimilarity of likely-to-
continue trade channels and classes of consumers; the
conditions under which purchases are made.

Applicant is seeking to register the marks LYNXMASTER
and for specific items within the general
heading of “metal garage door hardware”; and further to
register the mark for “electric door openers,
electric garage door openers and remote controls for
electric garage door openers.” Opposer’s registrations for
the mark LIFTMASTER cover, inter alia, “residential
electrical garage door controllers” and “electric motors for
doors, gates and shutters; automatic garage door openers.”
Opposer’s registration for the mark LIFT-MASTER covers
“electric door openers and structural parts thereof.”
To the extent applicant’s mark and
opposer’s marks LIFTMASTER and LIFT-MASTER each cover garage
door openers, the goods are in part identical. To the
extent garage door openers use garage door hardware, the
goods covered by applicant’s marks are in part complementary
to those of opposer’s marks. Because there are no
limitations as to channels of trade or classes of purchasers
in the recitation of goods in the cited registrations or in
the applications, it is presumed that opposer’s garage door
openers and operators move in all channels of trade normal
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
20
for those goods, and that they are available to all classes
of purchasers for those goods. See In re Linkvest S.A., 24
USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992). These would include the same
trade channels and purchasers for applicant’s goods. Thus,
in deciding whether there is a likelihood of confusion, we
must presume that the channels of trade and classes of
purchasers are the same. See Genesco Inc. v. Martz, 66
USPQ2d 1260, 1268 (TTAB 2003); In re Smith and Mehaffey, 31
USPQ2d 1531, 1532 (TTAB 1994) (“Because the goods are
legally identical, they must be presumed to travel in the
same channels of trade, and be sold to the same class of
purchasers”).
The record supports the presumption. Moreover,
applicant has admitted that it directly competes with
opposer in the garage door opener and operator markets.
Both parties sell to the same professional dealers,
distributors and installers, and their garage door openers
and accessories pass through the same trade channels. Both
attend the same two major national trade shows and advertise
in many of the same trade journals. Opposer does not sell
garage door openers, operators, or gate operators directly
to the ultimate consumer (the homeowner or builder);30

30 Anderson 7/27/10 Dep., p. 34-35. Opposer does sell accessories
for garage doors directly to consumers via its website. For
example, a universal keyless entry is sold under the mark
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
21
applicant also sells only to the “professional market” --
dealers and installers.31 Although the parties do not sell
directly to the ultimate consumer, both consider homeowners
to be their “main customer base.”32
Although applicant argues that it does not compete with
opposer in the garage door hardware market,33 there is no
dispute that garage hardware goods are complementary and
inherently related to garage door openers and are sold
through the same trade channels. Ms. Anderson testified
that opposer sells gate hardware for use in connection with
gate operators:
Q: Does Chamberlain use the LiftMaster brand
on gate operators?

A: Yes, we do.

Q: What is a gate operator?

A: A gate operator is a system that is
essentially exactly [sic] the same as a garage
door opener; however, it operates a gate, a fence,
and that type of thing.

Q: Does Chamberlain sell gate hardware?

A: Yes.

LIFTMASTER via the website directly to the end consumers.
Anderson 7/27/10 Dep., p. 59.
31 Schram 10/27/10 Dep., p. 23. “We do not sell to retailers, and
we do not sell directly to homeowners or end-users.”
32 Schram 12/27/10 Dep., p. 24; Anderson 7/27/10 Dep., p. 116
(opposer’s advertising primarily directed to homeowners).
33 Applicant manufactures “virtually every component [of garage
door hardware] that you would need to install a garage door for
both residential and commercial operations.” Schram 7/13/10
Dep., p. 16.
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
22
Q: What brand, if any, does Chamberlain use
on its gate hardware?

A: Both the LiftMaster brand, and I believe
we also have a subordinate brand, Power Wheels.

...

Q: Do you know if the gate hardware that you
were saying was sold under the LiftMaster brand,
do you know whether that’s packaged as part of the
gate operator as opposed to being sold separately?

A: I believe it’s both, depending on the
model. We have lots and lots of models.34

Mr. Tone testified that while “springs, rollers, garage
doors” would not be competitive with opposer’s offerings,
they would typically be sold “through the same dealer
channels that [opposer] use[s].”35
Applicant further argues that homeowners are unaware of
the trademarks used on garage door hardware because garage
door hardware is not marked with the trademarks of their
manufacturer, and homeowners never ask for hardware by brand
name.36 On the other hand, opposer has shown that
homeowners are likely to view garage door hardware as
related to garage door openers. Opposer has submitted
copies from at least a half-dozen “yellow pages” advertising
sections37 that show garage door installers and repair

34 Anderson 12/2/10 Dep., pp. 356, 401.
35 Tone 4/13/06 Dep., p. 36.
36 Applicant’s brief p. 12; Ewasiuk 7/30/10 Dep., p. 59.
37 Excerpts were taken from 7 directories: two from Illinois
(Chicago and S.W. DuPage and Northern Will County), two from
Jackson, Mississippi, one from Phoenix, Arizona, and two from
California (San Diego and the San Fernando Valley).
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
23
servicers typically advertise both garage door openers and
hardware together in the same ad. The ads include the marks
of those manufacturers from whom they purchase garage door
openers, and most of the ads display a LIFTMASTER logo. For
example, Allied Garage Door Repair advertised in the Chicago
April 2010 The Real Yellow Pages directory that they “Repair
& Install Anything To Do With Garage Doors,” under which is
a bulleted listing that includes “broken springs,” “broken
cables,” and “openers.”38 The LIFTMASTER brand appears in
the ad to inform the potential customer that Allied Garage
Door Repair carries LIFTMASTER branded goods. In reading
the ad, a homeowner sees hardware and “openers” sold
together. In addition, opposer submitted copies and current
status information of two registrations showing that GMI
Holdings, Inc. has registered the mark GENIE, based on use
in commerce, for, inter alia, “electric motor powered garage
door operators”39 and for “garage door hardware made
primarily of metal….”40 Copies of use-based, third-party
registrations may serve to suggest that the goods are of a
type which may emanate from a single source. See In re
Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785 (TTAB 1993).

38 Opposer’s notice of reliance filed August 2, 2010; exhibit 1.
39 Reg. No. 612987; registered September 27, 1955; renewed.
40 Reg. No. 2834183; registered April 20, 2004; affidavit under
Section 8 accepted.
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
24
Finally, applicant argues that dealers, distributors
and installers are sophisticated purchasers,41 and in this
regard applicant has offered to amend its identification of
goods to restrict its trade channels to only such customers.
While we agree that professional installers, dealers and
distributors may be more knowledgeable of the products than
retailers or end-users, nothing in the record suggests that
these consumers would not be confused about source upon
encountering garage door openers or garage door hardware
sold under the mark LYNXMASTER or . We have
often noted that even consumers who exercise a higher degree
of care are not necessarily knowledgeable regarding the
trademarks at issue and therefore immune from source
confusion. In re Wilson, 57 USPQ2d 1863, 1865-66 (TTAB
2001); In re Decombe, 9 USPQ2d 1812, 1814-1815 (TTAB 1988)
(“Being knowledgeable and/or sophisticated in a particular
field does not necessarily endow one with knowledge and
sophistication in connection with the use of trademarks.”).
Amendment of the identification of goods to restrict the
trade channels in applicant’s applications would not avoid a
likelihood of confusion because both parties sell directly
to this professional market. See Eurostar Inc. v. “Euro-
Star” Reitmoden GmbH & Co. KG, 34 USPQ2d 1266, 1270 (TTAB

41 Schram 10/27/10 Dep., p. 24.
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
25
1994). Applicant’s motion to amend its identification of
goods is denied.
The facts that the goods are in part identical, travel
through the same trade channels and are purchased by the
same customers weigh strongly in favor of a finding of
likelihood of confusion.
B. The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their
entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and
commercial impression.

We turn now to the du Pont likelihood of confusion
factor focusing on the similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound,
connotation and commercial impression. In re E. I. du Pont
De Nemours & Co., 177 USPQ at 567. In a particular case,
any one of these means of comparison may be critical in
finding the marks to be similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 9
USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6
USPQ2d 1041, 1042 (TTAB 1988). In comparing the marks, we
are mindful that where, as here, the goods are in part
identical, the degree of similarity necessary to find
likelihood of confusion need not be as great as where there
is a recognizable disparity between the goods. Century 21
Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America, 970 F.2d 874,
23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 1034 (1994). See also, Schering-Plough HealthCare
Products Inc. v. Ing-Jing Huang, 84 USPQ2d 1323, 1325 (TTAB
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
26
2007); Jansen Enterprises Inc. v. Rind, 85 USPQ2d 1104, 1108
(TTAB 2007). Finally, we note that the test is not whether
the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-
side comparison, but rather whether the marks are
sufficiently similar in terms of their overall commercial
impression so that confusion as to the source of the goods
offered under the respective marks is likely to result. San
Fernando Electric Mfg. Co. v. JFD Electronics Components
Corp., 565 F.2d 683, 196 USPQ 1, 3 (CCPA 1977); Spoons
Restaurants Inc. v. Morrison Inc., 23 USPQ 1735, 1741 (TTAB
1991), aff’d unpublished, No. 92-1086 (Fed. Cir. June 5,
1992).
In prior Opposition No. 91160673, the Board determined
that there was a likelihood of confusion between applicant’s
mark LYNX MASTER (in standard character form) for “electric
door openers; electric garage door openers; and remote
controls for garage doors,” and opposer’s LIFTMASTER mark.
The Board observed:
In this case, both marks – LIFTMASTER and LYNX
MASTER – consist of compound words with three
syllables having a similar cadence. In addition,
both marks begin with the letter “L” and end in
the word MASTER. This serves to create
similarities in appearance and sound. In terms of
meaning, we recognize that the specific
connotations of the marks LIFTMASTER and LYNX
MASTER are different due to the prefixes LIFT and
LYNX. However, similarity in any one of the
elements of sound, appearance and meaning may be
sufficient to support a finding of likelihood of
confusion. See Block Drug Co. Inc. v. Den-Mat
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
27
Inc., 17 USPQ2d 1315 (TTAB 1980). In this case,
when the marks LIFTMASTER and LYNX MASTER are
considered in their entireties, they are similar
in sound, appearance and commercial impression.
We find therefore that the du Pont factor of the
similarity of the marks favors a finding of
likelihood of confusion.

The Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Lynx Industries, Inc., slip
op. at p. 19, Opp. No. 91160673 (TTAB 12/14/09).
Here, applicant’s marks are LYNXMASTER and .
With respect to the mark LYNXMASTER, we find no meaningful
distinction between the mark portrayed as a single term and
the mark portrayed as two words. Accordingly, our reasoning
in the prior opposition applies equally to the mark
LYNXMASTER in this proceeding. With respect to the compound
word/design mark, applicant argues that the addition of the
cat head design has so modified its mark LYNXMASTER that
there is no longer any basis for a likelihood of confusion
finding. We disagree.
The cat head design, positioned as it is next to the
word LYNXMASTER and being a picture of the face of a lynx,42
visually reinforces the commercial impression of the literal

42 We take judicial notice of the following definition of the term
“lynx” and of the illustration of a lynx found at www.merriam-
webster.com: “any of several wildcats with relatively long legs,
a short stubby tail, mottled coat, and often tufted ears that are
thought to comprise a distinct genus (Lynx) of the cat family….”
The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions,
including online dictionaries which exist in printed format. See
University of Notre Dame du Lac v. J. C. Gourmet Food Imports
Co., Inc., 213 USPQ 594 (TTAB 1982), aff’d 703 F.2d 1372, 217
USPQ 505 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
28
element of the mark. When a mark comprises both a word and
a design, the word is normally accorded greater weight
because it would be used by purchasers to request the goods
or services. See In re Appetito Provisions Co., 3 USPQ2d
1553 (TTAB 1987). Here, the immediate impression of the
design is that of a lynx’s head or face, thereby reinforcing
the impression of the word LYNXMASTER. For these reasons,
we find that the LYNXMASTER literal element is the most
visually prominent portion of applicant’s mark, and
accordingly it is entitled to more weight in our analysis.
Moreover, the marks are similar in their most likely
pronunciation, and the design is not likely to be called by
any word other than “lynx.” Similarity in sound alone may
be sufficient for a finding of likelihood of confusion. See
Krim-Ko Corp. v. The Coca-Cola Co., 390 F.2d 728, 156 USPQ
523 (CCPA 1968); Molenaar Inc. v. Happy Toys Inc., 188 USPQ
469 (TTAB 1975).
It is a well-established principle that, in
articulating reasons for reaching a conclusion on the issue
of likelihood of confusion, there is nothing improper in
stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has
been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the
ultimate conclusion rests on a consideration of the marks in
their entireties. See In re National Data Corp., 753 F.2d
1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
29
We find the marks to be similar, and this factor weighs
in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion.
C. The fame of opposer’s mark LIFTMASTER

Opposer contends that its mark LIFTMASTER is famous.43
Fame, if it exists, plays a dominant role in the likelihood
of confusion analysis because famous marks enjoy a broad
scope of protection or exclusivity of use. A famous mark
has extensive public recognition and renown. Bose Corp. v.
QSC Audio Products Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 63 USPQ2d 1303, 1305
(Fed. Cir. 2002); Recot Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322,
54 USPQ2d 1894, 1897 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Kenner Parker Toys,
Inc. v. Rose Art Industries, Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 22 USPQ2d
1453, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Fame may be measured indirectly by the volume of sales
and advertising expenditures of the goods and services
identified by the marks at issue, “by the length of time
those indicia of commercial awareness have been evident,”
widespread critical assessments and notice by independent
sources of the products identified by the marks, as well as
the general reputation of the products and services. Bose
Corp. v. QSC Audio Products Inc., 63 USPQ2d at 1305-1306 and
1309. Although raw numbers of product sales and advertising
expenses may have sufficed in the past to prove fame of a
mark, raw numbers alone may be misleading. Some context in
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
30
which to place raw statistics may be necessary (e.g., the
substantiality of the sales or advertising figures for
comparable types of products or services). Bose Corp. v.
QSC Audio Products Inc., 63 USPQ2d at 1309.
Opposer started using the mark LIFTMASTER for garage
door openers about 35-40 years ago44 and presently uses the
mark on “residential garage door openers, the access
controls, the gate operators, and commercial door
operators”45 sold through professionally installed dealers.46
Opposer also sells gate hardware packaged as part of the
gate operator.47 Opposer has operated a publically
accessible website, www.LiftMaster.com, since 1995.48 The
website includes a “Dealer Extranet” link that requires
password protection and is only accessible by opposer’s in-
network dealers.49 Dealers also become familiar with
opposer’s LIFTMASTER products at training sessions conducted
at opposer’s Arizona facilities.50 Opposer’s annual sales
of LIFTMASTER branded products for North America and the
yearly amount spent in advertising (designated as
confidential) show that LIFTMASTER brand professionally
installed garage door openers dominate the United States

43 Opposer’s Brief, p. 47.
44 Anderson 7/27/10 Dep., p. 95.
45 Anderson 7/27/10 Dep., p. 96.
46 Anderson 7/27/10 Dep., p. 19.
47 Anderson 12/2/10 Dep., pp. 356, 401.
48 Anderson 7/27/10 Dep., p. 27.
49 Anderson 7/27/10 Dep., p. 31.
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
31
market.51 Ms. Anderson testified to opposer’s market share
for professionally installed garage door openers in the
United States. The exact figure was designated as
confidential; we can say, however, that it is significant.52
Mr. Schram remarked during his discovery deposition that he
“would be somewhat surprised if someone in the garage door
opener industry has never heard of Liftmaster.”53
Opposer advertises across a broad spectrum of media,
including television,54 radio,55 in about twenty different
trade publications56 and in Good Housekeeping Magazine,
which is directed to the general public.57 Opposer
merchandises the LIFTMASTER mark on ancillary products such
as hats, jackets, screwdrivers, box cutters, sunglasses,
visors, golf balls and tees.58 For the past 15 years,
opposer has used the tagline: “World’s #1 Professionally
Installed Garage Door Opener” in its advertising for the
LIFTMASTER garage door opener.59 Opposer has provided
millions of dollars of co-op advertising funds over a ten-
year period to its dealers to advertise the LIFTMASTER

50 Watkins 8/2/10 Dep., p. 19, 26-28; Ex. 4.
51 Anderson 7/27/10 Dep., pp. 144, 215.
52 Anderson 7/27/10 Dep., p. 184.
53 Schram 1/21/10 Discovery Dep., p. 16.
54 The LIFTMASTER brand has been advertised in TV ads since 1995.
Anderson 12/6/05 Dep., p. 80.
55 The LIFTMASTER brand has been advertised on the radio since
1997. Anderson 12/6/05 Dep., p 90.
56 Anderson 7/27/10 Dep., p. 118-119.
57 Anderson 12/6/05 Dep., p. 70-71.
58 Anderson 7/27/10 Dep., p. 103.
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
32
brand.60 Opposer’s dealers, in such co-op advertising,
promote the repair and installation of garage door openers
as well as the repair of hardware such as springs and cables
under the mark LIFTMASTER.61 Finally, independent sources
have referred to the LIFTMASTER brand in various media, such
as in a 2002 radio interview wherein Ms. Anderson was
interviewed by a radio personality62 and in a Jay Leno
television segment on installing a garage door opener that
featured a LIFTMASTER garage door opener.63
This record shows that the mark LIFTMASTER is well-
recognized by dealers, distributors and installers of
residential garage door openers and access controls. With
respect to the homeowners who are the ultimate consumers of
residential garage door openers, however, a survey (which
has been designated confidential) conducted in 2010 found
that unaided brand awareness of the mark LIFTMASTER was only
in the single digits.64 This direct evidence undercuts
opposer’s claim that the LIFTMASTER mark is famous among
end-users, but overall, the record shows that the mark is
commercially strong among end-users.
The mark’s fame among dealers, distributors and
installers of garage door openers and the strong commercial

59 Anderson 7/27/10 Dep., p. 193.
60 Anderson 12/6/05 Dep., p. 52, 99-100 and 110.
61 Anderson 7/27/10 Dep., p 193, Ex. SA-39.
62 Anderson 7/27/10 Dep., p. 134.
63 Anderson 7/27/10 Dep., p. 138.
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
33
awareness among consumers weighs strongly in favor of a
finding of likelihood of confusion.
D. Third-party use of similar marks; cancellations,
oppositions and settlements entered into by opposer

Applicant has submitted copies of 22 third-party
registrations for marks ending in the suffix “-master.”65
Applicant argues that these show that “-master” is a
laudatory term that describes how the products or services
being offered are the best in the market.66
While third-party registrations are entitled to little
weight in the absence of evidence of actual use, they may be
relied on to show that a word common to each mark has a
readily understood and well-known meaning and that it has
been adopted by third parties to express that meaning. Ritz
Hotel Ltd. V. Ritz Closet Seat Corp., 17 USPQ2d 1466, 1470
n. 10 (TTAB 1990). In this case, nothing in the record
confirms the meaning of the term proposed by applicant (as
the “best in the market”) to the exclusion of other
meanings, such as that found, among others, in an online
dictionary: “a device or mechanism that controls the
operation of another mechanism.”67 In connection with the
goods of the third-party registrations, e.g., garage doors,
door openers, and lift equipment, the latter definition

64 Anderson 12/2/10 Dep., p. 377.
65 Applicant’s notice of reliance filed October 29, 2010.
66 Applicant’s brief, p. 5.
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
34
appears equally, if not more, plausible. As such, the
LIFTMASTER mark would be considered suggestive of a device
such as a garage door opener that controls a garage door.
Applicant has also submitted copies of third-party
brochures, accessed through the Internet, showing third-
party uses of marks that include the term “-master” for
garage doors, roll-up doors, door openers, and related
goods.68 Applicant argues that because of the wide-spread
use of “-master” suffix marks in the industry, consumers
have become conditioned to distinguish between marks
containing the term “master” on the basis of the other
elements in the marks. See Palm Bay Imports, 73 USPQ2d at
1694.
Mr. Schram identified these brochures and testified
that he was familiar with the sale of garage door openers
under the mark TORQUEMASTER,69 as well as use by the Hormann
Company of the marks SPEED-MASTER, STEELMASTER, SCREEN
MASTER, and FLEX-MASTER for rolling doors, screen doors and
steel garage doors.70 Mr. Schram further testified that the
mark REDI-MASTER is in use in connection with a rolling door

67 From www/merriam-webster.com; accessed May 1, 2012.
68 Schram 10/27/10 Dep., pp. 20-49.
69 Schram 10/27/10 Dep., p. 81.
70 Schram 10/27/10 Dep., p. 34; Ex. 8.
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
35
opener71 and the mark HURRICANE MASTER is in use in
connection with wind-resistant garage doors.72
The probative value of third-party trademarks depends
entirely upon their usage. Olde Tyme Foods Inc. v. Roundy’s
Inc., 961 F.2d 200, 22 USPQ2d 1542, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
see also, Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imports, Ltd., 544
F.2d 1167, 192 USPQ 289, 294 (2d Cir. 1976). There is no
information as to the extent of use of any of the third-
party marks and nothing in the record to indicate how
familiar the marks are to relevant customers. The on-line
brochures have been considered for whatever probative value
they may have, but the record is insufficient to show that
marks containing “-master” suffixes have become so prevalent
in this field that potential consumers look to other indicia
to distinguish between such marks overall.
Additionally, applicant has submitted excerpts from the
file histories of prior cancellation and opposition
proceedings in which opposer has been involved,73 and we
have considered the confidential settlement agreements
attached as exhibits to the January 29, 2010 discovery
deposition of Mark Tone. Applicant argues that these show
opposer’s inconsistent enforcement efforts and acquiescence
in use of marks containing the term “master.” Much of the

71 Schram 10/27/10 Dep., p. 37; Ex. 10.
72 Schram 10/27/10 Dep., p. 38; Ex. 11.
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
36
salient data regarding such enforcement efforts and the
settlement agreements themselves are appropriately
designated as confidential. Suffice it to say, however,
that none of the actions taken by opposer in the prior
circumstances compels us to conclude that opposer has failed
to police its marks or allowed the strength of its
LIFTMASTER mark to become weak as a whole.
Applicant’s evidence of third-party registrations and
use as well as the evidence regarding opposer’s prior
dealings with third parties does not demonstrate that the
public has been “conditioned” to look to the LYNX- and LIFT-
elements of the parties’ marks in comparing them as a whole.
This duPont factor is neutral.
E. Balancing the factors.
Opposer’s mark LIFTMASTER is famous among professional
dealers, distributors and installers of garage door openers.
It is commercially strong among homeowners who have
installed such openers in their garages. Applicant’s marks
are similar to opposer’s LIFTMASTER and LIFT-MASTER marks,
and the goods are in part identical and in part
complementary. They are sold to the same classes of
consumers through the same trade channels. Accordingly, we
find that applicant’s registration of the marks LYNXMASTER

73 Applicant’s notices of reliance filed 10/29/10 and 11/4/10.
Opposition Nos. 91174249, 91175332, and 91185559
37
and for metal garage door hardware and “electric
door openers, electric garage door openers and remote
controls for electric garage door openers,” is likely to
cause confusion with opposer’s marks LIFTMASTER and LIFT-
MASTER.
Decision: The consolidated opposition is sustained
under Trademark Act Section 2(d) and registration to
applicant is refused in each instance. Inasmuch as we have
found a likelihood of confusion and refused registration
under Section 2(d), we need not reach opposer’s alternative
ground of dilution under Trademark Act Section 43(c), 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c).